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By John Holland Rose, Litt.D. 



The Personality of Napoleon 

(The Lowell Lectures, 1912) 

The Development of the European Nations 
1870-1914 

Origins of the War 

Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era 



THE DEVELOPMENT 



OF THE 



EUROPEAN NATIONS 

• 1870-1921. 

BY 

JJ^'^HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D. 

' FELLOW OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 

AUTHOR OF "the LIFE OF NAPOLEON," "THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PITT," 
" THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR," ETC. 

"Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas." — Vibgil. 



SIXTH EDITION, CARRYING THREE SUPPLEMENTARY 

CHAPTERS BY THE AUTHOR, AND AN APPENDIX 

PREPARED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE 

AUTHOR, BY WILLIAM L. MCPHERSON 



TWO VOLUMES IN ONE 



G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

NEW YORK AND LONDON 

Cbe Iknicftecbocher press 



% 






Copyright, 190S 

BY 

J. HOLLAND ROSE 
Copyright, 1916 

BY 

J. HOLLAND ROSE 
Copyright, 1922 

BY 

J, HOLLAND ROSE 
Made in the United States of America 



Ube 1kn{cI:erbocf!er press, l^ew ISorfi 

©aA674222 

I' 
M^v 72 1922 



TO 

MY WIFE 

WITHOUT WHOSE HELP 

THIS WORK 

COULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED 



PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION 

Iv this Edition are included three new chapters, in 
which I seek to describe the most important and best- 
ascertained facts of the period 1900-14. Necessarily, the 
narrative is tentative at many points; and it is impossible 
to attain impartiality; but I have sought to view events 
from the German as well as the British standpoint, and to 
sum up the evidence fairly. The addition of these chapters 
has necessitated the omission of the former Epilogue and 
Appendices. I regret the sacrifice of the Epilogue, for it 
emphasised two important considerations, (i) the tendency 
of British foreign xx)lic}^ towards undue complaisance, which 
b}' other Powers is often interpreted as weakness; (2) the 
danger arising from the keen competition in armaments. 
No one can review recent events without perceiving the 
significance of these considerations. Perhaps they may 
prove to be among the chief catLses producing the terrible 
finale of July-August 1 9 1 4 . I desire to express my acknow- 
ledgments and thanks for valuable advice given by Mr. J. 
W. Headlam, M.A., Mr. A. B. Hinds, M.A., and Dr. R. W 
Seton- Watson, D.Litt. 

J. H. R 

Camebidge, 
September 5, 191,5. 



PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION 

The outbreak of war in Europe is an event too momentous 
to be treated fully in this Preface. But I may point out that 
the catastrophe resulted from the two causes of unrest de- 
scribed in this volume, namely, the Alsace-Lorraine Question 
and the Eastern Question. Those disputes have dragged 
on without any attempt at settlement by the Great Powers. 
The Zabern incident inflamed public opinion in Alsace-Lor- 
raine, and illustrated the overbearing demeanour of the 
German military caste; while the insidious attempts of 
Austria in 191 3 to incite Bulgaria against Servia marked out 
the Hapsburg Empire as the chief enemy of the Slav peoples 
of the Balkan Peninsula after the collapse of Turkish power 
in 191 2. The internal troubles of the United Kingdom, 
France, and Russia in July, 1914, furnished the opportunity 
so long sought by the forward party at Berlin and Vienna; 
and the Austro-German Alliance, which, in its origin, was 
defensive (as I have shown in this volume) , became offensive, 
Italy parting from her allies when she discovered their 
designs. Drawn into the Triple Alliance solely by pique 
against France after the Tunis affair, she now inclines 
towards the Anglo-French connection. 

Readers of my chapter on the Eastern Question will not 
fail to see how the neglect of the Balkan peoples by the 
Great Powers has left that wound festering in the weak side 
of Europe; and they will surmise that the Balkan troubles 
have, by a natural Nemesis, played their part in bringing 



viii The European Nations 

about the European War. It is for students of modern 
Europe to seek to form a healthy public opinion so that 
the errors of the past may not be repeated, and that the new 
Europe shall be constituted in conformity with the aspi- 
rations of the peoples themselves. 

Cambridge, 
September 25, 1914. 



PREFACE 

THE line of Virgil quoted on the title-page represents in 
the present case a sigh of aspiration, not a paean of 
achievement. No historical student, surely, can ever feel 
the conviction- that he has fathomed the depths of that 
well where Truth is said to lie hid. What, then, must be 
the feelings of one who ventures into the mazy domain of 
recent annals, and essays to pick his way through thickets 
all but untrodden ? More than once I have been tempted 
to give up the quest and turn aside to paths where pioneers 
have cleared the way. There, at least, the whereabouts 
of that fabulous well is known and the plummet is ready to 
hand. Nevertheless, I resolved -to struggle through with 
my task, in the consciousness that the work of a pioneer 
may be helpful, provided that he carefully notches the 
track and thereby enables those who come after him to 
know what to seek and what to avoid. 

After all, there is no lack of guides in the present age. 
The number of memoir-writers and newspaper correspond- 
ents is legion; and I have come to believe that they are 
fully as trustworthy as similar witnesses have been in any 
age. The very keenness of their rivalry is some guarantee 
for truth. Doubtless competition for good "copy" occa- 
sionally leads to artful embroidering on humdrum actu- 
ality, but, after spending much time in scanning similar 
embroidery in the literature of the Napoleonic era, I un- 



X Preface 

hesitatingly place the work of Archibald Forbes, and that 
of several knights of the pen still living, far above the 
delusive tinsel of Marbot, Thiebault, and Segur, I will 
go farther and say that, if we could find out what were the 
sources used by Thucydides, we should notice qualms of 
misgiving shoot through the circles of scientific historians 
as they contemplated his majestic work. In any case, I 
may appeal to the example of the great Athenian in sup- 
port of the thesis that to undertake to write contemporary 
history is no vain thing. 

Above and beyond the accounts of memoir-writers and 
newspaper correspondents there are Blue Books. I am 
well aware that they do not always contain the whole 
truth. Sometimes the most important items are of neces- 
sity omitted. But the information which they contain is 
enormous ; and, seeing that the rules of the public service 
keep the original records in Great Britain closed for well- 
nigh a century, only the most fastidious can object to the 
use of the wealth of materials given to the world in Par- 
liamentary Papers. 

Besides these published sources there is the fund of 
information possessed by public men and the "well- 
informed" of various grades. Unfortunately this is rarely 
accessible, or only under conventional restrictions. Here 
and there I have been able to make use of it without any 
breach of trust; and to those who have enlightened my 
darkness I am very grateful. The illumination, I know, 
is only partial; but I hope that its effect, in respect to the 
twilight of diplomacy, may be compared to that of the 
Aurora Borealis lights. 

After working at my subject for some time, I found it 
desirable to limit it to events which had a distinctly 



Preface xi 

formative influence on the development of European 
States. On questions of motive and policy I have gener- 
ally refrained from expressing a decided verdict, seeing 
that these are always the most difficult to probe; and 
facile dogmatism on them is better fitted to omniscient 
leaderettes than to the pages of an historical work. At 
the same time, I have not hesitated to pronounce a judg- 
ment on these questions, and to differ from other writers, 
where the evidence has seemed to me decisive. To quote 
one instance, I reject the verdict of most authorities on 
the question of Bismarck's treatment of the Ems telegram, 
and of its effect in the negotiations with France in July, 
1870. 

For the most part, however, I have dealt only with ex- 
ternal events, pointing out now and again the part which 
they have played in the great drama of human action still 
going on around us. This limitation of aim has enabled 
me to take only specific topics, and to treat them far more 
fully than is done in the brief chronicle of facts presented 
by MM. Lavisse and Rambaud in the concluding volume 
of their Histoire Generate. Where a series of events began 
in the year 1899 or 1900, and did not conclude before the 
time with which this narrative closes, I have left it on one 
side. Obviously the Boer War falls under this head. 
Owing to lack of space my references to the domestic con- 
cerns of the United Kingdom have been brief. I have 
regretfully omitted one imperial event of great importance, 
the formation of the Australian Commonwealth. After 
all, that concerned only the British race; and in my survey 
of the affairs of the Empire I have treated only those which 
directly affected other nations as well, namely the Afghan 
and Egyptian questions and the Partition of Africa. Here 



Xll 



Preface 



I have sought to show the connection with "world poli- 
tics," and I trust that even specialists will find something 
new and suggestive in this method of treatment. 

In attempting to write a history of contemporary affairs, 
I regard it as essential to refer to the original authority, or 
authorities, in the case of every important statement. I 
have sought to carry out this rule (though at the cost of 
great additional toil) because it enables the reader to 
check the accuracy of the narrative and to gain hints for 
further reading. To compile bibliographies, where many 
new books are coming out every year, is a useless task ; 
but exact references to the sources of information never 
lose their value. 

My thanks are due to many who have helped me in this 
undertaking. Among them I may name Sir Charles Dilke, 
M.P., Mr. James Bryce, M.P., and Mr. Chedo Mijatovich, 
who have given me valuable advice on special topics. My 
obligations are also due to a subject of the Czar, who has 
placed his knowledge at my service, but for obvious reasons 
does not wish his name to be known. Mr. Bernard Pares, 
M.A., of the University of Liverpool, has very kindly read 
,over the proofs of the early chapters, and has offered 
most helpful suggestions. Messrs. G. Bell & Sons have 
granted me permission to make use of the plans of the 
chief battles of the Franco-German War from Mr. Hooper's 
work, Sedan and the Downfall of the Second Empire, pub- 
lished by them. To Mr. H. W. Wilson, author of Iron- 
clads in Action, my thanks are also due for permission to 
make use of the plan illustrating the fighting at Alexandria 

in 1882. 

J. H. R. 
July, 1905. 



CONTEXTS 
PART I 

PAGE 

Introduction' ....... i 

CHAPTER I 
The Cause5 of the Franxo-Germax War . . 28 

CHAPTER II 
From Worth to Gravelotte .... 58 

CHAPTER III 
Sedan ........ 85 

CHAPTER IV 
The Founding of the French Republic . . 109 

CHAPTER V 

The Founding of the French Republic — continued 135 

CHAPTER VI 
The German Empire . . . . . .153 



xiv Contents 

PAGE 

CHAPTER VII 
The Eastern Question 184 

CHAPTER VIII 
The Russo-Turkish War ..... 225 

CHAPTER IX 
The Balkan Settlement . . . , • , 264 

CHAPTER X 
The Making of Bulgaria ..... 299 

CHAPTER XI 
Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia . , . 344 

PART II 

CHAPTER I 
The Triple and Dual Alliances . , . I 

CHAPTER II 
The Central Asian Question . . . .44 

CHAPTER III 
The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns . . 92 



Contents xv 



PAGE 



CHAPTER IV 
Britain in Egypt ...... 143 

CHAPTER V 
Gordon and the Sudan . . . . .171 

CHAPTER VI 
The Conquest of the Sudan . . . .199 

CHAPTER VII 
The Partition of Africa . . . . . 228 

CHAPTER VIII 
The Congo Free State . . . . . 269 

CHAPTER IX 
Russia in the Far East ..... 299 

CHAPTER X 

The New Grouping of the Great Powers (1900- 

1907) . • • • . . . .320 

CHAPTER XI 
Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) .... 351 

CHAPTER XII 
The Crisis of 1914 ...... 376 



xvi Contents 

APPENDIX 

PAGE 

CHAPTER I 
The War and the Treaties .... 399 

CHAPTER II 
Europe after the Peace ..... 420 

Index 435 



MAPS AND PLANS 



PART I 



Sketch Map of the District between Metz and 
THE Rhine . . . . . . . 

Plan of the Battles of Rezonville and Grave- 
lotte ........ 



63 



81 
231 
253 



Map of Bulgaria 

Plan of Plevna ...... 

Map of the Treaties of Berlin and Stefano 285 
Map of Thessaly 296 



PART II 

Map of Afghanistan . . 
Battle of Maiwand ..... 
Battle of Alexandria (Bombardment of, 1882) 
Map of the Nile ..... 

The Battle of Omdurman .... 
Plan of Khartum ..... 
Map Showing the Partition of Africa 



71 

no 
161 
192 
213 

218 
At end 



xvu 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE EUROPEAN NATIONS 



INTRODUCTIOX 

"The movements in the masses of European peoples are divided 
and slow, and their progress interrupted and impeded, bec^,use they 
are such great and tmequally formed masses; but the preparation 
for the future is widely diffused, and . . . the promises of the 
age are so great that even the most faint-hearted rouse themselves 
to the belief that a time has arrived in which it is a privilege to 
live." — Gervixus, 1853. 

THE Roman poet Lucretius in an oft-quoted passage 
describes the satisfaction that naturally fills the mind 
when from some safe vantage-ground one looks forth on 
travellers tossed about on the stormy deep. We may per- 
haps use the poet's not ver\' altruistic words as symbolising 
many of the feelings with which, at the dawn of the twen- 
tieth centur\', we look back over the stormy waters of 
the century that has passed away. Some congrattdation 
on this score is justifiable, especially as those wars and 
revolutions have ser\-ed to build up States that are far 
stronger than their predecessors, in proportion as they 
correspond more nearly with the desires of the nations that 
compose them. 

As we gaze at the revolutions and wars that form the 
storm-centres of the past centiirv', we can now see some of 

VOL. I. 1. 



2 The European Nations 

the causes that brought about those storms. If we survey 
them with discerning eye, we soon begin to see that, in the 
main, the cyclonic disturbances had their origins in two 
great natural imxpulses of the civilised races of mankind. 
The first of these forces is that great impulse towards indi- 
vidual liberty, which we name Democracy; the second is 
chat impulse, scarcely less mighty and elemental, that 
prompts men to effect a close union with their kith and 
kin; this we may term Nationality. 

Now, it is true that these two forces have not led up to 
the last and crowning phase of human , development, as 
their enthusiastic champions at one time asserted that they 
would; far from that, they are accountable, especially so 
the force of Nationality, for numerous defects in the life of 
the several peoples; and the national principle is at this 
very time producing great and needless friction in the deal- 
ings of nations. Yet, granting all this, it still remains 
true th-at Democracy and Nationality have been the two 
chief formative influences in the political development of 
Europe during the nineteenth century. 

In no age of the world's history have these two impulses 
worked with so triumphant an activity. They have not 
always been endowed with living force. Among many 
peoples they lay dormant for ages and were only called to 
life by some great event, such as the intolerable oppression 
of a despot or of a governing caste that crushed the liberties 
of the individual, or the domination of an alien people over 
one that obstinately refused to be assimilated. Some- 
times the spark that kindled vital consciousness was the 
flash of a poet's genius, or the heroism of some sturdy son 
of the soil. The causes of awakening have been infinitely 
various, and have never wholly died away; but it is the 



Introduction 3 

special glory of the nineteenth century that races which 
had hitherto lain helpless and well-nigh dead rose to man- 
hood as if by magic, and shed their blood like water in the 
effort to secure a free and unfettered existence both for the 
individual and the nation. It is a true saying of the Ger- 
man historian, Gervinus, "The history of this age will no 
longer be only a relation of the lives of great men and of 
princes, but a biography of nations." 

At first sight, this illuminating statement seems to leave 
out of count the career of the mighty Napoleon. But it 
does not. The great Emperor unconsciously called into 
vigorous life the forces of Democracy and Nationality both 
in Germany and in Italy where there had been naught but 
servility and disunion. His career, if viewed from our pres- 
ent standpoint, falls into two portions: first, that in which 
he figured as the champion of Revolutionary France and 
the liberator of Italy from foreign and domestic tyrants ; 
and, secondly, as the imperial autocrat who conquered 
and held down a great part of Europe in his attempt to 
ruin British commerce. In the former of these enterprises 
he had the new forces of the age acting with him and en- 
dowing him with seemingly resistless might; in the latter 
part of his life he mistook his place in the economy of 
Nature, and by his violation of the principles of individual 
liberty and racial kinship in Spain and Central Europe, 
assured his own downfall. 

The greatest battle of the century was the tremendous 
strife that for three days surged to and fro around Leipzig 
in the month of October, 1813, when Russians, Prussians, 
Austrians, Swedes, together with a few Britons, Hanover- 
ians, and finally his own Saxon allies, combined to shake 
the imperial yoke from the neck of the Germanic peoples. 



4 The European Nations 

This Volkerschlacht (Battle of the Peoples) , as the Germans 
term it, decided that the future of Europe was not to be 
moulded by the imperial autocrat, but by the will of the 
princes and nations whom his obstinacy had embattled 
against him. Far from recognising the verdict, the great 
man struggled on until the pertinacity of the allies finally 
drove him from power and assigned to France practically 
the same boundaries that she had had in 1791, before the 
time of her mighty expansion. That is to say, the nation 
which in its purely democratic form had easily overrun 
and subdued the neighbouring States in the time of their 
old, inert, semi-feudal existence, was overthrown by them 
when their national consciousness had been trampled into 
being by the legions of the great Emperor. 

In 1814, and again after Waterloo, France was driven in 
on herself, and resumed something like her old position in 
Europe, save that the throne of the Bourbons never ac- 
quired any solidity — the older branch of that family being 
unseated by the Revolution of 1830. In the centre of the 
Continent, the old dynasties had made common cause with 
the peoples in the national struggles of 1813-14, and there- 
fore enjoyed more consideration — a -fact which enabled 
them for a time to repress popular aspirations for con- 
stitutional rule and national unity. 

Nevertheless, by the Treaties of Vienna (181 4- 15) the 
centre of Europe was more solidly organised than ever 
before. In place of the effete institution known as the 
Holy Roman Empire, which Napoleon swept away in 1806, 
the Central States were reorganised in the German Con- 
federation — a cumbrous and ineffective league in which 
Austria held the presidency. Austria also gained Venetia 
and Lombardy in Italy. The acquisition of the fertile 



Introduction 5 

Rhine Province by Prussia brought that vigorous State up 
to the bounds of Lorraine and made her the natural pro- 
tectress of Germany against France. Russia acquired 
complete control over nearly the whole of the former king- 
dom of Poland. Thus, the Powers that had been foremost 
in the struggle against Napoleon now gained most largely 
in the redistribution of lands in i8 14-15, while the States 
that had been friendly to him now suffered for their devo- 
tion. Italy was split up into a mosaic of States; Saxony 
ceded nearly the half of her lands to Prussia; Denmark 
yielded up her ancient possession, Norway, to the Swedish 
Crown. 

In some respects the triiimph of the national principle, 
which had brought victory to the old dynasties, strength- 
ened the European fabric. The Treaties of Vienna brought 
the boundaries of States more nearly into accord with 
racial interests and sentiments than had been the case 
before ; but in several instances those interests and feelings 
were chafed or violated by designing or short-sighted 
statesmen. The Germans, who had longed for an effective 
national union, saw with indignation that the constitution 
of the new Germanic Confederation left them under the 
control of the rulers of the component States and of the 
ver\' real headship exercised by Austria, which was always 
used to repress popular movements. The Italians, who 
had also learned from Napoleon the secret that they were 
in all essentials a nation, deeply resented the domination 
of Austria in Lombardy-Venetia and the parcelling out 
of the rest of the peninsula between reactionar}^ kings, 
somnolent dukes, and obscurantist cle^g^^ The Belgians 
likewise protested against the enforced union with Hol- 
land in what was then called the Kingdom of the United 



6 The European Nations 

Netherlands (1815-30). In the east of Europe the Poles 
struggled in vain against the fate which once more parti- 
tioned them between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The 
Germans of Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg submitted 
uneasily to the Danish rule; and only under the stress of 
demonstrations by the allies did the Norwegians accept 
the union with Sweden. 

It should be carefully noted that these were the very 
cases which caused most of the political troubles in the 
following period. In fact, most of the political occurrences 
on the Continent in the years 181 5 to 1870 — the revolts, 
revolutions, and wars, that give a special character to the 
history of the century — resulted directly from the bad or 
imperfect arrangements of the Congress of Vienna and of 
the so-called Holy Alliance of the monarchs who sought to 
perpetuate them. The effect of this widespread discontent 
was not felt at once. The peoples were too exhausted by 
the terrific strain of the Napoleonic wars to do much for a 
generation or more, save in times of popular excitement. 
Except in the south-east of Europe, where Greece, with the 
aid of Russia, Britain, and France, wrested her political 
independence from the grasp of the Sultan (1827), the 
forty years that succeeded Waterloo were broken by no 
important war; but they were marked by oft-recurring 
unrest and sedition. Thus, when the French Revolution 
of 1830 overthrew the reactionary dynasty of the elder 
Bourbons, the universal excitement caused by this event 
endowed the Belgians with strength sufificient to shake off 
the heavy yoke of the Dutch; while in Italy, Germany, 
and Poland the democrats and nationalists (now working 
generally in accord) made valiant but unsuccessful efforts 
to achieve their ideals. 



Introduction 7 

The same was the case in 1848. The excitement, which 
this time originated in Italy, spread to France, overthrew 
the throne of Louis PhiHppe (of the younger branch of the 
French Bourbons), and bade fair to roll half of the crowns 
of Europe into the gutter. But these spasmodic efforts of 
the democrats speedily failed. Inexperience, disunion, and 
jealousy paralysed their actions and yielded the victory to 
the old Governments. Frenchmen, in dismay at the seem- 
ing approach of communism and anarchy, fell back upon 
the odd expedient of a Napoleonic Republic, which in 
1852 was easily changed by Louis Napoleon into an Em- 
pire modelled on that of his far greater uncle. The demo- 
crats of Germany achieved some startling successes over 
their repressive Governments in the spring of the year 
1848, only to find that they could not devise a working 
constitution for the Fatherland ; and the deputies who met 
at the federal capital, Frankfurt, to unify Germany "by 
speechifying and majorities," saw power slip back little by 
little into the hands of the monarchs and princes. In the 
Austrian Empire nationalist claims and strivings led to a 
very Babel of discordant talk and action, amidst which the 
young Hapsburg ruler, Francis Joseph, thanks to Russian 
military aid, was able to triumph over the valour of the 
Hungarians and the devotion of their champion, Kossuth. 

In Italy the same sad tale was told. In the spring of 
that year of revolutions, 1848, the rulers in quick succes- 
sion granted constitutions to their subjects. The reform- 
ing Pope, Pius IX., and the patriotic King of Sardinia, 
Charles Albert, also made common cause with their peoples 
in the effort to drive out the Austrians from Lombardy- 
Venetia; but the Pope and all the potentates except 
Charles Albert speedily deserted the popular cause ; friction 



8 The European Nations 

between the King and the repubHcan leaders, Mazzini 
and Garibaldi, further weakened the nationalists, and the 
Austrians had little difficidty in crushing Charles Albert's 
forces, whereupon he abdicated in favour of his son, Victor 
Emmanuel II. (1849). The Republics set up at Rome and 
Venice struggled valiantly for a time against great odds, 
Mazzini, Garibaldi, and their volunteers being finally over- 
borne at the Eternal City by the French troops whom 
Louis Napoleon sent to restore the Pope (June, 1849); 
while, two months later, Venice surrendered to the Aus- 
trians whom she had long held at bay. The Queen of the 
Adriatic under the inspiring dictatorship of Manin had 
given a remarkable example of orderly constitutional gov- 
ernment in time of siege. 

It seemed to be the lot of the nationalists and democrats 
to produce leaders who could thrill the imagination of men 
by lofty teachings and sublime heroism; who could, in a 
word, achieve everything but success. A poetess, who 
looked forth from Casa Guidi windows upon the tragi- 
comedy of Florentine failure in those years, wrote that 
what was needed was a firmer union, a more practical and 
intelligent activity, on the part both of the people and of 
the future leader: 

A land's brotherhood 
Is most puissant: men, upon the whole, 

Are what they can be, — nations, what they would. 

Will therefore to be strong, thou Italy! 

Will to be noble ! Austrian Metternich 
Can fix no yoke unless the neck agree. 

Whatever hand shall grasp this oriflamme, 
Whatever man (last peasant or first Pope 

Seeking to free his country) shall appear. 
Teach, lead, strike fire into the masses, fill 



Introduction 9 

These empty bladders with fine air, insphere 
These wills into a unity of will, 

And make of Italy a nation — dear 
And blessed be that man! 

When Elizabeth Barrett Browning penned those Hnes 
she cannot have surmised that two men were working their 
way up the rungs of the political ladder in Piedmont and 
Prussia, whose keen intellects and masterful wills were to 
weld their Fatherlands into indissoluble union within the 
space of one momentous decade. These men were Cavour 
and Bismarck. 

It would far exceed the limits of space of this brief In- 
troduction to tell, except in the briefest outline, the story 
of the plodding preparation and far-seeing diplomacy by 
which these statesmen raised their respective countries 
from depths of humiliation to undreamt-of heights of 
triumph. The first thing was to restore the prestige of 
their States. No people can be strong in action that has 
lost belief in its own powers and has allowed its neighbours 
openly to flout it. The history of the world has shown 
again and again that politicians who allow their country 
to be regarded as une quaniite negligeable bequeath to some 
able successor a heritage of struggle and war — struggle for 
the nation to recover its self-respect, and war to regain 
consideration and fair treatment from others. However 
much frothy talkers in their clubs may decry the claims of 
national prestige, no great statesman has ever underrated 
their importance. Certainly the first aim both of Cavour 
and Bismarck was to restore self-respect and confidence to 
their States after the humiliations and the dreary isolation 
of those dark years, 1848-51. We will glance, first, at the 
resurrection (risorgimento) of the little Kingdom of Sar- 
dinia, which was destined to unify Italy. 



^ 



0> 



L/ 



lo The European Nations 

Charles Albert's abdication immediately after his defeat 
by the Austrians left no alternative to his son and successor, 
Victor Emmanuel II., but that of signing a disastrous peace 
with Austria. In a short time the stout-hearted young 
King called to his councils Count Cavour, the second son 
of a noble Piedmontese family, but of firmly Liberal prin- 
ciples, who resolved to make the little kingdom the centre 
of enlightenment and hope for despairing Italy. He 
strengthened the constitution (the only one out of many 
granted in 1848 that survived the time of reaction); he 
reformed the tariff in the direction of Free Trade; and 
during the course of the Crimean War he persuaded his 
sovereign to make an active alliance with France and 
England, so as to bind them by all the claims of honour 
to help Sardinia in the future against Austria. The occa- 
sion was most opportune; for Austria was then suspected 
and disliked both by Russia and the Western Powers owing 
to her policy of armed neutrality. Nevertheless the re- 
ward of Cavour's diplomacy came slowly and incompletely. 
By skilfully vague promises (never reduced to writing) 
Cavour induced Napoleon III. to take up arms against 
Austria; but, after the great victory of Solferino (June 24, 
1859), the French Emperor enraged the Italians by break- 
ing off the struggle before the allies recovered the great 
province of Venetia, which he had pledged himself to do. 
Worse still, he required the cession of Savoy and Nice to 
France, if the Central Duchies and the northern part of the 
Papal States joined the Kingdom of Sardinia, as they now 
did. Thus, the net result of Napoleon's intervention in 
Italy was his acquisition of Savoy and'Nice (at the price of 
Italian hatred) , and the gain of Lombardy and the central 
districts for the national cause (1859-60). 



Introduction 1 1 

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12 The European Nations 

of the north. Victor Emmanuel came in as the deus ex 
machina; his troops pressed southwards, occupying the 
eastern part of the Papal States in their march, and joined 
hands with the Garibaldians to the north of Naples, thus 
preventing the collision with France which the irregulars 
would have brought about. Even as it was, Cavour had 
hard work to persuade Napoleon that this was the only way 
of curbing Garibaldi and preventing the erection of a South 
Italian Republic; but finally the French Emperor looked 
on uneasily while the Pope's eastern territories were vio- 
lated, and while the cause of Italian Unity was assured at 
the expense of the Pontiff whom France was officially sup- 
porting in Rome. A plebiscite, or mass vote, of the people 
of Sicily, South Italy, and the eastern and central parts of 
the Papal States, was resorted to by Cavour in order to 
throw a cloak of legality over these irregular proceedings. 
The device pleased Napoleon, and it resulted in an over- 
whelming vote in favour of annexation to Victor Emman- 
uel's kingdom. Thus, in March, 1861, the soldier-king was 
able amidst universal acclaim to take the title of King of 
Italy. Florence was declared to be the capital of the new 
realm, which embraced all parts of Italy except the pro- 
vince of Venetia, pertaining to Austria, and the "Patri- 
monium Petri," that is, Rome and its vicinity, still held by 
the Pope and garrisoned by the French. The former of 
these was to be regained for la patria in 1866, the latter in 
1870, in consequence of the mighty triumphs then achieved 
by the principle of nationality in Prussia and Germany. 
To these triumphs we must now briefly advert. 

No one who looked at the state of European politics in 
1 86 1 could have imagined that in less than ten years Prussia 
would have waged three wars and humbled the might of 



Introduction 13 

Austria and France. At that time she showed no signs of 
exceptional vigour; she had as yet produced no leaders so 
inspiring as Mazzini and Garibaldi, no statesman so able as 
Cavour. Her new king, WiUiam, far from arousing the 
feelings of growing enthusiasm that centred in Victor 
Emmanuel, was more and more distrusted and disliked by 
Liberals for the policy of militarism on which he had just 
embarked. In fact, the Hohenzollem dA^nasty was passing 
into a "conflict time" with its Parliament which threat- 
ened to impair the influence of Prussia abroad and to retard 
her recover}' from the period of humiliations through which 
she had recently passed. 

A brief recital of those htmailiations is desirable as show- 
ing, firstly, the suddenness with which the affairs of a nation 
may go to ruin in slack and iinskilftil hands, and, secondly, 
the immense results that can be achieved in a few years by 
a small band of able men who throw their whole heart into 
the work of national regeneration. 

The previous ruler, Frederick William IV., was a gifted 
and learned man, but he lacked soundness of judgment 
and strength of will — qualities which are of more worth in 
governing than graces of the intellect. At the time of the 
revolutionary," outbreaks of 1848 he capitulated to the Ber- 
lin mob and declared for a constitutional regime in which 
Prussia should merge herself in Germany; but when the 
excesses of the democrats had weakened their authority, 
he put them down by militars" force, refused the German 
Crown offered him b}^ the popularly elected German Parlia- 
ment assembled at Frankfurt -on-the-Main (April, 1849) 5 
and thereupon attempted to form a smaller union of States, 
namely, Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover. This Three Kings' 
League, as it was called, soon came to an end; for it did net 



14 The European Nations 

satisfy the nationalists who wished to see Germany united, 
the constitutionalists who aimed at the supremacy of Par- 
liament, or the friends of the old order of things. The 
vacillations of Frederick William and the unpractical 
theorisings of the German Parliament at Frankfurt having 
aroused general disgust, Austria found little difficulty in 
restoring the power of the old Germanic Confederation in 
September, 1850. Strong in her alliance with Russia, she 
next compelled Frederick William to sign the Convention 
of Olmiitz (November, 1850). By this humiliating com- 
pact he agreed to forbear helping the German nationalists 
in Schleswig-Holstein to shake off the oppressive rule of 
the Danes ; to withdraw Prussian troops from Hesse-Cassel 
and Baden, where strifes had broken out; and to acknow- 
ledge the supremacy of the old Federal Diet under the 
headship of Austria. Thus, it seemed that the Prussian 
monarchy was a source of weakness and disunion for North 
Germany, and that Austria, backed up by the might of 
Russia, must long continue to lord it over the cumbrous 
Germanic Confederation. 

But a young country squire, named Bismarck, even then 
resolved that the Prussian monarchy should be the means 
of strengthening and binding together the Fatherland. 
The resolve bespoke the patriotism of a sturdy, hopeful 
nature ; and the young Bismarck was nothing if not patri- 
otic, sturdy, and hopeful. The son of an ancient family in 
the Mark of Brandenburg, he brought to his life-work 
powers inherited froin a line of fighting ancestors ; and his 
mind was no less robust than his body. Quick at mastering 
a mass of details, he soon saw into the heart of a problem, 
and his solution of it was marked both by unfailing skill 
and bv sound common-sense as to the choice of men and 



Introduction 15 

means. In some respects he resembles Napoleon the Great. 
Granted that he was his inferior in the width of vision and 
the versatility of gifts that mark a world-genius, yet he 
was his equal in diplomatic resourcefulness and in the power 
of dealing lightning strokes; while his possession of the 
priceless gift of moderation endowed his greatest political 
achievements with a soundness and solidity never possessed 
by those of the mighty conqueror who "sought to give the 
mot d'ordre to the universe." If the figure of the Prussian 
does not loom so large on the canvas of universal history 
as that of the Corsican — if he did not tame a Revolution, 
remodel society, and reorganise a continent — be it remem- 
bered that he made a United Germany, while Napoleon the 
Great left France smaller and weaker than he found her. 

Bismarck's first efforts, like those of Cavour for Sardinia, 
were directed to the task of restoring the prestige of his 
State. Early in his official career, the Prussian patriot 
urged the expediency of befriending Russia during the 
Crimean War, and he thus helped on that rapprochement 
between Berlin and St. Petersburg which brought the 
mighty triumphs of 1866 and 1870 within the range of 
possibility. In 1857 Frederick William became insane; 
and his brother William took the reins of Government as 
Regent, and early in 1861 as King. The new ruler was less 
gifted than his unfortunate brother; but his homely 
common-sense and tenacious will strengthened Prussian 
policy where it had been weakest. He soon saw the 
worth of Bismarck, employed him in high diplomatic 
positions, and when the royal proposals for strengthening 
the army were decisively rejected by the Prussian House 
of Representatives, he speedily sent for Bismarck to act 
as Minister- President* (Prime Minister) and "tame" the 



1 6 The European Nations 

refractory Parliament. The constitutional crisis was be- 
coming more and more acute when a great national 
question came into prominence owing to the action of 
the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein affairs. 

Without entering into the very tangled web of customs, 
treaties, and dynastic claims that made up the Schleswig- 
Holstein question, we may here state that those Duchies 
were by ancient law very closely connected together, that 
the King of Denmark was only Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, 
and that the latter duchy, wholly German in population, 
formed part of the Germanic Confederation. Latterly the 
fervent nationalists in Denmark, while leaving Holstein to 
its German connections, had resolved thoroughly to 
"Danify" Schleswig, the northern half of which was 
wholly Danish, and they pressed on this policy by harsh 
and intolerant measures, making it difficult or well-nigh 
impossible for the Germans to have public worship in their 
own tongue and to secure German teachers for their chil- 
dren in the schools. Matters were already in a very 
strained state, when, shortly before the death of King 
Frederick VII. of Denmark (November, 1863), the Rigsraad 
at Copenhagen sanctioned a constitution for Schleswig 
which would practically have made it a part of the Danish 
monarchy. The King gave his assent to it, an act which 
his succeSvSor, Christian IX., ratified. 

Now, this action violated the last treaty, that signed by 
the Powers at London in 1852, which settled the affairs of 
the Duchies; and Bismarck therefore had strong ground 
for appealing to the Powers concerned, as also to the Ger- 
man Confederation, against this breach of treaty obliga- 
tions. The Powers, especially England and France, sought 
to set things straight, but the efforts of our Foreign Minis- 



Introduction 1 7 

ter, Lord John Riissell, had no effect. The German Con- 
federation also reftised to take any steps about Schleswig 
as being outside its jurisdiction. Bismarck next persuaded 
Austria to help Prussia in defeating Danish designs on that 
duchy. The Danes, on the other hand, counted on the tm- 
ofhcial expressions of s^^mpath}' which came from the 
people of Great Britain and France at sight of a small State 
menaced by two powerful monarchies. In fact, the whole 
situation was compHcated by this explosion of feeling, 
which seemed to the Danes to portend the armed inter\-en- 
tion of the Western States, especially England, on their 
behalf. As far as is known, no official assurance to that 
effect ever went forth from London. In fact, it is certain 
that Queen Victoria absolutely forbade an}" such step ; but 
the mischief done by sentimental orators, heedless news- 
jjaper editors, and factious bus}' bodies, could not be un- 
done. As Lord John Russell afterwards stated in a short 
Essay on the Policy of England: "It pleased some English 
advisers of great influence to meddle in this affair; they 
were successful in thwarting the British Government, and 
in the end, with the professed view, and perhaps the real 
intention, of heljjing Denmark, their friendship tended to 
deprive her of Holstein and Schleswig altogether." This 
final judgment of a veteran statesman is worth quoting as 
showing his sense of the mischief done by well-meant but 
misguided sympathy, which pushed the Danes on to ruin 
and embittered our relations vvith Prussia for many years. 
Not that the conduct of the German Powers was flawless. 
On January." i6, 1864, they sent to Copenhagen a demand 
for the withdrawal of the constitution for Schleswig within 
two days. The Danish Foreign Minister pointed out that, 
sts the Rigsraad was not in session, this could not possibly 

vo:.. I. — 2. 



1 8 The European Nations 

be done within two days. In this last step, then, the 
German Powers were undoubtedly the aggressors. i The 
Prussian troops were ready near the River Eider, and at 
onee invaded Sehleswig. The Danes were soon beaten on 
the mainland; then a pause oceurred, during which a 
conference of the Powers concerned was held at London. 
It has been proved by the German historian, von Sybel, 
that the first serious suggestion to Prussia that she should 
take both the Duchies came secretly from Napoleon III. 
It was in vain that Lord John Russell suggested a sensible 
compromise, namely, the partition of Sehleswig between 
Denmark and Germany according to the language-frontier 
inside the Duchy. To this the belligerents demurred on 
])oints of detail, the Prussian representative asserting that 
he would not leave a single German under Danish rule. 
The war was therefore resumed, and ended in a complete 
defeat for the weaker State, which finally surrendered both 
Duchies to Austria and Prussia (1864). 2 

The question of the sharing of the Duchies now formed 
one of the causes of the far greater war between the victors; 
but, in truth, it was only j)art (A the much larger question, 

• Lord Wodehouse (afterwards liarl of Kimberlcy) was at that 
time sent on a si)ecial mission to Coj)enhagen. When his official 
correspondence is i)ubHshed, it will jiroltably throw light on many 
J joints. 

2 .Sybel, Die Bei^rilnduni^ des deutschen Retches, iii., pp. 299-344; 
Ddbidour, Hist, diplomatique de I'Europe, ii., pp. 261-273; Lowe, 
Life of Bismarck, i., chap, vi.; lieadlam, Bismarck, chap. viii. : 
Lord Malmesbury, Memoirs of an ex-Minister, pp. 584-593 (small 
edition); vSpencer Walpole, Life of Lord J.Russell, ii., pp. 396-411. 

In several res])ects the cause of ruin to Denmark in 1863-64 
bears a remarkal)le resemljlance to that which j)roduced war in 
South Africa in 1899, viz. , high-handed ciction of a minority towards 
men whom they treated as Outlanders, the stiff-necked obstinacy 
of the smaller State, and reliance on the vehement but (probably) 
unofficial offers of help or intervention by other nations. 



Introduction 19 

which had agitated Germany for centuries, whether the 
balance of power should belong to the North or the South. 
Bismarck also saw that the time was nearly ripe for settling 
this matter once for all in favour of Prussia; but he had 
hard work even to persuade his own sovereign; while the 
Prussian ParHament, as well as pubHc opinion throughout 
Germany, was violently hostile to his schemes and favoured 
the claims of the young Duke of Augustenburg to the ' 
Duchies — claims that had much show of right. Matters 
were patched up for a time between the two German States 
by the Convention of Gastein (August, 1865), while in 
reality each prepared for war and sought to gain allies. 

Here again Bismarck was successful. After vainl}^ seek- 
ing to buy Venetia from the Austrian Court, Italy agreed 
to side with Prussia against that Power in order to wrest b}^ 
force a province which she could not hope to gain peaceably. 
Russia, too, was friendl}^ to the Court of Berlin, owing to the 
help which the latter had given her in crushing the formida- 
ble revolt of the Poles in 1863. It remained to keep France 
quiet. In this Bismarck thought he had succeeded by 
means of inter\'iews which he held with Napoleon III. at 
Biarritz (November, 1865). What there transpired is not 
clearly known. That Bismarck pla5'ed on the Emperor's 
foible for oppressed nationalities, in the case of Itah', is 
fairly certain; that he fed him with hopes of gaining Bel- 
gium, or a slice of German land, is highly probable, and 
none the less so because he later on indignantly denied in 
the Reichstag that he ever "held out the prospect to any- 
body of ceding a single German village, or even as much as 
a clover-field." In any case Napoleon seems to have pro- 
mised to obser\-e neutraht}' — not because he loved Prussia, 
but because he expected the German Powers to wear one 



20 The European Nations 

another out and thus leave him master of the situation. 
In common with most of the wiseacres of those days he 
beUeved that Prussia and Italy would ultimately fall before 
the combined weight of Austria and of the German States, 
which closely followed her in the Confederation ; whereupon 
he could step in and dictate his own terms. i 

Bismarck and the leaders of the Prussian army had few 
doubts as to the result. They were determined to force on 
the war, and early in June, 1866, brought forward proposals 
at the Frankfurt Diet for the "reform" of the German 
Confederation, the chief of them being the exclusion of 
Austria, the establishment of a German Parliament elected 
by manhood suffrage, and the formation of a North Ger- 
man army commanded by the King of Prussia. 

A great majority of the Federal Diet rejected these 
proposals, and war speedily broke out, Austria being sup- 
ported by nearly all the German States except the two 
Mecklenburgs. 

The weight of numbers was against Prussia, even though 
she had the help of the Italians operating against Venetia. 
On that side Austria was completely successful, as also in 
a sea-fight near Lissa in the Adriatic ; but in the north the 
Hapsburgs and their German allies soon found out that 

1 Busch, Otir Chancellor, ii., p. 17 (Eng. edit.); Ddbidour, His- 
toire diplomatiqtie de I'Europe (1814-1878), ii., pp. 291-293. Lord 
Loftus in his Diplomatic Reminiscences (ii., p. 280) says: "So satis- 
fied was Bismarck that he could count on the neutrality of France, 
that no defensive military measures were taken on the Rhine and 
western frontier. He had no fears of Russia on the eastern frontier, 
and was therefore able to concentrate the military might of Prussia 
against Austria and her South German allies." 

Light has been thrown on the bargainings between Italy and 
Prussia by the Memoirs of General Govone, who found Bismarck a 
hard bargainer. 



Introduction 21 

organisation, armament, and genius count for more than 
numbers. The great organiser, von Roon, had brought 
Prussia's citizen army to a degree of efhciency that sur- 
prised every one; and the quick-firing "needle-gun" dealt 
havoc and terror among the enemy. Using to the full the 
advantage of her central position against the German States, 
Prussia speedily worsted their isolated and badly handled 
forces, while her chief armies overthrew those of Austria and 
Saxony in Bohemia. The Austrian plan of campaign had 
been to invade Prussia by two armies — a comparatively 
small force 'advancing from Cracow as a base into Silesia, 
while another, acting from Olmiitz, advanced through 
Bohemia to join the Saxons and march on Berlin, some 
50,000 Bavarians joining them in Bohemia for the same 
enterprise. This design speedily broke down owing to the 
short-sighted timidity of the Bavarian Government, which 
refused to let its forces leave their own territory ; the lack 
of railway facilities in the Austrian Empire also hampered 
the moving of two large armies to the northern frontier. 
Above all, the swift and decisive movements of the Prus- 
sians speedily drove the allies to act on the defensive — it- 
self a grave misfortune in war. 

Meanwhile the Prussian strategist, von Moltke, was 
carrying out a far more incisive plan of operations, that of 
sending three Prussian armies into the middle of Bohemia, 
and there forming a great mass which would sweep away 
all obstacles from the road to Vienna. This design received 
prompt and skilful execution. Saxony was quickly over- 
run, and the irruption of three great armies into Bohemia 
compelled the Austrians and their Saxon allies hurriedly to 
alter their plans. After suffering several reverses in the 
north of Bohemia, their chief array under Benedek barred 



2 2 The Huropean Nations 

the way of the two northern Prussian arimes on the heights 
north of the town of Koniggratz. On the morning of July 
3rd the defenders long beat off all frontal attacks with 
heavy loss; but about 2 p.m. the Army of Silesia, under the 
Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia, after a forced march 
of twelve miles, threw itself on their right flank, where 
Benedek expected no very serious onset. After desperate 
fighting the Army of Silesia carried the village of Chlum in 
the heart of the Austrian position, and compelled Austrians 
and Saxons to a hurried retreat over the Elbe. In this the 
Austrian infantry was saved from destruction by the heroic 
stand made by the artillery. Even so, the allies lost more 
than 13,000 killed and wounded, 22,000 prisoners, and 187 
guns.i 

Koniggratz (or Sadowa, as it is often called) decided the 
whole campaign. The invaders now advanced rapidly 
towards Vienna, and at the town of Nikolsburg conclud- 
ed the Preliminaries of Peace with Austria (July 26th), 
whereupon a mandate came from Paris, bidding them stop. 
In fact, the Emperor of the French offered his intervention 
in a manner most threatening to the victors. He sought 
to detach Italy from the Prussian alliance by the offer of 
Venetia as a left-handed present from himself — an offer 
which the Italian Government subsequently refused. 

To understand how Napoleon III. came to change front 
and belie his earlier proniises, one must look behind the 
scenes. Enough is already known to show that the Em- 
peror's hand was forced by his Ministers and by the Parisian 
Press, probably also by the Empress Eugenie. Though 

' Sybel, Die Begriindung des deutschen Reiches, v., pp. 174-205; 
Journals of Field Marshal Count von Blumenthal for 1866 and iSyi 
(Eng. edit.:), ^p 37-44. 



Introduction 23 

desirous, apparently, of befriending Prussia, he had already 
yielded to their persistent pleas urging him to stay the 
growth of the Protestant Power of North Germany. On 
June loth, at the outbreak of the war, he secretly concluded 
a treaty with Austria, holding out to her the prospect of 
recovering the great province of Silesia (torn from her by 
Frederick the Great in 1740) in return for a magnanimotis 
cession of Veijetia to Italy. The news of Koniggratz led 
to a violent outburst of anti-Prussian feeling ; but Napoleon 
refused to take action at once, when it might have been 
verv^ eilective. 

The best plan for the French Government would have 
been to send to the Rhine all the seasoned troops left avail- 
able by Napoleon III.'s ill-starred Mexican enterprise, so 
as to help the hard-pressed South German forces, offering 
also the armed mediation of France to the combatants. 
In that case Prussia must have drawn back, and Napoleon 
III. could have dictated his own terms to Central Europe. 
But his earlier leanings towards Prussia and Italy, the ad- 
vice of Prince Napoleon ("Plon-Plon"j and Lavalette, and 
the wheedlings of the Prussi'an ambassador as to compensa- 
tions which France might gain" as a set-off to Prussia's 
aggrandisement, told on the French Emperor's nature, 
always some what sluggish and then prostrated by severe 
internal pain; with the result that he sent his proposals 
for a settlement of the points in dispute, but took no steps 
towards enforcing them. A fortnight thus slipped away, 
during which the Prussians reaped the full fruits of their 
tritimph at Koniggratz; and it v.-as not until July 29th, 
three days after the preliminaries of peace were signed, 
that the French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhm^s, 
worried his master, then prostrate with pain at Vichy, into 



24 The European Nations 

sanctioning the following demands from victorious Prussia: 
the cession to France of the Rhenish Palatinate (belonging 
to Bavaria), the south-western part of Hesse Darmstadt, 
and that part of Prussia's Rhine-Province lying in the 
valley of the Saar which she had acquired after Waterloo. 
This would have brought within the French frontier the 
great fortress of Mainz (Mayence) ; but the great mass of 
these gains, it will be observed, would have been at the 
expense of South German States, whose cause France pro- 
claimed her earnest desire to uphold against the encroach- 
ing power of Prussia. 

Bismarck took care to have an official copy of these de- 
mands in writing, the use of which will shortly appear; and 
having procured this precious document, he defied the 
French envoy, telling him that King William, rather than 
agree to such a surrender of German land, would make 
peace with Austria and the German States on any terms, 
and invade France at the head of the forces of a united 
Germany. This reply caused another change of front at 
Napoleon's Court. The demands were disavowed and the 
Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, resigned. ^ 

The completeness of Pfussia's triumph over Austria and 
her German allies, together with the preparations of the 
Hungarians for revolt, decided the Court of Vienna to 
accept the Prussian terms which were embodied in the 
Treaty of Prague (August 23rd) ; they were, the direct 
cession of Venetia to Italy ; the exclusion of Austria from 
German affairs and her acceptance of the changes there 
pending ; the cession to Prussia of Schleswig-Holstein ; and 

» Sybel, op. cit., v., pp. 365-374. Debidour, op. cit., ii., pp. 315- 
318. See, too, volume viii. of Ollivier's work, L' Empire liberal, 
published in 1904; and M. de la Gorce's work, Histoire du second 
Empire, vi. (Paris, 1903). 



Introduction 25 

the payment of 20,000,000 thalers (about ;£3,ooo,ooo) as 
war indemnity. The lenience of these conditions was to 
have a very noteworthy result, namely, the speedy recon- 
ciliation of the two Powers : within twenty years they were 
firmly united in the Triple Alliance with Italy (see Chap- 
ter X.). 

Some difficulties stood in the way of peace between 
Prussia and her late enemies in the German Confederation, 
especially Bavaria. These last were removed when Bis- 
marck privately disclosed t-o the Bavarian Foreign Minister 
the secret demand made by France for the cession of the 
Bavarian Palatinate. In the month of August, the South 
German States, Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and Baden, ac- 
cepted Prussia's terms; whereby they paid small war in- 
demnities and recognised the new constitution of Germany. 
Outwardly they formed a South German Confederation; 
but this had a very shadowy existence ; and the three States 
by secret treaties with Prussia agreed to place their armies 
and all militar}^ arrangements, in case of war, under the 
control of the King of Prussia. Thus within a month 
from the close of "the Seven Weeks' War," the whole of 
Germany was quietly but firmly bound to common action 
in military matters; and the actions of France left little 
doubt as to the need of these timely precautions. 

On those German Satets which stood in the way of 
Prussia's territorial development and had shown marked 
hostility, Bismarck bore hard. The Kingdom of Hanover, 
Electoral Hesse (Hesse-Cassel), the Duchy of Nassau, and 
the Free City of Frankfurt were annexed outright, Prussia 
thereby gaining direct contact with her Westphalian and 
Rhenish Provinces. The absorption of Frankfurt-on-the- 
Main, and the formation of a new league, the North German 



26 The European Nations 

Confederation, swept away all the old federal machinery, 
and marked out Berlin, not Vienna or Frankfurt, as the 
future governing centre of the Fatherland. It was doubt- 
less a perception of the vast gains to the national cause 
which prompted the Prussian Parliament to pass a Bill oi 
Indemnity exonerating the King's Ministers for the illegal 
acts committed by them during the "conflict time" (1861- 
66) — acts which saved Prussia in spite of her Parliament. 

Constitutional freedom likewise benefited largely by the 
results of the war. The new North German Confederation 
was based avowedly on manhood suffrage, not because 
either King William or Bismarck loved democracy, but 
because, after lately pledging themselves to it as the ground- 
work of reform of the old Confederation, they could not 
draw back in the hour of triumph. As Bismarck after- 
wards confessed to his Secretary, Dr. Busch, "I accepted 
universal suffrage, but with reluctance, as a Frankfurt 
tradition " (i. e., of the democratic Parliament of Frank- 
furt in 1848).^ 'AH the lands, therefore, between the 
Niemen and the Main were bound together in a Confedera- 
tion based on constitutional principles, though the govern- 
ing powers of the King and his Ministers continued to be 
far larger than is the case in Great Britain. To this matter 
we shall recur when we treat of the German Empire, 
formed by the union of the North and South German Con- 
federations of 1866. 

Austria also was soon compelled to give way before the 
persistent demands of the Hungarian patriots for their 
ancient constitution, which happily blended monarchy and 
democracy. Accordingly, the centralised Hapsburg mon- 
archy was remodelled by the Ausgleich (compromise) of 

> Busch, Our Chancellor, ii., p. 196 (English edit.). 



Introduction 27 

1867, and became the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, 
the two parts of the realm being niled quite separately for 
most purposes of government, and united only for those 
of arm}' organisation, foreign policy, and finance. Parlia- 
mentar}^ control became dominant in each part of the 
Empire; and the grievances resulting from autocratic or 
bureaucratic rule vanished from Hungary. They disap- 
peared also from Hano\er and Hesse-Cassel, where the 
Guelf sovereigns and Electors had generally repressed 
popular movements. 

Greatest of all the results of the war of 1866, however, 
w'as the gain to the national cause in Germany and Italy. 
Peoples that had long been divided were now in the brief 
space of three months brought within sight of the long- 
wished-for unity. The rush of these events blinded men 
to their enduring import and produced an impression that 
the Prussian triumph was like that of Napoleon I., too 
sudden and brilHant to last. Those who hazarded this 
verdict forgot that his political arrangements for Europe 
violated every instinct of national solidarity; while those 
of 1866 served to group the hitherto divided peoples of 
Norih Germany and Italy around the monarchies that had 
proved to be the only possible rallying points in their re- 
spective countries. It was this harmonising of the claims 
and aspirations of monarchy, nationality, and democracy 
that gave to the settlement of 1866 its abiding importance, 
and fitted the two peoples for the crowning triiimph of 
1870. 



CHAPTER I 

THE CAUSES OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR 

"After the fatal year 1866, the Empire was in a state of decad- 
ence." — L. Gregoire, Histoire de France. 

THE irony of history is nowhere more manifest than in 
the curious destiny which called a Napoleon III. to 
the place once occupied by Napoleon I., and at the very 
time when the national movements, unwittingly called to 
vigorous life by the great warrior, were attaining to the 
full strength of manhood. Napoleon HI. was in many 
ways a well-meaning dreamer, who, unluckily for himself, 
allowed his dreams to encroach on his waking moments. 
In truth, his sluggish but very persistent mind never saw 
quite clearly where dreams must give way to realities; or, 
as M. de Falloux phrased it, "He does not know the differ- 
ence between dreaming and thinking." 1 Thus his policy 
showed an odd mixture of generous haziness and belated 
practicality 

Long study of his uncle's policy showed him, rightly 
enough, that it erred in trampling down the feeling of 
nationality in Germany and elsewhere. The nephew re- 
solved to avoid this mistake and to pose as the champion 
of the oppressed and divided peoples of Italy, Germany, 
Poland, and the Balkan Peninsula — a programme that 

1 Notes from a Diary, 1851-72, by Sir M. E. Grant Duff, i., p. 
120. 

28 



Causes of the Franco-German War 29 

promised to appeal to the ideal aspirations of the French, 
to embarrass the dynasties that had overthrown the first 
Napoleon, and to yield substantial gains for his nephew. 
Certainly it did so in the case of Italy; his championship 
of the Roumanians also helped on the making of that in- 
teresting principality (1861) and gained the good- will of 
Russia; but he speedily forfeited this by his wholly in- 
effective efforts on behalf of the Poles in 1863. His great 
mistakes, however, were committed in and after the year 
1863, when he plunged into Mexican politics with the 
chimerical aim of founding a Roman Catholic Empire in 
Central America, and favoured the rise of Prussia in con- 
nection with the Schleswig-Holstein question. By the 
former of these he locked up no small part of his army in 
Mexico when he greatly needed it on the Rhine; by the 
latter he helped on the rise of the vigorous North German 
Power. 

As we have seen, he secretly advised Prussia to take 
both Schleswig and Holstein, thereby announcing his wish 
for the effective union of Germans with the one great State 
composed almost solely of Germans. "I shall always be 
consistent in my conduct," he said. "If I have fought for 
the independence of Italy, if I have lifted up my voice 
for Polish nationality, I cannot have other sentiments in 
Germany, or obey other principles." This declaration be- 
spoke the doctrinaire rather than the statesman. Un- 
taught by the clamour which French Chauvinists and 
ardent Catholics had raised against his armed support of 
the Italian national cause in 1859, he now proposed to 
further the aggrandisement of the Protestant North Ger- 
man Power which had sought to partition France in 181 5. 

The clamour aroused by his leanings towards Prussia in 



30 The European Nations 

1864-66 was naturally far more violent, in proportion as 
the interests of France were more closely at stake. Prussia 
held the Rhine Province; and French patriots, who clung 
to the doctrine of the "natural frontiers" — the Ocean, 
Pyrenees, Alps, and Rhine — looked on her as the natural 
enemy. They pointed out that millions of Frenchmen 
had shed their blood in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars to win and to keep the Rhine boundary; and their 
most eloquent spokesman, M. Thiers, who had devoted his 
historical gifts to glorifying those great days, passionately 
declaimed against the policy of helping on the growth of 
the hereditary foe. 

We have already seen the results of this strife between 
the pro-Prussian foibles of the Emperor and the eager 
prejudices of Frenchmen, whose love of oppressed and 
divided nations grew in proportion to their distance from 
France, and changed to suspicion or hatred in the case 
of her neighbours. In 1866, under the breath of minister- 
ial arguments and oratorical onslaughts Napoleon III.'s 
policy weakly wavered, thereby giving to Bismarck's 
statecraft a decisive triumph all along the line. In vain 
did he in the latter part of that year remind the Prussian 
statesman of his earlier promises (always discreetly vague) 
of compensation for France, and throw out diplomatic 
feelers for Belgium, or at any rate Luxemburg. 1 In vain 
did M. Thiers declare in the Chamber of Deputies that 
France, while recognising accomplished facts in Germany, 

» In 1867 Bismarck's promises went so far as the framjng of a 
secret compact with France, one article of which stated that 
Prussia would not object to the annexation of Belgium by France. 
The agreement was first published by the Times on July 25, 1870, 
Bismarck then divulging the secret so as to inflame public opinion 
against France. 



Causes of the Franco-German War 31 

ought ' ' firmly to declare that he will not allow them to go 
further" (March 14, 1867). Bismarck replied to this chal- 
lenge of the French orator by publishing five days later the 
hitherto secret military alliances concluded with the South 
German States in August, 1866. Thenceforth France 
knew that a war with Prussia would be a war with united 
Germany. 

In the following year the Zollverein, or German Customs 
Union (which had been gradually growing since 1833), 
took a definitely national form in a Customs Parliament 
which assembled in April, 1868, thus unifying Germany 
for purposes of trade as well as those of war. This sharp 
rebuff came at a time when Napoleon's throne was tottering 
from the utter collapse of his Mexican expedition; when 
too, he more than ever needed popular support in France 
for the beginnings of a more constitutional rule. Early in 
1867 he sought to buy Luxemburg from Holland. This 
action aroused a storm of wrath in Prussia, which had 
the right to garrison Luxemburg; but the question was 
patched up by a conference of the Powers at London, the 
Duchy being declared neutral territory under the guarantee 
of Europe; the fortifications of its capital were also to be 
demolished, and the Prussian garrison withdrawn. This 
success for French diplomacy was repeated in Italy, where 
the French troops supporting the Pope crushed the efforts 
of Garibaldi and his irregulars to capture Rome, at the 
sanguinar\r fight of Mentana (November 3, 1867). The 
official despatch, stating that the new French rifle, the 
chassepot, "had done wonders," spread jubilation through 
France and a sharp anti-Gallic sentiment throughout 
Italy. 

..\nd w^hile Italy heaved with longings for her natural 



32 The European Nations 

capital, popular feeling in France and North Germany 
made steadily for war. 

Before entering upon the final stages of the dispute, it 
may be well to take a bird's-eye view of the condition of 
the chief Powers in so far as it explains their attitude 
towards the great struggle. 

The condition of French politics was strangely complex. 
The Emperor had always professed that he was the elect 
of France, and would ultimately crown his political edifice 
with the corner-stone of constitutional liberty. Had he 
done so in the successful years 1855-61, possibly his dy- 
nasty might have taken root. He deferred action, how- 
ever, until the darker years that came after 1866. In 1868 
greater freedom was allowed to the Press and in the case of 
public meetings. The General Election of the spring of 
1869 showed large gains to the Opposition, and decided the 
Emperor to grant to the Corps Legislatif the right of in- 
itiating laws concurrently with himself, and he declared 
that Ministers should be responsible to it (September, 
1869). 

These and a few other changes marked the transition 
from autocracy to the "Liberal Empire." One of the 
champions of constitutional principles, M. Emile Ollivier, 
formed a Cabinet to give effect to the new policy, and 
the Emperor, deeming the time ripe for consolidating his 
power on a democratic basis, consulted the country in a 
plebiscite, or mass vote, primarily as to their judgment on 
the recent changes, but implicitly as to their confidence in 
the imperial system as a whole. His skill in joining to- 
gether two topics that were really distinct, gained him a 
tactical victory. More than 7,350,000 affirmative votes 
were given, as against 1,572,000 negatives; while 1,900,000 



Causes of the Franco-German War 33 

voters registered no vote. This success at the polls em- 
boldened the supporters of the Empire ; and very many of 
them, especially, it is thought, the Empress Eugenie, be- 
lieved that only one thing remained in order to place the 
Napoleonic dynasty on a lasting basis ; that was a successful 
war. 

Champions of autocrac}^ pointed out that the growth of 
Radicalism coincided with the period of military failures 
and diplomatic slights. Let Napoleon III., they said in 
effect, imitate the policy of his uncle, who, as long as he 
dazzled Prance by triumphs, could afford to laugh at the 
efforts of constitution-mongers. The big towns might 
prate of liberty; but what France wanted was glory and 
strong government. Such were their pleas: there was 
much in the past history of France to support them. The 
responsible advisers of the Emperor determined to ta,ke a 
stronger tone in foreign affairs, while the out-and-out 
Bonapartists jealously looked for any signs of official weak- 
ness so that they might undermine the Ollivier Ministry 
and hark back to absolutism. When two great parties in 
a State make national prestige a catchword of the political 
game, peace cannot be secure; that was che position of 
France in the early part of 1870.1 

The eve of the Franco-German War was a time of great 
importance for the United Kingdom. The Reform Bill of 
1867 gave a great accession of power to the Liberal Party; 
and the General Election of November, 1868, speedily led 
to the resignation of the Disraeli Cabinet and the accession 
of the Gladstone Ministry to power. This portended 
change in other directions than home affairs. The tradition 

> See Ollivier' s great work, L' Empire liberal, for full details of this 
time. 

VOL. I. — 3. 



34 The European Nations 

of a spirited foreign policy died with Lord Palmerston in 
1865. With the entry of John Bright to the new Cabinet 
peace at all costs became the dominant note of British 
statesmanship. There was much to be said in favour of 
this. England needed a time of rest in order to cope with 
the discontent of Ireland and the problems brought about 
by the growth of democracy and commercialism in the 
larger island. The disestablishment and partial disendow- 
ment of the Protestant Church in Ireland Quly, 1869), the 
Irish Land Act (August, 1870), and the Education Act of 
1870, showed the preoccupation of the Ministry for home 
affairs; while the readiness with which, a little later, they 
complied with all the wishes of the United States in the 
Alabama case, equally proclaimed their pacific intentions. 
England, which in i860 had exercised so powerful an influ- 
ence on the Italian national question, was for five years a 
factor of small account in European affairs. Far from 
pleasing the combatants, our neutrality annoyed both of 
them. The French accused England of "deserting" Na- 
poleon III. in his time of need — a charge that has lately 
been revived by M. Hanotaux. To this it is only needful 
to reply that the French Emperor entered into alliance 
with us at the time of the Crimean War merely for 
his own objects, and allowed all friendly feeling to be 
ended by French threats of an invasion of England in 
1858 and his shabby treatment of Italy in the matter of 
Savoy and Nice a year later. On his side, Bismarck also 
complained that our feeling for the German cause went 
no further than "theoretical sympathy," and that "dur- 
ing the war England never compromised herself so far in 
our favour as to endanger her friendship with France." 
These vague and enigmatic charges at bottom only express 



Causes of the Franco-German War 35 

the annoyance of the combatants at their failure to draw 
neutrals into the strife,^ 

The traditions of the United States, of course, forbade 
their intervention in the Franco-Prussian dispute. By an 
article of their political creed termed the Monroe Doctrine, 
they asserted their resolve not to interfere in European 
affairs and to prevent the interference of any strictly 
European State in those of the New World. It was on this 
rather vague doctrine that they cried "hands off" from 
Mexico to the French Emperor; and the abandonment of 
his protege, the so-called Emperor Maximilian, by French 
troops, brought about the death of that unhappy prince and 
a sensible decline in the prestige of his patron (June, 1867). 

Russia likewise remembered Napoleon III.'s champion- 
ship of the Poles in 1863, which, however Platonic in its 
nature, caused the Czar some embarrassment. Moreover, 
King William of Prussia had soothed the Czar's feelings, 
ruffled by the dethroning of three German dynasties in 
1866, by a skilful reply which alluded to his (King William's) 
desire to be of service to Russian interests elsewhere — a 
hint which the diplomatists of St. Petersburg remembered 
in 1870 to some effect. 

For the rest, the Czar Alexander II. (1855-81) and his 
Ministers were still absorbed in the internal policy of re- 
form, which' in the sixties freed the serfs and gave Russia 
new judicial and local institutions, doomed to be swept away 
in the reaction following the murder of that enlightened 

» Hanotaux, Contemporary France, i., p. 9 (Eng. ed.); Bismarck: 
his Rejections and Reminiscences, ii., p. 61. The popiilar Prussian 
view about England fotind expression in the comic paper Kladder- 
datsch: 

Deutschland beziehe billige S^'mpathien 
IJnd Frankreich theures Kriegsmateriel. 



36 The European Nations 

ruler. The Russian Government therefore pledged itself 
to neutrality, but in a sense favourable to Prussia. The 
Czar ascribed the. Crimean War to the ambition of Na- 
poleon III., and remembered the friendship of Prussia 
at that time, as also in the Polish Revolt of 1863.^ Bis- 
marck's policy now brought its reward. 

The neutrality of Russia is always a matter of the utmost 
moment for the Central Powers in any war on their western 
frontiers. Their efforts against revolutionary France in 
1792-94 failed chiefly because of the ambiguous attitude 
of the Czarina Catherine II. ; and the collapse of Frederick 
William IV. 's policy in 1848-51 was due to the hostility of 
his eastern neighbour. In fact, the removal of anxiety 
about her open frontier on the east was now worth a 
quarter of a million of men to Prussia. 

But the Czar's neutrality was in one matter distinctly 
friendly to his uncle, King William of Prussia. It is an 
open secret that unmistakable hints went from St. Peters- 
burg to Vienna to the effect that, if Austria drew the sword 
for Napoleon III. she would have to reckon with an irruption 
of the Russians into her open Galician frontier. Probably 
this accounts for the conduct of the Hapsburg Power, 
which otherwise is inexplicable. A war of revenge against 
Prussia seemed to be the natural step to take. True, the 
Emperor Francis Joseph had small cause to like Napoleon 
III. The loss of Lombardy in 1859 still rankled in the 
breast of every patriotic Austrian; and the suspicions 
which that enigmatical ruler managed to arouse prevented 
any definite agreement resulting from the meeting of the 
two sovereigns at Salzburg in 1867. 

» See Sir H. Rumbold's Recollections of a Diplomatist (First Se- 
ries), ii., p. 292, for the Czar's hostility to France in 1870. 



Causes of the Franco-German War 37 

The relations of France and Austria were still in the same 
uncertain state before the War of 1870. The foreign policy 
of Austria was in the hands of Count Beust, a bitter foe of 
Prussia; but after the concession of constitutional rule to 
Hungary by the compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867, the Dual 
Monarchy urgently needed rest, especially as its army was 
undergoing many changes. The Chancellor's action was 
therefore clogged on all sides. Nevertheless, when the 
Luxemburg affair of 1867 brought France and Prussia near 
to war, Napoleon began to make advances to the Court of 
Vienna. How far they went is not known. Beust has 
asserted in his correspondence with the French Foreign 
Minister, the Due de Gramont (formerly Ambassador at 
Vienna), that they never were more than discussions, and 
that they ended in 1869 without any written agreement. 
The sole understanding was to the effect that the policy of 
both States should be friendly and pacific, Austria reserving 
the right to remain neutral if France were compelled to 
make war. The two Empires further promised not to 
make any engagement with a third Power without inform- 
ing the other. 

This statement is not very convincing. States do not 
usually bind themselves in the way just described, unless 
they have some advantageous agreement with the Power 
which has the first claim on their alliance. It is note- 
worthy, however, that the Due de Gramont, in'the corre- 
spondence alluded to above, admits that, as Ambassador 
and as Foreign Minister of France, he never had to claim 
the support of Austria in the war with Prussia.^ 

How are we to reconcile these statements with the un- 

I Memoirs of Count Beust, ii., pp. 358-359 (Appendix D, Eng. 
edit.). 



SS The European Nations 

doubted fact that the Emperor Napoleon certainly expected 
help from Austria and also from Italy? The solution of 
the riddle seems to be that Napoleon, as also Francis 
Joseph and Victor Emmanuel, kept their Foreign Ministers 
in the dark on many questions of high policy, which they 
transacted either by private letters among themselves, or 
through military men who. had their confidence. The 
French and Italian sovereigns certainly employed these 
methods, the latter because he was far more French in 
sympathy than his Ministers. 

As far back as the year 1868, Victor Emmanuel made 
overtures to Napoelon with a view to alliance, the chief aim 
of which, from his standpoint, was to secure the evacua- 
tion of Rome by the French troops, and the gain of the 
Eternal City for the national cause. Prince Napoleon lent 
his support to this scheme, and from an article written by 
him we know that the two sovereigns discussed the matter 
almost entirely by means of confidential letters.^ These 
discussions went on up to the month of June, 1869. Francis 
Joseph, on hearing of them, urged the French Emperor to 
satisfy Italy, and thus pave the way for an alliance between 
the three Powers against Prussia. Nothing definite came 
of the affair, and chiefly, it would seem, owing to the in- 
fluence of the Empress Eugenie and the French clerics. 
She is said to have remarked: "Better the Prussians in 
Paris tharr the ItaHan troQps in Rome." The diplomatic 
situation therefore remained vague, though in the second 
week of July, 1870, the Emperor again took up the threads 
which, with greater firmness and foresight, he might have 
woven into a firm design. 

The understanding between the three Powers advanced 
I Revue des deux Mondes for April i, 1878. 



Causes of the Franco-German War 39 

only in regard to military preparations. The Austrian 
Archduke Albrecht, the victor of Custoza, burned to avenge 
the defeat of Koniggratz, and with this aim in view visited 
Paris in February to March, 1870. He then proposed to 
Napoleon an invasion of North Germany by the armies of 
France, Austria, and Italy. The French Emperor de- 
veloped the plan by more specific overtures which he made 
in the month of June ; but his Ministers were so far in the 
dark as to these military proposals that they were then 
suggesting the reduction of the French army by ten thou- 
sand men, while Ollivier, the Prime Minister, on June 30th 
declared to the French Chamber that peace had never been 
better assured.^ 

And yet on that same day General Lebrun, aide-de-camp 
to the Emperor, was drawing up at Paris a confidential 
report of the mission with which he lately been entrusted 
to the Austrian military authorities. From that report 
we take the following particulars: On arriving at Vienna, 
he had three private interviews with the Archduke Al- 
brecht, and set before him the desirability of a joint in- 
vasion of North Germany in the autumn of that year. To 
this the Archduke demurred, on the ground that such a 
campaign ought to begin in the spring if the full fruits of 
victory were to be gathered in before the short days came. 
Austria and Italy, he said, could not place adequate forces 
in the field in less than six weeks owing to lack of railways. 2 

Developing his own views, the Archduke then suggested 

> Seignobos, A Political History of Contemporary Europe, ii., pp. 
806-807 (Eng. edit.). Oncken, Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm (i., pp. 
720-740), tries to prove that there was a deep conspiracy against 
Prussia. 1 am not convinced by his evidence. 

2 Souvenirs militaires, by General B. L. J. Lebrun (Paris, 1895), 
pp. 95-148. 



40 



The European Nations 



that it would be desirable for France to undertake the 
war against North Germany not later than the middle of 
March, 187 1, Austria and Italy at the same time beginning 
their mobilisations, though not declaring war until their 
armies were ready at the end of six weeks. Two French 
armies should in the meantime cross the Rhine in order to 
sever the South Germans from the Confederation of the 
North, one of them marching towards Nuremberg, where 
it would be joined by the western army of Austria and the 
Italian forces sent through Tyrol. The other Austrian 
army would then invade Saxony or Lusatia in order to 
strike at Berlin. He estimated the forces of the States 
hostile to Prussia as follows; 





Men. 


Horses. 


Cannon. 


France 


309,000 


35.000 


972 


Austria (exclusive 
of reserve) 


360,000 


27,000 


1,128 


Italy 


68,000 


S.ooo 


180 


Denmark 


260,000 (?) 


2,000 


72 



He thus reckoned the forces of the two German Con- 
federations : 





Men. 


Horses. 


Cannon. 


North 

South 


377,000 
97,000 


48,000 
10,000 


1,284 
288 



but the support of the latter might be hoped for. Lebrun 
again urged the desirability of a campaign in the autumn, 



Causes of the Franco-German War 41 

but the Archduke repeated that it must begin in the 
spring. In that condition, as in his earher statement 
that France must declare war first, while her allies pre- 
pared for war, we may discern a deep-rooted distrust of 
Napoleon III. 

On June 14th the Archduke introduced Lebrun to the 
Emperor Francis Joseph, who informed him that he 
wanted peace; but, he added, "if I make war, I must be 
forced to it." In case of war Prussia might exploit the 
national German sentiment existing in vSouth Germany 
and Austria. He concluded with these words: "But if 
the Emperor Napoleon, compelled to accept or to declare 
war, came with his armies into South Germany, not as an 
enemy but as a liberator, I should be forced on my side to 
declare that I [would] make common cause with him. In 
the eyes of my people I could do no other than join my 
armies to those of France. That is what I pray you to say 
for me to the Emperor Napoleon; I hope that he will see, 
as I do, my situation both in home and foreign affairs." 
Such was the report which Lebrun drew up for Napoleon 
III. on June 30th. It certainly led that sovereign to believe 
in the probability of Austrian help in the spring of 187 1, 
but not before that time. 

The question now arises whether Bismarck was aware of 
these proposals. If warlike counsels prevailed at Vienna, 
it is probable that some preparations would be made, and 
the secret may have leaked out in this way, or possibly 
through the Hungarian administration. In any case, Bis- 
marck knew that the Austrian Chancellor, Count Beust, 
thirsted for revenge for the events of 1866.^ If he heard 
any whispers of an approaching league against Prussia, he 
* Bismarck: his Reflections and Reminiscences, ii., p. 58. 



42 The European Nations 

would naturally see the advantage of pressing on war at 
once, before Austria and Italy were ready to enter the 
lists. Probably in this fact will be found one explanation 
of the origin of the Franco-German War. 

Before adverting to the proximate cause of the rupture, 
we may note that Beust's despatch of July ii, 1870, to 
Prince Metternich, Austrian Ambassador at Paris, displayed 
genuine fear lest France should rush blindly into war with 
Prussia; and he charged Metternich tactfully to warn the 
French Government against such a course of action, which 
would ' ' be contrary to all that we have agreed upon. . . 
Even if we wished, we could not suddenly equip a respect- 
ably large force. . . . Our services are gained to a 
certain extent [by France]; but we shall not go further 
unless events carry us on ; and we do not dream of plunging 
into war because it might suit France to do so." 

Again, however, the military men seem to have pushed 
on the diplomatists. The Archduke Albrecht and Count 
Vitzthum went to Paris charged with some promises of 
support to France in case of war. Thereafter, Count Beust 
gave the assurance at Vienna that the Austrians would be 
"faithful to our engagements, as they have been recorded 
in the letters exchanged last year between the two sover- 
eigns. We consider the cause of France as ours,' and we 
will contribute to the success of her arms to the utmost of 
our power." ' 

In the midst of this maze of cross-purposes this much is 
clear: that both Emperors had gone to work behind the 
backs of their Ministers, and that the military chiefs of 
France and Austria brought their States to the brink of 

> Memoirs of Count Beust, ii., p. 359; The Present Position of 
European Politics, p. 366 (1887), by the author of Greater Britain. 



Causes of the Franco-German War 43 

war while their Ministers and diplomatists were unaware 
of the nearness of danger. 

As we have seen, King Victor Emmanuel II. longed to 
draw the sword for Napoleon III., whose help to Italy in 
1859-60 he so curiously overrated. Fortunately for Italy, 
his Ministers took a more practical view of the situation; 
but probably they, too, would have made common cause 
with France had they received a definite promise of the with- 
drawal of French troops from Rome and the satisfac- 
tion of Italian desires for the Eternal City as the national 
capital. This promise, even after the outbreak ot the war, 
the French Emperor declined to give, though his cousin. 
Prince Napoleon, urged him vehemently to give way on 
that point. 1 

In truth, the Emperor could not well give way. An 
QEcumenical Council sat at Rome from December, 1869, to 
July, 1870; its Ultramontane tendencies were throughout 
strongly marked, as against the "Old Catholic" views; 
and it was a foregone conclusion that the Council would 
vote the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope in matters 
of religion — as it did on the day before France declared 
war against Prussia. How, then, could the Emperor, the 
"eldest son of the Church," as French monarchs have 
proudly styled themselves, bargain away Rome to the 
Italian Government, already stained by sacrilege, when this 
crowning aureole of grace was about to encircle the visible 
Head of the Church? There was no escape from the 
dilemma. Either Napoleon must go into war with shouts 
of "Judas ! " hurled at him by all pious Roman Catholics, 

> See the Rev. des deux Mondes for April i, 1878, and "Chronqiue" 
of the Revue d'Histoire diplomatique for 1905, p. 298; also W. H. 
Stillman, The Union of Italy, 1815-1895, p. 348. 



44 The European Nations 

or he must try his fortunes without the much-coveted help 
of Austria and Italy. He chose the latter alternative, 
largely, it would seem, owing to the influence of his ve- 
hemently Catholic Empress.^ After the first defeats he 
sought to open negotiations, but then it was too late. 
Prince Napoleon went to Florence and arrived there on 
August 2oth; but his utmost efforts failed to move the 
Italian Cabinet from neutrality. 

Even this brief survey of international relations shows 
that Napoleon III. was a source of weakness to France. 
Having seized on power by perfidious means, he through- 
out his whole reign strove to dazzle the French by a series 
of adventures, which indeed pleased the Parisians for the 
time, but at the cost of lasting distrust among the Powers. 
Generous in his aims, he at first befriended the German and 
Italian national movements, but forfeited all the fruits of 
those actions by his pettifogging conduct about Savoy and 
Nice, the Rhineland and Belgium; while his final efforts 
to please French Clericals and Chauvinists ^ by supporting 
the Pope at Rome lost him the support of States that 
might have retrieved the earlier blunders. In brief, by 
helping on the Nationalists of North Germany and Italy 
he offended French public opinion; and his belated and 
spasmodic efforts to regain popularity at home aroused 
M against him the distrust of all the Powers. Their feelings 

1 For the relations of France to the Vatican, see Histoire du 
second Empire, by M. de la Gorce, vi. (Paris, 1903); also Histoire 
C ontemporaine {i. e., of France in 1869-75), by M. Samuel Denis, 
4 vols. The Empress Eugenie once said that she was "deux fois 
Catholique," as a Spaniard and as French Empress. (Sir M. E. 
G-rant Duff, Notes from a Diary, 1851-1872, i., p. 125.) 

2 Chauvinist is a term corresponding to our "Jingo." It is de- 
rived from a man named Chauvin, who lauded Napoleon I. and 
French glory to the skies. 



Causes of the Franco-German War 45 

about him may be summarised in the mot of a diplomatist, 
"Scratch the Emperor and you will find the political 
refugee." 

How different were the careers of Napoleon III. and of 
Bismarck ! By resolutely keeping before him the national 
aim, and that only, the Prussian statesman had reduced 
the tangle of German affairs to simplicity and now made 
ready for the crowning work of all. In his Reminiscences 
he avows his belief, as early as 1866: "That a war with 
France would succeed the war with Austria lay in the logic 
of history"; and again: "I did not doubt that a Franco- / 
German War must take place before the construction of a 
United Germany could take place." ^ War would doubtless 
have broken out in 1867 over the Luxemburg question, had 
he not seen the need of delay for strengthening the bonds 
of union with South Germany and assuring the increase of 
the armies of the Fatherland by the adoption of Prussian 
methods; or, as he phrased it, "each year's postponement 
of the war would add one hundred thousand trained soldiers 
to our army. "2 In 1870 little was to be gained by delay. 
In fact, the unionist movement in Germany then showed 
ominous signs of slackening. In the South the Parliaments 
opposed any further approach to union with the North; 
and the voting of the military budget in the North for that 
year was likely to lead to strong opposition in the interests 
of the over- taxed people. A war might solve the unionist 
problem which was insoluble in time of peace ; and a casus ^ 
belli was at hand. 

Early in July, 1870, the news leaked out that Prince Leo- 
pold of Hohenzollem was the officially accepted candidate 

' Bismarck, Reminiscences, ii., pp. 41, 57 (Eng. edit.). 
2 lb., p. 58. 



46 The European Nations 

for the throne of Spain, left vacant since the revolution 
which drove Queen Isabella into exile in 1868.1 At once a 
thrill of rage shot through France ; and the Due de Gramont, 
Foreign Minister of the new Ollivier Ministry, gave ex- 
pression to the prevailing feeling in his answer to a question 
on the subject in the Chamber of Deputies (July 6th) : 

"We do not think that respect for the rights of a neigh- 
bouring people [Spain] obliges us to allow an alien Power 
[Prussia], by placing one of its princes on the throne of 
Charles V., to succeed in upsetting to our disadvantage the 
present equilibrium of forces in Europe, and imperil the 
interests and honour of France. We have the firm hope 
that this eventuality will not be realised. To hinder it, 
we count both on the wisdom of the German people and 
on the friendship of the Spanish people. If that should 
not be so, strong in your support and in that of the nation, 
we shall know how to fulfil our duty without hesitation and 
without weakness." ^ 

The opening phrases were inaccurate. The prince in 
question was Prince Leopold of the Swabian and Roman 
Catholic branch of the Hohenzollern family, who, as the 
Due de Gramont knew, could by no possibility recall the 
days when Charles V. reigned as Emperor in Germany and 
monarch in Spain. This misstatement showed the in- 
tention of the French Ministry to throw down the glove to 
Prussia — as is also clear from this statement in Gramont' s 
despatch of July loth to Benedetti: "If the King will not 
advise the Prince of Hohenzollern to withdraw, well, it is 
war forthwith, and in a few days we are at the Rhine." ^ 

> The ex-Queen Isabella died in Paris in April, 1904. 

2 Sorel, Hist, diplomatique de la Guerre Franco- Alle-mande, i., p. 77. 

3 Benedetti, Ma Mission en Prusse, p. 34. This work contains 
the French despatches on the whole affair. 



Causes of the Franco-German War 47 

Nevertheless, those who were behind the scenes had 
just cause for anger against Bismarck. The revelations 
of Benedetti, French Ambassador at Berlin, as well as 
the Memoirs of the King of Roumania (brother to Prince 
Leopold of Hohenzollem) leave no doubt that the candi- 
dature of the latter was privately and unofficially mooted 
in 1868, and again in the spring of 1869 through a Prussian 
diplomatist, Werthern, and that it met with no encour- 
agement whatever from the Prussian monarch or the Prince 
himself. But early in 1870 it was renewed in an official 
manner by the provisional Government of Spain, and (as 
seems certain) at the instigation of Bismarck, who, in May- 
June, succeeded in overcoming the reluctance of the Prince 
and of King William. Bismarck even sought to hurry the 
matter through the Spanish Cortes so as to commit Spain 
to the plan; but this failed owing to the misinterpretation 
of a ciphered telegram from Berlin at Madrid. 1 

Such was the state of the case when the affair became 
known to the Ollivier Ministry. Though not aware, seem- 
ingly, of all these details, Napoleon's advisers were justified 
in treating the matter, not as a private affair between the 
Hohenzollems and Spain (as Germans then maintained it 
was), but as an attempt of the Prussian Government to 
place on the Spanish throne a prince who could not but 
be friendly to the North German Power. In fact, the 
French saw in it a challenge to war; and, putting together 
all the facts as now known, we must pronounce that they 
were almost certainly right. Bismarck undoubtedly wanted 

1 In a recent work. Kaiser Wilhelm und die Begriindung des 
Reiches, 1866-1871, Dr. Lorenz tries to absolve Bismarck from com- 
plicity in these intrigues, but without success. See Reminiscences 
of the King of Roumania (edited by S. Whitman), pp. 70, 86-87, 
92-95; also Headlam's Bismarck, p. 327. 



/ 



48 The European Nations 

war; and it is impossible to think that he did not intend 
to use this candidature as a means of exasperating the 
' French. The man who afterwards declared that, at the 
beginning of the Danish disputes in 1863, he made up his 
mind to have Schleswig-Holstein for Prussia, 1 certainly 
saw in the Hohenzollem candidature a step towards a 
Prusso-Spanish alliance or a war with France that might 
cement German unity. 

In any case, that was the outcome of events. The 
French papers at once declaimed against the candidature 
in a way that aroused no less passion on the other side of 
the Rhine. For a brief space, however, matters seemed 
to be smoothed over by the calm good sense of the Prussian 
monarch and his nephew. The King was then at Ems, 
taking the waters, when Benedetti, the French ambassador, 
waited on him and pressed him most urgently to request 
Prince Leopold to withdraw from the candidature to the 
Spanish crown. This the King declined to do in the way 
that was pointed out to him, rightly considering that such 
a course would play into the hands of the French by lower- 
ing his own dignity and the prestige of Prussia. Moreover, 
he, rather illogically, held the whole matter to be primarily 
one that affected the Hohenzollern family and Spain. The 
young Prince, however, on hearing of the drift of events, 
solved the problem by declaring his intention not to accept 
the crown of Spain (July 12 th). The action was spontane- 
ous, emanating from Prince Leopold and his father, Prince 
Antony, not from the Prussian monarch, though, on hear- 
ing of their decision, he informed Benedetti that he en- 

, tirely approved it. 

\ If the French Government had really wished for peace, it 
« Busch, Our Chancellor, i., p. 367. 



Causes of the Franco-German War 49 

^ould have let the matter end there. But it did not do so. 
rhe extreme Bonapartists — plus royalistes que le rot — all 
ilong wished to gain prestige for their sovereign by in- 
rlicting an open humiliation on King William and through 
lim on Prussia. They were angry that he had evaded the 
mare, and now brought Prussia to bear on the Ministry, es- 
pecially the Due de Gramont, so that at 7 p.m. of that same 
lay Quly 12th) he sent a telegram to Benedetti at Ems di- 
recting him to see King William and press him to declare 
:hat he ' ' would not again authorise this candidature. ' ' The 
Minister added : "The effervescence of spirits [at Paris] is 
;uch that we do not know whether we shall succeed in mas- 
:ering it." This was true. Paris was almost beside herself. 
f\.s M. Sorel says: "The warm July evening drove into the 
streets a populace greedy of shows and excitements, whose 
.magination was spoiled by the custom of political quack- 
iTj, for whom war was but a drama and history a romance."^ 
5uch was the impulse which led to Gramont's new demand, 
md it was made in spite of the remonstrances of the British 
imbassador, Lord Lyons. 

Viewing that demand in the clearer light of the present 
:ime, we must say that it was not unreasonable in itself; 
Dut it was presented in so insistent a way that King 
William declined to entertain it. Again Gramont pressed 
Benedetti to urge the matter; but the utmost that the 
King would do was to state : ' ' He gives his approbation 
entirely and without reserve to the withdrawal of the 

1 Sorel, Hist, diploynatiqiie de la Guerre Franco- Allemande, i., 
;hap. iv. ; also for the tone of the French press, Giraudeau, La 
Verite stir la Campagne de iSyo, pp. 46-60. 

Ollivier tried to persuade Sir M. E. Grant DufE {Notes from a 
Diary, 1873-18S1, i., p. 45) that the French demand from King 
fVilliam was quite friendly and natural. 



50 The European Nations 

Prince of Hohenzollem: he cannot do more." He refused 
to see the ambassador further on this subject; but on 
setting out to return to Berlin — a step necessitated by the 
growing excitement throughout Germany — he took leave 
of Benedetti with perfect cordiality Quly 14th). The am- 
bassador thereupon returned to Paris. 

Meanwhile, however, Bismarck had given the last flick 
to the restive coursers of the press on both sides of the 
Rhine. In his Reminiscences he has described his de- 
pression of spirits on hearing the news of the withdrawal 
of Prince Leopold's candidature and of his nearly formed 
resolve to resign as a protest against so tame a retreat 
before French demands. But while Moltke, Roon, and 
he were dining together, a telegram reached him from the 
King at Ems, dated July 13th, 3.50 p.m., y/hich gave him 
leave to inform the ambassadors and the press of the 
present state of affairs. Bismarck saw his chance. The 
telegram could be cut down so as to give a more resolute 
look to the whole affair. And, after gaining Moltke's as- 
surance that everything was ready for war, he proceeded 
to condense it. The facts here can only be understood by 
a comparison of the two versions. We therefore give the 
original as sent to Bismarck by Abeken, Secretary to the 
Foreign Office, who was then at Ems: 

"His Majesty writes to me: 'Count Benedetti spoke to 
me on the promenade, in order to demand from me, 
finally in a very importunate manner, that I should 
authorise him to telegraph at once that I bound myself 
for all future time never again to give my consent if the 
Hohenzollems should renew their candidature. I refused 
at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor possi- 
ble to undertake engagements of this kind d tout jamais. 



Causes of the Franco-German War 51 

Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no news, 
and as he was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid 
than myself, he could see clearly that my Government once 
more had no hand in the matter.' His Majesty has since 
received a letter from the Prince. His Majesty, having 
told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting news from the 
Prince, has decided, with reference to the above demand, 
upon the representation of Count Eulenburg and myself, 
not to receive Count Benedetti again, but only to let him 
be informed through an aide-de-camp: 'That his Majesty 
had now received from the Prince confirmation of the news 
which Benedetti had already received from Paris, and had 
nothing further to say to the ambassador.' His Majesty 
leaves it to your Excellency whether Benedetti's fresh 
demand and its rejection should not be at once communi- 
cated both to our ambassadors and to the press." 

Bismarck cut this down to the following: 

"After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary 
Prince of Hohenzollem had been officially communicated 
to the Imperial Government of France by the Royal 
Government of Spain, the French ambassador at Ems 
further demanded of his Majesty the King that he would 
authorise him to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty the 
King bound himself for all future time never again to give 
his consent if the Hohenzollems should renew their can- 
didature. His Majesty the King thereupon decided not 
to receive the French ambassador again, and sent to tell 
him through the aide-de-camp on duty that his Majesty 
had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador." 

Efforts have been made to represent Bismarck's "edit- 
ing" of the Ems telegram as the decisive step leading to 
war; and in his closing years, when seized with the morbid 



J 



52 The European Nations 

desire of a partly discredited statesman to exaggerate his 
influence on events, he himself sought to perpetuate this 
version. He claims that the telegram, as it came from 
Ems, described the incident there "as a fragment of a 
negotiation still pending, and to be continued at Berlin." 
This claim is quite untenable. A careful perusal of the 
original despatch from Ems shows that the negotiation, 
far from being "still pending," was clearly described as 
having been closed on that matter. That Benedetti so 
regarded it is proved by his returning at once to Paris. If 
it could have been "continued at Berlin," he most cer- 
tainly would have proceeded thither. Finally, the words 
in the original as to the King's refusing Benedetti "some- 
what sternly" were omitted, and very properly omitted, 
by Bismarck in his abbreviated version. Had he included 
those words, he might have claimed to be the final cause 
of the War of 1870. As it is, his claim must be set aside as 
the offspring of senile vanity. His version of the original 
Ems despatch did not contain a single offensive word, 
neither did it alter any statement. Abeken also admitted 
that his original telegram was far too long, and that Bis- 
marck was quite justified in abbreviating it as he did.^ 

If we pay attention, not to the present more complete 
knowledge of the whole affair, but to the imperfect in- 
formation then open to the German public, war was the 

1 Heinrich Abeken, by Hedwig Abeken, p. 375. Bismarck's 
successor in the Chancellory, Count Caprivi, set matters in their 
true light in a speech in the Reichstag shortly after the publication 
of Bismarck's Reminiscences. 

I dissent from the views expressed by the well-informed reviewer 
of QUivier's L'Empire liberal (viii.) in the Times of May 27, 1904, 
who pins his faith to an interview of Bismarck with Lord Loftus 
on July 13, 1870. Bismarck, of course, wanted war; but so did 
Gramont, and I hold that the latter brought it about. 



Causes of the Franco-German War 53 

natural result of the second and very urgent demand that 
came from Paris. The Due de Gramont in despatching it 
must have known that he was playing a desperate game. 
Either Prussia would give way and France would score a 
diplomatic triumph over a hated rival, or Prussia would 
fight. The friends of peace in France thought matters 
hopeless when that demand was sent in so insistent a 
manner. As soon as Gladstone heard of the second de- 
mand of the Ollivi^r Ministry, he wrote to Lord Granville, 
then Foreign Minister: "It is our duty to represent the 
immense responsibility which will rest upon France, if she 
does not at once accept as satisfactory and conclusive the 
withdrawal of the candidature of Prince Leopold." i 

On the other hand, we must note that the conduct of the 
German press at this crisis was certainly provocative of 
war. The morning on which Bismarck's telegram appeared 
in the official North German Gazette saw a host of violent 
articles against France, and gleeful accounts of imaginary 
insults inflicted by the King on Benedetti. All this was to 
be expected after the taunts of cowardice freely levelled by 
the Parisian papers against Prussia for the last two days; 
but whether Bismarck directly inspired the many sensa- 
tional versions of the Ems affair that appeared in North 
Cierman papers on July 14th is not yet proven. 

However that may be, the French Government looked 
on the refusal of its last demand, the publication of Bis- 
marck's telegram, and the insults of the German press as a 
casus belli. The details of the sitting of the Emperor's 
Council at 10 p.m. on Jul> 14th, at which it was decided to 
call out the French reserves, are not yet known. Ollivier 
was not present. There had been a few hours of wavering 
> J. Morley, Life of Gladstone, ii., p. 328. 



54 The European Nations 

on this question ; but the tone of the Parisian evening 
papers — it was the French national day — the loud cries of 
the rabble for war, and their smashing the windows of the 
Prussian embassy, seem to have convinced the Emperor 
and his advisers that to draw back now would involve 
the fall of the dynasty. Report has uniformly pointed to 
the Empress as pressing these ideas on her consort, and the 
account which the Due de Gramont later on gave to Lord 
Malmesbury of her words at that momentous Council- 
meeting support a popular rumour. It is as follows: 

"Before the final resolve to declare war the Emperor, 
Empress, and Ministers went to St. Cloud. After some 
discussion Gramont told me that the Empress, a high- 
spirited and impressionable woman, made a strong and 
most excited address, declaring that 'war was inevitable 
if the honour of France was to be sustained.' She was 
immediately followed by Marshal Leboeuf, who, in the 
most violent tone, threw down his portfolio and swore that 
if war was not declared he would give it up and renounce 
his military rank. The Emperor gave way, and Gramont 
went straight to the Chamber to announce the fatal news.^ 

On the morrow (July 15th) the Chamber of Deputies 
appointed a Commission, which hastily examined the 

1 This version has, I believe, not been refuted. Still, I must 
look on it with suspicion. No Minister who had done so much 
to stir up the war-feeling ought to have made any such confession 
— least of all against a lady, who could not answer it. M. Seignobos, 
in his Political History of Contemporary Europe, i., chap, vi., p. 184 
(Eng. edit.), says of Gramont: " He it was who embroiled France in 
the war with Prussia." In the course of the parliamentary inquiry 
of 1872 Gramont convicted himself and his Cabinet of folly in 1870 
by using these words: "Je crois pouvoir declarer que si on avait 
eu un doute, un seule doute, sur notre aptitude a la guerre, on e<it 
immediatement arrete la negociation" {Enquete parlementaire, I., 
i., p. 108). 



Causes of the Franco-German War 55 

diplomatic documents and reported in a sense favourable to 
the Ollivier Ministry. The subsequent debate made strongly 
for a rupture ; and it is important to note that Ollivier and 
Gramont based the demand for warlike preparations on 
the fact that King William had refused to see the French 
ambassador, and held that that alone was a sufhcient in- 
sult. In vain did Thiers protest against the war as in- 
opportune, and demand to see all the necessary documents. 
The Chamber passed the war supplies by 246 votes to 10; 
and Thiers had his windows broken. Late on that night 
Gramont set aside a last attempt of Lord Granville to offer 
the mediation of England in the cause of peace, on the 
ground that this would be to the harm of France — "unless 
means were found to stop the rapid mobilisation of the 
Prussian armies which were approaching our frontier."^ 
In this connection it is needful to state that the order for 
mobilising the North German troops was not given by the 
King of Prussia until late on July 15th, when the war votes 
of the French Chambers were known at Berlin. 

Benedetti, in his review of the whole question, passes the 
following very noteworthy and sensible verdict: "It was 
public opinion which forced the [French] Government to 
draw the sword, and by an irresistible onset dictated its 
resolutions. " 2 This is certainly true for the public opin- 
ion of Paris, though not of France as a whole. The rural 
districts, which form the real strength of France, nearly 
always cling to peace. It is significant that the Prefects 
of French Departments reported that only sixteen declared 
in favour of war, while thirty-seven were in doubt on the 
matter, and thirty-four accepted war with regret. This is 

> Quoted by Sorel, op. cit., i., 196. 

2 Benedetti, Ma Mission en Prusse, p. 411. 



56 The European Nations 

what might be expected from a people which in the Prov- 
inces is marked by prudence and thrift. 

In truth, the people of modem Europe have settled down 
to a life of peaceful industry, in which war is the most hate- 
ful of evils. On the other hand, the massing of mankind 
in great cities, where thought is superficial and feelings 
can quickly be stirred by a sensation-mongering press, has 
undoubtedly helped to feed political passions and national 
hatred. A rural population is not deeply stirred by stories 
of slights to ambassadors. The peasant of Brittany had no 
active dislike for the peasant of Brandenburg. Each only 
asked to be left to till his fields in peace and safety. But 
the crowds on the Parisian boulevards and in Unter den 
Linden took (and seemingly always will take) a very 
different view of life. To them the news of the humiliation 
of the rival beyond the Rhine was the greatest and there- 
fore the most welcome of sensations; and, unfortunately, 
the papers which pandered to their taste set the tone of 
thought for no small part of France and Germany, and 
exerted on national policy an influence out of all propor- 
tion to its real weight. 

The story of the Franco-German dispute is one of national 
\| jealousy, carefully fanned for four years by newspaper 
editors and popular speakers until a spark sufficed to set 
Western Europe in a blaze. The spark was the Hohen- 
zollem candidature, which would have fallen harmless had 
not the tinder been prepared since Koniggratz by journal- 
ists at Paris and Berlin. The resulting conflagration may 
justly be described as due partly to national friction and 
partly to the supposed interests of the Napoleonic dynasty, 
N but also to the heat engendered by a sensational press. 

It is well that one of the chief dangers to the peace of the 



Causes of the Franco-German War 57 

modem world should be clearly recognised. . The central- 
isation of governments and of population may have its 
advantages; but over against them we must set grave 
drawbacks; among those of a political kind the worst are 
the growth of nervousness and excitability, and the craving 
for sensation — qualities which undoubtedly tend to em- 
bitter national jealousies at all times, and in the last case 
to drive weak dynasties or cabinets on to war. Certainly 
Bismarck's clever shifts to bring about a rupture in 1870 
would have failed had not the atmosphere both at Paris 
and Berlin been charged with electricity. 1 

1 Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern died at Berlin on June 8, 1905. 
He was bom in 1835 and in 1 861 married the Infanta of Portugal 



CHAPTER II 

FROM WORTH TO GRAVELOTTE 

"The Chief of the General Staff had his eye fixed from the first 
upon the capture of the enemy's capital, the possession of which 
is of more importance in France than in other countries. 
It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be laid for a pro- 
longed period and carried out in every point." — Von Moltke, The 
Franco-German War. 

IN olden times, before the invention of long-range arms 
of precision, warfare was decided mainly by indi- 
vidual bravery and strength. In the modem world victory 
has inclined more and more to that side which carefully 
prepares beforehand to throw a force, superior alike in 
armament and numbers, against the vitals of its enemy. 
Assuming that the combatants are fairly equal in physical 
qualities — and the spread of liberty has undoubtedly 
lessened the great differences that once were observable in 
this respect among European peoples — war becomes largely 
an affair of preliminary organisation. That is to say, it is 
now a matter of brain rather than muscle. Writers of the 
school of Carlyle may protest that all modem warfare is 
tame when compared with the splendidly rampant animal- 
ism of the Homeric fights. In the interests of humanity 
it is to be hoped that the change will go on until war be- 
comes wholly scientific and utterly unattractive. Mean- 
while, the soldier-caste, the politician, and the tax-payer 
have to face the fact that the fortunes of war are very 

58 



From Worth to Gravelotte 59 

largely decided by humdrum costly preparations in time 
of peace. 

The last chapter set forth the causes that led to war in 
1870. That event found Germany fully prepared. The 
lessons of the campaign of 1866 had not been lost upon the 
Prussian General Staff. The artillery was improved alike 
in materiel and in drill tactics, Napoleon I.'s plan of bring- 
ing massed batteries to bear on decisive points being de- 
veloped with Prussian thoroughness. The cavalry learnt 
to scout effectively and act as "the eyes and ears of an 
army," as well as to charge in brigades on a wavering foe. 
Universal military service had been compulsory in Prussia 
since 18 13; but the organisation of territorial army corps 
now received fuller development, so that each part of 
Prussia, including, too, most of the North German Con- 
federation, had its own small army complete in all arms, 
and reinforced from the reserve, and, at need, from the 
Landwehrr} By virtue of the military conventions of 
1866, the other German States adopted a similar system, 
save that while Prussians served for three years (with few 
exceptions in the case of successful examinees), the South 
Germans served with the colours for a shorter period. 
Those conventions also secured uniformity, or harmony, 
in the railway arrangements for the transport of troops. 

The general staff of the North German army had used 
these advantages to the utmost, by preparing a most com- 
plete plan of mobilisation, so complete, in fact, that the 

1 By the Prussian law of November 9, 1867, soldiers had to serve 
three years with the colours, four in the reserve, and five in the 
Landwehr. Three new army corps (9th, loth, and nth) were 
formed in the newly annexed or confederated lands — Hanover, 
Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, etc. (Maurice, The Franco-German War, 
1900). 



6o The European Nations 

myriad orders had only to be drawn from their pigeon- 
holes and dated in the last hours of July 15th. Forthwith 
the whole of the vast machinery started in swift but 
smooth working. Reservists speedily appeared at their 
regimental depots, there found their equipment, and 
speedily brought their regiments up to the war footing; 
trains were ready, timed according to an elaborate plan, 
to carry them Rhinewards; provisions and stores were 
sent forward, ohne Hast, ohne Rast, as the Germans say ; 
and so perfect were the plans on rail, river, and road that 
none of those blocks occurred which frequently upset the 
plans of the French. Thus, by dint of plodding prepara- 
tion, a group of federal States gained a decisive advantage 
over a centralised Empire which left too many things to 
be arranged in the last few hours. 

Herein lies the true significance of the War of 1870. All 
Governments that were not content to jog along in the old 
military ruts saw the need of careful organisation, including 
the eventual control of all needful means of transport; and 
all that were wise hastened to adapt their system to the 
new order of things, which aimed at assuring the swift, 
orderly movement of great masses of men by all the re- 
sources of mechanical science. Most of the civilised States 
soon responded to the new needs of the age; but a few 
(among them Great P)ritain) were content to make one or 
two superficial changes and slightly increase the number 
of troops, while leaving the all-important matter of or- 
ganisation almost untouched; and that, too, despite the 
vivid contrast which every one could see between the 
machine-like regularity of the German mobilisation and 
the chaos that reigned on the French side. 

Outwardly, the French army appeared to be beyond the 



From Worth to Gravelotte 6i 

reach of criticism. The troops had in large measure seen 
active service in the various wars whereby Napoleon III. 
fulfilled his promise of 1852 — "The Empire is peace"; and 
their successes in the Crimea, Lombardy, Syria, and China, 
everywhere, in fact, but Mexico, filled them with warlike 
pride. Armed with the chassepot, a newer and better 
rifle than the needle-gun, while their artillery (admittedly 
rather weak) was strengthened by the tnitrailleuse , they 
claimed to be the best in the world, and burned to measure 
swords with the upstart forces of Prussia. 

But there was a sombre reverse to this bright side. All 
thinking Frenchmen, including the Emperor, were aware 
of grave defects — the lack of training of the officers, ^ and 
the want of adaptability in the general staff, which had 
little of that practical knowledge that the German staff 
secured by periods of service with the troops. Add to this 
the leaven of republicanism working strongly in the army 
as in the State, and producing distrust between officers and 
men; above all, the lack of men and materials; and the 
outlook was not reassuring to those who knew the whole 
truth. Inclusive of the levies of the year 1869, which were 
not quite ready for active service, France would have by 
August I, 1870, as many as 567,000 men in her regular 
army; but, of these, colonial, garrison, and other duties 
claimed as many as 230,000, a figure which seems designed 
to include the troops that existed only on paper. Not 
only the personnel but the materiel came far below what 

I M. de la Gorce, in his Histoire du Second Empire, vi., tells how 
the French officers scouted study of the art of war, while most of 
them looked on favouritism as the only means of promotion. The 
warnings of Colonel Stofifel, French Military Attache at Berlin, were 
passed over as those of "a Prussomane, whom Bismarck had 
fascinated." 



62 The European Nations 

was expected. General Leboeuf, the War Minister, ven- 
tured to declare that all was ready, even to the last button 
on the gaiters; but his boast at once rang false when at 
scores of military depots neither gaiters, boots, nor uni- 
forms were ready for the reservists who needed them. 

Even where the organisation worked at its best, that 
best was slow and confused. There were no territorial 
army corps in time of peace ; and the lack of this organisa- 
tion led to a grievous waste of time and energy. Regiments 
were frequently far away from the depots which contained 
the reservists' equipment; and when these had found their 
equipment, they often wandered widely before finding 
their regiments on the way to the frontier. One general 
officer hunted about on the frontier for a command which 
did not exist. As a result of this lack of organisation, and 
of that control over the railways which the Germans had 
methodically enforced, France lost the many advantages 
which her compact territory and excellent railway system 
ought to have ensured over her more straggling and poorer 
rival. 

The loss of time was as fatal as it was singular under the 
rule of a Napoleon whose uncle had so often shattered his 
foes by swift movements of troops. In 1870 Napoleonic 
France had nothing but speed and dash on which to count. 
Numbers were against her. In 1869 Marshal Leboeuf had 
done away with the Garde Mobile, a sort of militia which 
had involved only fifteen days' drill in the year; and the 
Garde Nationale of the towns was less fit for campaigning 
than the re-formed Mobiles proved to be later on in the 
war. . Thus France had no reserves : everything rested on 
the 330,000 men struggling towards the frontiers. It is 
doubtful whether there were more than 220,000 men in the 



64 The European Nations 

first line by August 6th, with some 50,000 more in reserve 
at Metz, etc. 

Against them Germany could at once put into the field 
460,000 infantry, 56,000 cavalry, with 1,584 cannon; and 
she could raise these forces to some 1,180,000 men by 
calling out all the reserves and the Landwehr. These last 
were men who had served their time and had not, as a rule, 
lost their soldierly qualities in civil life. Nearly 400,000 
highly trained troops were ready to invade France early in 
August. 

In view of these facts it seems incredible that Ollivier, 
the French Prime Minister, could have publicly stated that 
he entered on war with a light heart. Doubtless Ministers 
counted on help from Austria or Italy, perhaps from both; 
but, as it proved, they judged too hastily. As was stated 
in Chapter I. of this work, Austria was not likely to move 
so long as Russia favoured the cause of Prussia; for any 
threatening pressure of the Muscovites on the open flank 
of the Hapsburg States, Galicia, has sufficed to keep them 
from embarking on a campaign in the West. In this case, 
the statesmen of Vienna are said to have known by July 
20th that Russia would quietly help Prussia; she informed 
the Hapsburg Government that any increase in its arma- 
ments would be met by a corresponding increase in those 
of Russia. The meaning of such a hint was clear; and 
Austria decided not to seek revenge for Koniggratz unless 
the French triumph proved to be overwhelming. As for 
Italy, her alliance with France alone was very improbable, 
for the reasons previously stated. 

Another will-o'-the-wisp which flitted before the ardent 
Bonapartists who pushed on the Emperor to war was that 
the South German States would forsake the North and 



From Worth to Gravelotte 65 

range their troops under the French eagles, as they had 
done in the years 1805-12. The first plan of campaign 
drawn up at Paris aimed at driving a solid wedge of French 
troops between the two Confederations and inducing or 
compelling the South to join France; it was hoped that 
Saxony would follow. As a matter of fact, ver\^ many of 
the South Germans and Saxons disliked Prussian suprem- 
acy ; Catholic Bavaria looked askance at the growing power 
of Protestant Prussia. Wurtemberg was Protestant, but 
far too democratic to wish for the control of the cast-iron 
bureaucrats of Berlin. The same was even more true of 
Saxon}^ where hostility to Prussia was a deep-rooted tra- 
dition; some of the Saxon troops on leaving their towns 
even shouted, "Napoleon soil leben!"^ It is therefore 
quite possible that, had France struck quickly at the 
valleys of the Neckar and Main, she might have reduced 
the South German States to neutrality. Alliance perhaps 
was out of the question save under overwhelming com- 
pulsion; for France had alienated the Bavarian and Hessian 
Governments by her claims in 1866, and the South German 
people by her recent offensive treatment of the Hohen- 
zoUem candidature. It is, however, safe to assert that 
if Napoleon I. had ordered French affairs he would have 
swept the South Germans into his net a month after the 
outbreak of war, as he had done in 1805. But nature had 
not bestowed warlike gifts on the nephew, who took com- 
mand of the French army at Metz at the close of July, 
1870. His feeble health, alternating with periods of severe 
pain, took from him all that buoyancy which lends life to 
an army and vigour to the headquarters; and his chief of 

^I.e., "Long live Napoleon!" The author had this from an 
Englishman who was then Uving in Saxony. 



66 The European Nations 

staff, Leboeur, did not make good the lack of these qual- 
ities in the nominal chief. 

All the initiative and vigour were on the east of the 
Rhine. The spread of the national principle to Central 
and South Germany had recently met with several checks; 
but the diplomatic blunders of the French Government, 
the threats of their press that the Napoleonic troops would 
repeat the wonders of 1805; above all, admiration of the 
dignified conduct of King William under what were thought 
to be gratuitous insults from France, began to kindle the 
flame of German patriotism even in the particularists of 
the South. The news that the deservedly popular Crown 
Prince of Prussia, Frederick William, would command the 
army now m.ustering in the Palatinate, largely composed 
of South Germans, sent a thrill of joy through those States. 
Taught by the folly of her stay-at-home strategy in 1866, 
Bavaria readily sent her large contingent beyond the 
Rhine; and all danger of a French irruption into South 
Germany was ended by the speedy massing of the Third 
German army, some 200,000 strong in all, on the north of 
Alsace. For the French to cross the Rhine at Speyer, or 
even at Kehl, in front of a greatly superior army (though 
as yet the\^ knew not its actual strength) was clearly im- 
possible ; and in the closing hours of July the French head- 
quarters fell back on other plans, which, speaking generally, 
were to defend the French frontier from the Moselle to the 
Rhine by striking at the advanced German troops. At 
least, that seems to be the most natural explanation of the 
sudden and rather flurried changes then made. 

It was wise to hide this change to a strategic defensive 
by assuming a tactical offensive; and on' August 2nd two 
divisions of Frossard's corps attacked and drove back the 



From Worth to Gravelotte 67 

advanced troops of the Second German army from Saar- 
briicken. The affair was unimportant: it could lead to 
nothing, unless the French had the means of following up 
the success. This they had not; and the advance of the 
First and Second German armies, commanded by General 
Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles, was soon to de- 
prive them of this position. 

Meanwhile the Germans were making ready a weightier 
enterprise. The muster of the huge Third army to the 
north of Alsace enabled their general staff to fix August 
4th for a general advance against that frontier. It fell to 
this army, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, Frederick 
William, to strike the first great blow. Early on August 
4th a strong Bavarian division advanced against the small 
fortified to^v^n of Weissenburg, which lies deep down in the 
valley of the Lauter, surrounded by lofty hills. There it 
surprised a weak French division, the vanguard of Mac- 
Mahon's army, commanded by General Abel Douay, whose 
scouts had found no trace of the advancing enemy. About 
10 A.M. Douay fell, mortally wounded; another German 
division, working round the town to the east, carried the 
strong position of the Geisberg; and these combined ef- 
forts, frontal and on the flank, forced the French hastily 
to retreat westwards over the hills to Worth, after losing 
more than two thousand men. 

The news of this reverse and of the large German forces 
ready to pour into the north of Alsace led the Emperor to 
order the 7th French corps at Belfort, and the 5th in and 
around Bitsch, to send reinforcements to MacMahon, whose 
main force held the steep and wooded hills between the 
villages of Worth, Froschweiler, and Reichshofen. The 
line of railway between Strassburg and Bitsch touches 



68 The European Nations 

Reichshofen ; but, for some reason that has never been 
satisfactorily explained, MacMahon was able to draw up 
only one division from the side of Strassburg and Belfort, 
and not one from Bitsch, which was within an easy march. 
The fact seems to be that de Failly, in command at Bitsch, 
was a prey to conflicting orders from Metz, and therefore 
failed to bring up the 5th corps as he should have done. 
MacMahon's cavalry was also very defective in scouting, 
and he knew nothing as to the strength of the forces 
rapidly drawing near from Weissenburg and the east. 

Certainly his position at Worth was very strong. The 
French lines were ranged along the steep wooded slope 
running north and south, with buttress-like projections, 
intersected by gullies, the whole leading up to a plateau on 
which stand the village of Froschweiler and the hainlet of 
Elsasshausen. Behind is the wood called the Grosser 
Wald, while the hamlet is flanked on the south and in 
front by an outlying wood, the Niederwald. Behind the 
Grosser Wald the ground sinks away to the valley in which 
runs the Bitsch-Reichshofen railway. In front of Mac- 
Mahon's position lay the village of Worth, deep in the 
valley of the Sauerbach. The invader would therefore 
have to carry this village, or cross the stream and press up 
the long, open slopes on which were ranged the French 
troops and batteries, with all the advantages of cover and 
elevation on their side. A poor general, having forces 
smaller than those of his enemy, might hope to hold such 
a position. But there was one great defect. Owing to de 
Failly's absence MacMahon had not enough men to hold 
the whole of the position marked out by nature for defence. 

Conscious of its strength, the Prussian Crown Prince 
ordered the leaders of his vanguard not to bring on a 



From Worth to Gravelotte 69 

general engagement on August 6th, when the invading army 
had not at hand its full striking strength.^ But orders 
failed to hold in the ardour of the Germans under the 
attacks of the French. Affairs of outposts along the 
Sauerbach early on that morning brought on a serious 
fight, which up to noon went against the invaders. At 
that time the Crown Prince galloped to the front, and 
ordered an atxack with all available forces. The fighting, 
hitherto fierce but spasmodic between division and division, 
was now fed by a steady stream of German reinforcements, 
until 87,000 of the invaders sought to wrest from Mac- 
Mahon the heights, with their woods and villages, which 
he had but 54,000 to defend. The superiority of numbers 
soon made itself felt. Pursuant to the Crown Prince's 
orders, parts of two Bavarian corps began to work their 
way (but with one strangely long interval of inaction) 
through the wood to the north of the French left wing ; on 
the Prussian nth corps fell the severer task of winning 
their way up the slopes south of Worth, and thence up to 
the Niederwald and Elsasshausen. When these woods were 
won, the 5th corps was to make its frontal attack from 
Worth against Froschweiler. Despite the desperate efforts 
of the French and their Turco regiments, and a splendid 
but hopeless charge of two regiments of Cuirassiers and one 
of Lancers against the German infantry, the Niederwald 
and Elsasshausen were won; and about four o'clock the 
sustained fire of fifteen German batteries against Frosch- 
weiler enabled the 5th corps to struggle up that deadly 
glacis in spite of desperate charges by the defenders. 

' See von Blumenthal's Journals, p. 87 (Eng. edit.): "The battle 
which I had expected to take place on the 7 th, and for which I 
had prepared a good scheme for turning the enemy's right flank, 
came on of itself to-day." 



yo The European Nations 

Throughout the day the French showed their usual dash 
and devotion, some regiments being cut to pieces rather 
than retire. But by, five o'clock the defence was out- 
flanked on the two wings and crushed at the centre; 
human nature could stand no more after eight hours' 
fighting; and after a final despairing effort of the French 
Cuirassiers all their line gave way in a general rout down 
the slopes to Reichshofen and towards Saveme. Apart 
from the Wurtembergers held in reserve, few of the Ger- 
mans were in a condition to press the pursuit. Never- 
theless the fruits of victory were very great: ten thousand 
Frenchmen lay dead or wounded ; six thousand un wounded 
prisoners were taken, with twenty-eight cannon and five 
mitrailleuses. Above all, MacMahon's fine army was utterly 
broken, and made no attempt to defend any of the po- 
sitions on the north of the Vosges. Not even a tunnel 
was there blown up to delay the advance of the Germans. 
Hastily gathering up the 5th corps from Bitsch, — the corps 
which ought to have been at Worth, — that gallant but 
unfortunate general struck out to the south-west for the 
great camp at Chalons. The triumph, however, cost the 
Germans dear. As many as 10,600 men were killed or 
wounded, the 5th Prussian corps alone losing more than 
half that number. Their cavalry failed to keep touch 
with the retreating French. 

On that same day (August 6th) a disaster scarcely less 
serious overtook the French 2nd corps, which had been 
holding Saarbriicken. Convinced that that post was too 
advanced and too weak in presence of the foremost divi- 
sions of the First and Second German armies now advanc- 
ing rapidly against it. General Frossard drew back his 
vanguard some mile and a half to the line of steep hills 



From Worth to Gravelotte 71 

between Spicheren and Forbach, just within the French 
frontier. This retreat, as it seemed, tempted General 
Kameke to attack with a single division, as he was justified 
in doing in order to find the direction and strength of the 
retiring force. The attack, when pushed home, showed 
that the French were bent on making a stand on their 
commanding heights ; and an onset on the Rothe Berg was 
stoutly beaten off about noon. 

But now the speedy advance and intelligent co-operation 
of other German columns was instrumental in turning an 
inconsiderable repulse into an important victory. General 
Goben was not far off, and, marching towards the firing, 
sent to offer his help with the 8th corps. General von 
Alvensleben, also, with the 3rd corps had reached Neun- 
kirchen when the sound of firing near Saarbriicken led him 
to push on for that place with the utmost speed. He en- 
trained part of his corps and brought it up in time to 
strengthen the attack on the Rothe Berg and other heights 
nearer to Forbach. Each battalion as it arrived was 
hurled forward, and General von Frangois, charging with 
his regiment, gained a lodgment half-way up the broken 
slope of the Rothe Berg, which was stoutly maintained 
even when he fell mortally wounded. Elsewhere the 
onsets were repelled by the French, who, despite their 
smaller numbers, kept up a sturdy resistance on the line 
of hills in the woods behind, and in the iron-works in front 
of Forbach. Even when the Germans carried the top of 
the Rothe Berg, their ranks were riddled by a cross-fire; 
but by incredible exertions they managed to bring guns to 
the summit and retaliate with effect.^ 

I For these details about the fighting at the Rothe Berg I am 
largely indebted to my friend Mr. Bernard Pares, M.A., who has 



72 The European Nations 

This, together with the outflanking movement which 
their increasing numbers enabled them to carry out against 
the French left wing at Forbach, decided the day, and 
Frossard's corps fell back, shattered, towards the corps of 
Bazaine. It is noteworthy that this was but nine or ten 
miles to the rear. Bazaine had ordered three divisions to 
march toward the firing: one made for a wrong point and 
returned; the others made half-hearted efforts, and thus 
left Frossard to be overborne by numbers. The result of 
these disjointed movements was that both Frossard and 
Bazaine hurriedly retired towards Metz, while the First 
and Second German armies now gathered up all their 
strength with the aim of shutting up the French in that 
fortress. To this end the First army made for Colombey, 
east of Metz, while the leading part of the Second army 
purposed to cross the Moselle south of Metz and circle 
round that stronghold on the west. 

It is now time to turn to the French headquarters. 
These two crushing defeats on a single day utterly dashed 
Napoleon's plan of a spirited defence of the north-east 
frontier until such time as the levies of 1869 should be 
ready, or Austria and Italy should draw the sword. On 
July 26th the Austrian ambassador assured the French 
Ministry that Austria was pushing on her preparations. 
Victor Emmanuel was with difficulty restrained by his 
ministers from openly taking the side of France. On the 
night of August 6th he received telegraphic news of the 
battles of Worth and Forbach, whereupon he exclaimed, 
"Poor Emperor! I pity him, but I have had a lucky 
escape." Austria also drew back, and thus left France 

made a careful study of the ground there, as also at W6rth and 
Sedan 



From Worth to Gravelotte li 

face to face with the naked truth that she stood alone and 
unready before a united and triumphant Germany, able 
to pour treble her own forces through the open portals of 
Lorraine and Northern Alsace. 

Napoleon III., to do him justice, had never cherished the 
wild dreams that haunted the minds of his consort and of 
the frothy "mamelukes" lately in favour at Court; still 
less did the "silent man of destiny" indulge in the idle 
boasts that had helped to alienate the sympathy of Europe 
and to weld together Germany to withstand the blows of 
a second Napoleonic invasion. The nephew knew full well 
that he was not the Great Napoleon — he knew it before 
Victor Hugo in spiteful verse vainly sought to dub him the 
Little. True, his statesmanship proved to be mere dreamy 
philosophising about nationalities; his administrative 
powers, small at the best, were ever clogged by his too 
generous desire to reward his fellow-conspirators of the 
coup d'etat of 185 1; and his gifts for war were scarcely 
greater than those of the other Napoleonides, Joseph and 
Jerome. Nevertheless the reverses of his early life had 
strengthened that fund of quiet stoicism, that energy to resist 
if not to dare, which formed the backbone of an otherwise 
somewhat weak, shadowy, and uninspiring character. And 
now, in the rapid fall of his fortunes, the greatest adventurer 
of the nineteenth century showed to the full those qualities 
of toughness and dignified reserve which for twenty years 
had puzzled and imposed on that lively, emotional people. 
By the side of the downcast braggarts of the Court and the 
unstrung screamers of the Parisian press, his mien had 
something of the heroic. Tout peut se retablir, — -' ' All may yet 
be set right," — ^such was the vague but dignified phrase in 
which he summarised the results of August 6th to his people. 



74 The European Nations 

The military situation now required a prompt retire- 
ment beyond the Moselle. The southerly line of retreat 
which MacMahon and de Failly had been driven to take 
forbade the hope of their junction with the main army at 
Metz in time to oppose a united front to the enemy. And 
it was soon known that their flight could not be stayed at 
Nancy or even at Toul. During the agony of suspense as 
to their movements and those of their German pursuers, 
the Emperor daily changed his plans. First, he and 
Leboeuf planned a retreat beyond the Moselle and Meuse; 
next, political considerations bade them stand firm on the 
banks of the Nied, some twelve miles east of Metz; and, 
when this position seemed unsafe, they ended the march- 
ings and counter-marchings of their troops by taking up 
a position at Colombey, nearer to Metz. 

Meanwhile at Paris the Chamber of Deputies had over- 
thrown the Ollivier Ministry, and the Empress Regent 
■ installed in office Count Palikao. There was a general out- 
cry against Leboeuf, and on the 12 th the Emperor resigned 
the command to Marshal Bazaine (Lebrun now acting as 
chief of staff), with the injunction to retreat to Verdun. 
For the Emperor to order such a retreat in his own 
name was thought to be inopportune. Bazaine was a 
convenient scapegoat, and he himself knew it. Had he 
thrown an army corps into Metz and obeyed the Em- 
peror's orders by retreating on Verdun, things would 
certainly have gone better than was now to be the 
case. In his printed defence Bazaine has urged that 
the army had not enough provisions for the march, 
and, further, that the outlying forts of Metz were not 
yet ready to withstand a siege — a circumstance which, 
if true, partly explains Bazaine's reluctance to leave 



From Worth to Gravelotte 75 

the "virgin city." ^ Napoleon III. quitted it early on the 
1 6th: he and his escort were the last Frenchmen to get 
free of that death-trap for many a week. 

While Metz exercised this fatal fascination over the 
protecting army, the First and Second German armies 
were striding westwards to envelop both the city and its 
guardians. Moltke's aim was to hold many of the French 
in the neighbourhood of the fortress, while his left wing 
swung round it on the south. The result was the battle of 
Colombey on the east of Metz (August 14th). It was a 
stubborn fight, costing the Germans some five thousand 
men, while the French with smaller losses finally withdrew 
under the eastern walls of Metz. But that heavy loss 
meant a great ultimate gain to Germany. The vacillations 
of Bazaine, whose strategy was far more faulty than that of 
Napoleon III. had been, together with the delay caused by 
the defiling of a great part of the army through the narrow 
streets of Metz, gave the Germans an opportunity such as 
had not occurred since the year 1805, when Napoleon I. 
shut up an Austrian army in Ulm. 

The man who now saw the splendid chance of which 
Fortune vouchsafed a glimpse, was Lieutenant-General von 
Alvensleben, commander of the 3rd corps, whose activity 
and resource had so largely contributed to the victory of 
Spicheren-Forbach. Though the orders of his Commander- 
in-Chief, Prince Frederick Charles, forbade an advance 
until the situation in front was more fully known, the 
General heard enough to convince himself that a rapid 

1 Bazaine gave this excuse in his Rapport sommaire stir les Opera- 
tions de I'Armee dti Rhin; but as a staff officer pointed out in his 
incisive Reponse, this reason must have been equally cogent when 
Napoleon (August 12th) ordered him to retreat; and he was still 
bound to obey the Emperor's orders. 



76 The European Nations 

advance southwards to and over the Moselle might enable 
him to intercept the French retreat on Verdun, which 
might now be looked on as certain. Reporting his con- 
viction to his chief, as also to the royal headquarters, he 
struck out with all speed on the 15th, quietly threw a 
bridge over the river, and sent on his advanced guard as 
far as Pagny near Gorze, while all his corps, about 33,000 
strong, crossed the river about midnight. Soon after 
dawn, he pushed on towards Gorze, knowing by this time 
that the other corps of the Second army were following 
him, while the 7th and 8th corps of the First army were 
about to cross the river nearly opposite that town. 

This bold movement, which would have drawn on him 
sharp censure in case of overthrow, was more than justifi- 
able seeing the discouraged state of the French troops, the 
supreme need of finding their line of retreat, and the 
splendid results that must follow on the interception of 
that retreat. The operations of war must always be at- 
tended with risk, and the great commander is he whose 
knowledge of the principles of strategy enables him quickly 
to see when the final gain warrants the running of risks 
and how they may be met with the least likelihood of 
disaster. 

Alvensleben's advance was in accordance with Moltke's 
general plan of operations; but that corps leader, finding 
the French to be in force between him and Metz, deter- 
mined to attack them in order to delay their retreat. The 
result was the battle of August i6th, variously known as 
Vionville, Rezonville, or Mars-la-Tour — a battle that de- 
fies brief description, inasmuch as it represented the effort 
of the 3rd, or Brandenburg, corps, with little help at 
first from others, to hold its ground against the onsets of 



From Worth to Gravelotte 77 

two French corps. Early in the fight Bazaine galloped 
up, but he did not bring forward the masses in his rear, 
probably because he feared to be cut off from Metz. Even 
so, all through the forenoon, it seemed that the gathering 
forces of the French must break through the thin lines 
audaciously thrust into that almost open plain on the 
flank of their line of march. But Alvensleben and his 
men held their ground with a dogged will that nothing 
could shatter. In one sense their audacity saved them. 
Bazaine for a long time could not believe that a single 
corps would throw itself against one of the two roads by 
which his great army was about to retreat. He believed 
that the northern road might also be in danger, and there- 
fore did not launch at Alvensleben the solid masses that 
must have swept him back towards the Meuse. At noon 
four battalions of the German loth corps struggled up 
from the south and took their share of the hitherto unequal 
fight. 

But the crisis of the fight came a little later. It was 
marked by one of the most daring and effective strokes 
ever dealt in modem warfare. At two o'clock, when the 
advance of Canrobert's 6th corps towards Vionville 
threatened to sweep away the wearied Brandenburgers, six 
squadrons of the 7th regiment of Cuirassiers with a few 
Uhlans flung themselves on the new lines of foemen, not 
to overpower them — that was impossible — but to delay 
their advance and weaken their impact. Only half of the 
brave horsemen returned from that ride of death, but they 
gained their end. 

The mad charge drove deep into the French array about 
Rezonville, and gave their leaders pause in the belief that 
it was but the first of a series of svstematic attacks on 



78 The European Nations 

the French left. System rather than dash was supposed 
to characterise German tactics; and the daring of their 
enemies for once made the French too methodical. Ba- 
zaine scarcely brought the 3rd corps and the Guard into 
action at all, but kept them in reserve. As the afternoon 
sun waned, the whole weight of the German loth corps was 
thrown into the fight about Vionville, and the vanguards 
of the 8th and 9th came up trom Gorze to threaten the 
French left. Fearing that he might be cut off from Metz 
on the south — a fear which had unaccountably haunted him 
all the day — Bazaine continued to feed that part of his 
lines; and thus Alvensleben was able to hold the positions 
near the southern road to Verdun, which he had seized in 
the morning. The day closed with a great cavalry com- 
bat on the German left wing in which the French had to 
give way. Darkness alone put an end to the deadly 
strife. Little more than two German corps had sufficed 
to stay the march of an army which potentially numbered 
in all more than 170,000 men. 

On both sides the losses were enormous, namely, some 
16,000 killed and wounded. No cannon, standards, or 
prisoners were taken; but on that day the army of Prince 
Frederick Charles practically captured the whole of Ba- 
zaine's army. The statement may seem overdrawn, but 
it is none the less true. The advance of other German 
troops on that night made Bazaine's escape from Metz 
far more difficult than before, and very earl}'' on the 
morrow he drew back his lines through Gravelotte to a 
strong position nearer Metz. Thus, a battle, which in a 
tactical sense seemed to be inconclusive, became, when 
viewed in the light of strategy, the most decisive of the 
war. Had Bazaine used even the forces which he had in 



From Worth to Gravelotte 79 

the field ready to hand he must have overborne Alvens- 
leben; and the arrival of 170,000 good troops at Verdun or 
Chalons would have changed the whole course of the war. 
The campaign would probably have followed the course 
of the many campaigns waged in the valleys of the Meuse 
and Marne; and Metz, held by a garrison of suitable size, 
might have defied the efforts of a large besieging army 
for fully six months. These conjectures are not fanciful. 
The duration of the food-supply of a garrison cut off from 
the outside world varies inversely with the size of that 
garrison. The experiences of armies invading and defend- 
ing the east of France also show with general accuracy 
what might have been expected if the rules of sound 
strategy had been observed. It was the actual course of 
events which transcended experience and set all proba- 
bilities at defiance. 

The battle of Gravelotte, or St. Privat, on the i8th, com- 
pleted the work so hardily begun by the 3rd German corps 
on the 1 6th. The need of driving back Bazaine's army 
upon Metz was pressing, and his inaction on the 17th gave 
time for nearly all the forces of the First and Second Ger- 
man armies to be brought up to the German positions, 
some nine miles west of Metz, though one corps was left 
to the east of that fortress to hinder any attempt of the 
French to break out on that side.. Bazaine, however, 
massed his great army on the west along a ridge stretching 
north and south, and presenting, especially in the southern 
half, steep slopes to the assailants. It also sloped away 
to the rear, thus enabling the defenders (as was the case 
with Wellington at Waterloo) secretly to reinforce any 
part of the line. On the French left wing, too, the slopes 
curved inward, thus giving the defenders ample advantage 



8o The European Nations 

against any flanking movements on that side. On the 
north, between Amanvillers and Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, 
the defence had fewer strong points except those villages, 
the Jaumont Wood, and the gradual slope of the ground 
away to the little River Ome, which formed an open glacis. 
Bazaine massed his reserves on the plateau of Plappeville 
and to the rear of his left wing; but this cardinal fault in 
his dispositions — due to his haunting fear of being cut off 
from Metz — was long hidden by the woods and slopes in 
the rear of his centre. The position here and on the French 
left was very strong, and at several points so far concealed 
the troops that up to ii a.m. the advancing Germans were 
in doubt whether the French would not seek to break 
away towards the north-west. That so great an army 
would remain merely on the defensive, a course so repug- 
nant to the ardour of the French nature and the tradi- 
tions of their army, entered into the thoughts of few. 

Yet such was the case. The solution of the riddle is to 
be found in Bazaine's despatch of August 17th to the Minis- 
ter of War: "We are going to put forth every effort to 
make good our supplies of all kinds in order to resume our 
march in two days if that is possible." ^ That the army 
was badly hampered by lack of stores is certain; but to 
postpone even for a single day the march to Verdun by the 
northern road, that by way of Briey, was fatal. Possibly, 
however, he hoped to deal the Germans so serious a blow 
if they attacked him on the i8th, as to lighten the heavy 
task of cutting his way out on the 19th. 

If so, he nearly succeeded. The Germans were quite 

J Bazaine, Rapport sommaire, etc. The sentence quoted above 
is decisive. The defence which Bazaine and his few defenders 
later on put forward, as well as the attacks of his foes, are of course 
mixed uo with theories evolved after the event. 



82 The European Nations 

taken aback by the extent and strength of his lines. Their 
intention was to outflank his right wing, which was be- 
lieved to stretch no farther north than Amanvillers; but 
the rather premature advance of Manstein's 9th corps 
soon drew a deadly fire from that village and the heights 
on either side, which crushed the artillery of that corps. 
Soon the Prussian Guards and the 12th corps began to 
suffer from the fire poured in from the trenches that 
crowned the hill. On the German right, General Stein- 
metz, instead of waiting for the hoped-for flank attack on 
the north to take effect, sent the columns of the First 
Army to almost certain death in the defile in front of 
Gravelotte, and he persisted in these costly efiforts even 
when the strength of the French position on that side was 
patent to all. For this the tough old soldier met with 
severe censure and ultimate disgrace. In his defence, 
however, it may be urged that when a great battle is raging 
with doubtful fortunes, the duty of a commander on the 
attacking side is to busy the enemy at as many points as 
possible, so that the final blow may be dealt with telling 
effect on a vital point where he cannot be adequately re- 
inforced; and the bulldog tactics of Steinmetz in front of 
Gravelotte, which cost the assailants many thousands of 
men, at any rate served to keep the French reserves on 
that side, and thereby weaken the support available for a 
more important point at the crisis of the fight. It so 
happened, too, that the action of Steinmetz strengthened 
the strange misconception of Bazaine that the Germans 
were striving to cut him off from Metz on the south. 

The real aim of the Germans was exactly the contrary, 
namely, to pin his whole army to Metz by swinging round 
their right flank on the villages of St. Privat and Raucourt. 



From Worth to Gravelotte 83 

Having some 40,000 men under Canrobert in. and between 
these villages, whose solid buildings gave the defence the 
best of cover, Bazaine had latterly taken little thought for 
that part of his lines, though it was dangerously far re- 
moved from his reserves. These he kept on the south, 
under the misconception which clung to him here as at 
Rezonville. 

The mistake was to prove fatal. As we have said, the 
German plan was to turn the French right wing in the more 
open country on the north. To this end the Prussian 
Guards and the Saxons, after driving the French outposts 
from Ste. Marie -aux-Chenes, brought all their strength to 
the task of crushing the French at their chief stronghold 
on the right, St. Privat. The struggle of the Prussian 
Guards up the open slope between that village and Aman- 
villers left them a mere shadow of their splendid array ; but 
the efforts of the German artillery cost the defenders dear: 
by seven o'clock St. Privat was in flames, and as the 
Saxons (the 12th corps), wheeling round from the north 
after a long flank-march, closed in on the outlying village 
of Raucourt, Canrobert saw that the day was lost unless 
he received prompt aid from the Imperial Guard. Bour- 
baki, however, brought up only some three thousand of 
these choice troops, and that too late to save St. Privat 
from the persistent fury of the German onset. 

As dusk fell over the scene of carnage the French right 
fell back in some disorder, even from part of Amanvillers, 
Farther south, they held their ground. On the whole, 
they had dealt to their foes a loss of 20,159 men, or nearly 
a tenth of their total. Of the French forces engaged, some 
150,000 in number, 7853 were killed and wounded, and 
4419 were taken prisoners. This disproportion in the 



84 The European Nations 

losses shows the toughness of the French defence and the 
(in part) unskilful character of the German attack. On 
this latter point the recently published Journals of Field 
Marshal Count von Blumenthal supply some piquant de- 
tails. He describes the indignation of King William at 
the wastefulness of the German tactics at Gravelotte: "He 
complained bitterly that the officers of the higher grades 
appeared to have forgotten all that had been so carefully 
taught them at manoeuvres, and had apparently all lost 
their heads." The same authority supplies what may be 
in part an explanation of this in his comment, written 
shortly before Gravelotte, that he believed there might 
not be another battle in the whole war — a remark which 
savours of presumption and ioWy. Gravelotte, therefore, 
cannot be considered as wholly creditable to the victors. 
Still, the result was that some 180,000 French troops were 
shut up within the outworks of Metz.i 

' For fuller details of these battles the student should consult 
the two great works on the subject — the staff histories of the war, 
issued by the French and German general staffs; Bazaine, L'Armee 
du Rhin and Episodes de la Guerre; General Blumenthal's Journals; 
Aus drei Kriegen, by General von Lignitz; Maurice, The Franco- 
German War; Hooper, The Campaign of Sedan; the war corre- 
spondence of the Times and the Daily News, published in book form- 



CHAPTER III 

SEDAN 

"Nothing is more rash and contrary to the principles of war 
than to make a flank march before an army in position, especially 
when this army occupies heights before which it is necessary to 
defile." — Napoleon I. 

THE success of the German operations to the south and 
west of Metz virtually decided the whole of the cam- 
paign. The Germans could now draw on their vast re- 
serves ever coming on from the Rhine, throw an iron ring 
around that fortress, and thereby deprive France of her 
only great force of regular troops. The throwing up of 
field-works and barricades went on with such speed that 
the blockading forces were able in a few days to detach a 
strong column towards Chalons-sur-Marne in order to help 
the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia. That army in 
the meantime was in pursuit of MacMahon by way of 
Nancy, and strained every nerve so as to be able to strike 
at the southern railway lines out of Paris. It was, how- 
ever, diverted to the north-west by events soon to be 
described. 

The German force detached from the neighbourhood of 
Metz consisted of the Prussian Guards, the 4th and 12th 
corps, and two cavalry divisions. This army, known as 

85 



86 The European Nations 

the Army of the Meuse, was placed imder the command of 
the Crown Prince of Saxony. Its aim was, in common 
with the Third German army (that of the Crown Prince of 
Prussia), to strike at MacMahon before he received rein- 
forcements. The screen of cavalry which preceded the 
Army of the Meuse passed that river on the 22nd, when the 
bulk of the forces of the Crown Prince of Prussia crossed 
not many miles farther to the south. The two armies 
swept on westwards within easy distance of one another; 
and on the 23rd their cavalry gleaned news of priceless 
value, namely, that MacMahon's army had left Chalons. 
On the next day the great camp was found deserted. 

In fact, MacMahon had undertaken a task of terrible 
difhculty. On taking over the command at Chalons, 
where Napoleon III. arrived from Metz on the i6th, he 
found hopeless disorder not only among his own beaten 
troops, but among many of the newcomers ; the worst were 
the Garde Mobile, many regiments of whom greeted the 
Emperor with shouts of "A Paris!'' To meet the Germans 
in the open plains of Champagne with forces so incoherent 
and dispirited was sheer madness ; and a council of war on 
the 17th came to the conclusion to fall back on the capital 
and operate within its outer forts — a step which might 
enable the army to regain confidence, repress any rising in 
the capital, and perhaps inflict checks on the Germans, 
until the provinces rose en masse against the invaders. 
But at this very time the Empress-Regent and the Palikao 
Ministry at Paris came to an exactly contrary decision, on 
the ground that the return of the Emperor with MacMahon's 
army would look like personal cowardice and a mean de- 
sertion of Bazaine at Metz. The Empress was for fighting 
a outrance, and her Government issued orders for a national 



Sedan 87 

rising and the enrolling of bodies of francs-tireurs, or 
irregulars, to harass the Germans.^ 

Their decision was telegraphed to Napoleon III. at 
Chalons. Against his own better judgment the Emperor 
yielded to political considerations — that millstone around 
the neck of the French army in 1870 — and decided to 
strike out to the north with MacMahon's army, and by 
way of Montmedy stretch a hand to Bazaine, who, on his 
side, was expected to make for that rendezvous. On the 
2ist, therefore, they marched to Reims. There the Em- 
peror received a despatch which Bazaine had been able to 
get through the enemies' lines on the 19th, stating that the 
Germans were making their way in on Metz, but that he 
(Bazaine) hoped to break away towards Montmedy and 
so join MacMahon's army. (This, it will be observed, was 
after Gravelotte had been lost.) Napoleon III. thereupon 
replied: "Received yours of the 19th at Reims; am going 
towards Montmedy ; shall be on the Aisne the day after to- 
morrow, and there will act according to circumstances to 
come to your aid." Bazaine did not receive this message 
until August 30th, and then made only two weak efforts to 
break out on the north (August 3ist-September ist). The 
Marshal's action in sending that message must be pro- 
nounced one of the most fatal in the whole war. It led the 
Emperor and MacMahon to a false belief as to the position 
at Metz, and furnished a potent argument to the Empress 

• See General Lebrun's Guerre de iSjo: Bazeilles-Sedan, for an 
account of his corps of MacMahon's army. 

In view of the events of the late Boer War, it is worth noting 
that the Germans never acknowledged the francs-tireurs as soldiers, 
and forthwith issued an order ending with the words, "They are 
amenable to martial law and liable to be sentenced to death" (Mau- 
rice, Franco-German War, p. 215). 



88 The European Nations 

and Palikao at Paris to urge a march towards Montm^dy 
at all costs. 

Doubtfully MacMahon led his straggling array from 
Reims in a north-easterly direction towards Stenay on the 
Meuse. Rain checked his progress, and dispirited the 
troops; but on the 27th of August, while about half-way be- 
tween the Aisne and the Meuse, his outposts touched those 
of the enemy. They were, in fact, those of the Prussian 
Crown Prince, whose army was about to cross the north- 
em roads over the Argonne, the line of hills that saw the 
French stem the Prussian invasion in 1792. Far different 
was the state of affairs now. National enthusiasm, or- 
ganisation, enterprise — -all were on the side of the invaders. 
As has been pointed out, their horsemen found out on the 
23rd that the Chalons camp was deserted; on the next day 
their scouts found out from a Parisian newspaper that 
MacMahon was at Reims; and, on the day following, news- 
paper tidings that had come round by way of London re- 
vealed the secret that MacMahon was striving to reach 
Bazaine. 

How it came about that this news escaped the eye of 
the censor has not been explained. If it was the work of 
an English journalist, that does not absolve the official 
censorship from the charge of gross carelessness in leaving 
even a loophole for the transmission of important secrets. 
Newspaper correspondents, of course, are the natural 
enemies of governments in time of war ; and the experience 
of the year 1870 shows that the fate of empires may depend 
on the efficacy of the arrangements for controlling them. 
As a proof of the superiority of the German organisation, 
or of the higher patriotism of their newspapers, we may 
mention that no tidings of urgent importance leaked out 



Sedan 89 

through the German press. This may have been due to 
a solemn declaration made by German newspaper editors 
and correspondents that they would never reveal such 
secrets ; but, from what we know of the fierce competition 
of newspapers for priority of news, it is reasonable to sup- 
pose that the German Government took very good care 
that none came in their way. 

As a result of the excellent scouting of their cavalr}^ and 
of the slipshod press arrangements of the French Govern- 
ment, the German Army of the Meuse, on the 26th, took a 
general turn towards the north-west. This movement 
brought its outposts near to the southernmost divisions of 
MacMahon, and sent through that Marshal's staff the fore- 
boding thrill felt by the commander of an imseaworthy 
craft at the oncoming of the first gust of a cyclone. He 
saw the madness of holding on his present course and 
issued orders for a retreat to Mezieres, a fortress on the 
Meuse below Sedan. Once more, however, the Palikao 
Ministry intervened to forbid this salutary move, — the only 
way out of imminent danger, — and ordered him to march 
to the relief of Bazaine. At this crisis Napoleon III. 
showed the good sense which seemed to have deserted the 
French politicians: he advised the Marshal not to obey 
this order if he thought it dangerous. Nevertheless Mac- 
Mahon decided to yield to the supposed interests of the 
dynasty, which the Emperor was ready to sacrifice to the 
higher claims of the safety of France. Their roles were 
thus curiously reversed. The Emperor reasoned as a soimd 
patriot and a good strategist. MacMahon must have felt 
the same promptings, but obedience to the Empress and 
the Ministry, or chivalrous regard for Bazaine, overcame 
his scruples. He decided to plod on towards the Meuse. 



90 The European Nations 

The Germans were now on the alert to entrap this army 
that exposed its flank in a long line of march near to the 
Belgian frontier. Their ubiquitous horsemen captured 
French despatches which showed them the intended moves 
in MacMahon's desperate game; Moltke hurried up every 
available division; and the elder of the two Alvenslebens 
had the honour of surprising de Failly's corps amidst the 
woods of the Ardennes near Beaumont, as they were in the 
midst of a meal. The French rallied and offered a brisk 
defence, but finally fell back in confusion northwards on 
Mouzon, with the loss of 2000 prisoners and 42 guns 
(August 30th). 

This mishap, the lack of provisions, and the fatigue and 
demoralisation of his troops, caused MacMahon on the 
31st, to fall back on Sedan, a little town in the valley of 
the Meuse. It is surrounded by ramparts planned by the 
great Vauban, but, being commanded by wooded heights, 
it no longer has the importance that it possessed before the 
age of long-range guns of precision. The chief strength of 
the position for defence lay in the deep loop of the river 
below the town, the dense Garenne Wood to the north- 
east, and the hollow formed by the Givonne brook on the 
east, with the important village of Bazeilles. It is there- 
fore not surprising that von Moltke, on seeing the French 
forces concentrating in this hollow, remarked to von 
Blumenthal, chief of the staff: "Now we have them in a 
trap; to-morrow we must cross over the Meuse early in 
the morning." 

The Emperor and MacMahon seem even then, on the 
afternoon of the 31st, to have hoped to give their weary 
troops a brief rest, supply them with provisions and stores 
from the fortress, and on the morrow, or the 2nd, make their 



Sedan 91 

escape by way of Mezieres. Possibly they might have done 
so on that night, and certainly they could have reached 
the Belgian frontier, only some six miles distant, and there 
laid down their arms to the Belgian troops whom the re- 
sourceful Bismarck had set on the qui vive. To remain 
quiet even for a day in Sedan was to court disaster; yet 
passivity characterised the French headquarters and the 
whole army on that afternoon and evening. True, Mac- 
Mahon gave orders for the bridge over the Meuse at Don- 
chery to be blown up, but the engine-driver who took the 
engineers charged with this important task lost his nerve 
when German shells whizzed about his engine, and drove 
off before the powder and tools could be deposited. A 
second party, sent later on, found that bridge in the pos- 
session of the enemy. On the east side, above Sedan, 
the Bavarians seized the railway bridge south of Bazeilles, 
driving off the French who sought to blow it up.^ 

Over the Donchery bridge and two pontoon bridges con- 
stucted below that village the Germans poured their troops 
before dawn of September ist, and as the morning fog of 
that day slowly lifted, their columns were seen working 
round the north of the deep loop of the Meuse, thus cutting 
off escape on the west and north-west. Meanwhile, on the 
other side of the town, von der Tann's Bavarians had begun 
the fight. Pressing in on Bazeilles so as to hinder the 
retreat of the enemy (as had been so effectively done at 
Colombey, on the east of Metz), they at first surprised the 
sleeping French, but quickly drew on themselves a sharp 
and sustained counter-attack from the marines attached 
to the 12th French corps. 

' Moltke, The Franco-German War, i., p. 114; Hooper, The Cam- 
paign of Sedan, p. 296. 



92 The European Nations 

In order to understand the persistent vigour of the 
French on this side, we must note the decisions fonned by 
their headquarters on August 31st and early on September 
ist. At a council of war held on the afternoon of the 31st 
no decision was reached, probably because the exhaustion of 
the 5th and 7th corps and the attack of the Bavarians on 
the 12th corps at Bazeilles rendered any decided move- 
ment very difficult. The general conclusion was that the 
army must have some repose; and Germans afterwards 
found on the battlefield a French order — "Rest to-day for 
the whole army." But already, on the 30th, an officer had 
come from Paris determined to restore the morale of the 
army and break through towards Bazaine. This was 
General de Wimpffen, who had gained distinction in pre- 
vious wars, and, coming lately from Algeria to Paris, was 
there appointed to supersede de Failly in command of the 
5th corps. Nor was this all. The Palikao Ministry ap- 
parently had some doubts as to MacMahon's energy, and 
feared that the Emperor himself hampered the operations. 
De Wimpffen therefore received an unofficial mandate to 
infuse vigour into the counsels at headquarters, and was 
entrusted with a secret written order to take over the 
supreme command if anything were to happen to Mac- 
Mahon. On taking command of the 5th corps on the 
30th, de Wimpffen found it demoralised by the hurried 
retreat through Mouzon ; but neither this fact nor the ex- 
haustion of the whole army abated the determination of 
this stalwart soldier to break through towards Metz. 

Early on September ist the positions held by the French 
formed, roughly speaking, a triangle resting on the right 
bank of the Meuse from near Bazeilles to Sedan and Glaire. 
Damming operations and the heavy rains of previous days 



Sedan 93 

had spread the river over the low-lying meadows, thus 
rendering it difficult, if not impossible, for an enemy to 
cross under fire; but this same fact lessened the space 
by which the French could endeavour to break through. 
Accordingly they deployed their forces almost wholly 
along the inner slopes of the Givonne brook and of the 
smaller stream that flows from the high land about Illy 
down to the village of Floing and thence to the Meuse. 
The heights of Illy, crowned by the Calvaire, formed the 
apex of the French position, while Floing and Bazeilles 
formed the other comers of what was in many respects 
good fighting-ground. Their strength was about 120,000 
men, though many of these were disabled or almost help- 
less from fatigue; that of the Germans was greater on the 
whole, but three of their corps could not reach the scene 
of action before i p.m. owing to the heaviness of the roads.i 
At first, then, the French had a superiority of force and 
far more compact position, as will be seen by the plan on 
page 94. 

We now resume the account of the battle. The fighting 
in and around Bazeilles speedily led to one very important 
result. At 6 a.m. a splinter of a shell fired by the as- 
sailants from the hills north-east of that village severely 
wounded Marshal MacMahon as he watched the conflict 
from a point in front of the village of Balan. Thereupon 
he named General Ducrot as his successor, passing over 
the claims of two generals senior to him. Ducrot, realising 
the seriousness of the position, prepared to draw off the 
troops towards the Calvaire of Illy preparatory to a retreat 
on Mezieres by way of St. Menges. The news of this im- 
pending retreat, which must be conducted under the hot 

1 Maurice, The Franco-German War, p. 235. 



94 The European Nations 

fire of the Germans now threatening the Hne of the Givonne, 
cut de WimpfTen to the quick. He knew that the Crown 
Prince held a force to the south-west of Sedan, ready to 
fall on the flank of any force that sought to break away 
to Mezieres; and a temporary success of his own 5th corps 
against the Saxons in La Moncelle strengthened his pre- 
possession in favour of a combined move eastwards towards 
Carignan and Metz. Accordingly, about nine o'clock he 
produced the secret order empowering him to succeed 
MacMahon should the latter be incapacitated. Ducrot at 
once yielded to the ministerial ukase ; the Emperor sought 
to intervene in favour of Ducrot, only to be waved aside 
by the confident de WimpfTen; and thus the long conflict 
between MacMahon and the Palikao Ministry ended in 
victory for the latter — and disaster for France. 1 

In hazarding this last statement we do not mean to im- 
ply that a retreat on Mezieres would then have saved the 
whole army. It might, however, have enabled part of it to 
break through either to Mezieres or the Belgian boundary ; 
and it is possible that Ducrot had the latter objective in 
view when he ordered the concentration at Illy. In any 
case, that move was now countermanded in favour of a 
desperate attack on the eastern assailants. It need hardly 
be said that the result of these vacillations was deplorable, 
unsteadying the defenders, and giving the assailants time 
to bring up troops and cannon, and thereby strengthen 
their grip on every important point. Especially valuable 
was the approach of the 2nd Bavarian corps; setting out 
from Raucourt at 4 a.m. it reached the hills south of Sedan 
about 9, and its artillery posted near Frenois began a 
terrible fire on the town and the French troops near it. 

» See Lebrun's Guerre de i8yo: Bazetlles-Sedan, for these disputes. 



Sedan 95 

About the same time the second division of the Saxons 
reinforced their hard-pressed comrades to the north of La 
Moncelle, where, on de Wimpffen's orders, the French were 
making a strong forward move. The opportune arrival of 
these new German troops saved their artillery, which had 
been doing splendid service. The French were driven back 
across the Givonne with heavy loss, and the massed battery 
of one hundred guns crushed all further efforts at advance 
on this side. Meanwhile at Bazeilles the marines had 
worthily upheld the honour of the French arms. Despite 
the terrible artillery fire now concentrated on the village, 
they pushed the German footmen back, but never quite 
drove them out. These, when reinforced, renewed the 
fight with equal obstinacy; the inhabitants themselves 
joined in with whatever weapons fury suggested to them; 
and as that merciless strife swayed to and fro amidst the 
roar of artillery, the crash of walls, and the hiss of flame, 
war was seen in all its naked ferocity. 

Yet here again, as at all points, the defence was gradually 
overborne by the superiority of the German artillery. 
About eleven o'clock the French, despite their superhuman 
efforts, were outflanked by the Bavarians and Saxons on 
the north of the village. Even then, when the regulars 
fell back, some of the inhabitants went on with their mad 
resistance; a great part of the village was now in flames, 
but whether they were kindled by the Germans, or by the 
retiring French so as to delay the victors, has never been 
cleared up. In either case, several of the inhabitants 
perished in the flames; and it is admitted that the Ba- 
varians burnt some of the villagers for firing on them from 
the windows.! 

' M. Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, i., p. i-'^. 



96 The European Nations 

In the defence of Bazeilles the French infantry showed 
its usual courage and tenacity. Elsewhere the weary and 
dispirited columns were speedily becoming demoralised 
under the terrific artillery fire which the Germans poured 
in from many points of vantage. The Prussian Guards 
coming up from Villers Cemay about lo a.m. planted their 
formidable batteries so as to sweep the Bois de Garenne 
and the ground about the Calvaire d'llly from the east- 
ward; and about that time the guns of the 5th and nth 
German corps, that had early crossed the Meuse below 
Sedan, were brought to bear on the west front of that 
part of the French position. The apex of the defenders' 
triangle was thus severely searched by some 200 guns; 
and their discharges, soon supported by the fire of skir- 
mishers and volleys from the troops, broke all forward 
movements of the French on that side. On the south and 
south-east as many cannon swept the French lines, but 
from a greater distance. 

Up to nearly noon there seemed some chance of the 
French bursting through on the north, and some of them 
did escape. Yet no well-sustained effort took place on 
that side, apparently because, even after the loss of Bazeilles 
at eleven o'clock, de Wimffpen clung to the belief that he 
could cut his way out towards Carignan, if not by Bazeilles, 
then perhaps by some other way, as Daigny or La Moncelle. 
The reasoning by which he convinced himself is hard to 
follow; for the only road to Carignan on that side runs 
through Bazeilles. Perhaps we ought to say that he did 
not reason, but was haunted by one fixed notion; and the 
history of war from the time of the Roman Varro down to 
the age of the Austrian Mack and the French de Wimp- 
ffen shows that men whose brains work in grooves and take 



Sedan 97 

no account of what is on the right hand and the left, are 
not fit to command armies ; they only yield easy triumphs 
tf, the great masters of warfare, — Hannibal, Napoleon the 
Great, and von Moltke. 

De Wimp ff en, we say, paid little heed to the remon- 
strances of Generals Douay and Ducrot at leaving the 
northern apex and the north-western front of the defence 
to be crushed by weight of metal and of numbers. He 
rode off towards Balan, near which village the former de- 
fenders of Bazeilles were making a gallant and partly suc- 
cesstul stand, and no reinforcements were sent to the hills 
on the north. The villages of Illy and Floing were lost; 
then the French columns gave ground even up the higher 
ground behind them, so great was the pressure of the 
German converging advance. Worst of all, skulkers began 
to hurry from the ranks and seek shelter in the woods, or 
even under the ramparts of Sedan far in the rear. The 
French gunners still plied their guns with steady devotion, 
though hopelessly outmatched at all points, but it was 
clear that only a great forward dash could save the day. 
Ducrot therefore ordered General Margueritte with three 
choice cavalry regiments (Chasseurs d'Afrique) and several 
squadrons of Lancers to charge the advancing lines. Mov- 
ing forward from the northern edge of the Bois de Garenne 
to judge his ground, Margueritte fell mortally wounded. 
De Banff remont took his place, and those brave horsemen 
swept forward on a task as hopeless as that of the Light 
Brigade at Balaclava, or that of the French Cuirassiers at 
Worth.i Their conduct was as glorious; but the terrible 

« Lebrun {op. cit., pp. 126-127; ^^so Appendix D) maintains that 
de Baufifremont then led the charge, de Gallifet leading only the 
3rd Chasseurs d'Afriaue. 



98 The European Nations 

power of the modem rifle was once more revealed, The 
pounding of distant batteries they could brave ; disordered 
but defiant they swept on towards the German lines, but 
when the German infantry opened fire almost at pistol 
range, rank after rank of the horsemen went down as grass 
before the scythe. Here and there small bands of horse- 
men charged the footmen on the flank, even in a few cases 
on their rear, it is said; but the charge, though bravely 
renewed, did little except to delay the German triumph 
and retrieve the honour of France. 

By about two o'clock the French cavalry was practically 
disabled, and there now remained no Imperial Guard, as at 
Waterloo, to shed some rays of glory over the disaster. 
Meanwhile, however, de Wimpffen had resolved to make 
one more effort. Gathering about him a few of the best 
infantry battalions in and about Sedan, he besought the 
Emperor to join him in cutting a way out towards the east. 
The Emperor sent no answer to this appeal; he judged 
that too much blood had already been needlessly shed. 
Still de Wimpflen persisted in his mad endeavour: burst- 
ing upon the Bavarians in the village of Balan, he drove 
them back for a space until his men, disordered by the 
rush, fell before the stubborn rally of the Bavarians and 
Saxons. With the collapse of this effort and the cutting 
up of the French cavalry behind Floing, the last frail 
barriers to the enemy's advance gave way. The roads to 
Sedan were now thronged with masses of fugitives, whose 
struggles to pass the drawbridges into the little fortress 
resembled an African battue; for King William and his 
staff, in order to hurry on the inevitable surrender, bade the 
two hundred or more pieces on the southern heights play 
upon the town. Still de Wimpffen refused to surrender, 



Sedan Q9 

and, despite the orders of his sovereign, continued the hope- 
less struggle. At length, to stay the frightful carnage, the 
Emperor himself ordered the white flag to be hoisted.^ 
A German officer went down to arrange preliminaries, and 
to his astonishment was ushered into the presence of the 
Emperor. The German staff had no knowledge of his 
whereabouts. On hearing the news, King William, who 
throughout the day sat on horseback at the top of the 
slope behind Frenois, said to his son, the Crown Prince, 
"This is indeed a great success; and I thank thee that thou 
hast contributed to it." He gave his hand to his son, who 
kissed it, and then, in turn, to Moltke and to Bismarck, 
who kissed it also. In a short time, the French General 
Reille brought to the King the following autograph letter: 

"Monsieur mon Frere — N'ayant pu mourir au milieu 
de mes troupes, il ne me reste qu'a remettre mon epee entre 
les mains de Votre Majeste. — ^Je suis de Votre Majeste le 
bon Frere 

" Napoleon. 

' Sedan, le i^"^ Septembre, 1870. 

The King named von Moltke to arrange the terms and 
then rode away to a village farther south, it being ar- 
ranged, probably at Bismarck's suggestion, that he should 
not see the Emperor until all was settled. Meanwhile de 
Wimpffen and other French generals, in conference with 
von Moltke, Bismarck, and Blumenthal, at the village of 
Donchery, sought to gain easy terms by appealing to their 
generosity and by arguing that this would end the war and 
earn the gratitude of France. To all appeals for permis- 
sion to let the captive army go to Algeria, or to lay down 
its arms in Belgium, the Germans were deaf, Bismarck 
» Lebrun, op. cit., pp. 130 et seq., for the disputes about surrender. 



loo The European Nations 

at length plainly saying that the French were an envi- 
ous and jealous people on whose gratitude it would be 
idle to count. De Wimpffen then threatened to renew the 
fight rather than surrender, to which von Moltke grimly 
assented, but Bismarck again interposed to bring about a 
prolongation of the truce. Early on the morrow, Napoleon 
himself drove out to Donchery in the hope of seeing the 
King. The Bismarckian Boswell has given us a glimpse 
of him as he then appeared: "The look in his light grey 
eyes was somewhat soft and dreamy, like that of people 
who have lived too fast." [In his case, we may remark, 
this was induced by the painful disease which never left 
him all through the campaign, and carried him off three 
years later.] "He wore his cap a little on the right, to 
which side his head also inclined. His short legs were out 
of proportion to the long upper body. His whole ap- 
pearance was a little unsoldier-like. The man looked too 
soft, I might say too spongy, for the uniform he wore." 

Bismarck, the stalwart Teuton who had wrecked his 
policy at all points, met him at Donchery and foiled his 
wish to see the King, declaring this to be impossible until 
the terms of the capitulation were settled. The Emperor 
then had a conversation with the Chancellor in a little 
cottage belonging to a weaver. Seating themselves on 
two rush-bottomed chairs beside the one deal table, they 
conversed on the greatest affairs of State. The Emperor 
said he had not sought this war — "he had been driven into 
it by the pressure of public opinion. I replied" (wrote 
Bismarck) "that neither had any one with us wished for 
war — the King least of all." ^ Napoleon then pleaded for 

' Busch, Bismarck on the Franco-German War, i., p. 109. Con- 
trast this statement with his later eflforts (^Reminiscences , ii., pp. 
95-100) to prove that he helped to bring on war. 



Sedan roi 

generous terms, but admitted that he, as a prisoner, could 
not fix them; they must be arranged with de Wimpffen. 
About ten o'clock the latter agreed to an unconditional 
surrender for the rank and file of the French army, but 
those officers who bound themselves by their word of 
honour (in writing) not to fight again during the present 
war were to be set free. Napoleon then had an interview 
with the King. What transpired is not known, but when 
the Emperor came out "his eyes," wrote Bismarck, 
"were full of tears." 

The fallen monarch accepted the King's offer of the 
castle of Wilhelmshohe near Cassel for his residence up to 
the end of the war; it was the abode on which Jerome 
Bonaparte had spent millions of thalers, wrung from 
Westphalian burghers, during his brief sovereignty in 
1807-13. Thither his nephew set out two days after 
the catastrophe of Sedan. And this, as it seems, was the 
end of a dynasty whose rise to power dated from the 
thrilling events of the Bridge of Lodi, Areola, Rivoli, and 
the Pyramids. The French losses on September ist were 
about 3000 killed, 14,000 wounded, and 21,000 prisoners. 
On the next day there surrendered 83,000 prisoners by 
virtue of the capitulation, along with 419 field-pieces and 
139 cannon of the fortress. Some 3000 had escaped, 
through the gap in the German lines on the north-east, to 
the Belgian frontier, and there laid down their arms. 

The news of this unparalleled disaster began to leak out 
at Paris late on the 2nd; and on the morrow, when details 
were known, crowds thronged into the streets shouting, 
"Down with the Empire! Long live the Republic! " Power 
still remained with the Empress-Regent and the Palikao 



102 The European Nations 

Ministry. All must admit that the Empress Eugenie did 
what was possible in this hopeless position. She appealed 
to that charming literary man, M. Prosper Merimee, to 
go to his friend, M. Thiers (at whom we shall glance 
presently), and beg him to form a Ministry that would 
save the Empire for the young Prince Imperial. M. 
Thiers politely but firmly refused to give a helping hand 
to the dynasty which he looked on as the author of his 
country's ruin. 

On that day the Empress also summoned the Chambers 
— the Senate and the Corps Legislatif — a vain expedient, 
for in times of crisis the French look to a man, not to 
Chambers. The Empire had no man at hand. General 
Trochu, Governor of Paris, was suspected of being a 
republican — ^at any rate he let matters take their course. 
On the 4th, vast crowds filled the streets ; a rush was made 
to the Chamber, where various compromises were being 
discussed; the doors were forced, and amid wild excite- 
ment a proposal to dethrone the Napoleonic dynasty was 
put. Two republican deputies, Gambetta and Jules Favre, 
declared that the Hotel de Ville was the fit place to declare 
the Republic. There, accordingly, it was proclaimed, the 
deputies for the city of Paris taking office as the Govern- 
ment of National Defence. They were just in time to 
prevent socialists like Blanqui, Flourens, and Henri 
Rochefort from installing the "Commune" in power. 
The Empress and the Prince Imperial at once fled, and, 
apart from a protest by the Senate, no voice was raised in 
defence of the Empire. Jules Favre, who took up the 
burden of Foreign Affairs in the new Government of 
National Defence, was able to say in his circular note of 
September 6th that "the revolution of September 4th took 



Sedan 103 

place without the shedding of a drop of blood or the loss 
of liberty to a single person." ^ 

That fact shows the unreality of Bonapartist rule in 
France. At bottom Napoleon III.'s ascendancy was due 
to several causes that told against possible rivals rather 
than directly in his favour. Hatred of the socialists, whose 
rash political experiments had led to the bloody days of 
street fighting in Paris in June, 1848, counted for much. 
Added to this was the unpopularity of the House of Or- 
leans after the sordid and uninteresting rule of Louis 
Philippe (1830-48). The antiquated royalism of the 
elder or Legitimist branch of that ill-starred dynasty made 
it equally an impossibility. Louis Napoleon promised to 
do what his predecessors, monarchical and republican, had 
signally failed to do, namely, to reconcile the claims of 
liberty and order at home and uphold the prestige of 
France abroad. For the first ten years the glamour of his 
name, the skill with which he promoted the material 
prosperity of France, and the successes of his early wars, 
promised to build up a lasting power. But then came the 
days of failing health and tottering prestige — of financial 
scandals, of the Mexican blunder, of the humiliation before 
the rising power of Prussia. To retrieve matters he toyed 
with democracy in France, and finally allowed his ministers 
to throw down a challenge to Prussia ; for, in the words of 
a French historian, the conditions on which he held power 
"condemned him to be brilliant." ^ 

Failing at Sedan, he lost all; and he knew it. His 
reign, in fact, was one long disaster for France. The 

1 Gabriel Hanotaux, Contemporary France, i., p. 14 (Eng. edit.). 

2 Said in 1852 by an eminent Frenchman to our countryman, 
Nassau Senior (Journals, ii., ad fin.). 



104 The European Nations 

canker of moral corruption began to weaken her public life 
when the creatures of whom he made use in the coup 
d'etat of 1 85 1 crept into place and power. The flashy 
sensationalism of his policy, setting the tone for Parisian 
society, was fatal to the honest, unseen drudgery which 
builds up a solid edifice alike in public and in private life. 
Even the better qualities of his nature told against ultimate 
success. As has been shown, his vague but generous ideas 
on nationality drew French policy away from the paths 
of obvious self-interest after the year 1864, and gave an 
easy victory to the keen and objective statecraft of Bis- 
marck. That he loved France as sincerely as he believed 
in the power of the Bonapartist tradition to help her can 
scarcely admit of doubt. His conduct during the War of 
1870 showed him to be disinterested, while his vision was 
clearer than that of the generals about him. But in the 
field of high policy, as in the moral events that make or 
mar a nation's life, his influence told heavily against the 
welfare of France ; and he must have carried into exile the 
consciousness that his complex nature and ill-matched 
strivings had but served to bring his dynasty and his 
country to an unexampled overthrow. 

It may be well to notice here an event of world-wide 
importance, which came as a sequel to the military collapse 
of France. Italians had always looked to the day when 
Rome would be the national capital. The great Napoleon 
during his time of exile at St. Helena had uttered the pro- 
phetic words: "Italy isolated between her natural limits 
is destined to form a great and powerful nation. 
Rome will without doubt be chosen by the Italians as their 
capital." The political and economic needs of the present 



Sedan 105 

coinciding herein with the voice of tradition, always so 
strong in ItaHan hearts, pointed imperiously to Rome as 
the only possible centre of national life. 

As was pointed out in the Introduction, Pius IX. after 
the years of revolution, 1848-49, felt the need of French 
troops in his capital, and his harsh and reactionary policy 
(or rather, that of his masterful Secretary of State, An- 
tonelli) before long completely alienated the feelings of his 
subjects. 

After the master-mind of Cavour was removed by death, 
(June, 186 1), the patriots struggled desperately, but in 
vain, to rid Rome of the presence of foreign troops and win 
her for the national cause. Garibaldi's raids of 1862 and 
1867 were foiled, the one by Italian, the other by French 
troops; and the latter case, which led to the sharp fight of 
Mentana, effaced any feelings of gratitude to Napoleon III. 
for his earlier help, which survived after his appropriation 
of Savoy and Nice. Thus matters remained in 1867-70, 
the Pope relying on the support of French bayonets to 
coerce his own subjects. Clearly this was a state of things 
which could not continue. The first great shock must 
always bring down a political edifice which rests not on its 
own foundations, but on external buttresses. These were 
suddenly withdrawn by the War of 1870. Early in August, 
Napoleon ordered all his troops to leave the Papal States; 
and the downfall of his power a month later absolved 
Victor Emmanuel from the claims of gratitude which he 
still felt towards his ally of 1859. 

At once the forward wing of the Italian national party 
took action in a way that either forced, or more probably 
encouraged, Victor Emmanuel's Government to step in 
under the pretext of preventing the creation of a Roman 



io6 The European Nations 

Republic. The King invited Pius IX. to assent to the 
peaceful occupation of Rome by the royal troops, and, on 
receiving the expected refusal, moved forward 35,000 sol- 
diers. The resistance of the 11,000 Papal troops proved 
to be mainly a matter of form. The wall near the Porta 
Pia soon crumbled before the Italian cannon, and after 
a brief struggle at the breach the white flag was hoisted 
at the bidding of the Pope (September 20th). 

Thus fell the temporal power of the Papacy. The event 
aroused comparatively little notice in that year of marvels, 
but its results have been momentous. At the time there 
was a general sense of relief, if not of joy, in Italy, that 
the national movement had reached its goal, albeit in so 
tame and uninspiring a manner. Rome had long been 
a prey to political reaction, accompanied by police super- 
vision of the most exasperating kind. The plebiscite as to 
the future government gave 133,681 votes for Victor Em- 
manuel's rule, and only 1507 negative votes. ^ 

Now, for the first time since the days of Napoleon I. 
and of the short-lived Republic for which Mazzini and 
Garibaldi worked and fought so nobly in 1849, the Eternal 
City began to experience the benefits of progressive rule. 
The royal Government soon proved to be very far from 
perfect. Favouritism, the multiplication of sinecures, 
municipal corruption, and the prosaic inroads of builders 
and speculators soon helped to mar the work of political 
reconstruction, and began to arouse a certain amount of 
regret for the more picturesque times of the Papal rule. A 
sentimental reaction of this kind is certain to occur in all 
cases of political change, especially in a city where tradition 
and emotion so long held sway. 

« Countess Cesaresco, The Liberation of Italy, p. 411. 



Sedan 107 

The consciences of the faithful were also troubled when 
the fiat of the Pope went forth excommunicating the 
robber-king and all his chief abettors in the work of sacri- 
lege. Sons of the Church throughout Italy were bidden 
to hold no intercourse with the interlopers and to take no 
part in elections to the Italian Parliament which thence- 
forth met in Rome. The schism between the Vatican and 
the King's Court and Government was never to be bridged 
over; and even to-day it constitutes one of the most per- 
plexing problems of Italy. 

Despite the fact that Rome and Italy gained little of 
that mental and moral stimulus which might have resulted 
from the completion of the national movement solely by 
the action of the people themselves, the fact nevertheless 
remains that Rome needed Italy and Italy needed Rome. 
The disappointment loudly expressed by idealists, senti- 
mentalists, and reactionaries must not blind us to the fact 
that the Italians, and above all the Romans, have benefited 
by the advent of unity, political freedom, and civic re- 
sponsibility. It may well be that, in acting as the leader 
of a constitutional people, the Eternal City will, little by 
little, develop higher gifts than those nurtured under Papal 
tutelage, and perhaps as beneficent to humanity as those 
which in the ancient world bestowed laws on Europe. 

As Mazzini always insisted, political progress, to be 
sound, must be based ultimately on moral progress. It is, 
of its very nature, slow, and is therefore apt to escape the 
eyes of the moralist or cynic who dwells on the untoward 
signs of the present. But the Rome for which Mazzini 
and his compatriots yearned and struggled can hardly fail 
ultimately to rise to the height of her ancient traditions 
and of that noble prophecy of Dante: "There is the seat 



io8 The European Nations 

of empire. There never was, and there never will be, a 
people endowed with such capacity to acquire command, 
with more vigour to maintain it, and more gentleness in 
its exercise, than the Italian nation, and especially the 
Holy Roman people." The lines with which Mr. Swin- 
burne closed his "Dedication" of Songs before Sunrise to 
Joseph, Mazzini are worthy of finding a place side by side 
with the words of the mediaeval seer: 

Yea, even she as at first, 

Yea, she alone and none other. 

Shall cast down, shall build up, shall bring home, 

Slake earth's hunger and thirst, 

Lighten, and lead as a mother; 

First name of the world's names, Rome. 






CHAPTER IV 

THE FOUNDING OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC 

" eyiyvero re Koyui ix^v Sr)tJ.OKpa.Tia, epy<a Se vvo tov wputTov avSpoi apx»j." 

"Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact 
ruled by her greatest man." — Thucydides, II., Ixv. 

THE aim of this work being to trace the outlines only 
of those outstanding events which made the chief 
States of the world what they are to-day, we can give only 
the briefest glance at the remaining events of the Franco- 
German War and the splendid though hopeless rally at- 
tempted by the newly installed Government of National 
Defence. Few facts in recent history have a more thrilling 
interest than the details of the valiant efforts made by the 
young Republic against the invaders. The spirit in which 
they were made breathed through the v/ords of M. Picard's 
proclamation on September 4th: "The Republic saved us 
from the invasion of 1792. The Republic is proclaimed." 
Inspiring as was this reference to the great and successful 
effort of the First Republic against the troops of Central 
Europe in 1792, it was misleading. At that time Prussia 
had lapsed into a state of weakness through the double 
evils of favouritism and a facing-both-ways policy. Now 
she felt the strength born of sturdy championship of a 
great principle, that of Nationality, which had ranged 
nearly the whole of the German race on her side. France, 

109 



Tio The European Nations 

on the other hand, owing to the shocking blunders of her 
politicians and generals during the war, had but one army 
corps free, that of General Vinoy, which hastily retreated 
from the neighbourhood of Mezieres towards Paris on 
September 2nd to 4th. She therefore had to count almost 
entirely on the Garde Mobile, the Garde Nationale, and 
jrancs-tireurs; but bitter experience was to show that 
this raw material could not be organised in a few weeks to 
withstand the trained and triumphant legions of Germany. 

Nevertheless there was no thought of making peace with 
the invaders. The last message of Count Palikao to the 
Chambers had been one of defiance to the enemy ; and the 
Parisian deputies, nearly all of them Republicans, who 
formed the Government of National Defence, scouted all 
faint-hearted proposals. Their policy took form in the 
famous phrase of Jules Favre, Minister of Foreign Affairs: 
"We will give up neither an inch of our territory nor a 
stone of our fortresses." This being so, all hope of 
compromise with the Germans was vain. Favre had inter- 
views with Bismarck at the Chateau de Ferrieres (Septem- 
ber 19th); but his fine oratory, even his tears, made no 
impression on the Iron Chancellor, who declared that in 
no case would an armistice be granted, not even for the 
election of a National Assembly, unless France agreed tc 
give up Alsace and a part of Lorraine, allowing the German 
troops also to hold, among other places, Strassburg and Toul. 

Obviously, a self -constituted body like the provisional 
government at Paris could not accept these terms, which 
most deeply concerned the nation at large. In the ex- 
isting temper of Paris and France, the mention of such 
terms meant war to the knife, as Bismarck must have 
known. On their side, Frenchmen could not believe that 



Founding of the French RepubHc 1 1 1 

their great capital, with its bulwarks and ring of outer 
forts, could be taken; while the Germans— so it seems 
from the Diary of General von Blumenthal — looked for- 
ward to its speedy capitulation. One man there was who 
saw the pressing need of foreign aid. M. Thiers (whose 
personality will concern us a little later) undertook to go 
on a mission to the chief Powers of Europe in the hope of 
urging one or more of them to intervene on behalf of France. 
The details of that mission are, of course, not fully 
known. We can only state here that Russia now repaid 
Prussia's help in crushing the Polish rebellion of 1863 by 
neutrality, albeit tinged with a certain jealousy of Ger- 
man success. Bismarck had been careful to dull that 
feeling by suggesting that she (Russia) should take the 
present opportunity of annulling the provision, made after 
the Crimean War, which prevented her from sending war- 
ships on to the Black Sea; and this was subsequently 
done, under a thin diplomatic disguise, at the Congress 
of London (March, 187 1). Bismarck's astuteness in sup- 
porting Russia at this time, therefore, kept that Power 
quiet. As for Austria, she undoubtedly wished to inter- 
vene, but did not choose to risk a war with Russia, which 
would probably have brought another overthrow. Italy 
would not unsheathe her sword for France unless the latter 
recognised her right to Rome (which the Italian troops 
entered on September 20th). To this the young French 
Republic demurred. Great Britain, of course, adhered to 
the policy of neutrality which she at first declared,^ 

» See Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de V Europe, ii., pp. 412- 
415. For Bismarck's fears of intervention, especially that of 
Austria, see his Reminiscences , ii., p. 109 (Eng. edit.) ; Count Beust's 
Aus drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten, pt. ii., pp. 361, 395; for Thiers 's 
efforts see his Notes on the years 1870-73 (Paris, 1904). 



1 12 The European Nations 

Accordingly, France had to rely on her own efforts. 
They were surprisingly great. Before the complete in- 
vestment of Paris (September 20th), a delegation of the 
Government of National Defence had gone forth to Tours 
with the aim of stirring up the provinces to the succour of 
the besieged capital. Probably the whole of the Govern- 
ment ought to have gone there ; for, shut up in the capital, 
it lost touch with the provinces, save when balloons and 
carrier-pigeons eluded the German sharpshooters and 
brought precious news.'^ The mistake was seen in time to 
enable a man of wondrous energy to leave Paris by balloon 
on October 7 th, to descend as a veritable deus ex machind 
on the faltering Delegation at Tours, and to stir the blood of 
France by his invective. There was a touch of the melo- 
dramatic not only in his apparition but in his speeches. 
Frenchmen, however, follow a leader all the better if he is 
a good stage-manager and a clever actor. The new leader 
was both ; but he was something more. 

Leon Gambetta had leaped to the front rank at the bar 

in the closing days of 1868 by a passionate outburst against 

the coup d'etat, uttered, to the astonishment of all, in a 

small Court of Correctional Police, over a petty case of 

State prosecution of a small Parisian paper. Rejecting 

the ordinary methods of defence, the young barrister flung 

defiance at Napoleon III. as the author of the coup d'etat 

and of all the present degradation of France. The daring 

of the young man, who thus turned the tables on the 

» M. Gregoire, in his Histoire de France, iv., p. 647, states that 
64 balloons left Paris during the siege, 5 were captured, and 2 lost 
in the sea; 363 carrier-pigeons left the city and 57 came in. For 
details of the French efforts, see Les Responsibilites de la Defense 
nationale, by H. Genevois; also The People's War in France, iSjo- 
1871, by Colonel L. Hale (The Pall Mall Military Series, 1904), 
founded on Honig's Der Volkskrieg an der Loire. 



Founding of the French Republic 113 

authorities and impeached the head of the vState, made a 
profound impression; it was redoubled by the southern 
intensity of his thought and expression. Disdaining all 
forms of rhetoric, he poured forth a torrent of ideas, 
clothing them in the first words that came to his facile 
tongue, enforcing them by blows of the fist or the most 
violent gestures, and yet, again, modulating the roar of 
passion to the falsetto of satire or the whisper of emotion. 
His short, thick-set frame, vibrating with strength, doubled 
the force of all his utterances. Nor did they lack the 
glamour of poetry and romance that might be expected 
from his Italian ancestry. He came of a Genoese stock 
that had for some time settled in the south of France. 
Strange fate, that called him now to the front with the 
aim of repairing the ills wrought to France by another 
Italian House! In time of peace his power over men 
would have raised him to the highest positions had his 
Bohemian exuberance of thought and speech been tam- 
able. It was not. He scorned prudence and moderation 
at all times, and his behaviour, when the wave of revolu- 
tion at last carried him to power, gave point to the taunt 
of Thiers, — "C'est un fou furieux." Such was the man 
who now brought the quenchless ardour of his patriotism 
to the task of rousing France. So far as words and energy 
could call forth armies, he succeeded; but as he lacked all 
military knowledge, his blind self-confidence was to cost 
France dear. 

Possibly the new levies* of the Republic might at some 
point have pierced the immense circle of the German lines 
around Paris (for at first the besieging forces were less 
numerous than the besieged), had not the assailants been 
strengthened by the fall of Metz (October 27). This is not 



114 The European Nations 

the place to discuss the culpabiHty of Bazaine for the soft- 
ness shown in the defence. The voluminous evidence 
taken at his trial shows that he was very slack in the 
critical days at the close of August; it is also certain that 
Bismarck duped him under the pretence that, on certain 
conditions to be arranged with the Empress Eugenie, his 
army might be kept intact for the sake of re-establishing 
the Empire. 1 The whole scheme was merely a device to 
gain time and keep Bazaine idle, and the German Chan- 
cellor succeeded here as at all points in his great game. 
On October 27th, then, 6000 oflficers, 173,000 rank and file, 
were constrained by famine to surrender, along with 541 
field-pieces and 800 siege guns. 

This capitulation, the greatest recorded in the history 
of civilised nations, dealt a death-blow to the hopes of 
France. Strassburg had hoisted the white flag a month 
earlier; and the besiegers of these fortresses were free to 
march westward and overwhelm the new levies. After 
gaining a success at Coulommiers, near Orleans (November 
9th) , the French were speedily driven down the valley of the 
Loire and thence as far west as Le Mans. In the North, 
at St. Quentin, the Germans were equally successful, as 
also in Burgundy against that once effective free lance. 
Garibaldi, who came with his sons to fight for the Re- 

' Bazaine gives the details from his point of view in his Episodes 
de la Guerre de 18 jo et le Blocus de Metz (Madrid, 1883). One of 
the go-betweens was a man Regnier, who pretended to come from 
the Empress Eugenie, then at Hastings; but Bismarck seems to 
have distrusted him and to have dismissed him curtly. The ad- 
venturess, Mme. Humbert, recently claimed that she had her 
"millions" from this Regnier. A sharp criticism on Bazaine's 
conduct at Metz is given in a pamphlet, Reponse au Rapport som- 
maire sur les Operations de I'Armee du Rhin, by one of his staff 
officers. See, too, M. Samuel Denis in his recent work, Histoire 
contemporaine (de France). 



Founding of the French Republic 115 

public. The last effort was made by Bourbaki and a large 
but ill-compacted army against the enemy's communica- 
tions in Alsace. By a speedy concentration the Germans 
at Hericourt, near Belfort, defeated this daring move 
(imposed by the Government of National Defence on 
Bourbaki against his better judgment), and compelled 
him and his hard-pressed followers to pass over into 
Switzerland (January 30, 187 1). 

Meanwhile Paris had already surrendered. During 130 
days, and that, too, in a winter of unusual severity, the 
great city had held out with a courage that neither defeats, 
schisms, dearth of food, nor the bombardment directed 
against its southern quarters could overcome. Towards 
the close of January famine stared the defenders in the 
face, and on the 28th an armistice was concluded, which 
put an end to the war except in the neighbourhood of 
Belfort. That exception was due to the determination of 
the Germans to press Bourbaki hard, while the French 
negotiators were not aware of his plight. The garrison of 
Paris, except 12,000 men charged with the duty of keeping 
order, surrendered; the forts were placed in the besiegers' 
hands. When that was done the city was to be re victualled 
and thereafter pay a war contribution of 200,000,000 
francs (;/^8,ooo,ooo). A National Assembly was to be 
freely elected and meet at Bordeaux to discuss the question 
of peace. The National Guards retained their arms, Favre 
maintaining that it would be impossible to disarm them; 
for this mistaken weakness he afterwards expressed his 
profound sorrow.^ 

' It of course led up to the Communist revolt. Bismarck's rela- 
tions to the disorderly elements in Paris are not fully known; but 
he warned Favre on January 26th to "provoke an emeute while you 



ii6 The European Nations 

Despite the very natural protests of Gambetta and many 
others against the virtual ending of the war at the dictation 
of the Parisian authorities, the voice of France ratified 
their action. An overwhelming majority declared for 
peace. The young Republic had done wonders in reviving 
the national spirit: Frenchmen could once more feel the 
self-confidence which had been damped by the surrenders 
of Sedan and Metz; but the instinct of self-preservation 
now called imperiously for the ending of the hopeless 
struggle. In the hurried preparations for the elections 
held on February 8th, few questions were asked of the 
candidates except that of peace or war; and it soon ap- 
peared that a great majority were in favour of peace, even 
at the cost of part of the eastern provinces. 

Of the 630 deputies who met at Bordeaux on February 
12th, fully 400 were Monarchists, nearly evenly divided 
between the Legitimists and Orleanists; 200 were pro- 
fessed Republicans; but only 30 Bonapartists were re- 
turned. It is not surprising that the Assembly, which 
met in the middle of February, should soon have declared 
that the Napoleonic Empire had ceased to exist, as being 
"responsible for the ruin, invasion, and dismemberment 
of the country" (March ist). These rather exaggerated 
charges (against which Napoleon III. protested from his 
place of exile, Chiselhurst) were natural in the then de- 
plorable condition of France. What is surprising and 
needs a brief explanation here, is the fact that a mon- 
archical Assembly should have allowed the Republic to be 
founded. 
V This paradoxical result sprang from several causes, some 

have an army to suppress it with" {Bismarck in the Fravco-German 
War, ii., p. 265). 



Founding of the French Republic 117 

of them of a general nature, others due to party con- 
siderations, while the personal influence of one man perhaps 
turned the balance at this crisis in the history of France. 
We will consider them in the order here named. 

Stating the matter broadly, we may say that the present 
Assembly was not competent to decide on the future con- 
stitution of France; and that vague but powerful instinct, 
which guides representative bodies in such cases, told 
against any avowedly partisan effort in that direction. 
The deputies were fully aware that they were elected to 
decide the urgent question of peace or war ; either to rescue 
France from her long agony or to pledge the last drops of 
her life-blood in an affair of honour.. By an instinct of 
self-preservation, the electors, especially in the country 
districts, turned to the men of property and local influence 
as those who were most likely to save them from the frothy 
followers of Gambetta. Accordingly, local magnates were 
preferred to the barristers and pressmen whose oratorical 
and literary gifts usually carry the day in France; and 
more than two hundred noblemen were elected. They were 
not chosen on account of their nobility and royalism, but 
because they were certain to vote against the jou furieux. 

Then, too, the royalists knew very well that time would 
be required to accustom France to the idea of a King, and 
to adjust the keen rivalries between the older and the 
younger branches of the Bourbon House. Furthermore, 
they were anxious that the odium of signing a disastrous 
peace should fall on -the young Republic, not on the 
monarch of the future. Just as the great Napoleon in 
1804 was undoubtedly glad that the giving up of Belgium 
and the Rhine boundary should devolve on his successor, 
Louis XVIII., and counted on that as one of the causes 



ii8 The European Nations 

undermining the restored monarchy, so now the royalists 
intended to leave the disagreeable duty of ceding the 
eastern districts of France to the Republicans who had so 
persistently prolonged the struggle. The clamour of no 
small section of the Republican party for war a outrance 
still played into the hands of the royalists and partly 
justified this narrow partisanship. Events, however, were 
to prove here, as in so many cases, that the party which 
undertook a pressing duty and discharged it manfully 
gained more in the end than those who shirked responsi- 
bility and left the conduct of afifairs to their opponents. 
Men admire those who dauntlessly pluck the flower safety 
out of the nettle danger. 

Finally, the influence of one commanding personality 
was ultimately to be given to the cause of the Republic. 
That strange instinct which in times of crisis turns the 
gaze of a people towards the one necessary man, now singled 
out M. Thiers. The veteran statesman was elected in 
twenty-six departments. Gambetta and General Trochu, 
Governor of Paris, were each elected nine times over. It 
was clear that the popular voice was for the policy of states- 
manlike moderation which Thiers now summed up in his 
person; and Gambetta for a time retired to Spain. 

The name of Thiers had not always stood for moderation. 
From the time of his youth, when his journalistic criticisms 
on the politics, literature, art, and drama of the Restora- 
tion period set all tongues wagging, to the day when his 
many-sided gifts bore him to power under Louis Philippe, 
he stood for all that is most beloved by the vivacious sons 
of France. His early work. The History of the French 
Revolution, had endeared him to the survivors of the old 
Jacobin and Girondin parties, and his eager hostility to 



I 



Founding of the French Republic 119 

England during his term of office flattered the Chauvinist 
feelings that steadily grew in volume during the otherwise 
dull reign of Louis Philippe. In the main, Thiers was an 
upholder of the Orleans dynasty, yet his devotion to con- 
stitutional principles, the ardour of his southern tempera- 
ment — he was a Marseillais by birth — and the vivacious 
egotism that never brooked contradiction, often caused 
sharp friction with the King and the King's friends. He 
seemed born for opposition and criticism. Thereafter, his', 
conduct of affairs helped to undermine the fabric of the 
Second Republic (1848-51). Flung into prison by the 
minions of Louis Napoleon at the time of the coup d'etat, 
he emerged buoyant as ever, and took up again the role 
that he loved so well. 

Nevertheless, amidst all the seeming vagaries of Thiers 's \ , 
conduct there emerge two governing principles — a passion- 
ate love of France, and a sincere attachment to reasoned 
liberty. The first was absolute and unchangeable; the 
second admitted of some variations if the ruler did not 
enhance the glory of France, and also (as some cynics said) 
recognise the greatness of M. Thiers. For the many gibes -^ 
to which his lively talents and successful career exposed 
him, he had his revenge. His keen glance and incisive 
reasoning generally warned him of the probable fate of 
dynasties and ministries. Like Talleyrand, whom he 
somewhat resembled in versatility, opportunism, and un- 
dying love of France, he might have said that he never 
deserted a government before it deserted itself. He fore- 
told the fall of Louis Philippe under the reactionary 
Guizot Ministry as, later on, he foretold the fall of Napoleon 
in. He blamed the Emperor for not making war on 
Prussia in 1866 with the same unanswerable logic that 



I20 The European Nations 

marked his opposition to the mad rush for war in 1870. 
And yet the war spirit had been in some sense strengthened 
by his own writings. His great work, The History of the 
Consulate and Empire , which appeared from 1845 to 1862, 
— the last eight volumes came out during the Second 
Empire, — was in the main a glorification of the first 
Napoleon. Men therefore asked with some impatience 
why the panegyrist of the uncle should oppose the suprem- 
acy of the nephew ; and the action of the crowd in smashing 
the historian's windows after his great speech against the 
War of 1870 cannot be called wholly illogical, even if it 
erred on the side of Gallic vivacity. 

In the feverish drama of French politics Time sometimes 
brings an appropriate Nemesis. It was so now. The man 
who had divided the energies of his manhood between 
parliamentary opposition of a somewhat factious type and 
the literary cultivation of the Napoleonic legend, was now, 
in the evening of his days, called upon to bear a crushing 
load of responsibility in struggling to win the best possible 
terms of peace from the victorious Teuton, in mediating 
between contending factions at Bordeaux and Paris, and 
finally, in founding a form of government which never 
enlisted his whole-hearted sympathy, save as the least 
objectionable expedient then open to France. 

For the present, the great thing was to gain peace with 
the minimum of sacrifice for France. Who could drive a 
better bargain than Thiers, the man who knew France so 
well, and had recently felt the pulse of the Governments of 
Europe? Accordingly, on the 17th of February, the As- 
sembly named him head of the executive power "until 
it is based upon the French constitution." He declined 
to accept this post until the words ' ' of the French Repub- 



Founding of the French RepubHc 121 

lie" were substituted for the latter clause. He had every 
reason for urging this demand. Unlike the Republic of 
1848, the strength of which was chiefly, or almost solely, 
in Paris, the Republic was proclaimed at Lyons, Marseilles, 
and Bordeaux, before any news came of the overthrow of 
the Napoleonic dynasty at the capital.^ 

He now entrusted three important portfolios, those for 
Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, and Public Instruction, to 
pronounced Republicans — Jules Favre, Picard, and Jules 
Simon. Having pacified the monarchical majority by 
appealing to them to defer all questions respecting the 
future constitution until affairs were more settled, he set 
out to meet Bismarck at Versailles. 

A disadvantage which almost necessarily besets parlia- 
mentary institutions had weakened the French case before 
the negotiations began. The composition of the Assembly 
implied a strong desire for peace, a fact which Thiers had 
needlessly emphasised before he left Bordeaux. On the 
other hand, Bismarck was anxious to end the war. He 
knew enough to be uneasy at the attitude of the neutral 
States; for public opinion was veering round in England, 
Austria, and Italy to a feeling of keen sympathy for 
France, and even Russia was restless at the sight of the 
great military Empire that had sprung into being on her 
flank. The recent proclamation of the German Empire 
at Versailles — an event that will be treated in a later 
chapter — opened up a vista of great developments for the 
Fatherland, not unmixed with difficulties and dangers. 
Above all, sharp differences had arisen between him and 
the military men at the German headquarters, who wished 

1 Seignobos, A Political History of Contemporary Europe, i., p. 187 
(Eng. edit.). 



X 



^22 The European Nations 

to "bleed France white" by taking a large portion of 
French Lorraine (including its capital, Nancy), a few 
colonies, and part of her fleet. It is now known that Bis- 
marck, with the same moderation that he displayed after 
Koniggratz, opposed these extreme claims, and he even 
doubted the advisability of keeping Metz, with its large 
French population. The words in which he let fall these 
thoughts while at dinner with Busch on February 21st de- 
serve to be quoted: 

" If they [the French] gave us a milliard^ more (;^40,ooo,- 
000) we might perhaps let them have Metz. We would 
then take 800,000,000 francs, and build ourselves a fort- 
ress a few miles farther back, somewhere about Falkenberg 
or Saarbriick — there must be some suitable spot there- 
abouts. We should thus make a clear profit of 200,000,- 
000 francs. I do not like so many Frenchmen being in 
our house against their will. It is just the same with 
Belfort. It is all French there, too. The military men, 
however, will not be willing to let Metz slip, and perhaps 
they are right." ^ 

A sharp difference of opinion had arisen between Bis- 
marck and Moltke on this question, and Emperor Wil- 
helm intervened in favour of Moltke. That decided the 
question of Metz against Thiers despite his threat that this 
might lead to a renewal of war. For Belfort, however, the 
French statesman made a supreme effort. That fortress 
holds a most important position. Strong in itself, it 
stands as sentinel guarding the gap of nearly level ground 
between the spurs of the Vosges and those of the Jura. If 
that virgin stronghold were handed over to Germany, she 

' A milliard = 1,000,000,000 francs. 

2 Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, ii., 341. 



Founding of the French RepubHc 123 

would be able easily to pour her legions down the valley 
of the Doubs and dominate the rich districts of Burgundy 
and the Lyonnais. Besides, military honour required 
France to keep a fortress that had kept the tricolour 
flying. Metz the Germans held, and it was impossible to 
turn them out. Obviously the case of Belfort was on a 
different footing. In his conference of February 24th, 
Thiers at last defied Bismarck in these words: "No; I 
will never yield Belfort and Metz in the same breath. You 
wish to ruin France in her finances, in her frontiers. Well! 
Take her. Conduct her administration, collect her rev- 
enues, and you will have to govern her in the face of 
Europe— if Europe permits." ^ 

Probably this defiance had less weight with the Iron 
Chancellor than his conviction, noticed above, that to bring 
two entirely French towns within the German Empire 
would prove a source of weakness; beside which, his own 
motto, Beati possidentes, told with effect in the case of 
Belfort. That stronghold was accordingly saved for 
France. Thiers also obtained a reduction of a milliard 
from the impossible sum of six milliards first named for the 
war indemnity due to Germany ; in this matter Jules Favre 
states that British mediation had been of some avail. If 
so, it partly accounts for the hatred of England which 
Bismarck displayed in his later years. The preliminaries 
of peace were signed at Versailles on February 26th. 

One other matter remained. The Germans insisted that, 

if Belfort remained to France, part of their army should 

enter Paris. In vain did Thiers and Jules Favre point out 

' G. Hanotaux, Contemporary France, i., p. 124 (Eng. edit.). 
This work is the most detailed and authoritative that has yet 
appeared on these topics. See, too, M. Samuel Denis's work, 
Histoire contemporaine. 



124 The European Nations 

the irritation that this would cause and the possible en- 
suing danger. The German Emperor and his staff made 
it a point of honour, and 30,000 of their troops accordingly 
marched in and occupied for a brief space the district of 
the Champs Ely sees. The terms of peace were finally 
ratified in the Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10, 187 1), whereby 
France ceded Alsace and part of Lorraine, with a popula- 
tion of some 1,600,000 souls, and underwent the other 
losses noted above. Last but not least was the burden of 
supporting the German army of occupation that kept its 
grip on the north-east of France until, as the instalments 
came in, the foreign troops were proportionately drawn 
away eastwards. The magnitude of these losses and bur- 
dens had already aroused cries of anguish in France. 
The National Assembly at Bordeaux, on first hearing the 
terms, passionately confirmed the deposition of Napoleon 
in.; while the deputies from the ceded districts lodged a 
solemn protest against their expatriation (March ist). 
Some of the advanced Republican deputies, refusing to 
acknowledge the cession of territory, resigned their seats 
in the Assembly. Thus there began a schism between the 
Radicals, especially those of Paris, and the Assembly 
which was destined to widen into an impassable gulf. 
Matters were made worse by the decision of the Assembly 
to sit, not at the capital, but at Versailles, where it would 
be free from the commotions of the great city. Thiers 
himself declared in favour of Versailles; there the Assem- 
bly met on March 20, 187 1. 

A conflict between this monarchical assembly and the 
eager Radicals of Paris perhaps lay in the nature of things. 
The majority of the deputies looked forward to the return 
of the King (whether the Comte de Chambord of the elder 



Founding of the French Republic 125 

Bourbons, or the Comte de Paris of the House of Orleans) 
as soon as France should be freed from the German armies 
of occupation and the spectre of the Red Terror. Some of 
their more impatient members openly showed their hand, 
and while at Bordeaux began to upbraid Thiers for his 
obstinate neutrality on this question. For his part, the 
wise old man had early seen the need of keeping the parties 
in check. On February 17 th he begged them to defer 
questions as to the future form of government, working 
meanwhile solely for the present needs of France, and 
allowing future victory to be the meed of that party which 
showed itself most worthy of trust. "Can there be any 
man," he exclaimed, "who would dare learnedly to dis- 
cuss the articles of the Constitution, while our prisoners 
are dying of misery far away, or while our people, perishing 
of hunger, are obliged to give their last crust to the foreign 
soldiers?" A similar appeal in March led to the informal 1 
truce on constitutional questions known as the Compact' 
of Bordeaux. It was at best an uncertain truce, certain 
to be broken at the first sign of activity on the Republican 
side. 

That activity was now put forth by the, "reds" of Paris. 
It would take us far too long to describe the origins of the 
municipal socialism which took form in the Parisian Com- 
mune of 1 87 1. The first seeds of that movement had been 
sown by its prototype of 1792-93, which summed up all 
the daring and vigour of the revolutionary socialism of 
that age. The idea had been kept alive by the "National 
Workshops" of 1848, whose institution and final sup- 
pression by the young Republic of that year had been its 
own undoing. 

History shows, then, that Paris, as the head of France, 



126 The European Nations 

was accustomed to think and act vigorously for herself in 
time of revolution. But experience proved no less plainly 
that the limbs, that is, the country districts, generally 
refused to follow the head in these fantastic movements. 
Hence, after a short spell of St. Vitus' activity, there 
always came a time of strife, followed only too often by 
torpor, when the body reduced the head to a state of 
benumbed subjection. The triumph of rural notions ac- 
counts for the reactions of 1831-47, and 1851-70. Paris, 
having once more regained freedom of movement by the 
fall of the Second Empire on September 4th, at once sought 
to begin her politico-social experiments, and, as we pointed 
out, only the promptitude of the "moderates," when face 
to face with the advancing Germans, averted the catas- 
trophe of a socialistic regime in Paris during the siege. 
Even so, the Communists made two determined efforts to 
gain power: the former of these, on October 31st, nearly 
succeeded. Other towns in the Centre and South, notably 
Lyons, were also on the brink of revolutionary socialism, 
and the success of the movement in Paris might con- 
ceivably have led to a widespread trial of the communal 
experiment. The war helped to keep matters in the old 
lines. 

But now, the feelings of rage at the surrender of Paris 
and the cession of the eastern districts of France, together 
with hatred of the monarchical assembly, that flouted the 
capital by sitting at the abode of the old Kings of France, 
served to raise popular passion to fever heat. The As- 
sembly undoubtedly made many mistakes: it authorised 
the payment of rents and all other obligations in the 
capital for the period of siege as if in ordinary times, and 
it appointed an unpopular man to command the National 



Founding of the French Republic 127 

Guards of Paris. At the close of February the National 
Guards formed a central committee to look after their 
interests and those of the capital ; and when the Executive 
of the State sent troops of the line to seize their guns 
parked on Montmartre, the Nationals and the rabble 
turned out in force. The troops refused to act against the 
National Guards, and these murdered two Generals, Le- 
comte and Thomas (March i8th). Thiers and his ministers 
thereupon rather tamely retired to Versailles, and the 
capital fell into the hands of the Communists. Greater 
firmness at the outset might have averted the horrors that 
followed. 

The Communists speedily consulted the voice of the 
people by elections conducted in the most democratic 
spirit. In many respects their programme of municipal 
reforms marked a great improvement on the type of town- 
government prevalent during the Empire. That was, 
practically, under the control of the imperial prejets. The 
Communists now asserted the right of each town to com- 
plete self-government, with the control of its officials, 
magistrates. National Guards, and police, as well as of 
taxation, education, and many other spheres of activity. 
The more ambitious minds looked forward to a time when 
France would form a federation of self-governing Com- 
munes, whose delegates, deciding matters of national 
concern, would reduce the executive power to complete 
subservience. At bottom this communal federalism was 
the ideal of Rousseau and of his ideal Cantonal State. 

By such means, they hoped, the brain of France would 
control the body, the rural population inevitably taking 
the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water, both 
in a political and material sense. Undoubtedly the Paris 



128 The European Nations 

Commune made some intelligent changes which pointed 
the way to reforms of lasting benefit; but it is very ques- 
tionable whether its aims could have achieved permanence 
in a land so ver}^ largely agricultural as France then was. 
Certainly it started its experiment in the worst possible 
way, namely, by defying the constituted authorities of the 
nation at large, and by adopting the old revolutionary 
calendar and the red flag, the symbol of social revolution. 
Thenceforth it was an affair of war to the knife. 

The National Government, sitting at Versailles, could 
not at first act with much vigour. Many of the line 
regiments sympathised with the National Guards of Paris: 
these were 200,000 strong, and had command of the walls 
and some of the posts to the south-west of Paris. The 
Germans still held the forts to the north and east of the 
capital, and refused to allow any attack on that side. It 
has even been stated that Bismarck favoured the Com- 
munists; but this is said to have resulted from their mis- 
reading of his promise to maintain a jriedlich (peaceful) 
attitude as if it were freundlich (friendly).^ The full 
truth as to Bismarck's relations to the Commune is not 
known. The Germans, however, sent back a force of 
French prisoners, and these with other troops, after beating 
back the Communist sortie of April 3rd, began to threaten 
the defences of the city. The strife at once took on a 
savage character, as was inevitable after the murder of 
two Generals in Paris. The Versailles troops, treating the 
Communists as mere rebels, shot their chief officers. 
Thereupon the Commune retaliated by ordering the cap- 
ture of hostages, and by seizing the Archbishop of Paris, 
and several other ecclesiastics (April 5 th). It also decreed 

> Debidour, Histoire diplomatiqtie de I'Etirope, ii., pp. 438-440. 



Founding of the French Republic 129 

the abolition of the budget for public worship and the 
confiscation of clerical and monastic property throughout 
France — a proposal which aroused ridicule and contempt. 

It would be tedious to dwell on the details of this terri- 
ble strife. Gradually the regular forces overpowered the 
National Guards of Paris, drove them from the southern 
forts, and finally (May 21st) gained a lodgment within the 
walls of Paris at the Auteuil gate. Then followed a week 
of street-fighting and madness such as Europe had not seen 
since the Peninsular War. "Room for the people, for the 
bare-armed fighting men. The hour of the revolutionary 
war has struck." This was the placard posted throughout 
Paris on the 22nd, by order of the Communist chief, Deles- 
cluze. And again, "After the barricades, our houses; 
after our houses, our ruins." Preparations were made to 
burn down a part of Central Paris to delay the progress 
of the Versaillese. Rumour magnified this into a plan 
of wholesale incendiarism, and wild stories were told of 
petroleuses flinging oil over buildings, and of Communist 
firemen ready to pump petroleum. A squad of infuriated 
"reds" rushed off and massacred the Archbishop of Paris 
and six other hostages, while elsewhere Dominican friars, 
captured regulars, and police agents fell victims to the 
rage of the worsted, party. 

Madness seemed to have seized on the women of Paris. 
Even when the men were driven from barricades by weight 
of numbers or by the capture of houses on their flank, these 
creatures fought on with the fury of despair till they met 
the death which the enraged linesmen dealt out to all who 
fought, or seemed to have fought. Simpson, the British 
war correspondent, tells how he saw a brutal officer tear 
the red cross ofif the arm of a nurse who tended the 



I30 The European Nations 

Communist wounded, so that she might be done to death as 
a fighter.^ Both sides, in truth, were infuriated by the long 
and murderous struggle, which showed once again that no 
strife is so horrible as that of civil war. On Sunday, May 
28th, the last desperate band was cut down at the Cemetery 
Pere-Lachaise, and fighting gave way to fusillades. Most 
of the chiefs perished without the pretence of trial, and the 
same fate befell thousands of National Guards, who were 
mown down in swathes and cast into trenches. In the last 
day of fighting, and the terrible time that followed, 17,000 
Parisians are said to have perished. 2 Little by little, law 
reasserted her sway, but only to doom 9600 persons to 
heavy punishment. Not until 1879 did feelings of mercy 
prevail, and then, owing to Gambetta's powerful pleading, 
an amnesty was passed for the surviving Communist 
prisoners. 

The Paris Commune affords the last important instance 
of a determined rising in Europe against a civilised Govern- 
ment. From this statement we of course except the fitful 
efforts of the Carlists in Spain; and it is needless to say 
that the risings of the Bulgarians and other Slavs against 
Turkish rule have been directed against an uncivilised 
Government. The absence of revolts in the present age 
marks it off from all that have preceded, and seems to call 
for a brief explanation. Obviously, there is no lack of dis- 
content, as the sequel will show. Finland, portions of 
Caucasia, and all the parts of the once mighty realm of 
Poland which have fallen to Russia and Prussia, now and 

• The Autobiography of William Simpson (London, 1903), p. 261. 

V i G. Hanotaux, Contemporary France, -p. 22$. For further details 

see Lissagaray's History of the Commune; also personal details in 

Washburne's Recollections of a Minister to France, 1869-77, ii., 

chaps, ii.-vii. 



Founding of the French Republic 13 f 

again heave with anger and resentment. But these feel- 
ings are suppressed. They do not flame forth, as was the 
case of Poland as late as the year 1863. What is the reason 
for this? Mainly, it would seem, the enormous powers 
given to the modern organised State b}'' the discoveries of 
mechanical science and the triumphs of the engineer. 
Telegraphy now flashes to the capital the news of a threat- 
ening revolt in the hundredth part of the time formerly 
taken by couriers with their relays of horses. Fully as 
great is the saving of time in the transport of large bodies 
of troops to the disaffected districts. Thus, the all-im- 
portant factors that make for success — force, skill, and 
time — are all on the side of the central Governments. 1 

The spread of constitutional rule has also helped to 
dispel discontent — or, at least, has altered its character. 
Representative government has tended to withdraw dis- 
affection from the market-place, the purlieus of the poor, 
and the fastnesses of the forest, and to focus it noisily but 
peacefully in the columns of the Press and the arena of 
Parliament. The appeal now is not so much to arms as to 
argument; and in this new sphere a minority, provided 
that it is well organised and persistent, may generally hope 
to attain its ends. Revolt, even if it take the form of a 
refusal to pay taxes, is therefore an anachronism under a 
democracy; unless, as in the case of the American Civil 
War, two great sections of the country are irreconcilably 
opposed. 

The fact, however, that there has been no widespread 
revolt in Russia since the year 1863, shows that democracy 

' See Turkey in Europe, by "Odysseus" (p. 130), for the parallel 
instance of the enhanced power of the Sultan Abdul Hamid owing 
to the same causes 



132 The European Nations 

has not been the chief influence tending to dissolve or 
suppress discontent. As we shall see in a later chapter, 
Russia has defied constitutionalism and ground down alien 
races and creeds; yet (up to the year 1904) no great rising 
has shaken her autocratic system to its base. This seems 
to prove that the immunity of the present age in regard to 
insurrections is due rather to the triumphs of mechanical 
science than to the progress of democracy. The fact is not 
pleasing to contemplate; but it must be faced. So also 
must its natural corollary that the minority, if rendered 
desperate, may be driven to arm itself with new and terrible 
engines of destruction in order to shatter that superiority 
of force with which science has endowed the centralised 
Governments of to-day. 

Certain it is that desperation, perhaps brought about by 
a sense of helplessness in face of an armed nation, was one 
of the characteristics of the Paris Commune, as it was also 
of Nihilism in Russia. In fact the Communist effort of 
187 1 may be termed a belated attempt on the part of a 
daring minority to dominate France by seizing the ma- 
chinery of government at Paris. The success of the Ex- 
tremists of 1793 and 1848 in similar experiments — not to 
speak of the communistic rising of Babeuf in 1797 — was 
only temporary; but doubtless it encouraged the "reds" 
of 1 781 to make their mad bid for power. Now, however, 
the case was very different. France was no longer a lethar- 
gic mass, dominated solely by the eager brain of Paris. 
The whole country thrilled with political life. For the 
time, the Provinces held the directing power, which had 
been necessarily removed from the capital; and — most 
powerful motive of all — they looked on the Parisian ex- 
periment as gross treason to la patrie, while she lay at the 



Founding of the French Republic 133 

feet of the Germans. Thus, the very motives which for a 
space lent such prestige and power to the Communistic 
Jacobins of 1793 told against their imitators in 1871. 

The inmost details of their attempt will perhaps never be 
fully known; for too many of the actors died under the 
ruins of the building they had so heedlessly reared. Never- 
theless, it is clear that the Commune was far from being 
the causeless outburst that it has often been represented. 
In part it resulted from the determination li the capital 
to free herself from the control of the "rurals" who domin- 
ated the National Assembly; and in that respect it fore- 
shadowed, however crudely, what will probably be the 
political future of all great States, wherein the urban 
population promises altogether to outweigh and control 
that of the country. Further, it should be remembered 
that the experimenters of 187 1 believed the Assembly to 
have betrayed the cause of France by ceding her eastern 
districts, and to be on the point of handing over the 
Republic to the monarchists. A fit of hysteria, or hypo- 
chondria, brought on by the exhausting siege and by 
exasperation at the triumphal entry of the Germans, 
added the touch of fury which enabled the Radicals of 
Paris to challenge the national authorities and there- 
after to persist in their defiance with French logicality 
and ardour. 

France, on the other hand, looked on the Communist 
movement at Paris and in the southern towns as treason 
to the cause of national unity, when there was the utmost 
need of concord. Thus on both sides there were deplor- 
able misunderstandings. In ordinary times they might 
have been cleared away by frank explanations between 
the more moderate leaders; but the feverish state of the 



T34 The European Nations 

public mind forbade all thoughts of compromise, and the 
very weakness brought on by the war sharpened the fit 
of delirium which will render the spring months of the 
year 187 1 for ever memorable even in the thrilling annals 
of Paris. 



i 



CHAPTER V 

THE FOUNDING OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC (continued) 

THE seemingly suicidal energy shown in the civil strifes 
at Paris served still further to depress the fortunes 
of France. On the very day when the Versailles troops 
entered the walls of Paris, Thiers and Favre signed the 
treaty of peace at Frankfurt. The terms were substan- 
tially those agreed on in the preliminaries of February, 
but the conditions of payment of the indemnity were 
harder than before. Resistance was hopeless. In truth, 
the Iron Chancellor had recently used very threatening 
language : he accused the French Government of bad faith 
in procuring the release of a large force of French prisoners, 
ostensibly for the overthrow of the Commune, but really in 
order to patch up matters with the "reds" of Paris and 
renew the war with Germany. Misrepresentations and 
threats like these induced Thiers and Favre to agree to the 
German demands, which took form in the Treaty of 
Frankfurt (May lo, 1871). 

Peace having been duly ratified on those hard terms, ^ it 

» They included the right to Hold four more Departments until 
the third half-milHard (£20,000,000, that is, ;£6o,ooo,ooo in all) 
had been paid. A commercial treaty on favourable terms, those 
of the "most favoured nation," was arranged, as also an exchange 
of frontier strips near Luxemburg and Belfort. Germany acquired 
Elsass (Alsace) and part of Lorraine, free of all their debts. 

We may note here that the Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce, 

135 



o 



6 The European Nations 



remained to build up France almost de novo. Nearly 
everything was wanting. The treasury was nearly empty, 
and that too in face of the enormous demands made by 
Germany. It is said that in February, 187 1, the unhappy 
man who took up the Ministry of Finance, carried away 
all the funds of the national exchequer in his hat. As 
Thiers confessed to the Assembly, he had, for very patriot- 
ism, to close his eyes to the future and grapple with the 
problems of every day as they arose. But he had faith in 
France, and France had faith in him. The French people 
can perform wonders when they thoroughly trust their 
rulers. The inexhaustible wealth inherent in their soil, 
the thrift of the peasantry, and the self-sacrificing ardour 
shown by the nation when nerved by a high ideal, con- 
stituted an asset of unsuspected strength in face of the 
staggering blows dealt to French wealth and credit. The 
losses caused by the war, the Commune, and the cession 
of the eastern districts, involved losses that have been 
reckoned at more than ;,^6 14,000,000. Apart from the 
1,597,000 inhabitants transferred to German rule, the loss 
of population due to the war and the civil strifes has been 
put as high as 491,000 souls. 1 

Yet France flung herself with triumphant energy into 
the task of paying off the invaders. At the close of June, 
187 1, a loan for two milliards and a quarter (;^9o,ooo,ooo) 
was opened for subscription, and proved to be an immense 

arranged in i860 with Napoleon largely by the aid of Cobden, was 
not renewed by the French Republic, which thereafter began to 
exclude British goods. Bismarck forced France at Frankfurt to 
concede favourable terms to German products. England was help- 
less. For this subject, see Protection in France, by H. O. Meredith 

(1905)- 

» Quoted by M. Hanotaux, Contemporary France, i., pp. 323-327. 



Founding of the French Republic ^Z7 

success. The required amount was more than doubled. 
By means of the help of international banks, the first half 
milliard of the debt was paid off in July, 1871, and Nor- 
mandy was freed from the burden of German occupation. 
We need not detail the dates of the successive payments. 
They revealed the unsuspected vitality of France and the 
energy of her Government and financiers. In March, 
1873, the arrangements for the payment of the last instal- 
ment were made, and in the autumn of that year the last 
German troops left Verdun and Belfort. For his great 
services in bending all the powers of France to this great 
financial feat, Thiers was universally acclaimed as the 
Liberator of the Territory. 

Yet that very same period saw him overthrown. To 
read this riddle aright, we must review the outlines of 
French internal politics. We have already referred to 
the causes that sent up a monarchical majority to the 
National Assembly, the schisms that weakened the action 
of that majority, and the peculiar position held by M. 
Thiers, an Orleanist in theory, but the chief magistrate of 
the French Republic. No more paradoxical situation has 
ever existed; and its oddity was enhanced by the usually 
clear-cut logicality of French political thought. Now, 
after the war and the Commune, the outlook was dim, 
even to the keenest sight. One thing alone was clear, the 
duty of all citizens to defer raising any burning question 
until law, order, and the national finances were re-estab- 
lished. It was the perception of this truth that led to the 
provisional truce between the parties known as the Com- 
pact of Bordeaux. Flagrantly broken by the "reds" of 
Paris in the spring of 187 1, that agreement seemed doomed. 
The Republic itself was in danger of perishing as it did 



138 The European Nations 

after the socialistic extravagances of the Revolution of 
1848. But Thiers at once disappointed the monarchists 
by stoutly declaring that he would not abet the overthrow 
of the Republic: "We found the Republic established, as 
a fact of which we are not the authors; but I will not de- 
stroy the form of government which I am now using to 
restore order, . . . When all is settled, the country 
will have the liberty to choose as it pleases in what con- 
cerns its future destinies." ^ Skilfull}^ pointing the fac- 
tions to the future as offering a final reward for their 
virtuous self-restraint, this masterly tactician gained time 
in which to heal the worst wounds dealt by the war. 

But it was amidst unending difficulties. The mon- 
archists, eager to emphasise the political reaction set in 
motion by the extravagances of the Paris Commune, 
wished to rid themselves at the earliest possible time of 
this self-confident little bourgeois who alone seemed to stand 
between them and the realisation of their hopes. Their 
more unscrupulous members belittled his services and 
hinted that love of power alone led him to cling to the 
Republic, and thus belie his' political past. Then, too, the 
Orleans princes, the Due d'Aumale and the Prince de 
Joinville, the surviving sons of King Louis Philippe, took 
their seats as deputies for the Oise and Haute-Mame De- 
partments, thus keeping the monarchical ideal steadily 
before the eye of France. True, the Due d'Aumale had 
declared to the electorate that he was ready to bow before 
the will of France whether it decided for a Constitutional 
Monarchy or a Liberal Republic; and the loyalty with 
which he served his country was destined to set the seal of 
honesty on a singularly interesting career. But there was 
» Speech of March 27, 1871. 



Founding of the French Republic ^39 

no guarantee that the Chamber would not take upon itself 
to interpret the will of France and call from his place of 
exile in London the Comte de Paris, son of the eldest de- 
scendant of Louis, Philippe, around whom the hopes of the 
Orleanists centred. 

Had Thiers followed his earlier convictions and declared 
for such a Restoration, it might quite conceivably have 
come about without very much resistance. But early in 
the year 187 1, or perhaps after the fall of the Empire, he 
became convinced that France could not heal her grievous 
wounds except under a government that had its roots 
deep in the people's life. Now, the cause of monarchy inj 
France was hopelessly weakened by schisms. Legitimists i 
and Orleanists were at feud ever since, in 1830, Louis , 
Philippe, so the former said, cozened the rightful heir out 
of his inheritance; and the efforts now made to fuse the 
claims of the two rival branches remained without result 
owing to the stiff and dogmatic attitude of the Comte de 
Chambord, heir to the traditions of the elder branch. A 
Bonapartist Restoration was out of the question. Yet all~^ 
three sections began more and more to urge their claims. 
Thiers met them with consummate skill. Occasionally 
they had reason to resent his tactics as showing unworthy 
finesse ; but oftener they quailed before the startling bold- 
ness of his reminders that, as they constituted the majority 
of the deputies of France, they might at once undertake to 
restore the monarchy — if they could. "You do not, and 
you cannot, do so. There is only one throne and it cannot 
have three occupants." ^ Or, again, he cowed them by 

• De Mazade, Thiers, p. 467. For a sharp criticism of Thiers, 
see Samuel Denis's Histoire Contemporaine (written from the royal- 
ist standpoint). 



140 The European Nations 

the sheer force of his personahty : " If I were a weak man, 
I would flatter you," he once exclaimed. In the last re- 
sort he replied to their hints of his ambition and self-seeking 
by offering his resignation. Here again the logic of facts 
was with him. For many months he was the necessary 
man, and he and they knew it. 

But, as we have seen, there came a time when the last 
hard bargains with Bismarck as to the payment of the war 
debt neared their end; and the rapier-play between the 
Liberator of the Territory and the parties of the Assembly 
also drew to a close. In one matter he had given them 
just cause for complaint. As far back as November i^,\ 
1872 (that is, before the financial problem was solved), he 
suddenly and without provocation declared from the 
tribtme of the National Assembly that it was time to 
establish the Republic. The proposal was adjourned, but 
Thiers had damaged his influence. He had broken the 
Compact of Bordeaux and had shown his hand. The 
Assembly now knew that he was a Republican. Finally, 
he made a dignified speech to the Assembly, justifying his 
conduct in the past, appealing from the verdict of parties 
to the impartial tribunal of History, and prophesying that 
the welfare of France was bound up with the maintenance 
of the conservative Republic. The Assembly by a ma- 
jority of fourteen decided on a course of action that he 
disapproved, and he therefore resigned (May 24, 1873). 

It seems that History will justify his appeal to her 
tribunal. Looking, not at the occasional shifts that he 
used in order to disunite his opponents, but rather at the 
underlying motives that prompted his resolve to maintain 
that form of government which least divided his country- 
men, posterity has praised his conduct as evincing keen 



Founding of the French RepubHc 141 

insight into the situation, a glowing love for France before 
which all his earliest predilections vanished, and a masterly 
skill in guiding her from the abyss of anarchy, civil war, 
and bankruptcy that had but recently yawned at her feet. 
Having set her upon the path of safety, he now betook 
himself once more to those historical and artistic studies 
which he loved better than power and ofhce. It is given to 
few men not only to write history but also to make history ; 
yet in both spheres Thiers achieved signal success. Some 
one has dubbed him "the greatest little man known to 
history." Granting even that the paradox is tenable, we 
may still assert that his influence on the life of France ex- 
ceeded that of many of her so-called heroes. 

In fact, it would be difhcult to point out in any country 
during the nineteenth century, since the time of Bona- 
parte's Consulate, a work of political, economic, and social 
renovation ' greater than that which went on in the two 
years during which Thiers held the reins of power. Apart 
from the unparalleled feat of paying off the Germans, the 
Chief of the Executive breathed new vigour into the public 
service, revived national spirit in so noteworthy a way as 
to bring down threats of war from German military circles 
in 1872 (to be repeated more seriously in 1875), and placed 
on the Statute Book two measures of paramount import- 
ance. These were the reform of Local Government and 
the Army Bill. 

These measures claim a brief notice. The former of 
them naturally falls into two parts, dealing severally 
with the Commune and the Department. These are the 
two all -important areas in French life. In rural districts 
the Commune corresponds to the English parish; it is 
the oldest and best-defined of all local areas. In urban 



142 The European Nations 

districts it corresponds with the municipahty or township. 
The Revolutionists of 1790 and 1848 had sought to apply 
the principle of manhood suffrage to communal govern- 
ment; but their plans were swept away by the ensuing 
reactions, and the dawn of the Third Republic found the 
Communes, both rural and urban, under the control of the 
pre jets and their subordinates. We must note here that 
the office of prefet, instituted by Bonaparte in 1800, was 
designed to link the local government of the Departments 
closely to the central power: this magistrate, appointed by 
the Executive at Paris, having almost unlimited control 
over local affairs throughout the several Departments. 
Indeed, it was against the excessive centralisation of the 
prefectorial system that the Parisian Communists made 
their heedless and unmeasured protest. The question 
having thus been thrust to the front, the Assembly brought 
forward (April, 187 1) a measure authorising the election 
of Communal Councils elected by every adult man who 
had resided for a year in the Commune. A majority of 
the Assembly wished that the right of choosing mayors 
should rest with the Communal Councils, but Thiers, brow- 
beating the deputies by his favourite device of threatening 
to resign, carried an amendment limiting this right to 
towns of less than 20,000 inhabitants. In the larger towns 
and in all capitals of Departments, the mayors were to be 
appointed by the central power. Thus the Napoleonic 
tradition in favour of keeping local government under the 
oversight of officials nominated from Paris was to some ex- 
tent perpetuated even in an avowedly democratic measure. 

Paris was to have a Municipal Council composed of eighty 
members elected by manhood suffrage from each ward; 
but the mayors of the twenty arrondissements , into which 



Founding of the French RepubHc 143 

Paris is divided, were, and still are, appointed by the State ; 
and here again the control of the police and other extensive 
powers are vested in the prejet of the Department of the 
Seine, not in the mayors of the arrondissements or the 
Municipal Council. The Municipal or Communal Act of 
187 1, then, is a compromise, on the whole a good working 
compromise, between the extreme demands for local self- 
government and the Napoleonic tradition, now become an 
instinct with most Frenchmen in favour of central control 
over matters affecting public order. ^ 

The matter of Army Reform was equally pressing. 
Here, again, Thiers had the ground cleared before him by 
a great overturn, like that which enabled Bonaparte in his 
day to remodel France, and the builders of modem Prussia, 
— Stein, Schamhorst, and Hardenberg, — to build up their 
State from its ruins. In particular, the inefficiency of the 
National Guards and of the Garde Mobile made it easy to 
reconstruct the French army on the system of universal 
conscription in a regular arm}^ the efficiency of which 
Prussia had so startlingly displayed in the campaigns of 
Koniggratz (Sadowa) and Sedan. Thiers, however, had no 
belief in a short-service system with its result of a huge 
force of imperfectly trained troops: he clung to the old 
professional army; and when that was shown to be in- 
adequate to the needs of the new age, he pleaded that the- 
period of compulsory service should be, not three, but five 
years. On the Assembly demurring to the expense and 
vital strain for the people which this implied, he declared 
with passionate emphasis that he would resign unless the 

' On the strength of this instinct see Mr. Bodley's excellent work, 
France, i., pp. 32-42, etc. For the Act, see Hanotaux, op. cit., pp. 
236-238. 



144 The European Nations 

five years were voted. They were voted (June lo, 1872).* 
At the same time, the exemptions, so numerous during the 
Second Empire, were curtailed and the right of buying a 
substitute was swept away. After five years' service with 
the active army, were to come four years with the reserve of 
the active army, followed by further terms in the territorial 
army. The favour of one year's service instead of five 
was to be accorded in certain well-defined cases, as, for 
instance, to those who had distinguished themselves at the 
f lycees, or highest grade public schools. Such was the law 
which was published on July 27, 1872.1 
I The sight of a nation taking on itself this heavy blood-tax 
' (heavier than that of Germany, where the time of service 
with the colours was only for three years) , aroused universal 
surprise, which beyond the Rhine took the form of sus- 
picion that France was planning a war of revenge. That 
feeling grew in intensity in military circles in Berlin three 
years later, as the sequel will show. Undaunted by the 
thinly veiled threats that came from Germany, France 
proceeded with the tasks of paying off her conquerors and 
reorganising her own forces; so that Thiers on his retire- 
ment from office could proudly point to the recovery of 
French credit and prestige after an unexampled overthrow. 
In feverish haste, the monarchical majority of the 
National Assembly appointed Marshal MacMahon to the 
Presidency (May 24, 1873). They soon found out, how- 
ever, the impossibility of founding a monarchy. The 
Comte de Paris, in whom the hopes of the Orleanists 
centred, went to the extreme of self-sacrifice, by visiting the 
Comte de Chambord, the Legitimist " King" of France, and 
recognising the validity of his claims to the throne. But 
' Hanotaux, op. cit., pp. 452-465. 



Founding of the French Republic 145 

this amiable pliability, while angering very many of the 
Orleanists, failed to move the monarch-designate by one 
hair's breadth from those principles of divine right against 
which the more liberal monarchists always protested. 
" Henri V." soon declared that he would neither accept any 
condition nor grant a single guarantee as to the character 
of his future rule. Above all, he declared that he would 
never give up the white flag of the ancien regime. In his 
eyes the tricolour, which shortly after the fall of the Bas- 
tile Louis XVI. had recognised as the flag of France, re- 
presented the spirit of the great Revolution, and for that 
great event he had the deepest loathing. As if still further 
to ruin his cause, the Count announced his intention of 
striving with all his might for the restoration of the Tem- 
poral Power of the Pope. It is said that the able Bishop 
of Orleans, Mgr. Dupanloup, on reading one of the letters 
by which the Comte de Chambord nailed the white flag to 
the mast, was driven to exclaim, "There! That makes the 
Republic! Poor France! All is lost." 

Thus the attempts at fusion of the two monarchical 
parties had only served to expose the weaknesses of their 
position and to warn France of the probable results of a 
monarchical restoration. That the country had well learned 
the lesson appeared in the bye-elections, which in nearly 
every case went in favour of Republican candidates. 
Another event that happened early in 1873 further served 
to justify Thiers 's contention that the Republic was the only 
possible form of government. On January 9th, Napoleon 
III. died of the internal disease which for seven years past 
had been undermining his strength. His son, the Prince 
Imperial, was at present far too young to figure as a 
claimant to the throne. 



146 The European Nations 

It is also an open secret that Bismarck worked hard to 1 
prevent all possibility of a royalist restoration ; and when ( 
the German Ambassador at Paris, Count Amim, opposed 
his wishes in this matter, he procured his recall and sub- 
jected him to a State prosecution. In fact, Bismarck be- 
lieved that under a Republic France would be powerless 
in war, and, further, that she could never form that alliance 
with Russia which was the bugbear of his later days. A 
Russian diplomatist once told the Due de Broglie that the 
kind of Republic which Bismarck wanted to see in France 
was une Republique dissolvante. 

Everything therefore concurred to postpone the mon- 
archical question, and to prolong the informal truce which 
Thiers had been the first to bring about. Accordingly, in 
the month of November, the Assembly extended thei 
Presidency of Marshal MacMahon to seven years — a period^ 
therefore known as the Septennate. 

Having now briefly shown the causes of the helplessness 
of the monarchical majority in the matter that it had most 
nearly at heart, we must pass over subsequent events save 
as thev refer to that crowning paradox — the establishment 
of a Republican Constitution. This was due to the despair 
felt by many of the Orleanists of seeing a restoration during 
the lifetime of the Comte de Chambord, and to the alarm 
felt by all sections of the monarchists at the activity and 
partial success of the Bonapartists, who in the latter part 
of 1874 captured a few seats. Seeking above all things to 
keep out a Bonaparte, they did little to hinder the forma- 
tion of a Constitution which all of them looked on as pro- 
visional. In fact, they adopted the policy of marking 
time until the death of the Comte de Chambord — whose 



Founding of the French Republic i47 

hold on life proved to be no less tenacious than on his 
creed — should clear up the situation. Accordingly, after 
many diplomatic delays, the Committee which in 1873 had 
been charged to draw up the Constitution, presented its 
plan, which took form in the organic laws of February 25, 
1875. They may be thus summarised: 

The Legislature consists of two Assemblies — the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate, the former being elected by 
"universal" (or, more properly, manhood) suffrage." The 
composition of the Senate, as determined by a later law, 
lies with electoral bodies in each of the Departments; 
these bodies consist of the national deputies for that De- 
partment, the members of their General Councils and Dis- 
trict Councils, and delegates from the Municipal Councils. 
Senators are elected for nine years ; deputies to the Cham- 
ber of Deputies for four years. The President of the Re- 
public is chosen by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
sitting together for that purpose. He is chosen for seven 
years and is eligible for re-election ; he is responsible to the 
Chambers only in case of high treason; he enjoys, con- 
jointly with the members of the two Chambers, the right 
of proposing laws; he promulgates them when passed and 
supervises their execution ; he disposes of the armed forces 
of France and has the right of pardon formerly vested in 
the Kings of France. Conformably to the advice of the 
Senate he may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. Each 
Chamber may initiate proposals for laws, save that 
financial measures rest solely with the Chamber of 
Deputies. 

The Chambers may decide that the Constitution shall 
be revised. In that case, they meet together, as a National 
Assembly, to carry out such revision, which is determined 



N 



148 The European Nations 

by the bare majority. Each arrondissement, or district of 
a Department, elects one deputy. From 1885 to 1889 the 
elections were decided by each Department on a list, but 
since that time the earlier plan has been revived. We 
may also add that the seat of government was fixed at 
Versailles; four years later this was altered in favour 
of Paris, but certain of the most important functions, 
such as the election of a new President, take place at 
Versailles. 

Taken as a whole, this Constitution was a clever com- 
promise between the democratic and autocratic principles 
of government. Having its roots in manhood suffrage, it 
delegated very extensive powers to the head of the State. 
These powers are especially noteworthy if we compare them 
with those of the Ministry. The President commissions 
such and such a senator or deputy to form a Ministry (not 
necessarily representing the opinions of the majority of the 
Chambers) ; and that Ministry is responsible to the Cham- 
bers for the execution of laws and the general policy of the 
Government; but the President is not responsible to the 
Chambers, save in the single and very exceptional case 
of high treason to the State. Obviously, the Assembly 
wished to keep up the autocratic traditions of the past as 
well as to leave open the door for a revision of the Consti- 
tution in a sense favourable to the monarchical cause. 
That this Constitution did not pave the way for the mon- 
archy was due to several causes. Some we have named 
above. 

Another and perhaps a final cause was the unwillingness 
or inability of Marshal MacMahon to bring matters to the 
test of force. Actuated, perhaps, by motives similar to 
those which kept the Duke of Wellington from pushing 



Founding of the French RepubHc 149 

matters to an extreme in England in 1831, the Marshal 
refused to carry out a coup d'etat against the Republican 
majority sent up to the Chamber of Deputies by the 
General Election of January, 1876. Once or twice he 
seemed on the point of using force. Thus, in May, 1877 
he ventured to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies ; but the 
Republican party, led by the impetuous Gambetta, ap- 
pealed to the country with decisive results. That orator's 
defiant challenge to the Marshal, either to submit or to 
resign {se soumettre ou se demettre) was taken up by France, 
with the result that nearly all the Republican deputies 
were re-elected. The President recognised the inevitable, 
and in December of that year charged M. Dufaure to form 
a Ministry that represented the Republican majority. In 
January, 1879, even, some senatorial elections went against 
the President, and he accordingly resigned (January 30, 
1879). 

In the year 1887 the Republic seemed for a time to be 
in danger owing to the intrigues of the Minister for War, 
General Boulanger. Making capital out of the difficulties -^ 
of France, the financial scandals brought home to President 
Grevy, and his own popularity with the army, the General 
seemed to be preparing a coup d'etat. The danger increased 
when the Ministry had to resign office (May, 1887). A 
"National party" was formed, consisting of monarchists, 
Bonapartists, clericals, and even some crotchety socialists 
— in fact, of all who hoped to make capital out of the fall 
of the parliamentary regime. The malcontents called for 
a plebiscite as to the form of government, hoping by these 
means to thrust in Boulanger as dictator to pave the way 
for the Comte de Paris up to the throne of France. After 
a prolonged crisis, the scheme ignominiously collapsed at 



150 The European Nations 

the first show of vigour on the RepiibHcan side. When 
the new Floquet Ministry summoned Boulanger to appear 
before the High Court of Justice, he fled to Belgium, and 
shortly afterwards committed suicide. 

The chief feature of French political life, if one reviews 
it in its broad outlines, is the increase of stability. When 
we remember that that veteran opportunist, Talleyrand, 
on taking the oath of allegiance to the new Constitution of 
1830, could say: "It is the thirteenth," and that no 
regime after that period lasted longer than eighteen years, 
we shall be chary of foretelling the speedy overthrow of the 
Third Republic at any and every period of ministerial 
crisis or political ferment. Certainly the Republic has 
seen Ministries made and unmade in bewilderingly quick 
succession; but these are at most superficial changes — 
the real work of administration being done by the hier- 
archy of permanent officials first established by the great 
Napoleon. Even so terrible an event as the murder of 
President Sadi Camot (June, 1894) produced none of the 
fatal events that British alarmists confidently predicted. 
M. Casimir Perier was quietly elected and ruled firmly. 
The same may be said of his successors, MM. Faure and Lou- 
bet. Sensible, business-like men of bourgeois origin, they 
typify the new France that has grown up since the age when 
military adventurers could keep their heels on her neck 
provided that they crowned her brow with laurels. That 
age would seem to have passed for ever away. A well- 
known adage says: "It is the unexpected that happens 
in French politics." To forecast their course is notoriously 
unsafe in that land of all lands. That careful and sagacious 
student of French life, Mr. Bodley, believes that the nation 
at heart dislikes the prudent tameness of Parliamentary 



Founding of the French Republic 151 

rule, and, that "the day will come when no power will pre- 
vent France from hailing a hero of her choice." ^ 

Doubtless the advent of a Napoleon the Great would 
severely test the qualities of prudence and patience that 
have gained strength under the shelter of democratic in- 
stitutions. Yet it must always be remembered that 
Democracy has until now never had a fair chance in 
France. The bright hopes of 1789 faded away ten years 
later amidst the glamour of military glory. As for the 
Republic of 1848, it scarcely outlived the troubles of 
infancy. The Third Republic, on the other hand, has 
attained to manhood. It has met and overcome very 
many difficulties; at the outset parts of two valued 
provinces and a vast sum of treasure were torn away. In 
those early days of weakness it also crushed a serious 
revolt. The intrigues of monarchists and Bonapartists 
were foiled. Hardest task of all, the natural irritation of 
Frenchmen at playing a far smaller part in the world was 
little by little allayed. 

- In spite of these difficulties, the Third Republic has now 
lasted a quarter of a century. That is to say, it rests on 
the support of a generation which has gradually become 
accustomed to representative institutions — an advantage 
which its two predecessors did not enjoy. The success of 
institutions depends in the last resort on the character of 
those who work them; and the testimony of all observers 
is that the character of Frenchmen has slowly but surely 
changed in the direction which Thiers pointed out in the 
dark days of February, 187 1 , as offering the only means of a 
sound national revival — "Yes: I believe in the future of 
France: I believe in it, but on condition that we have good 
» Mr. Bodley, France, i., ad fin. 



152 The European Nations 

sense; that we no longer use mere words as the current 
coin of our speech, but that under words we place realities; 
that we have not only good sense, but good sense endowed 
with courage." 

These are the qualities that have built up the France of 
to-day. The toil has been enormous, and it has been 
doubled by the worries and disappointments incident to 
parliamentarism when grafted on to a semi-military 
bureaucracy; but the toil and the disappointments have 
played their part in purging the French nature of the 
frothy sensationalism and eager irresponsibility that 
naturally resulted from the imperialism of the two Na- 
poleons. France seems to be outgrowing the stage of 
hobbledehoyish ventures, military or communistic, and 
to have taken on the staid, sober, and self-respecting mien 
of manhood — a process helped on by the burdens of debt 
and conscription resulting from her juvenile escapades. 
In a word, she has attained to a full sense of responsibility. 
No longer are her constructive powers hopelessly out- 
matched by her critical powers. In the political sphere she 
has found a due balance between the brain and the hand. 
From analysis she has worked her way to synthesis. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE GERMAN EMPIRE 

"From the very beginning of my career m.y sole guiding-star has 
been how to unify Germany, and, that being achieved, how to 
strengthen, complete, and so constitute her unification that it may 
be preserved enduringly and with the goodwill of all concerned in 
it." — Bismarck; Speech in the North German Reichstag, July 9, 
1869. 

ON the i8th of January, 187 1, while the German cannon 
were still thundering against Paris, a ceremony of 
world-wide import occurred in the palace of the Kings of 
France at Versailles. King William of Prussia was pro- 
claimed German Emperor. The scene lacked no element 
that could appeal to the historic imagination. It took 
place in the Mirror Hall, where all that was brilliant in the 
life of the old French monarchy used to encircle the person 
of Louis XIV. And now, long after that dynasty had 
passed away, and when the crown of the last of the Corsican 
adventurers had but recently fallen beneath the feet of the 
Parisians, the descendant of the Prussian Hohenzollerns 
celebrated the advent to the German people of that unity 
for which their patriots had vainly struggled for centuries. 
The men who had won this long-deferred boon were of no 
common stamp. King William himself, as is now shown 
by the publication of many of his letters to Bismarck, had 
played a far larger share in the making of a united Germany 

153 



154 • The European Nations 

than was formerly believed. His plain good sense and 
unswerving fortitude had many times marked out the path 
of safety and kept his country therein. The policy of the 
Army Bill of i860, which brought salvation to Prussia 
in spite of her Parliament, was wholly his. Bismarck's 
masterful grip of the helm of State in and after 1862 
helped to carry out that policy, just as von Roon's organis- 
ing ability perfected the resulting military machine; but 
its prime author was the King who now stood triumphant 
in the hall of his ancestral foes. Beside and behind him 
on the dais, in front of the colours of all the German States, 
were the chief princes of Germany — witnesses to the 
strength of the national sentiment which the wars against 
the First Napoleon had called forth and the struggle with 
the nephew had now brought to maturity. Among their 
figures one might note the stalwart form of the Crown 
Prince, along with other members of the House of Prussia; 
the Grand Duke of Baden, son-in-law of the Prussian 
King; the Crown Prince of Saxony, and representatives of 
every reigning family of Germany. Still more remarkable 
were some of the men grouped before the King and princes. 
There was the thin war-worn face of Moltke ; there, too, the 
sturdy figure of Bismarck: the latter, wrote Dr. Russell, 
"looking pale, but calm and self-possessed, elevated, as it 
were, by some internal force." ^ . , 

The King announced the re-establishment of the German 
Empire; and those around must have remembered that 
that venerable institution (which differed so widely from 
the present one that the word "re-establishment" was 
really misleading) had vanished but sixty-four years before 
at the behests of the First Napoleon. Next, Bismarck read 
» Quoted by C. Lowe, Life of Bismarck, i., p. 615. 



The German Empire 155 

the Kaiser's proclamation, stating his sense of duty to the 
German nation and his hope that, within new and stronger 
boundaries, which would guarantee them against attacks 
from France, they would enjoy peace and prosperity. 
The Grand Duke of Baden then called for three cheers for 
the Emperor, which were given with wild enthusiasm, and 
were taken up by the troops far round the iron ring that 
encircled Paris. 

Few events in history so much impress one, at first sight, 
with a sense of strength, spontaneity, and inevitableness. 
And yet, as more is known of the steps that led up to the 
closer union of the German States, that feeling is dis- 
agreeably warped. Even then it was known that Bavaria 
and Wiirtemberg strongly objected to the closer form of 
union desired by the Northern patriots, which would have 
reduced the secondary States to complete dependence on 
the Federal Government. Owing to the great reluctance 
of the Bavarian Government and people to give up the 
control of their railways, posts, and telegraphs, these were 
left at their disposal, the two other Southern States keep- 
ing the direction of the postal and telegraphic services in 
time of peace. Bavaria and Wiirtemberg likewise re- 
served the control of their armed forces, though in case of 
war they were to be placed at the disposal of the Emperor 
— arrangements which also hold good for the Saxon forces. 
In certain legal and fiscal matters Bavaria also bargained 
for freedom of action. 

What was not known then, and has leaked out in more or 
less authentic wa^^s, was the dislike, not only of most of the 
Bavarian people, but also of its Government, to the whole 
scheme of Imperial union. It is certain that the letter 
which King Louis finally wrote to his brother princes to 



156 The European Nations 

propose that union was originally drafted by Bismarck, 
and rumour asserts, on grounds not co be lightly dismissed, 
that the opposition of King Louis was not withdrawn until 
the Bavarian Court favourite, Count Holstein, came to 
Versailles and left it, not only with Bismarck's letter, but 
also with a considerable sum of money for his royal master 
and himself. Probably, however, the assent of the Bava- 
rian monarch, who not many years after became insane, 
was helped by the knowledge that if he did not take the 
initiative, it would pass to the Grand Duke of Baden, an 
ardent champion of German unity. 

Whatever may be the truth as to this, there can be no 
doubt as to the annoyance felt by Roman Catholic Bavaria 
and Protestant democratic Wtirtemberg at accepting the 
supremacy of the Prussian bureaucracy. This doubtless 
explains why Bismarck was so anxious to hurry through 
the negotiations, first, for the imperial union, and thereafter 
for the conclusion of peace with France. 

Even in a seemingly small matter he had met with much 
opposition, this time from his master. The aged monarch 
clung to the title King of Prussia; but if the title of Em- 
peror was a political necessity, he preferred the title " Em- 
peror of Germany"; nevertheless, the Chancellor tactfully 
but firmly pointed out that this would imply a kind of 
feudal over-lordship of all German lands, and that the 
title "German Emperor," as that of chief of the nation, 
was far preferable. In the end the King yielded, but he 
retained a sore feeling against his trusted servant for some 
time on this matter. It seems that at one time he even 
thought of abdicating in favour of his son rather than 
"see the Prussian title supplanted." ^ However, he soon 

» E. Marcks, Kaiser Wilhelm I. (Leipzig, 1900), pp. 337-343- 



The German Empire i57 

showed his gratitude for the immense services rendered 
by Bismarck to the Fatherland. On his next birthday 
(March 22) he raised the Chancellor to the rank of Prince 
and appointed him Chancellor of the Empire. 

It will be well to give here an outline of the Imperial 
Constitution. In all essentials it was an extension, with 
few changes, of the North German federal compact of the 
year 1866. It applied to the twenty-five States of Ger- 
many — inclusive, that is, of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lu- 
beck, but exclusive for the present, of Elsass-Lothringen 
(Alsace-Lorraine). In those areas Imperial law takes pre- 
cedence of local law (save in a few specially reserved cases 
for Bavaria and the Free Cities). The same laws of 
citizenship hold good in all parts of the Empire. The 
Empire controls these laws, the issuing of passports, sur- 
veillance of foreigners and of manufactures, likewise 
matters relating to emigration and colonisation. Com- 
merce, customs dues, weights and measures, coinage, bank- 
ing regulations-, patents, the consular service abroad, and 
matters relating to navigation also fall under its control. 
Railways, posts, and telegraphs (with the exceptions noted 
above) are subject to imperial supervision, the importance 
of which during the war had been so abundantly manifested. 

The King of Prussia is ipso facto German Emperor. He 
represents the Empire among foreign nations; he has the 
right to declare war, conclude peace, and frame alliances; 
but the consent of the Federal Council (Bundesrath) is 
needed for the declaration of war in the name of the 
Empire. The Emperor convenes, adjourns, and closes the 
sessions of the Federal Council and the Imperial Diet 
(Reichstag). They are convened every year. The Chan- 
cellor of the Empire presides in the Federal Council and 



158 The European Nations 

supervises the conduct of its business. Proposals of laws 
are laid before the Reichstag in accordance with the 
resolutions of the Federal Council and are supported by 
members of that Council. To the Emperor belongs the 
right of preparing and publishing the laws of the Empire: 
they must be passed by the Bundesrath and Reichstag, 
and then receive the assent of the Kaiser. They are then 
countersigned by the Chancellor, who thereby becomes 
responsible for their due execution. 

The members of the Bundesrath are appointed by the 
Federal Governments: they are sixty -two in number, and 
now include those from the Reichstand of Elsass-Loth- 
ringen (Alsace-Lorraine).^ 

The Prussian Government nominates seventeen mem- 
bers; Bavaria six; Saxony and Wiirtemberg and Alsace- 
Lorraine four each; and so on. The Bundesrath is presided 
over by the Imperial Chancellor. At the beginning of 
each yearly session it appoints eleven standing commit- 
tees to deal with the following matters:- (i) army and 
fortifications; (2) the navy; (3) tariff, excise, and taxes; 
(4) commerce and trade; (5) railways, posts, and tele- 
graphs; (6) civil and criminal law; (7) financial accounts; 
(8) foreign affairs; (9) Alsace-Lorraine; (10) the Imperial 
Constitution; (11) Standing Orders. Each committee is 
presided over by a chairman. In each committee at least 
four States of the Empire must be represented, and each 

V ' Up to 1874 the government of Alsace-Lorraine was vested 
solely in the Emperor and Chancellor. In 1874 the conquered 
lands returned deputies to the Reichstag. In October, 1879, they 
gained local representative institutions, but under the strict con- 
trol of the Governor, Marshal von Manteuflfel. This control has 
since been relaxed, the present administration being quasi-con- 
stitutional. 



The German Empire 159 

State is entitled to only one vote. To this rule there are 
two modifications in the case of the committees on the 
army and on foreign affairs. In the former of these Bavaria 
has a permanent seat, while the Emperor appoints the other 
three members from as many States: in the latter case, 
Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg only are 
represented. The Bundesrath takes action on the meas- 
ures to be proposed to the Reichstag and the resolutions 
passed by that body; it also supervises the execution of 
laws, and may point out any defects in the laws or in their 
execution. 

The members of the Reichstag, or Diet, are elected by 
universal (more properly manhood) suffrage and by direct 
secret ballot, in proportion to the population of the several 
States.^ On the average, each of the 397 members repre- 
sents rather more than one hundred thousand of the popula- 
tion. The proceedings of the Reichstag are public; it has 
the right (concurrently with those wielded by the Emperor 
and the Bundesrath) to propose laws for the Empire. 
It sits for three years, but may be dissolved by a resolu- 
tion of the Bundesrath, with the consent of the Emperor. 
Deputies may not be bound by orders and instructions 
issued by their constituents. They are not paid. 

As has been noted above, important matters such as 
railway management, so far as it relates to the harmonious 
and effective working of the existing systems, and the con- 
struction of new lines needful for the welfare and the de- 
fence of Germany, are under the control of the Empire — 
except in the case of Bavaria. The same holds good of 

1 Bismarck said in a speech to the Reichstag, on September 16, 
1878: "I accepted universal suffrage, but with repugnance, as a 
Frankfurt tradition . ' ' 



i6o The European Nations 

posts and telegraphs except in the Southern States. Rail- 
way companies are bound to convey troops and warlike 
stores at uniform reduced rates. In fact, the Imperial 
Government controls the fares of all lines subject to its 
supervision, and has ordered the reduction of freightage 
for coal, coke, minerals, wood, stone, manure, etc., for 
long distances, "as demanded by the interests of agri- 
culture and industry." In case of dearth, the railway 
companies can be compelled to forward food supplies at 
specially low rates. 

Further, with respect to military affairs, the central 
authority exercises a very large measure of control over 
the federated States. All German troops swear the oath 
of allegiance to the Emperor. He appoints 'all com- 
manders of fortresses; the power of building fortresses 
within the Empire is also vested in him ; he determines the 
strength of the contingents of the federated States, and in 
the last case may appoint their commanding officers; he 
may even proclaim martial law in any portion of the Em- 
pire, if public security demands it. The Prussian military 
code applies to all parts of the Empire (save to Bavaria, 
Wiirtemberg, and Saxony in time of peace) ; and the 
military organisation is everywhere of the same general 
description, especially as regards length of service, char- 
acter of the drill, and organisation in corps and regiments. 
Every German, unless physically unfit, is subject to mili- 
tary duty and cannot shift the burden on a substitute. 
He must serve for seven years in the standing army: that 
is, three years in the field army and four in the reserve; 
thereafter he takes his place in the landwehr.^ 

' The three years are shortened to one year for those who have 
taken a high place in the Gymnasia (highest of the pubUc schools) ; 



The German Empire t6t 

The secondary States are protected in one important i 
respect. The last proviso of the Imperial Constitution 
stipulates that any proposal to modify it shall fail if four- 
teen, or more, votes are cast against it in the Federal 
Council. This implies that Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and 
Saxony, if they vote together, can prevent any change 
detrimental to their interests. On the whole, the new 
system is less centralised than that of the North German 
Confederation had been ; arid many of the Prussian Liber- 
als, with whom the Crown Prince of Prussia very decidedly 
ranged himself on this question, complained that the 
Government was more federal than ever, and that far too 
much had been granted to the particularist prejudices of 
the Southern States.^ To all these objections Bismarck 
could unanswerably reply that it was far better to gain 
this great end without bitterness, even if the resulting 
compact were in some respects faulty, than to force on the 
Southern States a more logically perfect system that would 
perpetuate the sore feeling of the past. 

Such in its main outlines is the new Constitution of Ger- 
many. On the whole, it has worked well. That it has not 
fulfilled all the expectations aroused in that year of triumph 
and jubilation will surprise no one who knows that absolute 
and lasting success is attained only in Utopias, never in 
practical politics. In truth, the suddenness with which 
German unity was finally achieved was in itself a danger. 

The English reader will perhaps find it hard to realise 
this until he remembers that the whole course of recorded 

they feed and equip themselves and are termed "volunteers." Con- 
scription is the rule on the coasts for service in the German navy. 
For the text of the Imperial Constitution, see Lowe, Life of BiS' 
marck, ii., App. F. 

> J. W. Headlam, Bismarck, p. 367. 



1 62 The European Nations 

history shows us the Germans poHtically disunited or for 
the most part engaged in fratricidal strifes. When they 
first came within the ken of the historians of ancient Rome, 
they were a set of warring tribes who banded together only 
under the pressure of overwhelming danger; and such was 
to be their fate for well-nigh two thousand years. Their 
union under the vigorous rule of the great Prankish chief 
whom the French call Charlemagne, was at best nominal 
and partial. The Holy Roman Empire, which he founded 
in the year 800 by a mystically vague compact with the 
Pope, was never a close bond of union, even in his stern 
and able hands. Under his weak successors that imposing 
league rarely promoted peace among its peoples, while the 
splendour of its chief elective dignit}^ not seldom conduced 
to war. Next, feudalism came in as a strong political 
solvent, and thus for centuries Germany crumbled and 
mouldered away, until disunion seemed to be the fate of 
her richest lands, and particularism becamxC a rooted in- 
stinct of her princes, burghers, and peasants. Then again, 
South was arrayed against North during and long after the 
time of the Reformation; when the strife of creeds was 
stayed, the rivalry of the Houses of Hapsburg and Hohen- 
zollem added another cause of hatred. 

As a matter of fact, it was reserved for the two Na- 
poleons, uncle and nephew, to force those divided peoples 
to comradeship in arms. The close of the campaign of 
1 8 13 and that of 1814 saw North and South, Prussians and 
Austrians, for the first time fighting heartily shoulder to 
shoulder in a great war — for that of 1792-94 had only 
served to show their rooted suspicion and inner hostility. 
Owing to reasons that cannot be stated here, the peace of 
18 14-15 led up to no effective union: it even perpetuated 



The German Empire 163 

the old dualism of interests. But once more the hostility 
of France under a Napoleon strengthened the impulse to 
German consolidation and on this occasion there was at 
hand a man who had carefully prepared the way for an 
abiding form of political union; his diplomatic campaign 
of the last seven years had secured Russia's friendship and 
consequently Austria's reluctant neutrality; as for the 
dislike of the Southern States to unite with the North, 
that feeling waned for a few weeks amidst the enthusiasm 
caused by the German triumphs. The opportunity was , 
unexampled: it had not occurred even in 1814; it might 
never occur again ; and it was certain to pass away when 
the war fever passed by. How wise, then, to strike while 
the iron was hot! The smaller details of the welding 
process were infinitely less important than the welding 
itself. 

One last consideration remains. If the opportunity 
was unexampled, so also were the statesmanlike qualities 
of the man who seized it. The more that we know con- 
cerning the narrowly Prussian feelings of King William, 
the centralising pedantry of the Crown Prince of Prussia, 
and the petty particularism of the Governments of Bavaria 
and Wiirtemberg, the more does the figure of Bismarck 
stand out as that of the one great statesman of his country 
and era. However censurable much of his conduct may 
be, his action in working up to and finally consummating 
German unity at the right psychological moment stands 
out as one of the greatest feats of statesmanship which 
history records. 

But obviously a wedded life which had been preceded by 
no wooing, over whose nuptials- Mars shed more influence 
than Venus, could not be expected to run a wholly smooth 



164 The European Nations 

course. In fact, this latest instance in ethnical lore of 
marriage by capture has on the whole led to a more har- 
monious result than was to be expected. Possibly, if we 
could lift the veil of secrecy which is wisely kept drawn 
over the weightiest proceedings of the Bundesrath and its 
committees, the scene would appear somewhat different. 
As it is, we can refer here only to some questions of out- 
standing importance the details of which are fairly well 
known. 

The first of these which subjected the new Empire to any 
Vj serious strain was a sharp religious struggle against the 
new claims of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Without 
detailing the many causes of friction that sprang up be- 
tween the new Empire and the Roman Catholic Church, 
we may state that most of them had their roots in the 
activity shown by that Church among the Poles of Prussian 
Poland (Posen), and also in the dogma of papal infallibility. 
Decreed by the (Ecumenical Council at Rome on the very 
eve of the outbreak of the Franco-German War, it seemed 
to be part and parcel of that forward Jesuit policy which 
was working for the overthrow of the chief Protestant 
States. Many persons — among them Bismarck ^ — claimed 
that the Empress Eugenie's hatred of Prussia and the war- 
like influence which she is said to have exerted on Napoleon 
III. on that critical day, July 14, 1870, were prompted by 
Jesuitical intrigues. However that may be (and it is a 
matter on which no fair-minded man will dogmatise until 
her confidential papers see the light), there is little doubt 
that the Pope at Rome and the Roman hierarchy among 

1 Busch, Our Chancellor, i., p. 139, where he quotes a conversa- 
tion of Bismarck of November, 1883. On the Roman Catholic 
policy in Posen, see ibid., pp. 143-145. 



The German Empire 165 

the Catholics of Central and Eastern Europe did their best 
to prevent German unity and to introduce elements of 
discord. The dogma of the infallibility of the Pope in 
matters of faith and doctrine was itself a cause of strife. 
Many of the more learned and moderate of the German 
Catholics had protested against the new dogma, and some 
of these "Old Catholics," as they were called, tried to avoid 
teaching it in the universities and schools. Their bishops, 
however, insisted that it should be taught, placed some 
recalcitrants under the lesser ban, and deprived them of 
their posts. 

When these high-handed proceedings were extended 
even to the schools, the Prussian Government intervened, 
and early in 1872 passed a law ordaining that all school 
inspectors should be appointed by the King's Government 
at Berlin, This greatly irritated the Roman Catholic 
hierarchy and led to aggressive acts on both sides, the 
German Reichstag taking up the matter and decreeing the 
exclusion of the Jesuits from all priestly and scholastic 
duties of whatever kind within the Empire Quly, 1872). 
The strife waxed ever fiercer. When the Roman Catholic 
bishops of Germany persisted in depriving "Old Catholics" 
of professorial and other charges, the central Government 
retorted by the famous "May Laws" of 1873, The first 
of these forbade the Roman Catholic Church to intervene 
in civil affairs in any way, or to coerce officials and citizens 
of the Empire. The second required of all ministers of re- 
ligion that they should have passed the final examination 
at a high school and also should have studied theology for 
three years at a German university: it further subjected all 
seminaries to State inspection. The third accorded fuUei 
legal protection to dissidents from the various creeds. 



J 



1 66 The European Nations 

This anti-clerical policy is known as the " Kultur- 
Kampf," a term that denotes a struggle for civilisation 
against the forces of reaction. For some years the strife 
was of the sharpest kind. The Roman Catholic bishops 
continued to ban the "Old Catholics," while the State re- 
fused to recognise any act of marriage or christening per- 
formed by clerics who disobeyed the new laws The logical 
sequel to this was obvious, namel}^, that the State should 
insist on the religious ceremon}^ of marriage being supple- 
mented by a civil contract.^ Acts to render this com- 
pulsory were first passed by the Prussian Landtag late in 
1873 and by the German Reichstag in 1875. 

It would be alike needless and tedious to detail the fur- 
ther stages of this bitter controversy, especially as several 
of the later "May Laws" have been repealed. We may, 
however, note its significance in the development of parties. 
Many of the Prussian nobles and squires (Junkers the 
latter were called) joined issue with Bismarck on the 
Civil Marriage Act, and this schism weakened Bismarck's 
long alliance with the Conservative party. He enjoyed, 
however, the enthusiastic support of the powerful National 
Liberal party, as well as the Imperialist and Progressive 
groups. Differing on many points of detail, these parties 
aimed at strengthening the fabric of the central power, and 
it was with their aid in the Reichstag that the new institu- 
tions of Germany were planted and took root. The 
general election of 1874 sent up as many as 155 National 
Liberals, and they, with the other groups just named, gave 
the Government a force of 240 votes — a good working 
majority as long as Bismarck's aims were of a moderately 
Liberal character. This, however, was not always the 
' Lowe, Life of Bismarck, ii., p. 336, note. 



The German Empire 167 

case even in 1874-79 when he needed their alliance. His 
demand for a permanently large military establishment 
alienated his allies in 1874, and they found it hard to sat- 
isfy the requirements of his exacting and rigorous nature. 
The harshness of the "May Laws" also caused endless 
friction. Out of some 10,000 Roman Catholic priests in 
Prussia (to which kingdom alone the severest of these laws 
applied) only about thirty bowed the knee to the State. 
In 800 parishes the strife went so far that all religious 
services came to an end. In the year 1875, fines amount- 
ing to 28,000 marks (;^i4oo) were imposed, and 103 
clerics or their supporters were expelled from the Empire.^ 
Clearly this state of things could not continue without 
grave danger to the Empire ; for the Church held on her 
way with her usual doggedness, strengthened by the "pro- 
testing" deputies from the Reichsland on the south-west, 
from Hanover (where the Guelph feeling was still upper- 
most), as well as those from Polish Posen and Danish 
Schleswig. Bismarck and the anti-clerical majority of 
the Reichstag scorned any thoughts of surrender. Yet, 
slowly but surely, events at the Vatican and in Germany 
alike made for compromise. In February, 1878, Pope 
Pius IX. passed away. That unfortunate pontifE had 
never ceased to work against the interests of Prussia and 
(jermany, while his encyclicals since 1873 mingled threats 
of defiance of the May Laws with insults against Prince 

» Busch, Our Chancellor, i., p. 122, quotes speeches of his hero 
to prove that Bismarck himself disliked this Civil Marriage Law. 
"From the political point of view I have convinced myself that the 
State ... is constrained by the dictates of self-defence to 
enact this law in order to avert from a portion of His Majesty's 
subjects the evils with which they are menaced by the Bishops' 
rebellion against the laws and the State" (speech of January 17, 
1873). In 1849 he had opposed civil marriage. 



1 68 The European Nations 

Bismarck. His successor, Leo XIII. (i 8 78-1 903), showed 
rather more disposition to come to a compromise, and 
that, too, at a time when Bismarck's new commercial 
policy made the support of the Clerical Centre in the 
Reichstag peculiarly acceptable. 

Bismarck's resolve to give up the S3^stem of Free Trade, 
or rather of light customs dues, adopted by Prussia and the 
German Zollverein in 1865, is so momentous a fact in the 
economic history of the modem world, that we must here 
give a few facts which will enable the reader to understand 
the conditions attending German commerce up to the 
years 1878-79, when the great change came. The old 
order of things in Prussia, as in all German States, was 
strongly protective — in fact, to such an extent as often to 
prevent the passing of the necessaries of life from one little 
State to its Lilliputian neighbours. The rise of the 
national idea in Germany during the wars against the 
great Napoleon led to a more enlightened system, es- 
pecially for Prussia. The Prussian law of 18 18 asserted 
the principle of imposing customs dues for revenue pur- 
poses, but taxed foreign products to a moderate extent. 
On this basis she induced neighbouring small German 
States to join her in a Customs Union (Zollverein), which 
gradually extended, until by 1836 it included all the States 
of the present Empire except the two Mecklenburgs, the 
Elbe Duchies, and the three Free Cities of Hamburg, 
Bremen, and Liibeck. That is to say, the attractive force 
of the highly developed Prussian State practically unified 
Germanv for purposes of trade and commerce, and that, 
too, thirty-five years before political union was achieved. 

This, be it observed, was on condition of internal Free 



The German Empire 169 

Trade but of moderate duties being levied on foreign 
products. Up to 1840 these import duties were on the 
whole reduced; after that date a protectionist reaction 
set in; it was checked, however, by the strong wave of 
Free-Trade feeling which swept over Europe after the 
victory of that principle in England in 1846—49. Of the 
new champions of Free Trade on the Continent, the fore- 
most in point of time was Cavour, for that kingdom of 
Sardinia on which he built the foundations of a regenerated 
and united Italy. Far more important, however, was 
the victory which Cobden won in 1859-60 by inducing 
Napoleon III. to depart from the almost prohibitive 
system then in vogue in France. The Anglo-French 
Commercial Treaty of January, i860, seemed to betoken 
the speedy conversion of the world to the ^enlightened 
policy of unfettered exchange of all its products. In 1862 
and 1865 the German Zollverein followed suit, relaxing 
duties on imported articles and manufactured goods — a 
process continued in the commercial treaties and tariff 
changes of the years 1868 and 1869, 

At this time Bismarck's opinions on fiscal matters were 
somewhat vague. He afterwards declared that he held 
Free Trade to be altogether false. But in this as in other 
matters he certainly let his convictions be shaped by ex- 
pediency. Just before tiie conclusion of peace with France 
he so far approximated to Free Trade as to insist that the 
Franco-German Commercial Treaty of 1862,^ which the 
war had of course abrogated — war puts an end to all 
treaties between the States directly engaged — should now 

1 For that treaty, and Austria's desire in 1862 to enter the Ger- 
man Zollverein, see The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord A 
Loftus, ii., pp. 250-251. 



I70 The European Nations 

be again regarded as in force and as holding good up to the 
year 1887. He even stated that he "would rather begin 
again the war of cannon-balls than expose himself to a 
war of tariffs." France and Germany, therefore, agreed 
to place one another permanently on "the most favoured 
nation" footing. Yet this same man, who so much de- 
sired to keep down the Franco-German tariff, was destined 
eight years later to initiate a protectionist policy which 
set back the cause of Free Trade for at least a generation. 
What brought about this momentous change? To 
answer this fully would take up a long chapter. We can 
only glance at the chief forces then at work. Firstly, 
Germany, after the year 1873, passed through a severe and 
prolonged economic crisis. It was largely due to the 
fever of spegulation induced by the incoming of the French 
milliards into a land where gold had been none too plenti- 
ful. Despite the efforts of the German Government to 
hold back a large part of the war indemnity for purposes of 
military defence and substantial enterprises, the people 
imagined themselves to be suddenly rich. Prices rapidly 
rose, extravagant habits spread in all directions, and in 
the years 1872—73 company-promoting attained to the 
rank of a fine art, with the result that sober, hard-working 
Germany seemed to be almost another England at the 
time of the South Sea Bubble. Alluding to this time, , 
Busch said to Bismarck early in 1887: "In the long-run 
the [French] milliards were no blessing, at least not for our 
manufacturers, as they led to over-production. It was 
merely the bankers who benefited, and of these only the 
big ones." * 

1 Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, by M. Busch iii., 
p. 161 (Eng. edit.). 



The German Empire 



I7r 



The result happened that always happens when a nation 
mistakes money, the means of commercial exchange, for 
the ultimate source of wealth. After a time of inflation / 
came the inevitable collapse. The unsound companies I 
went by the board; even sound ventures were in some 
cases overturned. How grievously public credit suffered, 
may be seen by the later official admission, that liquidation 
and bankruptcies of public companies in the following ten --^ 
years inflicted on shareholders a total loss of more than 
345,000,000 marks (;^i7,25o,ooo).^ 

Now, it was in the years 1876-77, while the nation lay 
deep in the trough of economic depression, that the de- 
mand for "protection for home industries" grew loud and; 
persistent. Whether it would not have been raised even 
if German finance and industry had held on its way in a 
straight course and on an even keel, cannot of course be 
determined, for the protectionist movement had been 
growing since the year 1872, owing to the propaganda of 
the "Verein fur Sozialpolitik". (Union for Social Politics), 
founded in that year. But it is safe to say that the col- 
lapse of speculation due to the inflowing of the French 
milliards greatly strengthened the forces of economic 
reaction. 

Bismarck himself put it in this way: that the introduc- 
tion of Free Trade in 1865 soon produced a state of atrophy 
in Germany; this was checked for a time by the French 
war indemnity; but Germany needed a permanent cure, 
namely, Protection. It is true that his ideal of national 
life had always been strict and narrow — in fact, that of the 
average German official; but we may doubt whether he 

I German State Paper of June 28, 1884, quoted by Dawson, 
Bismarck and State Socialism, App. B. 



172 The European Nations 

had in view solely the shelter of the presumedly tender 
flora of German industry from the supposed deadly blasts 
of British, Austrian, and Russian competition. He cer- 
tainly hoped to strengthen the fabric of his Empire by 
extending the customs system and making its revenue 
depend more largely on that source and less on the con- 
tributions of the federated States. But there was probably 
a still wider consideration. He doubtless, wished to bring 
prominently before the public gaze another great subject 
that would distract it from the religious feuds described 
above and bring about a rearrangement of political parties. j 
The British people has good reason to know that the dis- 
cussion of fiscal questions that vitally touch every trade 
and every consumer, does act like the turning of a kaleido- 
scope upon party groupings; and we may fairly well as- 
sume that so far-seeing a statesman as Bismarck must | 
have forecast the course of events. 

Reasons of statecraft also warned him to build up the 
Empire four-square while yet there was time. The rapid 
recovery of France, whose milliards had proved somewhat 
of a "Greek gift" to Germany, had led to threats on the 
part of the war party at Berlin, which brought from 
Queen Victoria, as also from the Czar Alexander, private 
but pressing intimations to Kaiser Wilhelm that no war 
of extermination must take place. This affair and its 
results in Germany's foreign policy will occupy us in 
Chapter XII. Here we may note that Bismarck saw in 
it a reason for suspecting Russia, hating England, and 
jealously watching every movement in France. Grermany's 
future, it seemed, would have to be safeguarded by all the 
peaceable means available. How natural, then, to tone 
down her internal religious strifes by bringing forward 



The German Empire 173 

another topic of still more absorbing interest, and to aim 
at building up a self-contained commercial life in the 
midst of uncertain, or possibly hostile, neighbours. In 
truth, if we view the question in its broad issues in the life 
of nations, we must grant that Free Trade could scarcely 
be expected to thrive amidst the jealousies and fears en- 
tailed by the War of 1870. That principle presupposes 
trust and good- will between nations; whereas the wars of 
1859, 1864, and 1870 left behind bitter memories and 
rankling ills. Viewed in this light, Germany's abandon- 
ment of Free Trade in 1879 was but the natural result of 
that forceful policy by which she had cut the Gordian knot 
of her national problem. 

The economic change was decided on in the year 1879, 
when the federated States returned to "the time-honoured 
ways of 1823-65." Bismarck appealed to the Reichstag 
to preserve at least the German market to German in- 
dustry. The chances of having a large export trade were 
on every ground precarious; but Germany could, at the 
worst, support herself. All interests were mollified by 
having moderate duties imposed to check imports. Small 
customs dues were placed on com and other food supplies 
so as to please the agrarian party ; imports of manufactured 
goods were taxed for the benefit of German industries, and 
even raw materials underwent small imposts. The Reichs- 
tag approved the change and on July 7th passed the 
Government's proposals by 217 to 117: the majority com- 
prised the Conservatists, Clericals, the Alsace-Lorrainers, 
and a few National Liberals; while the bulk of the last- 
named, hitherto Bismarck's supporters on most topics, 
along with Radicals and Social Democrats, opposed it. 
The new tariff came into force on January i, 1880. 



174 The European Nations 

On the whole, much may be said in favour of the im- 
mediate results of the new policy. By the year 1885 the 
number of men employed in iron and steel works had in- 
creased by 35 per cent, over the numbers of 1879; wages 
also had increased, and the returns of shipping and of the 
export trade showed a considerable rise. Of course, it is 
impossible to say whether this would not have happened 
in any case owing to the natural tendency to recover from 
the deep depression of the years 1875-79. The duties on 
corn did not raise its price, which appears strange until we 
know that the foreign imports of com were less than 8 
per cent, of the whole amount consumed. In 1885, there- 
fore, Bismarck gave way to the demands of the agrarians 
that the corn duties should be raised still further, in order 
to make agriculture lucrative and to prevent the streaming 
of rural population to the towns. Again the docile Reichs- 
tag followed his lead. But two years later, it seemed 
that the new com duties had failed to check the fall of 
prices and keep landlords and farmers from ruin; once 
more, then, the duties were raised, being even doubled on 
certain food products. This time they undoubtedly had 
one important result, that of making the urban popula- 
tion, especially that of the great industrial centres, more 
hostile to the agrarians and to the Government which 
seemed to be legislating in their interests. From this time 
forward the Social Democrats began to be a power in the 
land. 

And yet, if we except the very important item of rent, 
which in Berlin presses with cruel weight on the labouring 
classes, the general trend of the prices of the necessaries of 
life in Germany has been downwards, in spite of all the 
protectionist duties. The evidence compiled in the British 



The German Empire 



175 



official Blue-book on "British and Foreign Trade and 
Industry" (1903. Cd. 1761, p. 226) yields the following 
results. By comparing the necessary expenditure on food 
of a workman's family of the same size and living under the 
same conditions, it appears that if we take that expenditure 
for the period 1897-1901 to represent the number 100 we 
have these results: 



Period. 


Germany. 


United Kingdom. 


1877-1881 
1882-1886 
1887-1891 
1892-1896 
1897-1901 


112 

lOI 
103 

99 
100 


140 
125 
106 
98 
100 



Thus the fall in the cost of living of a British working man's 
family has been 40 points, while that of the German work- 
ing man shows a decline of only 12 points. It is, on the 
whole, surprising that there has not been more difference 
between the two countries.^ 

Before dealing with the new social problems that re- 
sulted, at least in part, from the new duties on food, we 
may point out that Bismarck and his successors at the 
German Chancery had used the new tariff as a means of 
extorting better terms from the surrounding countries. 

> In a recent work, England and the English (London, 1904), Dr. 
Carl Peters says: "Considering that wages in England average 20 
per cent, higher in England than in Germany, that the week has 
only 54 working hours, and that all articles of food are cheaper, the 
fundamental conditions of prosperous home-life are all round more 
favourable in England than in Germany. And yet he [the British 
working man] does not derive greater comfort from them, for the 
simple reason that a German labourer's wife is more economical 
and more industrious than the English wife." See, too, Professor 
Ashley's Progress of the German Working Classes (1904). 



176 The European Nations 

The Iron Chancellor has always acted on the diplomatic 
principle do ut des — ' ' I give that you may give ' ' — with its 
still more cynical corollary — "Those who have nothing to 
give will get nothing." The new German tariff on agri- 
cultural products was stiffly applied against Austria for 
many years, to compel her to grant more favourable terms 
to German manufactured goods. For eleven years Austria- 
Hungary maintained their protective barriers; but in 1891 
German persistence was rewarded in the form of a treaty 
by which the Dual Monarchy let in German goods on easiei 
terms provided that the com duties of the northern Power 
were relaxed. The fiscal strife with Russia was keener and 
longer, but had the same result (1894). Of a friendlier 
kind were the negotiations with Italy, Belgium, and 
Switzerland, which led to treaties with those States in 1891. 
It is needless to say that in each of these cases the lowering 
of the com duties was sharply resisted by the German 
agrarians. We may here add that the Anglo- German 
commercial treaty which expired in 1 903 has been extended 
for two years; and that Germany's other commercial 
treaties were at the same time continued. 

It is hazardous at present to venture on any definite 
judgment as to the measure of success attained by the 
German protectionist policy. Protectionists always point 
to the prosperity of Germany as the crowning proof of its 
efficacy. In one respect they are, perhaps, fully justified 
in so doing. The persistent pressure which Germany 
brought to bear on the even more protectionist systems of 
Russia and Austria undoubtedly induced those Powers to 
grant easier terms to German goods than they would have 
done had Germany lost her bargaining power by persisting 
in her former free tr ,de tendency. Her success in this 



The German Empire i77 

matter is the best instance in recent economic history of 
the desirability of holding back something in reserve so 
as to be able to bargain effectively with a Power that keeps 
up hostile tariffs. In this jealously competitive age the 
State that has nothing more to offer is as badly off in 
economic negotiations as one that, in affairs of general 
policy, has no armaments wherewith to face a well-equipped 
foe. This consideration is of course scouted as heretical 
by orthodox economists; but it counts for much in the 
workaday world, where tariff wars and commercial treaty 
bargainings unfortunately still distract the energies of 
mankind. 

On the other hand, it would be risky to point to the in- 
ternal prosperity of Germany and the vast growth of her 
exports as proofs of the soundness of protectionist theories. 
The marvellous growth of that prosperity is very largely 
due to the natural richness of a great part of the country, 
to the intelligence, energy, and foresight of the people 
and their rulers, and to the comparatively backward state 
of German industry and commerce up to the year 1870. 
Far on into the nineteenth century, Germany was suffering 
from the havoc wrought by the Napoleonic wars and still 
earlier struggles. Even after the year 1850, the political 
uncertainties of the time prevented her enjoying the 
prosperity that then visited England and France. There- 
fore, only since 1870 (or rather since 1877-78, when the 
results of the mad speculation of 1873 began to wear away) 
has she entered on the normal development of a modem 
industrial State; and he would be an eager partisan who 
would put down her prosperity mainly to the credit of the 
protectionist regime. In truth, no one can correctly 
gauge the value of the complex causes — economic, political, 



178 The European Nations 

educational, scientific, and engineering — that make for 
the prosperity of a vast industrial community. So closely 
are they intertwined in the nature of things, that dog- 
matic arguments laying stress on one of them alone must 
speedily be seen to be the merest juggling with facts and 
figures. 

As regards the wider influences exerted by Germany's 
new protective policy, we can here allude only to one; and 
that will be treated more fully in the chapter dealing with 
the partition of Africa. That policy gave a great stimulus 
to the colonial movement in Germany, and through her in 
all European States. As happened in the time of the old 
mercantile system, Powers which limited their trade with 
their neighbours felt an imperious need for absorbing new 
lands in the tropics to serve as close preserves for the 
mother-country. Other circumstances helped to impel 
Germany on the path of colonial expansion; but probably 
the most important, though the least obvious, was the 
recrudescence of that "mercantilism" which Adam Smith 
had exploded. Thus, the triumph of the national principle 
in and after 1870 was consolidated by means which tended 
to segregate the human race in masses, regarding each 
other more or less as enemies or rivals, alike in the spheres 
of politics, commerce, and colonial expansion. 

We may conclude our brief survey of German con- 
structive policy by glancing at the chief of the experiments 
which may be classed as akin to State Socialism. 

In 1882 the German Government introduced the Sickness 
Insurance Bill and the Accident Insurance Bill, but they 
were not passed till 1884, and did not take effect till 1885. 
For the relief of sickness the Government relied on existing 



The German Empire 179 

institutions organised for that object. This was very- 
wise, seeing that the great difficulty is how to find out 
whether a man really is ill or is merely shamming illness. 
Obviously a local club can find that out far better than a 
great imperial agency can. The local club has every reason 
for looking sharply after doubtful cases as a State Insurance 
Fund cannot do. As regards sickness, then, the Imperial 
Government merely compelled all the labouring classes, 
with few exceptions, to belong to some sick fund. They 
were obliged to pay in a sum of not less than about fourpence 
in the pound of their weekly wages ; and this payment of 
the workman has to be supplemented by half as much 
paid by his employer — or rather, the employer pays the 
whole of the premium and deducts the share payable by 
the workman from, his wages. 

Closely linked with this is the Accident Insurance Law. 
Here the " brunt of the payment falls wholly on the em- 
ployer. He alone pays the premiums for all his work 
people; the amount varies according to (i) the man's 
wage, (2) the risk incidental to the employment. The 
latter is determined by the actuaries of the Government. 
If a man is injured (even if it be by his own carelessness) 
he receives payments during the first thirteen weeks from 
the ordinary Sick Fund. If his accident keeps him a 
prisoner any longer, he is paid from the Accident Fund of 
the employers of that particular trade, or from the Im- 
perial Accident Fund. Here of course the chance of 
shamming increases, particularly if the man knows that he 
is being supported out of a general fund made up entirely 
by the employers' payments. The burden on the em- 
ployers is certainly very heavy, seeing that for all kinds 
of accidents relief may be claimed; the only exception is 



i8o The European Nations 

in cases where the injury can be shown to be wilfully com- 
mitted.^ A British Blue-book issued on March 31, 1905, 
shows that the enormous sum of ;£5,372,i5o was paid in 
Germany in the year 1902 as compensation to workmen 
for injuries sustained while at work. 

The burden of the employers does not end here. They 
have to bear their share of Old Age Insurance. This law 
was passed in 1889, at the close of the first year of the 
present Kaiser's reign. His father, the Emperor Fred- 
erick, during his brief reign had not favoured the principles 
of State Sociahsm; but the young Emperor William in 
November, 1888, announced that he would further the work 
begun by his grandfather, and though the difficulties of 
insurance for old age were very great, yet, with God's help, 
they would prove not to be insuperable. 

Certainly the effort was by far the greatest that had yet 
been made by any State. The young Emperor and his 
Chancellor sought to build up a fund whereby 12,000,000 
of work people might be guarded against the ills of a 
penniless old age. Their law provided for all workmen 
(even men in domestic service) whose yearly income did 
not exceed 2,000 marks (;^ioo). Like the preceding laws, 
it was compulsory. Every youth who is physically and 
mentally sound, and who earns more than a minimum 
wage, must begin to put by a fixed proportion of that wage 
as soon as he completes his sixteenth year. His employer 
is also compelled to contribute the same amount for him. 
Mr. Dawson, in the work already referred to, gives some 

' For the account given below, as also that of the Old Age In- 
surance Law, I am indebted to Mr. Dawson's excellent little work, 
Bismarck and State Socialism (Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1890). 
See also the Appendix to The German Empire of To-Day, by "Veri- 
tas" (1902). 



The German Empire 



lb I 



figures showing what the joint payments of employer and 
employed amount to on this score. If the workman earns 
;^i5 a year (i.e., about 6s. a week), the sum of 3s. ^^d. is 
put by for him yearly into the State Fund. If he earns 
jQs6 a. year, the joint annual payment will be 5s. 7^d. ; if 
he earns £^8, it will be 7s. a year, and so on. These pay- 
ments are reckoned up in various classes, according to the 
amounts; and according to the total amount is the final 
annuity payable to the worker in the evening of his days. 
That evening is very slow in coming for the German 
worker. For old age merely, he cannot begin to draw his 
full pension until he has attained the ripe age of seventy- 
one years. Then he will draw the full amount. He 
may anticipate that if he be incapacitated; but in that 
case the pension will be on a lower scale, proportioned 
to the amounts paid in and the length of time of the 
payments. 

The details of the measure are so complex as to cause a 
good deal of friction and discontent. The calculation of 
the various payments alone employs an army of clerks; 
the need of safeguarding against personation and other 
kinds of fraud makes a great number of precautions 
necessary; and thus the whole system becomes tied up 
with red tape in a way that even the more patient work- 
man of the Continent cannot endure. 

In a large measure, then, the German Government has 
failed in its efforts to cure 1?he industrial classes of their 
socialistic ideas. But its determination to attach them to 
the new German Empire, and to make that Empire the 
leading industrial State of the Continent, has had a com- 
plete triumph. So far as education, technical training, 
research, and enlightened laws can make a nation great, 



i82 The European Nations 

Germany is surely on the high-road to national and in* 
dustrial supremacy. 

It is a strange contrast that meets our eyes if we look 
back to the years before the advent of King William and 
Bismarck to power. In the dark days of the preWous 
reign Germany was weak, divided, and helpless. In re- 
gard to political life and industry she was still almost in 
swaddling-clothes; and her struggles to escape from the 
irksome restraint-s of the old Confederation seemed likely 
to be as futile as they had been since the year 1S15. But 
the advent of the King and his sturdy helper to power 
speedily changed the situation. The political problems 
were grappled with one by one and were trenchantly 
solved. Union was won by Bismarck's diplomacy and 
Prussia's sword; and when the longed-for goal was reached 
in seven momentous years, the same qualities were brought 
to bear on the difficult task of consolidating that tmion. 
Those qualities were the courage and honesty of purpose 
that the House of Hohenzollem has always displayed since 
the days of the Great Elector; added to these were rarer 
gifts, namely, the width of view, the eagle foresight, the 
strength of will, the skill in the choice of means, that made 
up the imposing personality of Bismarck. It was with an 
eye to him, and to the astonishing triumphs wrought by 
his diplomacy over France, that a diplomatist thus summed 
up the results of the year 1S70: "Europe has lost a mis- 
tress, but she has got a master.'' 

After the lapse of a generation that has been weighted 
with the cmrass of militarism, we are able to appreciate the 
force of that remark. Equally true is it that the formation 
of the Grerman Empire has not added to the cxdture and 
the inner happiness of the German people. The days of 



The German Empire , 183 

quiet culture and happiness are gone; and in their place 
has come a straining after ambitious aims which is a 
heavy drag even on the vitality of the Teutonic race. 
Still, whether for good or for evil, the unification of Ger- 
many must stand out as the greatest event in the history 
of the nineteenth century. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE EASTERN QUESTION 

"Perhaps one fact which Has at the root of all the actions of the 
Turks, small and great, is that they are by nature nomads. . . . 
Hence it is that when the Turk retires from a country he leaves 
no more sign of himself than does a Tartar camp on the upland 
pastures where it has passed the summer." — Turkey in Europe, by 
"Odysseus." 

THE remark was once made that the Eastern Question 
was destined to perplex mankind up to the Day of 
Judgment. Certainly that problem is extraordinarily com- 
plex in its details. For a century and a half it has dis- 
tracted the statesmen and philanthropists of Europe; for 
it concerns not only the ownership of lands of great intrinsic 
and strategic importance, but also the welfare of many 
peoples. It is a question, therefore, which no intelligent 
man ought to overlook. 

For the benefit of the tiresome person who insists on 
having a definition of every term, the Eastern Question 
may be briefly described as the problem of finding a modus 
Vivendi between the Turks and their Christian subjects and 
the neighbouring States. This may serve as a general 
working statement. No one who is acquainted with the 
rules of logic will accept it as a definition. Definitions can 
properly apply only to terms and facts that have a clear 
outline; and they can therefore very rarely apply to the 

i84 



The Eastern Question 185 

facts of history, which are of necessity as many-sided as 
human life itself. The statement given above is incom- 
plete, inasmuch as it neither hints at the great diflficulty 
of reconciling the civic ideas of Christian and Turkish 
peoples, nor describes the political problems arising out 
of the decay of the Ottoman Power and the ambitions of 
its neighbours. 

It will be well briefly to see what are the difficulties that 
arise out of the presence of Christians under the rule of a 
great Moslem State. They are chiefly these: Firs t, the 
Koran, though far from enjoining persecution of Christians, 
yet distinctly asserts the superiority of the true believer 
and the inferiority of "the people of the book" (Christians). 
The latter therefore are excluded from participation in 
public affairs, and in practice are refused a hearing in the 
law courts. Consequently they tend to sink to the posi- 
tion of hewers of wood and drawers of water to the Mos- 
lems, these on their side inevitably developing the defects 
of an exclusive dominant caste. This is so especially with 
the Turks. They are one of the least gifted of the Mon- 
golian family of nations; brave in war and patient under 
suffering and reverses, they nevertheless are hopelessly 
narrow-minded and bigoted; and the Christians in their 
midst have fared perhaps worse than anywhere else 
among the Mohammedan peoples. 

M. de Laveleye, who studied the condition of things in 
Turkey not long after the war of 1877-78, thus summed up 
the causes of the social and political decline of the Turks: 

"The true Mussulman loves neither progress, novelty, 
nor education; the Koran is enough for him. He is 
satisfied with his lot, therefore cares little for its im- 
provement, somewhat like a Catholic monk; but at the 



1 86 The European Nations 

same time he hates and despises the Christian raya, who is 
the labourer. He pitilessly despoils, fleeces, and ill-treats 
him to the extent of completely ruining and destroying 
those families, which are the only ones who cultivate the 
ground; it was a state of war continued in time of peace, 
and transformed into a regime of permanent spoliation 
and murder. The wife, even when she is the only one, is 
always an inferior being, a kind of slave, destitute of any 
intellectual culture ; and as it is she who trains the children 
— boys and girls — the bad results are plainly seen." 

Matters were not always and in all parts of Turkey so bad 
as this; but they frequently became so under cruel or 
corrupt governors, or in times when Moslem fanaticism 
ran riot. In truth, the underlying cause of Turkey's 
troubles is the ignorance and fanaticism of her people. 
These evils result largely from the utter absorption of all 
devout Moslems in their creed and ritual. Texts from the 
Koran guide their conduct; and all else is decided by 
fatalism, which is very often a mere excuse for doing 
nothing.^ Consequently all movements for reform are 
mere ripples on the surface of Turkish life; they never 
touch its dull depths; and the Sultan and officials, knowing 
this, cling to the old ways with full confidence. The pro- 
tests of Christian nations on behalf of their coreligionists 
are therefore met with a polite compliance which means 
nothing. Time after time the Sublime Porte has most 
solemnly promised to grant religious liberty to its Christian 
subjects; but the promises were but empty air, and those 
who made them knew it. In fact, the firmans of reform 

1 " Islam continues to be, as it has been for twelve centuries, the 
most inflexible adversary to the Western spirit " {History of Senna 
and the Slav Provinces of Turkey, by L. von Ranke, Eng. edit., p. 
296). 



The Eastern Question 187 

now and again issued with so much ostentation have never 
been looked on by good Moslems as binding, because the 
chief spiritual functionary, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, whose 
assent is needed to give validity to laws, has withheld it 
from those very ordinances. As he has power to depose 
the Sultan for a lapse of orthodoxy, the result may be 
imagined. The many attempts of the Christian Powers to 
enforce their notions of religious toleration on the Porte 
have in the end merely led to further displays of Oriental 
psliteness. 

It may be asked: Why have not the Christians of Turkey 
united in order to gain civic rights? The answer is that 
they are profoundly divided in race and sentiment. In 
the north-east are the Roumanians, Slavs by extraction 
but ages ago Latinised in speech and habit of mind by 
contact with Roman soldiers and settlers on the Lower 
Danube. South of that river there dwell the Bulgars, 
who, strictly speaking, are not Slavs but Mongolians. 
After long sojourn on the Volga they took to themselves the 
name of that river, lost their Tartar speech, and became 
Slav in sentiment and language. This change took place 
before the ninth century, when they migrated to the south 
and conquered the districts which they now inhabit. 
Their neighbours on the west, the Servians, are Slavs in 
every sense, and look back with pride to the time of the 
great Servian Kingdom, carved out by Stephen Dushan, 
which stretched southwards to the ^gean and the Gulf of 
Corinth (about 1350). 

To the west of the present Kingdom of Servia dwell other 
Servians and Slavs, who have been partitioned and ground 
down by various conquerors and have kept fewer traditions 
than the Servians who won their freedom. But from this 



1 88 The European Nations 

statement we must except the Montenegrins, who in their 
mountain fastnesses have ever defied the Turks. To the 
south of them is the large but httle-known Province of 
Albania, inhabited by the descendants of the ancient 
Illyrians, with admixtures of Greeks in the south, Bul- 
garians in the east, and Servians in the north-east. Most 
of the Albanians forsook Christianity and are among the 
most fanatical and warlikfe upholders of Islam; but in their 
turbulent clan-life they often defy the authority of the 
Sultan, and uphold it only in order to keep their supremacy 
over the hated and despised Greeks and Bulgars on their 
outskirts. Last among the non-Turkish races of the Bal- 
kan Peninsula are a few Wallachs in Central Macedonia, 
and Greeks; these last inhabit Thessaly and the seaboard 
of Macedonia and of part of Roumelia. It is well said that 
Greek influence in the Balkans extends no further inland 
than that of the sea breezes. 

Such is the medley of races that complicates the Eastern 
Question. It may be said that Turkish rule in Europe 
survives owing to the racial divisions and jealousies of the 
Christians. The Sultan puts in force the old Roman 
motto. Divide et impera, and has hitherto done so, in the 
main, with success. That is the reason why Islam domi- 
nates Christianity in the south-east of Europe. 

This brief explanation will show what are the evils that 
affect Turkey as a whole and her Christian subjects in 
particular. They are due to the collision of two irrecon-' 
cilable creeds and civilisations, the Christian and the 
Mohammedan. Both of them are gifted with vitality and 
propagandist power (witness the spread of the latter in 
Africa and Central Asia in our own day) ; and, while no 
comparison can be made between them on ideal grounds 



The Eastern Question 189 

and in their ethical and civic results, it still remains true 
that Islam inspires its votaries with fanatical bravery in 
war. There is the weakness of the Christians of south- 
eastern Europe. Superior in all that makes for home life, 
civilisation, and civic excellence, they have in time past 
generally failed as soldiers when pitted against an equal 
number of Moslems. But the latter show no constructive 
powers in time of peace, and have very rarely assimilated 
the conquered races. Putting the matter baldly, we may 
say that it is a question of the survival of the fittest, be- 
tween beavers and bears; and in the nineteenth century 
the advantage has been increasingly with the former. 

These facts will appear if we take a brief glance at the 
salient features of the history of European Turkey. After 
capturing Constantinople, the capital of the old Eastern 
Empire, in the year 1453, the Turks for a time rapidly ex- 
tended their power over the neighbouring Christian States, 
Bulgaria, Servia, and Hungary. In the year 1683 they 
laid siege to Vienna; but after being beaten back from 
that city by the valiant Sobieski, King of Poland, they 
gradually lost ground. Little by little Hungary, Transyl- 
vania, the Crimea, and parts of the Ukraine (South Russia) 
were wrenched from their grasp, and the close of the 
eighteenth century saw their frontiers limited to the River 
Dniester and the Carpathians.^ Further losses were 
staved off only by the jealousies of the great Powers. 
Joseph II. of Austria came near to effecting further 

> The story that Peter the Great of Russia left a clause in his 
will, bidding Russia to go on with her southern conquests until she 
gained Constantinople, is an impudent fiction of French publicists 
in the year 181 2, when Napoleon wished to keep Russia and Turkey 
at war. Of course, Peter the Great gave a mighty impulse to 
Russian movements towards Constantinople. 



igo The European Nations 

conquests, but his schemes of partition fell through amidst 
the wholesale collapse of his too ambitious policy. Napoleon 
Bonaparte seized Egypt in 1798, but was forced by Great 
Britain to give it back to Turkey (1801-02). In 1807-12 
Alexander I. of Russia resumed the conquering march of 
the Czars southward, captured Bessarabia, and forced the 
Sultan to grant certain privileges to the Principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1806-15 the Servians revolted 
against Turkish rule: they had always remembered the 
days of their early fame, and in 18 17 wrested from the 
Porte large rights of local self-government. 

Ten years later the intervention of England and France 
in favour of the Greek patriots led to the battle of Navarino, 
which destroyed the Turko-Egyptian fleet and practically 
secured the independence of Greece. An even worse blow 
was dealt by the Czar Nicholas I. of Russia. In 1829, at 
the close of a war in which his troops drove the Turks over 
the Balkans and away from Adrianople, he compelled the 
Porte to sign a peace at that city, whereby they acknow- 
ledged the almost complete independence of Moldavia 
and Wallachia. These Danubian Principalities owned the 
suzerainty of the Sultan and paid him a yearly tribute, but 
in other respects were practically free from his control, 
while the Czar gained for the time the right of protecting 
the Christians of the Eastern, or Greek, Church in the 
Ottoman Empire. The Sultan also recognised the inde- 
pendence of Greece. Further troubles ensued which laid 
Turkey for a time at the feet of Russia. England and 
France, however, intervened to raise her up; and they 
also thwarted the efforts of Mehemet Ali, the rebellious 
Pasha of Egypt, to seize Syria from his nominal lord, the 
Sultan. 



The Eastern Question igi 

Even this bare summary will serve to illustrate three 
important facts: first, that Turkey never consolidated her 
triumph over the neighbouring Christians, simply because 
she could not assimilate them, alien as they were in race, 
creed, and civilisation; second, that the Christians gained 
more and more support from kindred peoples (especially 
the Russians) as these last developed their energies; third, 
that the liberating process was generally (though not in 
1827) delayed by the action of the Western Powers (Eng- 
land and France), which, on grounds of policy, sought to 
stop the aggrandisement of Austria, or of Russia, by sup- 
porting the authority of the Sultan. 

The policy of supporting the Sultan against the aggres- 
sion of Russia reached its climax in the Crimean War 
(1854-55), which was due mainly to the efforts of the Czar 
Nicholas to extend his protection over the Greek Christians 
in Turkey. France. England, and later on the Kingdom 
of Sardinia made war on Russia — France, chiefly because 
her new ruler, Napoleon III., wished to play a great part 
in the world, and avenge the disasters of the Moscow cam- 
paign of 181 2; England, because her Government and 
people resented the encroachments of Russia in the East, 
and sincerely believed that Turkey was about to become 
a civilised State; and Sardinia, because her statesman 
Cavour saw in this action a means of securing the alliance 
of the two Western States in his projected campaign 
against Austria. The war closed with the Treaty of Paris, 
of 1856, whereby the signatory Powers formally admitted 
Turkey "to participate in the advantages of the public 
law and system of Europe," 

This, however, merely signified that the signatory 
Powers would resist encroachments on the territorial 



192 The European Nations 

integrity of Turkey. It did not limit the rights of the 
Powers, as specified in various "capitulations," to safe- 
guard their own subjects residing in Turkey against Turk- 
ish misrule. The Sultan raised great hopes by issuing a 
firman granting religious liberty to his Christian subjects; 
this was inserted in the Treaty of Paris, and thereby 
became part of the public law of Europe. The Powers also 
became collectively the guarantors of the local privileges 
of the Danubian Principalities. Another article of the 
treaty provided for the exclusion of war-ships from the 
Black Sea. This of course applied specially to Russia and 
Turkey. 1 

The chief diplomatic result of the Crimean War, then, 
was to substitute a European recognition of religious toler- 
ation in Turkey for the control over her subjects of the 
Greek Church which Russia had claimed. The Sublime 
Porte Was now placed in a stronger position than it had 
held since the year 1770; and the due performance of its 
promises would probably have led to the building up of a 
strong State. But the promises proved to be mere waste- 
paper. The Sultan, believing that England and France 
would always take his part, let matters go on in the old 
bad way. The natural results came to pass. The Christ- 
ians became more and more restive under Turkish rule. 
In i860 numbers of them were massacred in the Lebanon, 
and Napoleon III. occupied part of Syria with French 
troops. The vassal States in Europe also displayed in- 
creasing vitality, while that of Turkey waned. In 1861, 
largely owing to the diplomatic help of Napoleon III., 

> For the treaty and the firman of 1856, see The European Con- 
cert in the Eastern Question, by T. F. Holland; also Debidotir, His- 
toire diplomatique de V Europe (1814-1878), ii., pp. 150-152; The 
Eastern Question, by the late Duke of Argyll, i., chap. i. 



The Eastern Question 193 

Moldavia and Wallachia united and formed the Princi- 
pality of Roumania. In 1862, after a short but terrible 
struggle, the Servians rid themselves of the Turkish gar- 
risons and framed a constitution of the Western type. 
But the worst blow came in 1870. During the course of 
the Franco-German War the Czar's Government (with the 
good-will and perhaps the active connivance of the Court 
of Berlin) announced that it would no longer be bound by 
the article of the Treaty of Paris excluding Russian war- 
ships from the Black Sea. The Gladstone Ministry sent 
a protest against this act, but took no steps to enforce its 
protest. The young British diplomatist Sir Horace Rum- 
bold, then at St. Petersburg, believed that she would have 
drawn back at a threat of war.^ Finally, the Russian 
declaration was agreed to by the Powers in a treaty 
signed at London on March 31, 187 1. 

These warnings were all thrown away on the Porte. Its 
promises of toleration to Christians were ignored; the 
wheels of government clanked on in the traditional rusty 
way; governors of provinces and districts continued, as 
of yore, to pocket the grants that were made for local im- 
provements; in defiance of the promises given in 1856, 
taxes continued to be "farmed" out to contractors; the 
evidence of Christians against Moslems was persistently re- 
fused a hearing in courts of justice ^ ; and the collectors of 
taxes gave further turns of the financial screw in order to 
wring from the cultivators, especially from the Christians, 
the means of satisfying the needs of the State and the 

» Sir Horace Rumbold, Recollections of a Diplomatist (First Se- 
ries), ii., p. 295. 

2 As to this, see Reports: Condition of Christians in Turkey 
(i860). Presented ',0 Parliament in 1861. Also Parliamentary- 
Papers, Turkey, No, 16 (1877). 



194 The European Nations 

ever-increasing extravagance of the Sultan. Incidents 
which were observed in Bosnia by an Oxford scholar of 
high repute, in the summer of 1875, will be found quoted 
in an Appendix at the end of this volume. 

Matters came to a climax in the autumn of that year in 
Herzegovina, the southern part of Bosnia. There after a 
bad harvest the farmers of taxes and the Mohammedan 
landlords insisted on having their full quota. For many 
years the peasants had suffered under agrarian wrongs, 
which cannot be described here ; and now this long- 
suffering peasantry, mostly Christians, fled to the mount- 
ains, or into Montenegro, whose sturdy mountaineers had 
never bent beneath the Turkish yoke.^ Thence they made 
forays against their oppressors until the whole of that part 
of the Balkans was aflame with the old religious and racial 
feuds. The Slavs of Servia, Bulgaria, and of Austrian 
Dalmatia also gave secret aid to their kith and kin in the 
struggle against their Moslem overlords. These peoples 
had been aroused by the sight of the triumph of the 
national cause in Italy, and felt that the time had come to 
strike for freedom in the Balkans. Turkey therefore 
failed to stamp out the revolt in Herzegovina, fed as it 
was by the neighbouring Slav peoples; and it was clear 
to all the politicians of Europe that the Eastern Question 
was entering once more on an acute phase. 

These events aroused varied feelings in the European 

1 Efforts were made by the British Consul, Holmes, and other 
pro-Turks, to assign this revolt to Panslavonic intrigues. That 
there were some Slavonic emissaries at work is undeniable; but 
it is equally certain that their efforts would have had no result 
but for the existence of unbearable ills. It is time, surely, to give 
up the notion that peoples rise in revolt merely owing to outside 
agitators. To revolt against the warlike Turks has never been 
child's plav. 



The Eastern Question 195 

States. The Russian people, being in the main of Slavonic 
descent, sympathised deeply with the struggles of their 
kith and kin, who were rendered doubly dear by their 
membership in the Greek Church. The Panslavonic 
Movement, for bringing the scattered branches of the Slav 
race into some form of political union, was already gaining 
ground in Russia; but it found little favour with the St. 
Petersburg Government owing to the revolutionary aims 
of its partisans. Sympathy with the revolt in the Balkans 
was therefore confined to nationalist enthusiasts in the 
towns of Russia. Austria was still more anxious to pre- 
vent the spread of the Balkan rising to the millions of her 
own Slavs. Accordingly, the Austrian Chancellor, Count 
Andrassy, in concert with Prince Bismarck and the Russian 
statesman Prince Gortchakoff, began to prepare a scheme 
of reforms which was to be pressed on the Sultan as a 
means of conciliating the insurgents of Herzegovina. They 
comprised (i) the improvement of the lot of the peasantry; 
(2) complete religious liberty; (3) the abolition of the 
farming of taxes ; (4) the application of the local taxation 
to local needs; (5) the appointment of a commission, half 
of Moslems, half of Christians, to supervise the execution 
of these reforms and of others recently promised by the 
Porte. 1 

These proposals would probably have been sent to the 
Porte before the close of 1875 but for the diplomatic inter- 
vention of the British Cabinet. Affairs at London were 
then in the hands of that skilful and determined statesman, 
Disraeli, soon to become Lord Beaconsfield. It is im- 
possible to discuss fully the causes of that bias in his 

' For the full text, see Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, iv., 
pp. 2418—2429. 



196 The European Nations 

nature which prejudiced him against supporting the 
Christians of Turkey. Those causes were due in part to 
the Semitic instincts of his Jewish ancestry — the Jews 
having consistently received better treatment from the 
Turks than from the Russians — and in part to his staunch 
Imperialism, which saw in Muscovite expansion the chief 
danger to British communications with India. Mr. Bryce 
has recently pointed out in a suggestive survey of Dis- 
raeli's character that tradition had great weight with him.^ 
It is known to have been a potent influence on the mind of 
Queen Victoria ; and, as the traditional policy at Whitehall 
was to support Turkey against Russia, all the personal 
leanings, which count for so much, told in favour of a 
continuance in the old lines, even though the circumstances 
had utterly changed since the time of the Crimean War. 

When, therefore, Disraeli became aware that pressure 
was about to be applied to the Porte by the three Powers 
above named, he warned them that he considered any 
such action to be inopportune, seeing that Turkey ought 
to be allowed time to carry out a programme of reforms of 
recent date. By an irade of October 2, 1875, the Sultan 
had promised to all his Christian subjects a remission of 
taxation and the right of choosing not only the controllers 
of taxes, but also delegates to supervise their rights at 
Constantinople. 

In taking these promises seriously, Disraeli stood almost 
alone. But his speech of November 9, 1875, at the Lord 
Mayor's banquet, showed that he viewed the Eastern 
Question solely from the standpoint of British interests. 
His acts spoke even more forcibly than his words. That 
was the time when the dawn of Imperialism flushed all the 
» Bryce, Studies in Contemporary Biography (1904). 



The Eastern Question 197 

Eastern sky. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales had just begun 
his Indian tour amidst splendid festivities at Bombay; 
and the repetition of these in the native States undoubtedly 
did much to awaken interest in our Eastern Empire and 
cement the loyalty of its princes and peoples. Next, at 
the close of the month of November, came the news that 
the British Government had bought the shares in the 
Suez Canal previously owned by the Khedive of Egypt 
for the sum of £4,000,000.^ The transaction is now 
acknowledged by every thinking man to have been a 
master-stroke of policy, justified on all grounds, financial 
and imperial. In those days it met with sharp censure 
from Disraeli's opponents. In a sense this was natural; 
for it seemed to be part of a scheme for securing British 
influence in the Levant and riding roughshod over the 
susceptibilities of the French (the constructors of the 
canal) and the plans of Russia. Everything pointed to 
the beginning of a period of spirited foreign policy which 
would lead to war with Russia. 

Meanwhile the three Empires delayed the presentation 
of their scheme of reforms for Turkey, and, as it would 
seem, out of deference to British representations. The 
troubles in Herzegovina therefore went on unchecked 
through the winter, the insurgents refusing to pay any 
heed to the Sultan's promises, even though these were 
extended by the irade of December 12th, offering religiotis 
liberty and the institution of electoral bodies throughout 
the whole of European Turkey.. The statesmen of the 
Continent were equally sceptical as to the bona fides of 
these offers, and on January 31, 1876, presented to the 
Porte their scheme of reforms already described. Disraeli 
> For details of this affair, see Chapter XVI. of this work. 



igS The European Nations 

and our Foreign Minister, Lord Derby, gave a cold and 
guarded assent to the " Andrassy Note," though they were 
known to regard it as "inopportune." To the surprise 
of the world, the Porte accepted the note on February nth, 
with one reservation. 

This act of acceptance, however, failed to satisfy the 
insurgents. They decided to continue the struggle. 
Their irreconcilable attitude doubtless arose from their 
knowledge of the worthlessness of Turkish promises when 
not backed by pressure from the Powers; and it should be 
observed that the "note" gave no hint of any such pres- 
sure.^ But it was also prompted by the hope that Servia 
and Montenegro would soon draw the sword on their 
behalf — as indeed happened later on. Those warlike 
peoples longed to join in the struggle against their an- 
cestral foes; and their rulers were nothing loth to do so. 
Servia was then ruled by Prince Milan (1868-89) of that 
House of Obrenovitch which has been extinguished by the 
cowardly murders of June, 1903, at Belgrade. He had 
recently married Nathalie Kechko, a noble Russian lady, 
whose connexions strengthened the hopes that he na,turally 
entertained of armed Muscovite help in case of a war with 
Turkey. Prince Nikita of Montenegro had married his 
second daughter to a Russian Grand Duke, cousin of the 
Czar Alexander II., and therefore cherished the same 
hopes. It was clear that unless energetic steps were taken 
by the Powers to stop the spread of the conflagration it 
would soon wrap the whole of the Balkan Peninsula in 

1 See Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 5 (1877), for Consul 
Freeman's report of March 17, 1877, of the outrages by the Turks 
in Bosnia. The refugees declared they would "sooner drown 
themselves in the Unna than again subject themselves to Turkish 
oppression." The Porte denied all the outrages. 



The Eastern Question 199 

flames. An outbreak of Moslem fanaticism at Salonica 
(May 6th), which led to the murder of the French and Ger- 
man Consuls at that port, shed a lurid light on the whole 
situation and convinced the Continental Powers that 
sterner measures must be adopted towards the Porte. 

Such was the position, and such the considerations, that 
led the three Empires to adopt more drastic proposals. 
Having found, meanwhile, by informal conferences with 
the Herzegovinian leaders, what were the essentials to a 
lasting settlement, they prepared to embody them in a 
second note, the Berlin Memorandum, issued on May 13th. 
It was drawn up by the three Imperial Chancellors at 
Berlin, but Andrassy is known to have given a somewhat 
doubtful consent. This " Berlin Memorandum" demanded 
the adoption of an armistice for two months; the re- 
patriation of the Bosnian exiles and fugitives; the estab- 
lishment of a mixed commission for that purpose; the 
removal of Turkish troops from the rural districts of 
Bosnia; the right of the Consuls of the European Powers 
to see to the carrying out of all the promised reforms. 
Lastly, the Memorandum stated that if within two months 
the three Imperial Courts did not attain the end they had 
in view (viz., the carrying out of the needed reforms), it 
would become necessary to take "efficacious measures" 
for that pUiOose.^ Bismarck is known to have favoured 
the policy of Gortchakoff in this affair. 

The proposals of the Memorandum were at once sent to 
the British, French, and Italian Governments for their 
assent. The two last immediately gave it. After a brief 
delay the Disraeli Ministry sent a decisive refusal and made 
no alternative proposal, though one of its members, Sir 
1 Hertslet, iv., pp. 2459-2463. 



200 The European Nations 

Stafford Northcote, is known to have formulated a scheme.^ 
The Cabinet took a still more serious step: on May 24th, it 
ordered the British fleet in the Mediterranean to steam to 
Besika Bay, near the entrance to the Dardanelles — the 
very position it had taken before the Crimean War.2 It 
is needless to say that this act not only broke up the 
"European Concert," but ended all hopes of compelling 
Turkey at once to grant the much-needed reforms. That 
compulsion would have been irresistible had the British 
fleet joined the Powers in preventing the landing of troops 
from Asia Minor in the Balkan Peninsula. As it was, the 
Turks could draw those reinforcements without hindrance. 

The Berlin Memorandum was, of course, not presented 
to Turkey, partly owing to the rapid changes which then 
took place at Constantinople. To these we must now 
advert. 

The Sultan, Abdul Aziz, during his fifteen years of rule 
had increasingly shown himself to be apathetic, wasteful, 
and indifferent to the claims of duty. In the month of 
April, when the State repudiated its debts, and officials and 
soldiers were left unpaid, his life of luxurious retirement 
went on unchanged. It has been reckoned that of the 
total Turkish debt of ;£T20o,ooo,ooo, as much as ;^T53,- 
000,000 was due to his private extravagance.'' Discontent 
therefore became rife, especially among the fanatical 

' Sir Stafford Northcote. Earl of Iddesleigh, by Andrew Lang, ii., 
p. 181. 

2 Our ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliott, asked 
(May 9th) that a squadron should be sent there to reassure the British 
subjects in Turkey; but as the fleet was not ordered to proceed 
thither until after a long interval, and was kept there in great 
strength and for many months, it is fair to assume that the aim of 
our Government was to encourage Turkey. 

3 Gallenga, The Eastern Question, ii., p. 99. 



The Eastern Question 201 

bands of theological students at Constantinople. These 
Softas, as they are termed, numbering some 20,000 or 
more, determined to breathe new life into the Porte — an 
aim which the patriotic " Young Turkey " party already had 
in view. On May nth large bands of Softas surrounded 
the buildings of the Grand Vizier and the Sheik-ul-Islam, 
and with wild cries compelled them to give up their powers 
in favour of more determined men. On the night of May 
2 9th-3oth they struck at the Sultan himself. The new 
Ministers were on their side: the Sheik-ul-Islam, the chief of 
the Ulemas, who interpret Mohammedan theology and law, 
now gave sentence that the Sultan might be dethroned for 
misgovemment ; and this was done without the least show 
of resistance. His nephew, Murad Effendi, was at once 
proclaimed Sultan as Murad V. ; a few days later the de- 
throned Sultan was secretly murdered, though possibly his 
death may have been due to suicide.^ 

We may add here that Murad soon showed himself to be 
a friend to reform; and this, rather than any incapacity 
for ruling, was probably the cause of the second palace 
revolution, which led to his deposition on August 31st. 
Thereupon his brother, the present ruler, Abdul Hamid, 
ascended the throne. His appearance was thus described 
by one who saw him at his first State progress through his 
capital: "A somewhat heavy and stern countenance . . . 
narrow at the temples, with a long gloomy cast of features, 
large ears, and dingy complexion. ... It seemed to 
me the countenance of a ruler capable of good or evil, but 
knowing his own mind and determined to have his own 

» For the aims of the Young Turkey party, see the Life of Midhat 
Pasha, by his son; also an article by Midhat in the Nineteenth 
Century for June, 1878. 



202 The European Nations 

way." ^ This forecast has been fulfilled in the most 
sinister manner. 

If any persons believed in the official promise of June 
ist, that there should be "liberty for all" in the Turkish 
dominions, they might have been undeceived by the events 
that had just transpired to the south of the Balkan Mount- 
ains. The outbreak of Moslem fanaticism, which at Con- 
stantinople led to the dethronement of two Sultans in 
order to place on the throne a stern devotee, had already 
deluged with blood the Bulgarian districts near Philippo- 
polis. In the first days of May, the Christians of those 
parts, angered by the increase of misrule and fired with 
hope by the example of the Herzegovinians, had been 
guilty of acts of insubordination; and at Tatar Bazardjik 
a few Turkish officials were killed. The movement was of 
no importance, as the Christians were nearly all unarmed. 
Nevertheless, the authorities poured into the disaffected 
districts some 18,000 regulars, along with hordes of ir- 
regulars, or Bashi-Bazouks ; and these, especially the last, 
proceeded to glut their hatred and lust in a wild orgy 
which desolated the whole region with a thoroughness that 
the Huns of Attila could scarcely have excelled (May 9th- 
i6th.) In the upper valley of the Maritza, out of eighty vil- 
lages all but fifteen were practically wiped out. Batak, a 
flourishing town of some 7000 inhabitants, underwent a 
systematic massacre, culminating in the butchery of all who 
had taken refuge in the largest church ; of the whole popu- 
lation only 2000 managed to escape. ^ 

» Gallenga, The Eastern Qtiestion, ii., p. 126. Murad died in the 
year 1904. 

2 Mr. Baring, a secretary of the British Legation at Constan- 
tinople, after a careful examination of the evidence, gave the num- 
ber of Bulgarians slain as "not fewer than 12,000" ; he opined that 



The Eastern Question 203 

It is painful to have to add that the British Government 
was indirectly responsible for these events. Not only had 
it let the Turks know that it deprecated the intervention 
of the European Powers in Turkey (which was equivalent 
to giving the Turks carte blanche in dealing with their 
Christian subjects), but on hearing of the Herzegovina 
revolt, it pressed on the Porte the need of taking speedy 
measures to suppress them. The despatches of Sir Henry 
Elliott, our ambassador at Constantinople, also show that 
he had favoured the use of active measures towards the 
disaffected districts north of Philippopolis.^ 

Of course, neither the British Government nor its am- 
bassador foresaw the awful results of this advice; but 
their knowledge of Turkish methods should have warned 
them against giving it without adding the cautions so 
obviously needed. Sir Henry Elliott speedily protested 
against the measures adopted by the Turks, but then it 
was too late. 2 Furthermore, the contemptuous way in 
which Disraeli dismissed the first reports of the Bulgarian 
massacres as "coffee-house babble" revealed his whole 
attitude of mind on Turkish affairs ; and the painful im- 
pression aroused by this utterance was increased by his 
declaration of July 30th that the British fleet then at 

163 Mussulmans were perhaps killed early in May. He admitted 
the Batak horrors. Achmet Agha, their chief perpetrator, was at 
first condemned to death by a Turkish commission of inquiry, but 
he was finally pardoned. Shefket Pasha, whose punishment was 
also promised, was afterwards promoted to a high command. 
Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 2 (1877), pp. 248-249; ihid., No. 15 
(1877), No. 77, p. 58. Mr. Layard, successor to Sir Henry Elliott 
at Constantinople, afterwards sought to reduce the numbers slain 
to 3500. Turkey, No. 26 (1877), p. 54. 

1 Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 3 (1876), pp. 144, 173, 198-199. 

2 See, inter alia, his letter of May 26, 1876, quoted in Life ana 
Correspondence of William White (1902), pp. 99-100, 



204 The European Nations 

Besika Bay was kept there solely in defence of British 
interests. He made a similar but more general statement 
in the House of Commons on August nth. On the next 
morning the world heard that Queen Victoria had been 
pleased to confer on him the title of Earl of Beaconsfield. 
It is well known, on his own admission, that he could no 
longer endure the strain of the late sittings in the House 
of Commons and had besought Her Majesty for leave to 
retire. She, however, suggested the gracious alternative 
that he should continue in ofhce with a seat in the House 
of Lords. None the less, the conferring of this honour was 
felt by very many to be singularly inopportune. 

For at this time tidings of the massacres at Batak and 
elsewhere began to be fully known. Despite the efforts 
of Ministers to discredit them, they aroused growing ex- 
citement; and when the whole truth was known, a storm 
of indignation swept over the country as over the whole 
of Europe. Efforts were made by the Turcophil Press to 
represent the new trend of popular feeling as a mere party 
move and an insidious attempt of the Liberal Opposition 
to exploit humanitarian sentiment; but this charge will 
not bear examination. Mr. Gladstone had retired from 
the Liberal Leadership early in 1875 and was deeply oc- 
cupied in literary work ; and Lords Granville and Harting- 
ton, on whom devolved the duty of leading the Opposition, 
had been very sparing of criticisms on the foreign policy of 
the Cabinet. They, as well as Mr. Gladstone, had merely 
stated that the Government, on refusing to join in the 
Berlin Memorandum, ought to have formulated an alterna- 
tive policy. We now know that Mr. Gladstone left his 
literary work doubtfully and reluctantly. 1 

• J. Morley, Life of Gladstone, ii., pp. 548-549. 



The Eastern Question 205 

Now, however, the events in Bulgaria shed a ghastly 
light on the whole situation, and showed the consequences 
of giving the "moral support" of Britain to the Turks. 
The whole question ceased to rest on the high and dry 
levels of diplomacy, and became one of life or death for 
many thousands of men and women. The conscience of 
the country was touched to the quick by the thought that 
the presence of the British Mediterranean fleet at Besika 
Bay was giving the same encouragement to the Turks as 
it had done before the Crimean War, and that, too, when 
they had belied the promises so solemnly given in 1856, 
and were now proved to be guilty of unspeakable bar- 
barities. In such a case, the British nation would have 
been disgraced had it not demanded that no further alliance 
should be formed. It was equally the duty of the leaders 
of the Opposition to voice what was undoubtedly the 
national sentiment. To have kept silence would have 
been to stultify our Parliamentary institutions. The 
parrot cry that British interests were endangered by 
Russia's supposed designs on Turkey was met by the 
unanswerable reply that, if those designs existed, the best 
way to check them was to maintain the European concert 
and especially to keep in close touch with Austria, seeing 
that that Power had as much cause as England to dread 
any southward extension oi the Czar's power. Russia 
might conceivably fight Turkey and Great Britain; but 
she would not wage war against Austria as well. There- 
fore, the dictates of humanity as well as those of common 
sense alike condemned the British policy, which from the 
outset had encouraged the Turks to resist European inter- 
vention, had made us in some measure responsible for the 
Bulgarian massacres, and, finally, had broken up the 



2o6 The European Nations 

concert of the Powers, from which alone a peaceful solution 
of the Eastern Question could be expected. 

The union of the Powers having been dissolved by Brit- 
ish action, it was but natural that Russia and Austria 
should come to a private understanding. This came about 
at Reichstadt in Bohemia on July 8th. No definitive 
treaty was signed, but the two Emperors and their Chan- 
cellors framed an agreement defining their spheres of in- 
fluence in the Balkans in case war should break out between 
Russia and Turkey. Francis Joseph of Austria covenanted 
to observe a neutrality friendly to the Czar under certain 
conditions that will be noticed later on. Some of those 
conditions were distasteful to the Russian Government, 
which sounded Bismarck as to his attitude in case war 
broke out between the Czar and the Hapsburg ruler. 
Apparently the reply of the German Chancellor was un- 
favourable to Russia,^ for it thereafter renewed the nego- 
tiations with the Court of Vienna. On the whole, the 
ensuing agreement was a great diplomatic triumph; for 
the Czar thereby secured the neutrality of Austria — a 
Power that might readily have remained in close touch 
with Great Britain had British diplomacy displayed more 
foresight. 

The prospects of a great war, meanwhile, had increased, 
owing to the action of Servia and Montenegro. The rulers 
of those States, unable any longer to hold in their people, 
and hoping for support from their Muscovite kinsfolk, de- 
clared war on Turkey at the end of June. Russian volun- 
teers thronged to the Servian forces by thousands; but, 
despite the leadership of the Russian General, TchernayefE, 
they were soon overborne by the numbers and fanatical 

' Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences, ii., chap, xxviii. 



The Eastern Question 207 

\ralour of the Turks. Early in September, Servia appealed 
to the Powers for their mediation; and, owing chiefl}^ to 
the efforts of Great Britain, terms for an armistice were 
proposed by the new Sultan, Abdul Hamid, but of so hard 
a nature that the Servians rejected them. 

On the fortune of war still inclining against the Slavonic 
cause, the Russian people became intensely excited; and 
it was clear that they would speedily join in the war unless 
the Turks moderated their claims. There is reason to 
believe that the Czar Alexander 11. dreaded the outbreak 
of hostilities with Turkey in which he might become 
embroiled with Great Britain, The Panslavonic party in 
Russia was then permeated by revolutionary elements 
that might threaten the stability of the dynasty at the 
end of a long and exhausting struggle. But, feeling him- 
self in honour bound to rescue Servia and Montenegro from 
the results of their ill-judged enterprise, he assembled 
large forces in South Russia and sent General Ignatieff to 
Constantinople with the demand, urged in the most im- 
perious manner (October 30), that the Porte should im- 
mediately grant an armistice to those States. At once 
Abdul Hamid gave way. 

Even so, Alexander II. showed every desire of averting 
the horrors of war. Speaking to the British ambassador 
at St. Petersburg on November 2d, he said that the present 
state of affairs in Turkey "was intolerable, and unless 
Europe was prepared to act with firmness and energy, he 
should be obliged to act alone." But he pledged his word 
that he desired no aggrandisement, and that "he had not 
the smallest wish or intention to be possessed of Con- 
stantinople." ^ At this time proposals for a conference of 
» Hertslet, iv., p. 2508. 



2o8 The European Nations 

the Powers at Constantinople were being mooted: they 
had been put forth by the British Government on October 
5th. There seemed, therefore, to be some hope of a com- 
promise if the Powers reunited so as to bring pressure to 
bear on Turkey; for, a week later, the Sultan announced 
his intention of granting a constitution, with an elected 
Assembly to supervise the administration. But hopes of 
peace as well as of effective reform in Turkey were damped 
by the warlike speech of Lord Beaconsfield at the Lord 
Mayor's banquet on November 9th. He then used these 
words: "If Britain draws the sword in a righteous cause; 
if the contest is one which concerns her liberty, her inde- 
pendence, or her Empire, her resources, I feel, are inex- 
haustible. She is not a country that, when she enters into 
a campaign, has to ask herself whether she can support a 
second or a third campaign." On the next day the Czar 
replied in a speech at Moscow to the effect that if the 
forthcoming conference at Constantinople did not lead to 
practical results, Russia would be forced to take up arms; 
and he counted on the support of his people. A week 
later 160,000 Russian troops were mobilised. 

The issue was thus clear as far as concerned Russia. It 
was not so clear for Great Britain. Even now, we are in 
ignorance as to the real intent of Lord Beaconsfield's speech 
at the Guildhall. It seems probable that, as there were 
divisions in his Cabinet, he may have wished to bring 
about such a demonstration of public feeling as would 
strengthen his hands in proposing naval and military 
preparations. The duties of a Prime Minister are so com- 
plex that his words may be viewed either in an international 
sense, or as prompted by administrative needs, or by his 
relations to his colleagues, or, again, thev may be due 



The Eastern Question 209 

merely to electioneering considerations. Whatever their 
real intent on this occasion, they were interpreted by 
Russia as a defiance and by Turkey as a promise of armed 
help. 

On the other hand, if Lord Beaconsfield hoped to 
strengthen the pro-Turkish feeling in the Cabinet and the 
country, he failed. The resentment aroused by Turkish 
methods of rule and repression was too deep to be eradi- 
cated even by his skilful appeals to imperialist sentiment. 

The Bulgarian atrocities had at least brought this much 
of good: they rendered a Turco-British alliance absolutely 
impossible. 

Lord Derby had written to this effect on August 29th 
to Sir Henry Elliott: "The impression produced here by 
events in Bulgaria has completely destroyed sympathy 
with Turkey. The feeling is universal and so strong that 
even if Russia were to declare war against the Porte, Her 
Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible 
to interfere." ^ 

The assembly of a conference of the envoys of the 
Powers at Constantinople was claimed to be a decisive 
triumph for British diplomacy. There were indeed some 
grounds for hoping that Turkey would give way before a 
reunited Europe. The pressure brought to bear on the 
British Cabinet by public opinion resulted in instructions 
being given to Lord Salisbury (our representative, along 
with Sir H. Elliott, at the Conference) which did not differ 
much from the avowed aims of Russia and of the other 
Powers. Those instructions stated that the Powers could 
not accept mere promises of reform, for "the whole history 
of the Ottoman Empire, since it was admitted into the 
« Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 6 (1877). 



2IO The European Nations 

European Concert under the engagements of the Treaty 
of Paris [1856], has proved that the Porte is unable to 
guarantee the execution of reforms in the provinces by 
Turkish officials, who accept them with reluctance and 
neglect them with impunity." The Cabinet, therefore, 
insisted that there must be "external guarantees," but 
stipulated that no foreign armies must be introduced into 
Turkey.^ Here alone British ministers were at variance 
with the other Powers; and when, in the preliminary 
meetings of the Conference, a proposal was made to bring 
Belgian troops in order to guarantee the thorough execu- 
tion of the proposed reforms. Lord Salisbury did not oppose 
it. In pursuance of instructions from London, he even 
warned the Porte that Britain would not give any help in 
case war resulted from its refusal of the European proposals. 
It is well known that Lord Salisbury was far less pro- 
Turkish than the Prime Minister or the members of the 
British embassy at Constantinople. During a diplomatic 
tour that he had made to the chief capitals he convinced 
himself "that no Power was disposed to shield Turkey — 
not even Austria — if blood had to be shed for the status 
quo." (The words are those used by his assistant, Mr., 
afterwards Sir, William White.) He had had little or no 
difficulty in coming to an understanding with the Russian 
plenipotentiary, General Ignatieff, despite the intrigues of 
Sir Henry Elliott and his staff to hinder it.^ Indeed, the 
situation shows what might have been effected in May, 
1876, had not the Turks then received the support of the 
British Government. 

• Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 2 (1877), No. i; also, in part, in 
Hertslet, iv., p. 2517. 

2 Sir William White: Life and Correspondence, p. 117. 



The Eastern Question 211 

Now, however, there were signs that the Turks decHned 
to take the good advice of the Powers seriously; and on 
December 23rd, when the "full " meetings of the Conference 
began, the Sultan and his ministers treated the plenipo- 
tentiaries to a display of injured virtue and reforming zeal 
that raised the situation to the level of the choicest comedy. 
In the midst of the proceedings, after the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Safvet Pacha, had explained away the Bulgarian 
massacres as a myth woven by the Western imagination, 
salvoes of cannon were heard, that proclaimed the birth of 
a new and most democratic constitution for the whole of 
the Turkish Empire. Safvet did justice to the solemnity 
of the occasion ; the envoys of the Powers suppressed their 
laughter; and before long, Lord Salisbury showed his 
resentment at this display of Oriental irony and stubborn- 
ness by ordering the British fleet to withdraw from Besika 
Bay.i 

But deeds and words were alike wasted on the Sultan and 
his ministers. To all the proposals and warnings of the 
Powers they replied by pointing to the superior benefits 
about to be conferred by the new constitution. The Con- 
ference therefore speedily came to an end (January 20th). 
It had served its purpose. It had fooled Europe.^ 

The responsibility for this act of cynical defiance must be 
assigned to one man. The Sultan had never before mani- 
fested a desire for any reform whatsoever; and it was not 

' See Gallenga {The Eastern Question, ii., pp. 255—258) as to the 
scepticism regarding the new constitution, felt alike by foreigners 
and natives at Constantinople. 

2 See Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 2 (1878), p. 114, for the constitu- 
tion; and p. 302 for Lord Salisbury's criticisms on it; also ibid., 
pp. 344-345, for Turkey's final rejection of the proposals of the 
Powers. 



2 12 The European Nations 

until December 19, 1876, that he named as Grand Vizier 
Midhat Pasha, who was known to have long been weaving 
constitutional schemes. This Turkish Sieyes was thrust 
to the front in time to promulgate that fundamental re- 
form. His tenure of power, like that of the French con- 
stitution-monger in 1799, ended when the scheme had 
served the purpose of the real controller of events. Midhat 
obviously did not see whither things were tending. On 
January 24, 1877, he wrote to Said Pasha, stating that, 
according to the Turkish Ambassador at London (Musurus 
Pasha), Lord Derby congratulated the Sublime Porte on 
the dissolution of the Conference, "which he considers a 
success for Turkey." ^ 

It therefore only remained to set the constitution in 
motion. After six days, when no sign of action was 
forthcoming, Midhat wrote to the Sultan in urgent terms 
reminding him that their object in promulgating the 
constitution "was certainly not merely to find a solution of 
the so-called Eastern Question, nor to seek thereby to make 
a demonstration that should conciliate the sympathies of 
Europe, which had been estranged from us." This note 
seems to have irritated the Sultan. Abdul Hamid, with 
his small, nervous, exacting nature, has always valued 
ministers in proportion to their obedience, not to their 
power of giving timely advice. In every independent 
suggestion he sees the germ of opposition, and perhaps of a 
palace plot. He did so now. By way of reply, he bade 
Midhat come to the palace. Midhat, fearing a trap, de- 
ferred his visit, until he received the assurance that the 
order for the reforms had been issued. Then he obeyed 

» Life of Midhat Pasha, by Midhat Ali (1903), p. 142. Musurus 
must have deUberately misrepresented Lord Derby. 



The Eastern Question 213 

the summons; at once he was apprehended, and was 
hurried to the Sultan's yacht, which forthwith steamed 
away for the ^gean (February sth). The fact that he 
remained above its waters, and was allowed to proceed 
to Italy, may be taken as proof that his zeal for reform 
had been not without its uses in the game which the 
Sultan had played against the Powers. The Turkish 
Parliament, which assembled on March ist, acted with 
the subservience that might have been expected after 
this lesson. The Sultan dissolved it on the outbreak of 
war, and thereafter gave up all pretence of constitutional 
forms. As for Midhat, he was finally lured back to Tur- 
key and done to death. Such was the end of the Tur- 
kish constitution, of the Turkish Parliament, and of their 
contriver.^ 

Even the dissolution of the Conference of the Powers did 
not bring about war at once. It seems probable that the 
Czar hoped much from the statesmanlike conduct of Lord 
Salisbury at Constantinople, or perhaps he expected to 
secure the carrying out of the needed reforms by means of 
pressure from the Three Emperors' League (see Chapter 
XII.). But, unless the Russians gave up all interest in the 
fate of their kinsmen and co-religionists in Turkey, war 
was now the more probable outcome of events. Alexander 
had already applied to Germany for help, either diplomatic 
or military; but these overtures, of whatever kind, were 
declined by Bismarck — so he declared in his great speech 
of February 6, 1888. Accordingly, the Czar drew closer 
to Austria, with the result that the Reichstadt agreement 

> Life of Midhat Pasha, chaps, v.-vii. For the Sultan's charac- 
ter and habits, see an article in the Contemporary Review for Decem- 
ber, 1896, by D. Kelekian. 



2 14 The European Nations 

of July 8, 1876, now assumed the form of a definitive treaty 
signed at Vienna between the two Powers on January 15, 

1877- 

The full truth on this subject is not known. M. Elie de 
Cyon, who claims to have seen the document, states that 
Austria undertook to remain neutral during the Russo- 
Turkish War, that she stipulated for a large addition of 
territory if the Turks were forced to quit Europe; also 
that a great Bulgaria should be formed, and that Servia 
and Montenegro should be extended so as to become con- 
terminous. To the present writer this account appears 
suspect. It is inconceivable that Austria should have 
assented to an expansion of these Principalities which 
would bar her road southward to Salonica.^ 

Another and more probable version was given by the 
Hungarian Minister, M. Tisza, during the course of debates 
in the Hungarian Delegations in the spring of 1887, to this 
effect: — (i) No Power should claim an exclusive right of 
protecting the Christians of Turkey, and the Great Powers 
should pronouce on the results of the war ; (2) Russia would 
annex no land on the right (south) bank of the Danube, 
would respect the integrity of Roumania, and refrain from 
touchinfy Constantinople; (3) if Russia formed a new 
Slavonic State in the Balkans, it should not be at the 
expense of non-Slavonic peoples ; and she would not claim 
special rights over Bulgaria, which was to be governed by 
a prince who was neither Russian nor Austrian ; (4) Russia 
would not extend her military operations to the districts 
west of Bulgaria. These were the terms on which Austria 

' Elie de Cyon, Histoire de V Entente franco-msse, chap. i. ; and 
in Nouvelle Revue for June i, 1887. His account bears obviourS 
signs of malice against Germany and Austria. 



The Eastern Question 215 

agreed to remain neutral ; and in certain cases she claimed 
to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.^ 

Doubtless these, or indeed any, concessions to Austria 
were repugnant to Alexander II. and Prince Gortchakoff; 
but her neutrality was essential to Russia's success in case 
war broke out ; and the Czar's Government certainly acted 
with much skill in securing the friendly neutrality of the 
Power which in 1854 had exerted so paralysing a pressure 
on the Russian operations on the Lower Danube. 

Nevertheless, Alexander II. still sought to maintain the 
European Concert with a view to the exerting of pacific 
pressure upon Turkey. Early in March he despatched 
General Ignatieff on a mission to the capitals of the Great 
Powers; except at Westminster, that envoy found opinion 
favourable to the adoption of some form of coercion against 
Turkey, in case the Sultan still hardened his heart against 
good advice. Even the Beaconsfield Ministry finally 
agreed to sign a protocol, that of March 31, 1877, which 
recounted the efforts of the six Great Powers for the im- 
provement of the lot of the Christians in Turkey, and 
expressed their approval of the promises of reform made 
by that State on February 13, 1876. Passing over without 
notice the new Turkish constitution, the Powers declared 
that they would carefully watch the carrying out of the 
promised reforms, and that, if no improvement in the lot 
of the Christians should take place, "they [the Powers] 
reserve to themselves to consider in common as to the 
means which they may deem best fitted to secure the well- 
being of the Christian populations, and the interests of the 
general peace." ^ This final clause contained a suggestion 

» Debidour, Hist, diplomatiqtie de I' Europe (i 814-1878), ii., p. 502. 
2 Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 9 (1877), p. 2. 



2i6 The European Nations 

scarcely less threatening than that with which the Berlin 
Memorandum had closed; and it is difficult to see why 
the British Cabinet, which now signed the London Protocol, 
should have wrecked that earlier effort of the Powers. In 
this as. in other matters it is clear that the Cabinet was 
swayed by a "dual control," 

But now it was all one whether the British Government 
signed the Protocol or not. Turkey would have none of it. 
Despite Lord Derby's warning that "the Sultan would be 
very unwise if he would not endeavour to avail himself of 
the opportunity afforded him to arrange a mutual dis- 
armament," that potentate refused to move a hair's 
breadth from his former position. On the 12th of April 
the Turkish Ambassador announced to Lord Derby the 
final decision of his Government: "Turkey, as an inde- 
pendent State, cannot submit to be placed under any 
surveillance, whether collective or not. . . . No con- 
sideration can arrest the Imperial Government in their 
determination to protest against the Protocol of the 31st 
March, and to consider it, as regards Turkey, as devoid of 
all equity, and consequently of all binding character." 
Lord Derby thereupon expressed his deep regret at this 
decision, and declared that he "did not see what further 
steps Her Majesty's Government could take to avert a 
war which appeared to have become inevitable." ^ 

The Russian Government took the same view of the 
case, and on April 7/19, 1877, stated in a despatch that, 
as a pacific solution of the Eastern Question was now im- 
possible, the Czar had ordered his armies to cross the 
frontiers of Turkey. The official declaration of war 
followed on April 12/24. From the point of view of LtDrd 
» Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 15 (1877), pp. 354-355- 



The Eastern Question 217 

Derby this seemed "inevitable." Nevertheless, on May 
ist he put his name to an official document which reveals 
the curious dualism which then prevailed in the Beacons- 
field Cabinet. This reply to the Russian despatch con- 
tained the assertion that the last answer of the Porte did 
not remove all hope of deference on its part to the wishes 
and advice of Europe, and "that the decision of the 
Russian Government is not one which can have their con- 
currence or approval." We shall not be far wrong in 
assuming that, while the hand that signed this document 
was the hand of Derby, the spirit behind it was that of 
Beaconsfield. 

In many quarters the action of Russia was stigmatised 
as the outcome of ambition and greed, rendered all the 
more odious by the cloak of philanthropy which she had 
hitherto worn. The time has not come when an exhaustive 
and decisive verdict can be given on this charge. Few 
movements have been free from all taint of meanness ; but 
it is clearly unjust to rail against a great Power because, 
at the end of a war which entailed frightful losses and a 
serious though temporary loss of prestige, it determined 
to exact from the enemy the only form of indemnity which 
was forthcoming, namely, a territorial indemnity. Russia's 
final claims, as will be seen, were open to criticism at 
several points, but the censure just referred to is puerile. 
It accords, however, with most of the criticisms passed in 
London "club-land," which were remarkable for their 
purblind cynicism. 

No one who has studied the mass of correspondence con- 
tained in the Blue-books relating to Turkey in 1875-77 can 
doubt that the Emperor Alexander II. displayed marvellous 
patience in face of a series of brutal provocations by Moslem 



2i8 The European Nations 

fanatics and the clamour of his own people for a liberating 
crusade. Bismarck, who did not like the Czar, stated that 
he did not want war, but waged it "under stress of Pan- 
slavist influence." ^ That some of his ministers and 
generals had less lofty aims is doubtless true; but prac- 
tically all authorities are now agreed that the maintenance 
of the European Concert would have been the best means 
of curbing those aims. Yet, despite the irritating con- 
duct of the Beaconsfield Cabinet, the Emperor Alexander 
sought to reunite Europe with a view to the execution of 
the needed reforms in Turkey. Even after the successive 
rebuffs of the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum by 
Great Britain and of the suggestions of the Powers at 
Constantinople by Turkey, he succeeded in restoring the 
semblance of accord between the Powers, and in leaving 
to Turkey the responsibility of finally and insolently de- 
fying their recommendations. A more complete diplo- 
matic triumph has rarely been won. It was the reward of 
consistency and patience, qualities in which the Beacons- 
field Cabinet was signally lacking. 

We may notice one other criticism: that Russia's agree- 
ment with Austria implied the pre-existence of aggressive 
designs. This is by no means conclusive. That the Czar 
should have taken the precaution of coming to the ar- 
rangement of January, 1877, with Austria does not prove 
that he was desirous of war. The attitude of Turkey 
during the Conference at Constantinople left but the slight- 
est hope of peace. To prepare for war in such a case is not 
a proof of a desire for war, but only of common prudence. 

Certain writers in France and Germany have declared 

1 Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences, ii., p. 259 (Eng. t\ 
ed.). 



The Eastern Question 219 

that Bismarck was the real author -of the Russo-Turkish 
War. The dogmatism of their assertions is in signal con- 
trast with the thinness of their evidence.^ It rests inainly 
on the statement that the Three Emperors' League (see 
Chapter XII.) was still in force; that Bismarck had come 
to some arrangement for securing gains to Austria in the 
south-east as a set-off to her losses in 1859 and 1866; that 
Austrian agents in Dalmatia had stirred up the Herze- 
govina revolt of 1875; and that Bismarck and Andrassy 
did nothing to avert the war of 1877. Possibly he had a 
hand in these events — he had in most events of the time; 
and there is a suspicious passage in his Memoirs as to the 
overtures made to Berlin in the autumn of 1876. The 
Czar's ministers wished to know whether, in the event of a 
war with Austria, they would have the support of Germany. 
To this the Chancellor replied, that Germany could not allow 
the present equilibrium of the monarchical Powers to be 
disturbed: "The result . . . was that the Russian storm 
passed from Eastern Galicia to the Balkans." ^ Thereafter 
Russia came to terms with Austria as described above. 

But the passage just cited only proves that Russia might 
have gone to war with Austria over the Eastern Question. 
In point of fact, she went to war with Turkey, after coming 
to a friendly arrangement with Austria. Bismarck there- 
fore acted as "honest broker" between his two allies; and 
it has yet to be proved that Bismarck did not sincerely 
work with the other two Empires to make the coercion 
of Turkey by the civilised Powers irresistibly strong. In 
his speech of December 6, 1876, to the Reichstag, the 

1 Elie de Cyon, op. cit., chap. i. ; also in Nouvelle Revive for 
1880. 

2 Bismarck' s Reflections and Reminiscences , ii., p. 231 (Eng. ed.). 



2 20 The European Nations 

Chancellor made a plain and straiji;htforward declaration of 
his policy, namely, that of neutrality, but inclining towards 
friendship with Austria. That, surely, did not drive Russia 
into war with Turkey, still less entice her into it. As for 
the statement that Austrian intrigues were the sole cause 
of the Bosnian revolt, it must appear childish to all who 
bear in mind the exceptional hardships and grievances of 
the peasants of that province. Finally, the assertion of a 
newspaper, the Czas, that Queen Victoria wrote to Bis- 
marck in April, 1877, urging him to protest against an 
attack by Russia on Turkey, may be dismissed as an im- 
pudent fabrication.' It was altogether opposed to the 
habits of her late Majesty to write letters of that kind to 
the foreign ministers of other Powers. 

Until documents of a contrary tenor come to light, we 
may say with some approach to certainty that the respon- 
sibility for the war of 1877-78 rests with the Sultan of 
Turkey and with those who indirectly encouraged him to 
set at naught the counsels of the Powers. Lord Derby 
and Lord Salisbury had of late plainly warned him of the 
consequences of his stubbornness; but the influence of the 
British embassy q,t Constantinople and of the Turkish 
Ambassador in London saems greatly to have weakened 
the force of those warnings. 

It must always be remembered that the Turk will con- 
cede religious freedom and civic equality to the "Giaours" 
only under overwhelming pressure. In such a case he 
mutters Kismet ("It is fate"), and gives way; but the 
least sign of weakness or wavering on the part of the 
Powers awakens his fanatical scruples. Then his devotion 
to the Koran forbids any surrender. History has afforded 
> Busch, Our Chancellor, ii., p. 126. 



The Eastern Question 221 

several proofs of this, from the time of the Battle of Nava- 
rino (1827) to that of the intervention of the Western 
Powers on behalf of the slaughtered and harried Christians 
of the Lebanon (i860). Unfortunately Abdul Hamid had 
now come to regard the concert of the Powers as a "loud- 
sounding nothing." With the usual bent of a mean and 
narrow nature he detected nothing but hypocrisy in its 
lofty professions, and self-seeking in its philanthropic aims, 
together with a treacherous desire among influential per- 
sons to make the whole scheme miscarry. Accordingly 
he fell back on the boundless fund of inertia with which a 
devout Moslem ruler blocks the way to Western reforms. 
A competent observer has finely remarked that the Turk 
never changes; his neighbours, his frontiers, his statute- 
books may change, but his ideas and his practice remain 
always the same. He will not be interfered with; he will 
not improve.^ To this statement we must add that only 
under dire necessity will he allow his Christian subjects to 
improve. The history of the Eastern Question may be 
summed up in these assertions. 

Abdul Hamid II. is the incarnation of the reactionary 
forces which have brought ruin to Turkey and misery to 
her Christian subjects. He owed his crown to a recrudes- 
cence of Moslem fanaticism; and his reign has illustrated 
the unsuspected strength and ferocity of his race and 
creed in iace of the uncertain tones in which Christendom 
has spoken since the spring of the year 1876. The reasons 
which prompted his defiance a year later were revealed by 
his former Grand Vizier, Midhat Pasha, in an article in the 
Nineteenth Century for June, 1877. The following passage 
is especially illuminating: 

' Turkey in Europe, by "Odysseus," p. 139. 



k 



222 The European Nations 

' ' Turkey was not unaware of the attitude of the Eng- 
Hsh Government towards her; the British Cabinet had 
declared in clear terms that it would not interfere in our 
dispute. This decision of the English Cabinet was per- 
fectly well known to us, but we knew still better that the 
general interests of Europe and the particular interests of 
England were so bound up in our dispute with Russia that, 
in spite of all the declarations of the English Cabinet, it 
appeared to us to be absolutely impossible for her to avoid 
interfering sooner or later in this Eastern dispute. This 
profound belief added to the reasons we have mentioned 
was one of the principal factors of our contest with Russia." ^ 

It appears, then, that the action of the British Govern- 
ment in the spring and summer of 1876, and the well- 
known desire of the Prime Minister to intervene in favour 
of Turkey, must have contributed to the Sultan's decision 
to court the risks of war rather than allow any intervention 
of the Powers on behalf of his Christian subjects. 

The information that has come to light from various 

quarters serves to strengthen the case against Lord Bea- 

consfield's policy in the years 1875-77. The letter written 

by Mr. White to Sir Robert Morier on January 16, 1877, and 

referred to above, shows that his diplomatic experience 

had convinced him of the futility of supporting Turkey 

against the Powers. In that letter he made use of these 

significant words: "You know me well enough. I did not 

come here [Constantinople] to deceive Lord Salisbury or 

to defend an untenable Russophobe or pro-Turkish policy. 

There will probably be a difference of opinion in the 

' See, too, the official report of our pro-Turkish Ambassador at 
Constantinople, Mr. Layard (Maj^ 30, 1877), as to the difficulty of 
our keeping out of the war in its final stages (Pari. Papers, Turkey, 
No. 26 (1877), p. 52). 



The Eastern Question 223 

Cabinet as to our future line of policy, and I shall not 
wonder if Lord Salisbury should upset Dizzy and take his 
place or leave the Government on this question. If he 
does the latter, the coach is indeed upset." Mr. White 
also referred to the personnel of the British Embassy at 
Constantinople in terms which show how mischievous 
must have been its influence on the counsels of the Porte. 
A letter from Sir Robert Morier of about the same date 
proves that that experienced diplomatist also' saw the 
evil results certain to accrue from the Beaconsfield policy -. 
"I have not ceased to din that into the ears of the F. O. 
(Foreign Office), to make ourselves the point d'appui of the 
Christians in the Turkish Empire, and thus take all the 
wind out of the sails of Russia; and after the population 
had seen the difference between an English and a Russian 
occupation [of the disturbed parts of Turkey] it would 
jump to the eyes even of the blind, and we should debuter 
into a new policy at Constantinople with an immense 
advantage." ^ This advice was surely statesmanlike. To 
support the young and growing nationalities in Turkey 
would serve, not only to checkmate the supposed aggressive 
designs of Russia, but also to array on the side of Britain 
the progressive forces of the East. To rely on the Turk 
was to rely on a moribund creature. It was even worse. 
It implied an indirect encouragement to the "sick man" 
to enter on a strife for which he was manifestly unequal, 
and in which we did not mean to help him. But these 
considerations failed to move Lord Beaconsfield and the 
Foreign Office from the paths of tradition and routine. ^ 

' Sir William White: Life and Correspondence, pp. 115-117. 
2 For the power of tradition in the Foreign Office, see Sir William 
White: Life and Correspondence, p. 119. 



2 24 The European Nations 

Finally, in looking at the events of 1875-76 in their 
broad outlines, we may note the verdict of a veteran 
diplomatist, whose conduct before the Crimean War proved 
him to be as friendly to the interests of Turkey as he was 
hostile to those of Russia, but who now saw that the situa- 
tion differed utterly from that which was brought about 
by the aggressive action of Czar Nicholas I. in 1854. In 
a series of letters to the Times he pointed out the supreme 
need of joint action by all the Powers who signed the 
Treaty of Paris; that that treaty by no means prohibited 
their intervention in the affairs of Turkey; that wise and 
timely intervention would be to the advantage of that 
State; that the Turks had always yielded to coercion if it 
were of overwhelming strength, but only on those terms; 
and that therefore the severance of England from the 
European Concert was greatly to be deplored.^ In private 
this former champion of Turkey went even farther, and 
declared on September 10, 1876, that the crisis in the 
East would not have become acute had Great Britain 
acted conjointly with the Powers. ^ There is every reason 
to believe that posterity will endorse this judgment of 
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. 

» Letters of December 31, 1875; M!ay 16, 1876; and September 
9, 1876, republished with others in The Eastern Question, by Lord 
Stratford de Redclifife. 

2 J. Morley, Life of Gladstone, ii., p. 555. 



CHAPTER VIII 



THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR 



"Knowledge of the great operations of war can be acquired only 
by experience and by the applied study of the campaigns of all the 
great captains. Gustavus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as 
Alexander, Hannibal, and Csesar, have all acted on the same prin- 
ciples. To keep one's forces together, to bear speedily on any 
point, to be nowhere vulnerable, such are the principles that assure 
victory," — Napoleon. 

DESPITE the menace to Russia contained in the 
British Note of May i, 1877, there was at present 
Httle risk of a collision between the two Powers for the 
causes already stated. The Government of the Czar 
showed that it desired to keep on friendly terms with the 
Cabinet of St. James, for, in reply to a statement of Lord 
Derby that the security of Constantinople, Egypt, and the 
Suez Canal was a matter of vital concern for Great Britain, 
the Russian Chancellor, Prince Gortchakoff, on May 30th 
sent the satisfactory assurance that the two latter would 
remain outside the sphere of military operations ; that the 
acquisition of the Turkish capital was "excluded from the 
views of His Majesty the Emperor," and that its future 
was a question of common interest which could be settled 
only by a general understanding among the Powers.^ So 
long as Russia adhered to these promises there could 
scarcely be any question of Great Britain's intervening on 
behalf of Turkey. 

1 Hertslet, iv., p. 2625. 
225 



2 26 The European Nations 

Thus the general situation in the spring of 1877 scarcely 
seemed to warrant the hopes with which the Turks entered 
on the war. They stood alone confronting a Power which 
had vastly greater resources in men and treasure. Seeing 
that the Sultan had recently repudiated a large part of the 
State debt, and could borrow only at exorbitant rates of 
interest, it is even now mysterious how his Ministers 
managed to equip very considerable forces, and to arm 
them with quick-firing rifles and excellent cannon. The 
Turk is a born soldier, and will fight for nothing and live 
on next to nothing when his creed is in question ; but that 
does not solve the problem of how the Porte could buy huge 
stores of arms and ammunition. It had procured 300,000 
American rifles, and bought 200,000 more early in the war. 
On this topic we must take refuge in the domain of legend, 
and say that the life of Turkey is the life of a phoenix: it 
now and again rises up fresh and defiant among the flames. 

As regards the Ottoman army, an English officer in its 
service, Lieutenant W. V. Herbert, states that the artillery 
was very good, despite the poor supply of horses ; that the 
infantry was very good; the regular cavalry mediocre, the 
irregular cavalry useless. He estimates the total forces in 
Europe and Asia at 700,000; but, as he admits that the 
battalions of 800 men rarely averaged more than 600, that 
total is clearly fallacious. An American authority believed 
that Turkey had not more than 250,000 men ready in 
Europe, and that of these not more than 165,000 were 
north of the Balkans when the Russians advanced towards 
the Danube.^ Von Lignitz credits the Turks with only 
215,000 regular troops and 100,000 irregulars (Bashi 

> The Campaign in Bulgaria, by F. V. Greene, pt. ii., ch. i. ; 
W. V. Herbert, The Defence of Plevna, chaps, i.-ii. 



The Russo-Turkish War 227 

Bazouks and Circassians) in the whole Empire; of these 
he assigns two-thirds to European Turkey.^ 

It seemed, then, that Russia had no very formidable 
task before her. Early in May seven army corps began 
to move towards that great river. They included i8o 
battalions of infantry, 200 squadrons of cavalry, and 800 
guns — in all about 200,000 men. Their cannon were in- 
ferior to those of the Turks, but this appeared to be a 
small matter in view of the superior numbers which 
Russia seemed about to place in the field. The mobilis- 
ation of her huge army, however, went on slowly, and 
produced by no means the numbers that were officially 
reported. The British military attache at the Russian 
headquarters. Colonel Wellesley, reported this fact to the 
British Government, and, on this being found out, incurred 
disagreeable slights from the Russian authorities. 2 

Meanwhile Russia had secured the co-operation of 
Roumania by a convention signed on April i6th, whereby 
the latter State granted a free passage through that 
Principality, and promised friendly treatment to the Mus- 
covite troops. The Czar in return pledged himself to 
"maintain and defend the actual integrity of Roumania." ^ 
The sequel will show how this promise was fulfilled. For 
the present it seemed that the interests of the Principality 
were fully secured. Accordingly Prince Charles (elder 
brother of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, whose candi- 
dature for the Crown of Spain made so much stir in 1870) 
took the further step of abrogating the suzerainty of the 
Sultan over Roumania (June 3). 

1 Aus drei Kreigen, by General von Lignitz, p. 99. 

2 With the Russians in War and Peace, by Colonel F. A. Welles- 
ley (1905), eh. xvii. 

•5 Hertslet, iv., p. 2577. 



2 28 The European Nations 

Even before the declaration of independence Roumania 
had ventured on a few acts of war against Turkey ; but the 
co-operation of her army, comprising 50,000 regulars and 
70,000 National Guards, with that of Russia proved to be 
a knotty question. The Emperor Alexander II., on 
reaching the Russian headquarters at Plojeschti, to the 
north of Bukharest, expressed his wish to help the Rou- 
manian army, but insisted that it must be placed under 
the cornmander-in-chief of the Russian forces, the Grand 
Duke Nicholas. To this Prince Charles demurred, and the 
Roumanian troops at first took no active part in the cam- 
paign. Undoubtedly their non-arrival served to mar the 
plans of the Russian staff. ^ 

Delays multiplied from the outset. The Russians, not 
having naval superiority in the Black Sea, which helped to 
gain them their speedy triumph in the campaign of 1828, 
could only strike through Roumania and across the Danube 
and the difificult passes pf the middle Balkans. Further, 
as the Roumanian railways had but single lines, the move- 
ment of men and stores to the Danube was very slow. 
Numbers of the troops, after camping on its marshy banks 
(for the river was then in flood), fell ill of malarial fever; 
above all, the carelessness of the Russian staff and the un- 
blushing peculation of its subordinates and contractors 
clogged the wheels of the military machine. One result 
of it was seen in the bad bread supplied to the troops. A 
Roumanian officer, when dining with the Grand Duke 
Nicholas, ventured to compare the ration bread of the 
Russians with the far better bread supplied to his own men 
at cheaper rates. The Grand Duke looked at the two 

' Reminiscences of the King of Roumania, edited by S. Whitman 
(1899), pp. 269, 274. 



The Russo-Turkish War 229 

specimens and then — talked of something else.^ Nothing 
could be done until the flood subsided and large bodies of 
troops were ready to threaten the Turkish line of defence 
at several points. ^ 

The Ottoman position by no means lacked elements of 
strength. The first of these was the Danube itself. The 
task of crossing a great river in front of an active foe is one 
of the most dangerous of all military operations. Any 
serious miscalculation of the strength, the position, or the 
mobility of the enemy's forces may lead to an irreparable 
disaster; and until the bridges used for the crossing are 
defended by tetes de pont the position of the column that 
has passed over is precarious. 

The Danube is especially hard to cross, because its 
northern bank is for the most part marshy, and is domi- 
nated by the southern bank. The German strategist von 
Moltke, who knew Turkey well, and had written the best 
history of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, maintained 
that the passage of the Danube must cost the invaders 
upwards of 50,000 men. Thereafter, they would be 
threatened by the quadrilateral of fortresses — Rustchuk, 
Shumla, Varna, and Silistria. Three of these were con- 
nected by railway, which enabled the Turks to send troops 
quickly from the port of Varna to any position between 
the mountain stronghold of Shumla and the riverine fort- 
ress, Rustchuk. 

Even the non-military reader will see by a glance at the 
map that this quadrilateral, if strongly held, practically 

' Farcy, La Guerre sur le Danube, p. 73. For other malpractices 
see Col. F. A Wellesley's With the Russians in Peace and War, 
chaps, xi., xii. 

2 Punch hit oflf the situation by thus parodying the well-known 
line of Horace: "Russicus expectat dum defluat amnis." 



230 The European Nations 

barred the roads leading to the Balkans on their eastern 
side. It also endangered the march of an invading army 
through the middle of Bulgaria to the central passes of 
that chain. Moreover, there are in that part only two or 
three passes that can be attempted by an army with 
artillery. The fortress of Widdin, where Osman Pasha 
was known to have an army of about 40,000 seasoned 
troops, dominated the west of Bulgaria and the roads 
leading to the easier passes of the Balkans near Sofia. 

These being the difficulties that confronted the in- 
vaders in Europe, it is not surprising that the first im- 
portant battles took place in Asia. On the Armenian 
frontier the Russians, under Loris Melikoff, soon gained 
decided advantages, driving back the Turks with con- 
siderable losses on Kars and Erzeroum. The tide of war 
soon turned in that quarter, but, for the present, the 
Muscovite triumphs sent a thrill of fear through Turkey, 
and probably strengthened the determination of Abdul- 
Kerim, the Turkish commander-in-chief in Europe, to 
maintain a cautious defensive. 

Much could be said in favour of a "Fabian" policy of 
delay. Large Turkish forces were in the western provinces 
warring against Montenegro, or watching Austria, Servia, 
and Greece. It is even said that Abdul-Kerim had not at 
first more than about 120,000 men in ttie whole of Bulgaria, 
inclusive of the army at Widdin. But obviously, if the 
invaders so far counted on his weakness as to thrust their 
columns across the Danube in front of forces that could be 
secretly and swiftly strengthened by drafts from the South 
and West, they would expose themselves to the gravest 
risks. The apologists of Abdul-Kerim claim that such was 
his design, and that the signs of sluggishness which he at 



2 32 The European Nations 

first displayed formed a necessary part of a deep-laid 
scheme for luring the Russians to their doom. Let the 
invaders enter Central Bulgaria in force, and expose their 
flanks to Abdul-Kerim in the Quadrilateral, and to Osman 
Pasha at Widdin ; then the Turks, by well-concerted moves 
against those flanks, would drive the enemy back on the 
Danube, and perhaps compel a large part of his forces to 
lay down their arms. Such is their explanation of the 
conduct of Abdul-Kerim. 

As the Turkish Govemrhent is wholly indifferent to the 
advance of historical knowledge, it is impossible even now 
to say whether this idea was definitely agreed on as the 
basis of the plan of campaign. There are signs that Abdul- 
Kerim and Osman Pasha adopted it, but whether it was 
ever approved by the War council at Constantinople is a 
different question. Such a plan obviously implied the 
possession of great powers of self-control by the Sultan and 
his advisers, in face of the initial success of the Russians; 
and unless that self-control was proof against panic, the 
design could not but break down at the crucial point. 
Signs are not wanting that in the suggestions here tenta- 
tively offered we find a key that unlocks the riddle of the 
Danubian campaign of 1877. 

At first Abdul-Kerim in the Quadrilateral, and Osman 
at Widdin, maintained a strict defensive. The former 
posted small bodies of troops, probably not more than 
20,000 in all, at Sistova, Nicopolis, and other neighbour- 
ing points. But, apart from a heavy bombardment of 
Russian and Roumanian posts on the northern bank, 
neither commander did much to mar the hostile prepar- 
ations. This want of initiative, which contrasted with 
the enterprise displayed by the Turks in 1854, enabled 



The Russo-Turkish War 233 

the invaders to mature their designs with httle or no 
interruption. 

The Russian plan of campaign was to destroy or cripple 
the four small Turkish ironclads that patrolled the lower 
reaches of the river, to make feints at several points, and 
to force a passage at two places — first near Ibrail into the 
Dobrudscha, and thereafter, under cover of that diversion, 
from Simnitza to Sistova. The latter place of crossing 
combined all possible advantages. It was far enough 
away from the Turkish Quadrilateral to afford the first 
essentials of safety; it was known to be but weakly held; 
its position on the shortest line of road between the Danube 
and a practicable pass of the Balkans — the vShipka Pass — 
formed a strong recommendation; while the presence of 
an island helped on the first preparations. 

The flood of the Danube having at last subsided, all was 
ready by midsummer. Russian batteries and torpedo- 
boats had destroyed two Turkish gunboats in the lower 
reaches of the river, and on June 22nd a Russian force 
crossed in boats from a point near Galatz to Matchin, and 
made good their hold on the Dobrudscha. 

Preparations were also ripe at Simnitza. In the narrow 
northern arm of the river the boats and pontoons collected 
by the Russians were launched with no difficulty, the island 
was occupied, and on the night of June 26-27, a Vol- 
hynian regiment, along with Cossacks, crossed in boats 
over the broad arm of the river, there some 1000 yards 
wide, and gained a foothold on the bank. Already their 
numbers were thinned by a dropping fire from a Turkish 
detachment; but the Turks made the mistake of trusting 
to the bullet instead of plying the bayonet. Before dawn 
broke, the first-comers had been able to ensconce them- 



234 The European Nations 

selves under a bank until other boats came up. Then with 
rousing cheers they charged the Turks and pressed them 
back. 

This was the scene which greeted the eyes of General 
Dragomirofif as his boat drew near to the shore at 5 a.m. 
Half hidden by the morning mist, the issue seemed doubt- 
ful. But at his side stood a general, fresh from triumphs 
in Turkestan, who had begged to be allowed to come as 
volunteer or aide-de-camp. When Dragomiroff, in an 
agony of suspense, lowered his glass, the other continued 
to gaze, and at last exclaimed: "I congratulate you on 
your victory." "Where do you see that?" asked Dra- 
gomiroff. "Where? On the faces of the soldiers. Look 
at them. Watch them as they charge the enemy. It is a 
pleasure to see them." The verdict was true. It was the 
verdict of Skobeleff.^ 

Such was the first appearance in European warfare of 
the greatest leader of men that Russia has produced since 
the days of Suvoroff. The younger man resembled that 
sturdy veteran in his passion for war, his ambition, and 
that frank, bluff bearing which always wins the hearts ot 
the soldiery. The grandson of a peasant, whose bravery 
had won him promotion in the great year, 181 2; the son 
of a general whose prowess was renowned, Skobeleff was 
at once a commander and a soldier. "Ah! he knew the 
soul of a soldier as if he were himself a private." These 
were the words often uttered by the Russians about Sko- 
beleff; similar things had been said of Suvoroff in his day. 
For champions such as these the emotional Slavs will al- 

1 Quoted from a report by an eye-witness, by "O. K." (Madame 
Novikoff), Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause, p. 38. The crossing 
was planned by the Grand Duke Nicholas; see von Lignitz, Aus 
drei Kriegen, p. 149 



The Russo-Turkish War 235 

ways pour out their blood like water. But, like the captor 
of Warsaw, Skobeleff knew when to put aside the bayonet 
and win the day by skill. Both were hard hitters, but 
they had a hold on the principles of the art of war. The 
combination of these qualities was formidable ; and many 
Russians believe that, had the younger man, with his 
magnificent physique and magnetic personality, enjoyed 
the length of days vouchsafed to the diminutive Suvoroff, 
he would have changed the face of two continents. 

The United States attache to the Russian army in the 
Russo-Turkish War afterwards spoke of his military genius 
as "stupendous," and prophesied that, should he live 
twenty years longer, and lead the Russian armies in the 
next Turkish war, he would win a place side by side with 
"Napoleon, Wellington, Grant, and Moltke." To equate 
these four names is a mark of transatlantic enthusiasm 
rather than of balanced judgment; but the estimate, so 
far as it concerns Skobeleff, reflects the opinion of nearly 
all who knew him.^ 

Encouraged by the advent of Skobeleff and Dragomiroff , 
the Russians assumed the offensive with full effect, and by 
the afternoon of that eventful day had mastered the rising 
ground behind Sistova. Here again the Turkish defence 
was tame. The town was unfortified, but its outskirts 
presented facilities for defence. Nevertheless, under the 
pressure of the Russian attack and of artillery fire from 
the north bank, the small Turkish garrison gave up the 
town and retreated towards Rustchuk. At many points 
on that day the Russians treated their foes to a heavy 
bombardment or feints of crossing, especially at Nicopolis 
and Rustchuk; and this accounts for the failure of the 
» F. V. Greene, Sketches of Army Life in Russia, p. 142. 



236 The European Nations 

defenders to help the weak garrison on which fell the brunt 
of the attack. All things considered, the crossing of the 
Danube must rank as a highly creditable achievement, 
skilfully planned and stoutly carried out; it cost the in- 
vaders scarcely 700 men.^ 

They now began to make a pontoon-bridge across the 
Danube between Simnitza and Sistova; and by July 2nd 
had 65,000 men and 244 cannon in and near the latter 
town. Meanwhile, their 14th corps held the central 
position of Babadagh in the Dobrudscha, thereby pre- 
venting any attack from the northeast side of the Quad- 
rilateral against their communications with the south of 
Russia. 

It may be questioned, however, whether the invaders did 
well to keep so large a force in the Dobrudscha, seeing that 
a smaller body of light troops patrolling the left bank of 
the lower Danube or at the tete de pont at Matchin would 
have answered the same purpose. The chief use of the 
crossing at Matchin was to distract the attention of the 
enemy, an advance through the unhealthy district of 
the Dobrudscha against the Turkish Quadrilateral being in 
every way risky; above all, the retention of a whole corps 
on that side weakened the main line of advance, that from 
Sistova ; and here it was soon clear that the Russians had 
too few men for the enterprise in hand. The pontoon- 
bridge over the Danube was completed by July 2nd, a fact 
which enabled those troops which were in Roumania to be 
hurried forward to the front. 

Obviously it was unsafe to march towards the Balkans 
until both flanks were secured against onsets from the 

» Fa^C5^ La Guerre sur le Danube, ch. viii. ; "Daily News " Corre- 
spondence of, the War of 1877-78, chap. viii. 



The Russo-Turkish War 237 

Quadrilateral on the east, and from Nicopolis and Widdin 
on the west. At Nicopolis, twenty-five miles away, there 
were about 10,000 Turks; and around Widdin, about 100 
miles farther up the stream, Osman mustered 40,000 more. 
To him Abdul-Kerim now sent an order to march against 
the flank of the invaders. 

Nor were the Balkan passes open to the Russians; for, 
after the crossing of the Danube, Reuf Pasha had orders to 
collect all available troops for their defence, from the Shipka 
Pass to the Slievno Pass farther east; 7000 men now held 
the Shipka; about 10,000 acted as a general reserve at 
Slievno; 3000 were thrown forward to Timova, where the 
mountainous country begins, and detachments held the 
more difficult tracks over the mountains. An urgent 
message was also sent to Suleiman Pasha to disengage the 
largest possible force from the Montenegrin war; and, had 
he received this message in time, or had he acted with the 
needful speed and skill, events might have gone very 
differently. 

For some time the Turks seemed to be paralysed at all 
points by the vigour of the MuscoA/ite movements. Two 
corps, the 13th and 14th, marched south-east from Sistova 
to the torrent of the Jantra, or Yantra, and seized Bella, 
an important centre of roads in that district. This secured 
them against any immediate attack from the Quadrilateral. 
The Grand Duke Nicholas also ordered the 9th corps, under 
the command of General Kriidener, to advance from Sis- 
tova and attack the weakly fortified town of Nicopolis. 
Aided by the Roumanian guns on the north bank of the 
Danube, this corps succeeded in overpowering the defence 
and capturing the town, along with 7000 troops and no 
guns (July 1 6th). 



238 The European Nations 

Thus the invaders seemed to have gained a secure base 
on the Danube, from Sistova to Nicopohs, whence they 
could safely push forward their vanguard to the Balkans. 
In point of fact their light troops had already seized one 
of its more difficult passes- — an exploit that will always 
recall the name of that dashing leader, General Gurko. 
The plan now to be described was his conception; it was 
approved by the Grand Duke Nicholas. Setting out from 
Sistova and drawing part of his column from the force at 
Bella, Gurko first occupied the important town of Timova, 
the small Turkish garrison making a very poor attempt to 
defend the old Bulgarian capital (July ytli). The liberators 
there received an overwhelming ovation, and gained many 
recruits for the "Bulgarian Legion." Pushing ahead, the 
Cossacks and Dragoons seized large supplies of provisions 
stored by the Turks, and gained valuable news respecting 
the defences of the passes. 

The Shipka Pass, due south of Timova, was now strongly 
held, and Turkish troops were hurrying towards the two 
passes north of Slievno, some fifty miles farther east. 
Even so they had not enough men at hand to defend all 
the passes of the mountain chain that formed their chief 
line of defence. They left one of them practically unde- 
fended; this was the Hainkoi Pass, having an elevation of 
3700 feet above the sea. 

A Russian diplomatist, Prince Tserteleff, who was 
charged to collect information about the passes, found 
•that the Hainkoi enjoyed an evil reputation. "Ill luck 
awaits him who crosses the Hainkoi Pass," so ran the local 
proverb. He therefore determined to try it; by dint of 
questioning the friendly Bulgarian peasantry he found one 
man who had been through it once, and that was two years 



The Russo-Turkish War 239 

before, with an ox-cart. Where an ox-cart could go, a 
Hght mountain gun could go. Accordingly, the Prince and 
General Rauch went with 200 Cossacks to explore the pass, 
set the men to work at the worst places, and, thanks to the 
secrecy observed by the peasantry, soon made the pass to 
the summit practicable for cavalry and light guns. The 
Prince disguised himself as a Bulgarian shepherd to ex- 
amine the southern outlet; and, on his bringing a favour- 
able report, 11,000 men of Gurko's command began to 
thread the intricacies of the defile. 

Thanks to good food, stout hearts, jokes, and songs, they 
managed to get the guns up the worst places. Then began 
the perils of the descent. But the Turks knew nothing of 
their effort, else it might have ended far otherwise. At the 
southern end 300 Turkish regulars were peacefully smoking 
their pipes and cooking their food when the Cossacks and 
Rifles in the vanguard burst upon them, drove them head- 
long, and seized the village of Hainkoi. A pass over the 
Balkans had been secured at the cost of two men killed and 
three wounded! Gurko was almost justified in sending to 
the Grand Duke Nicholas the proud vaunt that none but 
Russian soldiers could have brought field artillery over such 
a pass, and in the short space of three days (July 11-14).^ 

After bringing his column of 11,000 men through the 
pass, Gurko drove off four Turkish battalions sent against 
him from the Shipka Pass and Kazanlik. Next he sent 
out bands of Cossacks to spread terror southwards, and 
delude the Turks into the belief that he meant to strike 
at the important towns, Yeni Zagra and Eski Zagra, on the 

1 General Gurko's Advance Guard in 1877, by Colonel Epauchin, 
translated by H. Havelock (The Wolseley Series, 1900), chap, ii.; 
The Daily News War Correspondence (1877), pp. 263-270. 



240 The European Nations 

road to Adrianople. Having thus caused them to loosen 
their grip on Kazanlik and the Shipka, he wheeled his main 
force to the westward (leaving 3500 men to hold the exit 
of the Hainkoi), and drove the Turks successively from 
positions in front of the town, from the town itself, and 
then from the village of Shipka. Above that place towered 
the mighty wall of the Balkans, lessened somewhat at the 
pass itself, but presenting even there a seemingly im- 
pregnable position. 

Gurko, however, relied on the discouragement of the 
Turkish garrison after the defeats of their comrades, and 
at seeing their positions turned on the south while they 
were also threatened on the north; for another Russian 
column had advanced from Tirnova up the more gradual 
northern slopes of the Balkans, and now began taihammer 
at the defences of the pass on that side. The garrison con- 
sisted of six and a half battalions under Khulussi Pasha, 
and the wreckage of five battalions already badly beaten 
by Gurko 's column. These, with one battery of artillery, 
held the pass and the neighbouring peaks, which they had 
in part fortified. 

In pursuance of a pre-arranged plan for a joint attack 
on July 17th of both Russian forces, the northern body 
advanced up the slopes; but, as Gurko's men were unable 
to make their diversion in time, the attack failed. An 
isolated attempt by Gurko's force on the next day also 
failed, the defenders disgracing themselves by tricking 
the Russians with the white flag and firing upon them. 
But the Turks were now in difficulties for want of food and 
water; or possibly they were seized with panic. At any 
rate, while amusing the Russians with proposals of sur- 
render, they stole off in small bodies, early on July 19th. 



The Russo-Turkish War 241 

The truth was, ere long, found out by outposts of the 
north Russian forces; Skobeleff and his men were soon 
at the summit, and there Gurko's vanguard speedily joined 
them with shouts of joy. 

Thus, within twenty -three days from the crossing of the 
Danube Gurko seized two passes of the Balkans, besides 
capturing 800 prisoners and 13 guns. It is not surprising 
that a Turkish official despatch of July 21st to Suleiman 
summed up the position: "The existence of the Empire 
hangs on a hair." And when Gurko's light troops pro- 
ceeded to raid the valley of the Maritsa, it seemed that the 
Turkish defence would collapse as helplessly as in the 
memorable campaign of 1828. We must add here that 
the Bulgarians now began to revenge themselves for the 
outrages of May, 1876; and the struggle was sullied by 
horrible acts on both sides. 

The impression produced by these dramatic strokes was 
profound and widespread. The British fleet was sent to 
Besika Bay, a step preparatory, as it seemed, to steaming 
up the Dardanelles to the Sea of Marmora. At Adrianople 
crowds of Moslems fled away in wild confusion towards 
Constantinople. There the frequent meetings of ministers 
at the Sultan's palace testified to the extent of the alarm ; 
and that nervous despot wavered between the design of 
transferring the seat of government to Brussa in Asia 
Minor, and that of unfurling the standard of the Prophet 
and summoning all the faithful to rally to its defence against 
the infidels. Finally he took courage from despair, and 
adopted the more manly course. But first he disgraced 
his ministers. The War Minister and Abdul-Kerim were 
summarily deposed, the latter being sent off as prisoner to 
the island of Lemnos. 



242 The European Nations 

All witnesses agree that the War Minister, Redif Pasha, 
was incapable and corrupt. The age and weakness of 
Abdul-Kerim might have excused his comparative inaction 
in the Quadrilateral in the first half of July. It is probable 
that his plan of campaign, described above, was sound; 
but he lacked the vigour, and the authorities at Constan- 
tinople lacked the courage, to carry it out thoroughly and 
consistently. 

Mehemet AH Pasha, a renegade German, who had been 
warring with some success in Montenegro, assumed the su- 
preme command on July 22nd; and Suleiman Pasha, who, 
with most of his forces, had been brought by sea from 
Antivari to the mouth of the river Maritsa. now gath- 
ered together all the available troops for the defence of 
Roumelia. 

The Czar, on his side, cherished hopes of ending the 
war while Fortune smiled on his standards. There are 
good grounds for thinking that he had entered on it with 
great reluctance. In its early stages he let the British 
Government know of his desire to come to terms with 
Turkey ; and now his War Minister, General Milutin , hinted 
to Colonel F. A. Wellesley, British attache at headquarters, 
that the mediation of Great Britain would be welcomed 
by Russia. That officer on July 30th had an interview 
with the Emperor, who set forth the conditions on which 
he would be prepared to accept peace with Turkey. They 
were: the recovery of the strip of Bessarabia lost in 1856, 
and the acquisition of Batoum in Asia Minor. Alexander 
II. also stated that he would not occupy Constantinople 
unless that step were necessitated by the course of events; 
that the Powers would be invited to a conference for the 
settlement of Turkish affairs; and that he had no wish to 



The Russo-Turkish War 243 

interfere with the British spheres of interest already re- 
ferred to. 

Colonel Wellesley at once left headquarters for London, 
but on the following day the aspect of the campaign 
underwent a complete change, which, in the opinion of 
the British Government, rendered futile all hope of a 
settlement on the conditions laid down by the Czar.^ 
For now, when the Turkish cause seemed irrevocably 
lost, the work of a single brave man to the north of the 
Balkans dried up, as if by magic, the flood of invasion, 
brought back victory to the standards of Islam, and bade 
fair to overwhelm the presumptuous Muscovites in the 
waters of the Danube. Moltke in his account of the war 
of 1828 had noted a peculiarity of the Ottomans in warfare 
(a characteristic which they share with the glorious de- 
fenders of Saragossa in 1808) of beginning the real defence 
when others would abandon it as hopeless. This remark, 
if not true of the Turkish army as a whole, certainly ap- 
plies to that part of it which was thrilled to deeds of daring 
by Osman Pasha. 

More fighting had fallen to him, perhaps, than to any 
Turk of his time. He was now forty years of age; his 
frame, slight and of middle height, gave no promise of 
strength or capacity; neither did his face, until the ob- 
server noted the power of his eyes to take in the whole 
situation "with one slow, comprehensive look." ^ This 
gave him a magnetic faculty, the effect of which was not 
wholly marred by his disdainful manners, curt speech, 
and contemptuous treatment of foreigners. Clearly here 

1 Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 9 (1878), Nos. 2,3; With the Russians 
in Peace and War, by Colonel the Hon. F. A. Wellesley, ch. xx. 

2 W. W. Herbert, The Defence of Plevna, p. 81. »• 



244 The European Nations 

was a cold, sternly objective nature like that of Bonaparte. 
He was a good representative of the stolid Turk of the 
provinces, who, far from the debasing influence of the 
Court, retains the fanaticism and love of war on behalf of 
his creed that make his people terrible even in the days of 
decline.^ 

In accordance with the original design of Abdul-Kerim, 
Osman had for some time remained passive at Widdin. 
On receiving orders from the commander-in-chief, he moved 
eastwards on July 13th, with 40,000 men, to save Nicopolis. 
Finding himself too late to save that place he then laid his 
plans for the seizure of Plevna. The importance of that 
town as a great centre of roads, and as possessing many 
advantages for defence on the hills around, had been pre- 
viously pointed out to the Russian staff by Prince Charles 
of Roumania, as indeed, earlier still, by Moltke. Accord- 
ingly, the Grand Duke Nicholas had directed a small force 
of cavalry towards that town. General Kriidener made 
the mistake of recalling it in order to assist in the at- 
tack on Nicopolis on July 14-16, an unlucky move, which 
enabled Osman to occupy Plevna without resistance on 
July i9th.2 On the i8th the Grand Duke Nicholas or- 
dered General Kriidener to occupy Plevna. Knowing 
nothing of Osman's whereabouts, his vanguard advanced 
heedlessly on the town, only to meet with a very decided 
repulse, which cost the Russians 3000 men Quly 20th). 

Osman now entrenched himself on the open downs that 
stretch eastwards from Plevna. As will be seen by refer- 
ence to the map on page 233, his position, roughly speak- 
ing, formed an ellipse pointing towards the village of 

> For these qualities, see Turkey in Europe, by "Odysseus," p. 97. 
2 Herbert, The Defence of Plevna, p. 129. 



The Russo-Turkish War 245 

Grivitza, Above that village his engineers threw up two 
great redoubts which dominated the neighbourhood. 
Other redoubts and trenches screened Plevna on the 
north-east and south. Finally, the crowns of three main 
slopes lying to the east of Plevna bristled with defensive 
works. West of the town lay the deep vale of the little 
river Wid, itself the chief defence on that side. We may 
state here that during the long operations against Plevna the 
Russians had to content themselves with watching this 
western road to Orkanye and Sophia by means of cavalry ; 
but the reinforcements from Sophia generally made their 
way in. From that same quarter the Turks were also able 
to despatch forces to occupy the town of Lovtcha, between 
Plevna and the Shipka Pass. 

The Russian staff, realising its error in not securing this 
important centre of roads, and dimly surmising the strength 
of the entrenchments which Osman was throwing up near 
to the base of their operations, determined to attack Plevna 
at once. Their task proved to be one of unexpected 
magnitude. Already the long curve of the outer Turkish 
lines spread along slopes which formed natural glacis, 
while the ground farther afield was so cut up by hollows 
as to render one combined assault very difficult. The 
strength, and even the existence, of some of Osman's works 
was unknown. Finally, the Russians are said to have had 
only 32,000 infantry at hand, with two brigades of cavalry. 

Nevertheless, Generals Krudener and Schahofski re- 
ceived orders to attack forthwith. They did so on July 
31st. The latter, with 12,000 men, took two of the outer 
redoubts on the south side, but had to fall back before the 
deadly fire that poured on him from the inner works. 
Krudener operated against the still stronger positions on 



246 The European Nations 

the north; but, owing to difficulties that beset his advance, 
he was too late to make any diversion in favour of his 
colleague. In a word, the attack was ill planned and still 
worse combined. Five hours of desperate fighting yielded 
the assailants not a single substantial gain; their losses 
were stated officially to be 7336 killed and wounded; but 
this is certainly below the truth. Turkish irregulars fol- 
lowed the retreating columns at nightfall, and butchered 
the wounded, including all whom they found in a field- 
hospital. 

This second reverse at Plevna was a disaster of the first 
magnitude. The prolongation of the Russian line beyond 
the Balkans had left their base and flanks too weak to 
stand against the terrible blows that Osman seemed about 
to deal from his point of vantage. Plevna was to their 
right flank what Bella was to their left. Troops could not 
be withdrawn from the latter point lest the Turks from 
Shumla and Rustchuk should break through and cut their 
way to the bridge at Sistova; and now Osman's force 
threatened that spinal cord of the Russian communica- 
tions. If he struck, how could the blow be warded off? 
For bad news poured in from all quarters. From Armenia 
came the tidings that Mukhtar Pasha, after a skilful re- 
treat and concentration of force, had turned on the Russians 
and driven them back in utter confusion. 

From beyond the Balkans Gurko sent news that Sulei- 
man's army was working round by way of Adrianople, and 
threatened to pin him to the mountain chain. In fact, 
part of Gurko 's corps sustained a serious reverse at Eski 
Zagra, and had to retreat in haste through the Hainkoi 
Pass; while its other sections made their way back to the 
Shipka Pass, leaving a rearguard to hold that important 



The Russo-Turkish War 247 

position (July 30- August 8). Thus, on all sides, proofs 
accumulated that the invaders had attempted far too 
much for their strength, and that their whole plan 
of campaign was more brilliant than sound. Possibly, 
had not the 14th corps been thrown away on the un- 
healthy Dobrudscha, enough men would have been at 
hand to save the situation. But now everything was at 
stake. 

The whole of the month of August was a time of grave 
crisis for the Russians, and it is the opinion of the best 
military critics that the Turks, with a little more initiative 
and power of combination, might have thrown the Rus- 
sians back on the Danube in utter disarray. From this 
extremity the invaders were saved by the lack among the 
Turks of the above-named gifts, on which, rather than on 
mere bravery, the issue of campaigns and the fate of na- 
tions now ultimately depend. True to their old renown, the 
Turks showed signal prowess on the field of battle, but they 
lacked the higher intellectual qualities that gamer the full 
harvest of results. 

Osman, either because he knew not that the Russians 
had used up their last reserves at Plevna, or because he 
mistrusted the manoeuvring powers of his men, allowed 
Krudener quietly to draw off his shattered forces towards 
Sistova, and made only one rather half-hearted move against 
that all-important point. The new Turkish commander- 
in-chief, Mehemet AH, gathered a formidable array in front 
of Shumla and drove the Russian army, now led by the 
Czarevitch, back on Bella, but failed to pierce their lines. 
Finally, Suleiman Pasha, in his pride at driving Gurko 
through the Hainkoi Pass, wasted time on the southern 
side, first, by harrying the wretched Bulgarians, and then 



248 The European Nations 

by hurling his brave troops repeatedly against the now 
almost impregnable position on the Shipka Pass. 

It is believed that jealousy of the neighbouring Turkish 
generals kept Suleiman from adopting less wasteful and 
more effective tactics. If he had made merely a feint of 
attacking that post, and had hurried with his main body 
through the Slievno Pass on the east to the aid of Mehemet, 
or through the western defiles of the Balkans to the help 
of the brave Osman in his Plevna-Lovtcha positions, prob- 
ably the gain of force to one or other of them might have 
led to really great results. As it was, these generals dealt 
heavy losses to the invaders, but failed to drive them back 
on the Danube. 

Moreover, Russian reinforcements began to arrive by 
the middle of August, the Emperor having already on July 
22nd called out the first ban of the militia and three divi- 
sions of the reserve of the line, in all some 224,000 men.^ 

The bulk of these men did not arrive until September; 
and meanwhile the strain was terrible. The war corre- 
spondence of Mr. Archibald Forbes reveals the state of 
nervous anxiety in which Alexander II. was plunged at 
this time. Forbes had been a witness of the savage tenacity 
of the Turkish attack and the Russian defence on the hills 
commanding the Shipka Pass. Finally, he had shared in 
the joy of the hard-pressed defenders at the timely advent 
of a rifle battalion hastily sent up on Cossack ponies, and 
the decisive charge of General Radetzky at the head of two 
companies of reserves at a Turkish breastwork in the very 
crisis of the fight (August 24th). Then, after riding post- 
haste northwards to the Russian headquarters at Gomi 
Studen, he was at once taken to the Czar's tent, and noted 
» F. V. Greene, The Campaign in Bulgaria, p. 225. 



The Russo-Turkish War 249 

the look of eager suspense on his face until he heard the re- 
assuring news that Radetzky kept his seat firm on the pass. 

The worst was now over. The Russian Guards, 50,000 
strong, were near at hand, along with the other reinforce- 
ments above named. The urgency of the crisis also led 
the Grand Duke Nicholas to waive his claim that the 
Roumanian troops should be placed under his immediate 
command. Accordingly, early in August, Prince Charles 
led some 35,000 Roumanians across the Danube, and was 
charged with the command of all the troops around Plevna. ^ 
The hopes of the invaders were raised by Skobeleff's cap- 
ture, on- September 3rd, of Lovtcha, a place half-way be- 
tween Plevna and the Balkans, which had ensured Osman's 
communications with Suleiman Pasha. The Turkish losses 
at Lovtcha are estimated at nearly 15,000 men.^ 

This success having facilitated the attack on Plevna from 
the south, a general assault was ordered for September i ith. 
In the meantime Osman also had received large reinforce- 
ments from Sophia, and had greatly strengthened his de- 
fences. So skilfully had outworks been thrown up on the 
north-east of Plevna that what looked like an unimportant 
trench was found to be a new and formidable redoubt, 
which foiled the utmost efforts of the 3rd Roumanian 
division to struggle up the steep slopes on that side. To 
their 4th division and to a Russian brigade fell an equally 
hard task, that of advancing from the east against the two 
Grivitza redoubts which had defied all assaults. The 
Turks showed their usual constancy, despite the heavy and 
prolonged bombardment which preluded the attack here 
and all along the lines. But the weight and vigour of the 

' Reminiscences of the King of Roumania, p. 275. 
2 F. V. Greene, op. cit., p. 232. 



2 50 The European Nations 

onset told by degrees; and the Russian and Roumanian 
supports finally carried by storm the more southerly of 
the two redoubts. The Turks made desperate efforts to 
retrieve this loss. From the northern redoubt and the 
rear entrenchments somewhat to the south there came a 
galling fire which decimated the victors; for a time the 
Turks succeeded in recovering the work, but at nightfall 
the advance of other Russian and Roumanian troops 
ousted the Moslems. Thenceforth the redoubt was held 
by the allies. 

Meanwhile, to the south of the village of Grivitza the 
4th and 9th Russian corps had advanced in dense masses 
against the cluster of redoubts that crowned the heights 
south-east of Plevna, but their utmost efforts were futile; 
under the fearful fire of the Turks the most solid lines 
melted away, and the corps fell back at nightfall, with the 
loss of no ofificers and 5200 men. 

Only on the south and south-west did the assailants 
seriously imperil Osman's defence at a vital point; and 
here again Fortune bestowed her favours on a man who 
knew how to wrest the utmost from her, Michael Dimi- 
trievitch Skobeleff. Few men or women could look on 
his stalwart figure, frank, bold features, and keen, kindling 
eyes without a thrill of admiration. Tales were told by 
the camp-fires of the daring of his early exploits in Central 
Asia: how, after the capture of Khiva in 1874, he dressed 
himself in Turkoman garb, and alone explored the route 
from that city to Igdy, as well as the old bed of the river 
Oxus; or again, how, at the capture of Khokand in the 
following year, his skill and daring led to the overthrow 
of a superior force and the seizure of fifty-eight guns. 
Thus, at thirty-two years of age he was the darling of the 



The Russo-Turkish War 251 

tTOOps; for his prowess in the field was not more marked 
than his care and foresight in the camp. While other 
generals took little heed of their men, he saw to their com- 
fort and cheered them by his jokes. They felt that he 
was the embodiment of the patriotism, love of romantic 
exploit, and soaring ambition of the Great Russians. 

They were right. Already, as will appear in a later 
chapter, he was dreaming of the conquest of India; and, 
like Napoleon, he could not only see visions but also master 
details, from the principles of strategy to the routine of 
camp life, which made those visions realisable. If am- 
bition spurred him on towards Delhi, hatred of things 
Teutonic pointed him to Berlin. Ill would it have fared 
with the peace of the world had this champion of the 
Slavonic race lived out his life. But his fiery nature wore 
out its tenement, the baser passions, so it is said, con- 
tributing to hasten the end of one who lived his true life 
only amidst the smoke of battle. In war he was sublime. 
Having recently come from Central Asia, he was at first 
unattached to any corps, and roved about in search of the 
fiercest fighting. His insight and skill had warded off a 
deadly flank attack on Schahofski's shattered corps at 
Plevna on July 30th, and his prowess contributed largely 
to the capture of Lovtcha on September 3rd. War cor- 
respondents, who knew their craft, turned to follow Skobe- 
leff, wherever official reports might otherwise direct them; 
and the lust of fighting laid hold of the grey columns when 
they saw the "white general" approach. 

On September nth Prince Imeritinski and Skobeleff 
(the order should be inverted) commanded the extreme 
left of the Russian line, attacking Plevna from the south. 
Having four regiments of the line and four battalions of 



252 The European Nations 

sharpshooters — about 12,000 men in all — he ranged them 
at the foot of the hill, whose summit was crowned by an 
all-important redoubt — the "Kavanlik." There were four 
others that flanked the approach. When the Russian 
guns had thoroughly cleared the way for an assault, he 
ordered the bands to play and the two leading regiments 
to charge up the slope. Keeping his hand firmly on the 
pulse of the battle, he saw them begin to waver under the 
deadly fire of the Turks; at once he sent up a rival regi- 
ment; the new mass carried on the charge until it, too, 
threatened to die away. The fourth regiment struggled 
up into that wreath of death, and with the like result. 

Then Skobeleff called on his sharpshooters to drive home 
the onset. Riding on horseback before the invigorating 
lines, he swept on the stragglers and waverers until all of 
them came under the full blast of the Turkish flames 
vomited from the redoubt. There his sword fell, shivered 
in his hand, and his horse rolled over at the very verge of 
the fosse. Fierce as ever, the leader sprang to his feet, 
waved the stump in air, and uttered a shout which put 
fresh heart into his men. With him they swarmed into 
the fosse, up the bank, and fell on the defenders. The 
bayonet did the rest, taking deadly revenge for the mur- 
derous volleys. 

But Osman's engineers had provided against such an 
event. The redoubt was dominated from the left and 
could be swept by cross-fire from the rear and right. On 
the morrow the Turks drew in large forces from the north 
side and pressed the victors hard. In vain did Skobeleff 
send urgent messages for reinforcements to make good the 
gaps in his ranks. None were sent, or, indeed, could be 
sent. Five times his men beat off the foe. The sixth 



254 The European Nations 

charge hurled them first from the KavanHk redoubt, and 
thereafter from the flanking works and trenches out on to 
that fatal slope. A war correspondent saw Skobeleff af- 
ter this heartbreaking loss, "his face black with powder 
and smoke, his eyes haggard and bloodshot, and his voice 
quite gone. I never before saw such a picture of battle." ^ 
Thus all the efforts of the Russians and Roumanians had 
failed to wrest more than a single redoubt from the Mos- 
lems; and at that point they were unable to. make any 
advance against the inner works. The fighting of Septem- 
ber II-I2 is believed to have cost the allies 18,000 men 
killed and wounded out of the 75,000 infantrymen engaged. 
The mistakes of July 31st had been again repeated. The 
number of assailants was too small for an attack on so 
great an extent of fortified positions defended with quick- 
firing rifles. Had the Russians, while making feints at 
other points to hold the Turks there, concentrated their 
efforts either on the two Grivitza redoubts, or on those 
about the Kavanlik work, they would almost certainly 
have succeeded. As it was, they hurled troops in close 
order against lines the strength of which was not well 
known; and none of their commanders but Skobeleff 
emploj^ed tactics that made the most of their forces. ^ 
The depression at the Russian headquarters was now ex- 
treme.^ On September 13th the Emperor held a council 
of war at which the Prince of Roumania, the Grand Duke 
Nicholas, General Milutin (Minister of War) and three 
other generals were present. The Grand Duke declared 

1 War Correspondence of the Daily News, pp. 479-483. For 
another character-sketch of Skobeleff, see the Fortnightly Review 
of October, 1882, by W. K. Rose. 

2 For an account of the battle, see Greene, op. cit., pt. ii., chap. v. 

3 General von Lignitz, Aus drei Kriegen, p. 167. 



' The Russo-Turkish War 255 

that the only prudent course was to retire to the Danube, 
construct a tete de pont guarding the southern end of their 
bridge, and, after receiving reinforcements, again begin 
the conquest of Bulgaria. General Milutin, however, de- 
murred to this, seeing that Osman's army was not mobile 
enough to press them hard; he therefore proposed to 
await the reinforcements in the positions around Plevna. 
The Grand Duke thereupon testily exclaimed that Milutin 
had better be placed in command, to which the Emperor 
replied: "No; you shall retain the command; but the 
plan suggested by the Minister of War shall be carried 
out." 1 

The Emperor's decision saved the situation. The Turks 
made no combined effort to advance towards Plevna in 
force ; and Osman felt too little trust in the new levies that 
reached him from Sophia to move into the open and attack 
Sistova, Indeed, Turkish strategy over the whole field of 
war is open to grave censure. On their side there was a 
manifest lack of combination. Mehemet AH pounded away 
for a month at the army of the Czarevitch on the River 
Lom, and then drew back his forces (September 24th). He 
allowed Suleiman Pasha to fling his troops in vain against 
the natural stronghold of the Russians at the Shipka Pass, 
and made no dispositions for succouring Lovtcha. Obvi- 
ously he should have concentrated the Turkish forces so 
as to deal a timely and decisive blow either on the Lom or 
on the Sophia-Plevna road. When he proved his incapacity 
both as commander-in-chief and as comniander of his own 
force, Turkish jealousy against the quondam German flared 
forth; and early in October he was replaced by Suleiman. 
The change was greatly for the worse. Suleiman's pride 
- 1 Col. F. A. Wellesley, op. cit., p. 283. 



256 The European Nations 

and obstinacy closed the door against larger ideas, and it 
has been confidently stated that at the end of the cam- 
paign he was bribed by the Russians to betray his cause. 
However that may be, it is certain that the Turkish generals 
continued to fight each for his own hand, and thus lost the 
campaign. 

It was now clear that Osman must be starved out from 
the position which the skill of his engineers and the steadi- 
ness of his riflemen had so speedily transformed into an 
impregnable stronghold. Todleben, the Russian engineer 
who had strengthened the outworks of Sevastopol, had 
been called up to oppose trench to trench, redoubt to 
redoubt. Yet so extensive were the Turkish works, and 
so active was Shevket Pasha's force at Sophia in sending 
help and provisions, that not until October 24th was tha 
line of investment completed, and by an army which now 
numbered fully 120,000 men. By December loth Osman 
came to the end of his resources and strove to break out on 
the west over the River Wid towards Sophia. Masking the 
movement with great skill, he inflicted heavy losses On the 
besiegers. Slowly, however, they closed around him, and 
a last scene of slaughter ended in the surrender of the 
43,000 half -starved survivors, with the 77 guns that had 
wrought such havoc among the invaders. Osman 's de- 
fence is open to criticism at some points, but it had cost 
Russia more than 50,000 lives, and paralysed her efforts 
in Europe during five months. 

The operations around Plevna are among the most in- 
structive in modem warfare, as illustrating the immense 
power that quick-firing rifles confer upon the defence. 
Given a nucleus of well-trained troops, with skilled engin- 
eers, any position of ordinary strength can quickly be 



The Russo-Turkisb War 257 

turned into a stronghold that will foil the efforts of a 
far greater number of assailants. Experience at Plevna 
showed that four or five times as many men were needed 
to attack redoubts and trenches as in the days of muzzle- 
loading muskets. It also proved that infantry fire is far 
more deadly in such cases than the best -served artillery. 
And yet a large part of Osman's troops — perhaps the 
majority after August — were not regulars. Doubtless 
that explains why (with the exception of an obstinate but 
unskilful effort to break out on August 31st) he did not 
attack the Russians in the open after his great victories of 
July 31st and September 11-12. On both occasions the 
Russians were so badly shaken that, in the opinion of com- 
petent judges, they could easily have been driven in on 
Nicopolis or Sistova, in which case the bridges at those 
places might have been seized. But Osman did not do so, 
doubtless because he knew that his force, weak in cavalry 
and unused to manoeuvring, would be at a disadvantage in 
the open. Todleben, however, was informed on good 
authority that, when the Turkish commander heard of the 
likelihood of the investment of Plevna, he begged the Porte 
to allow him to retire ; but the assurance of Shevket Pasha, 
the commander of the Turkish force at Sophia, that he 
could keep open communications between that place and 
Plevna, decided the authorities at Constantinople to order 
the continuance of defensive tactics,^ 

Whatever may have been the cause of this decision it 
ruined the Turkish campaign. Adherence to the defensive 
spells defeat now, as it has always done. Defeat comes 

1 A. Forbes, Czar and Sultan, p. 291. On the other hand, W. V. 
Herbert {op. cit., p. 456) states that it was Osman's wish to retire 
to Orkanye, on the road to Sophia, and that this was forbidden. 
For remarks on this, see Greene, op. cit., chap. viii. 



258 The European Nations 

more slowly, now that quick-firing rifles quadruple the 
power of the defence ; but all the same it must come if the 
assailant has enough men to throw on that point and then 
at other points. Or, to use technical terms, while modem 
inventions alter tactics, that is, the dispositions of troops 
on the field of battle^ — a fact which the Russians seemed to 
ignore at Plevna — they do not change the fundamental 
principles of strategy. These are practically immutable, 
and they doom to failure the side that, at the critical 
points, persists in standing on the defensive. A study of 
the events around Plevna shows clearly what a brave but 
ill-trained army can do and what it cannot do under 
modern conditions. 

From the point of view of strategy — that is, the conduct 
of the great operations of a campaign — Osman's defence of 
Plevna yields lessons of equal interest. It affords the most 
brilliant example in modem warfare of the power of a force 
strongly intrenched in a favourable position to "contain," 
that is, to hold or hold back, a greater force of the enemy. 
Other examples are the Austrian defence of Mantua in 
1796-97, which hindered the young Bonaparte's invasion 
of the Hapsburg States; Bazaine's defence of Metz in 1870; 
and Sir George White's defence of Lady smith against the 
Boers. We have no space in which to compare these 
cases, in which the conditions varied so greatly. Suffice it 
to say that Mantua and Plevna were the most effective 
instances, largely because those strongholds lay near the 
most natural and easy line of advance for the invaders 
Metz and Ladysmith possessed fewer advantages in tMs 
respect; and, considering the strength of the fortress and 
the size and quality of his army, Bazaine's conduct at 
Metz must rank as the weakest on record, for his 180,000 



The Russo-Turkish War 259 

troops "contained" scarcely more than their own number 
of Germans. 

On the other hand, Osman's force brought three times 
its number of Russians to a halt for five months before 
hastily constructed lines. In the opinion of many author- 
ities the Russians did wrong in making the whole cam- 
paign depend on Plevna. When it was clear that Osman 
would cling to the defensive, they might with safety have 
secretly detached part of the besieging force to help the 
army of the Czarevitch to drive back the Turks on Shumla. 
This would have involved no great risk ; for the Russians 
occupied the inner lines of what was, roughly speaking, a 
triangle, resting on the Shipka Pass, the River Lom, and 
Plevna as its extreme points. Having the advantage of 
the inner position, they could quickly have moved part of 
their force at Plevna, battered in the Turkish defence on 
the Lom, and probably captured the Slievno passes. In 
that case they would have cleared a new line of advance to 
Constantinople farther to the east, and made the possession 
of Plevna of little worth. Its value always lay in its near- 
ness to their main line of advance, but they were not tied 
to that line. It is safe to say that, if Moltke had directed 
their operations, he would have devised some better plan 
than that of hammering away at the redoubts of Plevna. 

In fact, the Russians made three great blunders: first, 
in neglecting to occupy Plevna betimes; second, in under- 
rating Osman's powers of defence; third, in concentrating 
all their might on what was a very strong, but not an es- 
sential, point of the campaign. 

The closing scenes of the war are of little interest except 
in the domain of diplomacy. vServia having declared war 
against Turkey immediately after the fall of Plevna, the 



26o The European Nations 

Turks were now hopelessly outnumbered. Gurko forced 
his way over one of the western passes of the Balkans, 
seized Sophia (January 4, 1878), and, advancing quickly 
towards Philippopolis, utterly routed Suleiman's main 
force near that town (January 17th). The Turkish com- 
mander-in-chief thus paid for his mistake in seeking to de- 
fend a mountain chain with several passes by distributing 
his army among those passes. Experience has proved 
that this invites disaster at the hands of an enterprising 
foe, and that the true policy is to keep light troops or 
scouts at all points, and the main forces at a chief central 
pass and at a convenient place in the rear, whence the in- 
vaders may be readily assailed before they complete the 
crossing. As it was, Suleiman saw his main force, still 
nearly 50,000 strong, scatter over the Rhodope Mountains; 
many of them reached the ^gean Sea at Enos, whence they 
were conveyed by ship to the Dardanelles. He himself 
was tried by court-martial and imprisoned for fifteen years. ^ 
A still worse fate befell those of his troops which hung 
about Radetzky's front below the Shipka Pass. The 
Russians devised skilful moves for capturing this force. 
On January 5-8, Prince Mirsky threaded his way with a 
strong column through the deep snows of the Travna Pass, 
about twenty-five miles east of the Shipka, which he then 
approached, while Skobeleff struggled through a still 
more difficult defile west of the central position. The 
total strength of the Russians was 56,000 men. On the 
8th, when their cannon were heard thundering in the rear 
of the Turkish earthworks at the foot of the Shipka Pass, 

' Sir N. Layard attributed to him the overthrow of Turkey. 
See his letter of February i, 1878, in Sir W. White: Life and Cor- 
respondence, p. 127. h 



The Russo-Turkish War 261 

Radetzky charged down on the Turkish positions in front, 
while Mirsky assailed them from the east. Skobeleff mean- 
while had been detained by the difficulties of the path and 
the opposition of the Turks on the west. But on the 
morrow his onset on the main Turkish positions carried all 
before it. On all- sides the Turks were worsted and laid 
down their arms; 36,000 prisoners and 93 guns (so the 
Russians claim) were the prize of this brilliant feat (January 
9, 1878).! 

In Roumelia, as in Armenia, there now remained com- 
paratively few Turkish troops to withstand the Russian 
advance, and the capture of Constantinople seemed to be a 
matter of a few weeks. There are grounds for thinking 
that the British Ministry, or certainly its chief, longed to 
send troops from Malta to help in its defence. Colonel 
Wellesley, British attache at the Russian headquarters, 
returned to London at the time when the news of the 
crossing of the Balkans reached the Foreign Office. At 
once he was summoned to see the Prime Minister, who in- 
quired eagerly as to the length of time which would elapse 
before the Russians occupied Adrianople. The officer 
thought that that event might occur within a month — 
an estimate which proved to be above the mark. Lord 
Beaconsfield was deeply concerned to hear this, and 
added, "If you can only guarantee me six weeks, I see my 
way." He did not further explain his meaning; but 
Colonel Wellesley felt sure that he wished to move British 
troops from Malta to Constantinople. ^ Fortunately the 

- Greene, op. cit., chap. xi. I have been assured by an English- 
man serving with the Turks that these numbers were greatly 
exaggerated. 

2 With the Russians in Peace and War, by Col. F. A. Wellesley, 
p. 272. 



262 The European Nations 

Russian advance to Adrianople was so speedy — their van- 
guard entered that city on January 20th — as to dispose of 
any such project. But it would seem that only the utter 
collapse of the Turkish defence put an end to the plans of 
part at least of the British Cabinet for an armed interven- 
tion on behalf of Turkey. 

Here, then, as at so many points of their history, the 
Turks lost their opportunity, and that, too, through the in- 
capacity and corruption of their governing class. The war 
of 1877 ended as so many of their wars had ended. Thanks 
to the bravery of their rank and file and the mistake 
of the invaders, they gained tactical successes at some 
points; but they failed to win the campaign owing to the 
inability of their Government to organise soundly on a 
great scale and the intellectual mediocrity of their com- 
manders in the sphere of strategy. Mr. Layard, who 
succeeded Sir Henry Elliott at Constantinople early in 
1878, had good reason for writing, "The utter rottenness 
of the present system has been fully revealed by the 
present war." ^ Whether Suleiman was guilty of perverse 
obstinacy, or, as has often been asserted, of taking 
bribes from the Russians, cannot be decided. What is 
certain is that he was largely responsible for the final 
debacle. 

But in a wider and deeper sense the Turks owed their 
misfortunes to themselves — to their customs and their 
creed. Success in war depends ultimately on the brain- 
power of the chief leaders and organisers ; and that source 
of strength has long ago been dried up in Turkey by ad- 
hesion to a sterilising creed and cramping traditions. 
The wars of the latter half of the nineteenth century are of 
» Sir William White: Life and Correspondence, p. 128. 



The Russo-Turkish War 263 

unique interest, not only because they have built up the 
great national fabrics of to-day, but also because they 
illustrate the truth of that suggestive remark of the great 
Napoleon: "The general who does great things is he who 
also possesses qualities adapted for civil life." 



CHAPTER IX 

THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT 

"New hopes should animate the world; new light 

Should dawn from new revealings to a race 
• Weighed down so long, forgotten so long." 

— Robert Browning, Paracelsus. 

THE collapse of the Turkish defence in Roumelia in- 
augurated a time of great strain and stress in Anglo- 
Russian relations. On December 13, 1877, that is, three 
days after the fall of Plevna, Lord Derby reminded the 
Russian Government of its promise of May 30, 1876, that 
the acquisition of Constantinople was excluded from the 
wishes and intentions of the Emperor Alexander II., and 
expressed the earnest hope that the Turkish capital would 
not be occupied, even for military purposes. The reply 
of the Russian Chancellor (December i6th) was reserved. 
It claimed that Russia must have full right of action, 
which is the right of every belligerent, and closed with a 
request for a clearer definition of the British interests which 
would be endangered by such a step. In his answer of 
January 13, 1878, the British Foreign Minister specified the 
occupation of the Dardanelles as an event that would en- 
danger the good relations between England and Russia; 
whereupon Prince Gortchakoff on January 16, 1878, gave 
the assurance that this step would not be taken unless 
British forces were landed at Gallipoli, or Turkish troops 
were concentrated there. 

264 



The Balkan Settlement 265 

So far this was satisfactory; but other signs seemed to 
betoken a resolve on the part of Russia to gain time while 
her troops pressed on towards Constantinople. The return 
of the Czar to St. Petersburg after the fall of Plevna had 
left more power in the hands of the Grand Duke Nicholas 
and of the many generals who longed to revenge themselves 
for the disasters in Bulgaria by seizing Constantinople. 

In face of the probability of this event, public opinion in 
England underwent a complete change. Russia appeared 
no longer as the champion of oppressed Christians, but as 
an ambitious and grasping Power. Mr. Gladstone's im- 
passioned appeals for non-intervention lost their effect, and 
a warlike feeling began to prevail. The change of feeling 
was perfectly natural. Even those who claimed that the 
war might have been averted, by the adoption of a different 
policy by the Beaconsfield Cabinet, had to face the facts of 
the situation; and these were extremely grave. 

The alarm increased when it was known that Turkey, 
on January 3, 1878, had appealed to the Powers for their 
mediation, and that Germany had ostentatiously refused. 
It seemed probable that Russia, relying on the support of 
Germany, would endeavour to force her own terms on the 
Porte. Lord Loftus, British Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg, was therefore charged to warn the Ministers of the 
Czar (January i6th) that any treaty made separately be- 
tween Russia and Turkey, which affected the international 
treaties of 1856 and 187 1, would not be valid without the 
consent of all the signatory Powers. Four days later the 
Muscovite vanguard entered Adrianople, and it appeared 
likely that peace would soon be dictated at Constantinople 
without regard to the interests ( of Great Britain and 
Austria. 



266 The European Nations 

Such was the general position when Parhament met at 
Westminster on January 17th. The Queen's Speech con- 
tained the significant phrase that, should hostilities be un- 
fortunately prolonged, some unexpected occurrence might 
render it incumbent to adopt measures of precaution. 
Five days later it transpired that the Sultan had sent an 
appeal to Queen Victoria for her mediation with a view to 
arranging an armistice and the discussion of the prelimi- 
naries of peace. In accordance with this appeal, the Queen 
telegraphed to the Emperor of Russia in these terms: 

"I have received a direct appeal from the Sultan which 
I cannot leave without an answer. Knowing that you are 
sincerely desirous of peace, I do not hesitate to communi- 
cate this fact to you, in hope that you may accelerate the 
negotiations for the conclusion of an armistice which may 
lead to an honourable peace." 

This communication was sent with the approval of the 
Cabinet. The nature of the reply is not known. Probably 
it was not encouraging, for on the next day Qanuary 23rd) 
the British Admiralty ordered Admiral Hornby with the 
Mediterranean fleet to steam up the Dardanelles to Con- 
stantinople. On the following day this was annulled, and 
the Admiral was directed not to proceed beyond Besika 
Bay.^ The original order was the cause of the resignation 
of Lord Carnarvon. The retirement of Lord Derby was 
also announced, but he afterwards withdrew it, probably 
on condition that the fleet did not enter the Sea of Marmora. 

Light was thus thrown on the dissensions in the Cabinet, 
and the vacillations in British policy. Disraeli once said in 

1 For the odd mistake in a telegram, which caused the original 
order, see Sir Stafford Northcote. Earl of Iddesleigh, by Andrew 
Lang, ii., pp. 111-112. 



The Balkan Settlement 267 

his whimsical way that there were six parties in the Min- 
istry. The first party wanted immediate war with Russia ; 
the second was for war in order to save Constantinople; 
the third was for peace at any price; the fourth would 
let the Russians take Constantinople and then turn them 
out ; the fifth wanted to plant the cross on the dome of St. 
Sophia; "and then there are the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, who desire to see something 
done, but don't know exactly what." ^ The coupling of 
himself with the amiable Sir Stafford Northcote is a good 
instance of Disraelian irony. It is fairly certain that he 
was for war with Russia ; that Lord Carnarvon constituted 
the third party, and Lord Derby the fourth. 

On the day after the resignation of Lord Carnarvon, the 
British Cabinet heard for the first time what were the de- 
mands of Russia. They included the formation of a 
Greater Bulgaria, "within the limits of the Bulgarian 
nationality," practically independent of the Sultan's direct 
control ; the entire independence of Roumania, Servia, and 
Montenegro; a territorial and pecuniary indemnity to 
Russia for the expenses of the war; and "an ulterior un- 
derstanding for safe-guarding the rights and interests of 
Russia in the Straits." 

The extension of Bulgaria to the shores of the ^gean 
seemed at that time a mighty triumph for Russian in- 
fluence; but it was the last item, vaguely foreshadowing 
the extension of Russian influence to the Dardanelles, that 
most aroused the alarm of the British Cabinet. Russian 
control of those Straits would certainly have endangered 

1 Ibid., pp. 105-106. For the telegrams between the First Lord 
of the Admiralty, W. H. Smith, and Admiral Hornby, see Life and 
Times of W. H. Smith, by Sir H. Maxwell, i., chap. xi. 



268 The European Nations 

Britain's connexions with India by way of the Suez Canal, 
seeing that we then had no foothold in Egypt. Accordingly, 
on January 28th, the Ministry proposed to Parliament the 
voting of an additional sum of ;£6,ooo,ooo towards in- 
creasing the armaments of the country. At once there 
arose strong protests against this proposal, especially from 
the districts then suffering from the prolonged depression 
of trade. The outcry was very natural; but none the less 
it can scarcely be justified in view of the magnitude of the 
British interests then at stake. Granted that the views 
of the Czar were pacific, those of his generals at the seat of 
war were very much open to question.^ The long-coveted 
prize of Constantinople, or the Dardanelles, was likely to 
tempt them to disregard official orders from St. Petersburg 
unless they knew that any imprudent step would bring on 
a European war. In any case, the vote of ;^6,ooo,ooo was 
a precautionary measure; and it probably had the effect 
of giving pause to the enthusiasts at the Russian head- 
quarters. 

The preliminary bases of peace between Russia and 
Turkey were signed at Adrianople (January 31st) on the 
terms summarised above, except that the Czar's Minister 
now withdrew the obnoxious clause about the Straits. A 
line of demarcation was also agreed on between the hostile 
forces: it passed from Derkos, a lake near the Black Sea, 
to the north of Constantinople, in a southerly direction by 

> See the compromising revelations made by an anonymous 
Russian writer in the Revue de Paris for July 15, 1897. The au- 
thoress, "O. K.," in her book The Friends and Foes of Russia (pp. 
240-241), states that only the autocracy could have stayed the 
Russian advance on Constantinople. General U. S. Grant told her 
that if he had had such an order, he would have put it in his pocket 
and produced it again when in Constantinople. 



The Balkan Settlement 269 

the banks of the Karasou stream as far as the Sea of Mar- 
mora. This gave to the Russians the hnes of Tchekmedje, 
the chief natural defence of Constantinople, and they oc- 
cupied this position on February 6th. This fact was re- 
ported by Mr. Layard, Sir Henry Elliot's successor at 
Constantinople, in alarmist terms, and it had the effect of 
stilling the opposition at Westminster to the vote of 
credit. Though official assurances of a reassuring kind 
came from Prince Gortchakoff at St. Petersburg, the 
British Ministry on February yth ordered a part of the 
Mediterranean fleet to enter the Sea of Marmora for 
the defence of British interests and the protection of British 
subjects at Constantinople. The Czar's Government there- 
upon declared that if the British fleet steamed up the 
Bosporus, Russian troops would enter Constantinople for 
the protection of the Christian population. 

This rivalry in philanthropic zeal was not pushed to its 
logical issue, war. The British fleet stopped short of the 
Bosporus, but within sight of the Russian lines. True, 
these were pushed eastwards slightly beyond the limits 
agreed on with the Turks ; but an arrangement was arrived 
at between Lord Derby and Prince Gortchakoff (February 
19th) that the Russians would not occupy the lines of 
Bulair close to Constantinople, or the Peninsula of Galli- 
poli commanding the Dardanelles, provided that British 
forces were not landed in that important strait.^ So mat- 
ters rested, both sides regarding each other with the sullen- 
ness of impotent wrath. As Bismarck said, a war would 
have been a fight between an elephant and a whale. 

The situation was further complicated by an invasion 
of Thessaly by the Greeks (February 3rd) ; but they were 
' Hertslet, iv., p. 2670. 



270 The European Nations 

withdrawn at once on the urgent remonstrance of the 
Powers, coupled with a promise that the claims of Greece 
would be favourably considered at the general peace. ^ 

In truth, all the racial hatreds, aspirations, and ambitions 
that had so long been pent up in the south-east of Europe 
now seemed on the point of bursting forth and overwhelm- 
ing civilisation in a common ruin. Just as the earth's 
volcanic forces now and again threaten to tear their way- 
through the crust, so now the immemorial feuds of Mos- 
lems and Christians, of Greeks, Servians, Bulgars, Wallachs, 
and Turks, promised to desolate the slopes of the Balkans 
of Rhodope, and the Pindus, and to spread the lava tide of 
war over the half of the Continent. The Russians and 
Bulgars, swarming over Roumelia, glutted their revenge 
for past defeats and massacres by outrages well-nigh as 
horrible as that of Batak. At once the fierce Moslems of 
the Rhodope Mountains rose in self-defence or for ven- 
geance. And while the Russian eagles perforce checked 
their flight within sight of Stamboul, the Greeks and Ar- 
menians of that capital, nay, the very occupants of the 
foreign embassies, trembled at sight of the lust of blood 
that seized on the vengeful Ottomans. 

Nor was this all. Far away beyond the northern horizon 
the war cloud hung heavily over the Carpathians. The 
statesmen of Vienna, fearing that the terms of their bargain 
with Russia were now forgotten in the intoxication of her 
triumph, determined to compel the victors to lay their 
spoils before the Great Powers. In haste the Austrian and 
Hungarian troops took station on the great bastion of the 
Carpathians, and began to exert on the military situation 

* L. Sergeant, Greece in ike Nineteenth Century (1897), ch. xi. 



The Balkan Settlement 271 

the pressure which had been so fatal to Russia in her 
Turkish campaign of 1854. 

But though everything betokened war, there were forces 
that worked slowly but surely for a pacific settlement. 
However threatening was the attitude of Rtissia, her rulers 
really desired peace. The war had shown once again the 
weakness of that Power for offence. Her strength lies in 
her boundless plains, in the devotion of her millions of 
peasants to the Czar, and in the patient, stubborn strength 
which is the outcome of long centuries of struggle with the 
yearly tyrant, winter. Her weakness lies in the selfishness, 
frivolity, corruption, and narrowness of outlook of her 
governing class — -in short, in their incapacity for organisa- 
tion. Against the steady resisting power of her peasants 
the great Napoleon had hurled his legions in vain. That 
campaign of 18 12 exhibited the strength of Russia for 
defence. But when, in fallacious trust in that precedent, 
she had undertaken great wars far from her base, failure 
has nearly always been the result. The pathetic devotion 
of her peasantry has not made up for the mental and moral 
defects of her governing classes. This fact had fixed it- 
self on every competent observer in 1877. The Emperor 
Alexander knew it only too well. Now, early in 1878, it 
was fairly certain that his army would suceumb under the 
frontal attacks of Turks and British, and the onset of the 
Austrians on their rear. 

Therefore when, on February 4th, the Hapsburg State 
proposed to refer the terms of peace to a Conference of 
the Powers at Vienna, the consent of Russia was almost 
certain, provided that the prestige of the Czar remained 
unimpaired. Three days later the place of meeting 
was changed to Berlin, the Conference also becoming a 



2 72 The European Nations 

Congress, that is, a meeting where the chief Ministers of 
the Powers, not merely their Ambassadors, would take part. 
The United Kingdom, France, and Italy at once signified 
their assent to this proposal. As for Bismarck, he promised 
in a speech to the Reichstag (February 1 9th) that he would 
act as an "honest broker" between the parties most nearly 
concerned. There is little doubt that Russia took this in 
a sense favourable to her claims, and she, too, consented. 

Nevertheless, she sought to tie the hands of the Congress 
by binding Turkey to a preliminary treaty signed on 
March 3rd at San Stefano, a village near to Constantinople. 
The terms comprised those stated above (p. 269), but they 
also stipulated the cession of frontier districts to Servia 
and Montenegro, while Russia was to acquire the Rouman- 
ian districts east of the river Pruth, Roumania receiv- 
ing the Dobrudscha as an equivalent. Most serious of all 
was the erection of Bulgaria into an almost independent 
Principality, extending nearly as far south as Midia (on the 
Black Sea), Adrianople, Salonica, and beyond Ochrida in 
Albania. As will be seen by reference to the map (p. 287), 
this Principality would then have comprised more than 
half of the Balkan Peninsula, besides including districts on 
the ^gean Sea and around the town of Monastir, for which 
the Greeks have never ceased to cherish hopes. A Russian 
Commissioner was to supervise the formation of the 
government for two years ; all the fortresses on the Danube 
were to be razed, and none others constructed; Turkish 
forces were required entirely to evacuate the Principality, 
which was to be occupied by Russian troops for a space of 
time not exceeding two years. 

On her side, Turkey undertook to grant reforms to the 
Armenians, and protect them from Kurds and Circassians. 



The Balkan Settlement 2']-^^ 

Russia further claimed 1,410,000,000 roubles as war in- 
demnity, but consented to take the Dobrudscha district 
(offered to Roumania, as stated above), and in Asia the 
territories of Batoum, Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazid, in lieu 
of 1,100,000,000 roubles. The Porte afterwards declared 
that it signed this treaty under persistent pressure from 
the Grand Duke Nicholas and General Ignatieff, who again 
and again declared that otherwise the Russians would 
advance on the capital.^ 

At once, from all parts of the Balkan Peninsula, there 
arose a chorus of protests against the Treaty of San Stefano. 
The Mohammedans of the proposed State of Bulgaria pro- 
tested against subjection to their former helots. The 
Greeks saw in the treaty the death-blow to their hopes of 
gaining the northern coasts of the ^gean and a large part 
of central Macedonia. They fulminated against the Bul- 
garians as ignorant peasants, whose cause had been taken 
up recently by Russia for her own aggrandisement. ^ The 
Servians were equally indignant. They claimed, and with 
justice, that their efforts against the Turks should be re- 
warded by an increase of territory which would unite to 
them their kinsfolk in Macedonia and part of Bosnia, and 
place them on an equality with the upstart State of Bul- 
garia. Whereas the treaty assigned to these proteges of 
Russia districts inhabited solely by Servians, thereby bar- 
ring the way to any extension of that Principality. 

Still more urgent was the protest of the Roumanian 

1 For the text of. the treaty, see Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 22 
(1878) ; also The European Concert in the Eastern Question, by T. E. 
Holland, pp. 335-348. 

2 Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 31 (1878), Nos. 6-17, and enclosures; 
L'Hellenisme et la Macedonie, by N. Kasasis (Paris, 1904); L. Ser- 
geant, op. cit., ch. xii. 



2 74 The European Nations 

Government. In return for the priceless services rendered 
by his troops at Plevna, Prince Charles and his Ministers 
were kept in the dark as to the terms arranged between 
Russia and Turkey. The Czar sent General Ignatieff to 
prepare the Prince for the news, and sought to mollify him 
by the hint that he might become also Prince of Bulgaria, 
a suggestion which was scornfully waved aside. The 
Government at Bukharest first learned the full truth as to 
the Bessarabia - Dobrudscha exchange from the columns 
of the Journal du St. Petershourg, which proved that the 
much-prized Bessarabian territory was to be bargained 
away by the Power which had solemnly undertaken to 
uphold the integrity of the Principality. The Prince, the 
Cabinet, and the people unanimously inveighed against 
this proposal. On February 4th the Roumanian Chamber 
of Deputies declared that Roumania would defend its 
territory to the last, by armed force if necessary; but it 
soon appeared that none of the Powers took any interest 
in the matter, and, thanks to the prudence of Prince 
Charles, the proud little nation gradually schooled itself 
to accept the inevitable.^ 

The peace of Europe now turned on the question whether 
the Treaty of San Stefano would be submitted as a whole 
to the Congress of the Powers at Berlin ; England claimed 
that it must be so submitted. This contention, in its ex- 
treme form, found no support from any of the Powers, not 
even from Austria, and it met with firm opposition from 
Russia. She, however, assured the Viennese Cotirt that 
the Congress would decide which of the San Stefano terms 
affected the interests of Europe and would pronounce on 

» Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 30 (1878); also Reminiscences of the 
King of Roumania, chaps, x., xi. 



The Balkan Settlement 275 

them. The Beaconsfield Cabinet later on affirmed that 
"every article in the treaty between Russia and Turkey 
will be placed , before the Congress — not necessarily for 
acceptance, but in order that it may be considered what 
articles require acceptance or concurrence by the several 
Powers and what do not." ^ 

When this much was conceded, there remained no irre- 
concilable difference, unless the treaty contained secret 
articles which Russia claimed to keep back from the Con- 
gress. As far as we know, there were none. But the fact 
is that the dispute, small as it now appears to us, was 
intensified by the suspicions and resentment prevalent 
on both sides. The final decision of the St. Petersburg 
Government was couched in somewhat curt and threaten- 
ing terms : "It leaves to the other Powers the liberty of 
raising such questions at the Congress as they may think 
it fit to discuss, and reserves to itself the liberty of accept- 
ing, or not accepting, the discussion of these questions." ^ 

This haughty reply, received at Downing Street on 
March 27th, again brought the two States to the verge 
of war. Lord Beaconsfield, and all his colleagues but 
one, determined to make immediate preparations for the 
outbreak of hostilities, while Lord Derby, clinging to the 
belief that peace would be best preserved by ordinary 
negotiations, resigned the portfolio for foreign affairs 
(March 28th); two days later he was succeeded by the 
Marquis of Salisbury. ^ On April ist the Prime Minister 
gave notice of motion that the reserves of the army and 

1 Lord Derby to Sir H. Elliot, March 13, 1878. Pari. Papers, 
Turkey, No. 24 (1878), No. 9, p. 5. 

2 Ibid., No. 15, p. 7. 

3 See the close of the chapter for Lord Derby's further reason 
for resigning. 



276 The European Nations 

militia should be called out; and on the morrow Lord 
Salisbury published a note for despatch to foreign courts 
summarising the grounds of British opposition to the 
Treaty of San Stefano, and to Russia's contentions re- 
specting the Congress. 

Events tpok a still more threatening turn fifteen days 
later, when the Government ordered eight Indian regi- 
ments, along with two batteries of artillery, to proceed at 
once to Malta. The measure aroused strong differences of 
opinion, some seeing in it a masterly stroke which revealed 
the greatness of Britain's resources, while the more nervous 
of the Liberal watch-dogs bayed forth their fears that it 
was the beginning of a Strafford-like plot for undermining 
the liberties of England. 

So sharp were the differences of opinion in England, that 
Russia would perhaps have disregarded the threats of the 
Beaconsfield Ministry had she not been face to face with a 
hostile Austria. The great aim of the Czar's Government 
was to win over the Dual Monarchy by offering a share of 
the spoils of Turkey. Accordingly, General Ignatieff went 
on a mission to the continental courts, especially to that of 
Vienna, and there is little doubt that he offered Bosnia to 
the Hapsburg Power. That was the least which Francis 
Joseph and Count Andrassy had the right to expect, for 
the secret compact made before the war promised them 
as much. In view of the enormous strides contemplated 
by Russia, they now asked for certain rights in connexion 
with Servia and Montenegro, and commercial privileges 
that would open a way to Salonica.i But Russia's aims, 
as expressed at San Stefano, clearly were to dominate 
the Greater Bulgaria there foreshadowed, which would 
» Debidour, Hist, diplomatique de I'Europe, ii., p. 515. 



The Balkan Settlement 277 

probably shut out Austria from political and commercial 
influence over the regions north of Salonica. IgnatieflE's 
effort to gain over Austria therefore failed; and it was 
doubtless Lord Beaconsfield's confidence in the certainty 
of Hapsburg support in case of war that prompted his 
defiance alike of Russia and of the Liberal party at home. 

The Czar's Government also was well aware of the peril 
of arousing a European war. Nihilism lifted its head 
threateningly at home; and the Russian troops before 
Constantinople were dying like flies in autumn. The 
outrages committed by them and the Bulgarians on the 
Moslems of Roumelia had, as we have seen, led to a revolt 
in the district of Mount Rhodope; and there was talk in 
some quarters of making a desperate effort to cut ofT 
the invaders from the Danube. ^ The discontent of the 
.Roumanians might have been worked upon so as still fur- 
ther to endanger the Russian communications. Probably 
the knowledge of these plans and of the warlike prepara- 
tions of Great Britain induced the Russian Government 
to moderate its tone. On April 9th it expressed a wish 
that Lord Salisbury would formulate a definite policy. 

The new Foreign Minister speedily availed himself of this 
offer; and the cause of peace was greatly furthered by 
secret negotiations which he carried on with Count Shuva- 
loff. The Russian Ambassador in London had throughout 
bent his great abilities to a pacific solution of the dispute 

> For these outrages, see Pari. Papers, Turkey (1878), Nos. 42 
and 45, with numerous enclosures. The larger plans of the Rho- 
dope insurgents and their abettors at Constantinople are not fully 
known. An Englishman, Sinclair, and some other free-lances were 
concerned in the affair. The Rhodope district long retained a 
kind of independence; see Les Evenements politiques en Bulgarie, 
by A. G. Drandar. Appendix. 



278 The European Nations 

and, on finding out the real nature of the British objections 
to the San Stefano Treaty, he proceeded to St. Petersburg 
to persuade the Emperor to accept certain changes. In 
this he succeeded, and on his return to London was able to 
come to an agreement with Lord Salisbury (May 30th), the 
chief terms of which clearly foreshadowed those finally 
adopted at Berlin. 

In effect they were as follows: The Beaconsfield Cabinet 
strongly objected to the proposed wide extension of Bul- 
garia at the expense of other nationalities, and suggested 
that the districts south of the Balkans, which were peopled 
almost wholly by Bulgarians, should not be wholly with- 
drawn from Turkish control, but "should receive a large 
measure of administrative self-government . . . with 
a Christian governor." To these proposals the Russian 
Government gave a conditional assent. Lord Salisbury • 
further claimed that the Sultan should have the right "to 
canton troops on the frontiers of southern Bulgaria"; and 
that the militia of that province should be commanded by 
officers appointed by the Sultan with the consent of Europe. 
England also undertook to see that the cause of the Greeks 
in Thessaly and Epirus received the attention of all the 
Powers, in place of the intervention of Russia alone on their 
behalf, as specified in the San Stefano Treaty. 

Respecting the cession of Roumanian Bessarabia to 
Russia, on which the Emperor Alexander had throughout 
insisted (see page 250), England expressed "profound re- 
gret" at that demand, but undertook not to dispute it at 
the Congress. On his side the Emperor Alexander con- 
sented to restore Bayazid in Asia Minor to the Turks, but 
insisted on the retention of Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan. 
Great Britain acceded to this, but hinted that the defence 



The Balkan Settlement 279 

of Turkey in Asia would thenceforth rest especially upon 
her — a hint to prepare Russia for the Cyprus Convention. 

For at this time the Beaconsfield Cabinet had been 
treating secretly with the Sublime Porte. When Lord 
Salisbury found out that Russia would not abate her 
demands for Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars, he sought to 
safeguard British interests in the Levant by acquiring 
complete control over the island of Cyprus. His final in- 
structions to Mr. Layard to that effect were telegraphed 
on May 30th, that is, on the very day on which peace with 
Russia was practically assured.^ The Porte, unaware of 
the fact that there was little fear of the renewal of hos- 
tilities, agreed to the secret Cyprus Convention on June 
4th; while Russia, knowing little or nothing as to Britain's 
arrangement with the Porte, acceded to the final -arrange- 
ments for the discussion of Turkish affairs at Berlin. It 
is not surprising that this manner of doing business aroused 
great irritation both at St. Petersburg and Constantinople. 
Count Shuvaloff's behaviour at the Berlin Congress when 
the news came out proclaimed to the world that he con- 
sidered himself tricked by Lord Beaconsfield; while that 
statesman disdainfully sipped nectar of delight that rarely 
comes to the lips. even of the gods of diplomacy. 

The terms of the Cyprus Convention were to the effect 
that, if Russia retained the three districts in Asia Minor 
named above, or any of them (as it was perfectly certain 
that she would) ; or if she sought to take possession of 
any further Turkish territory in Asia Minor, Great Britain 
would help the Sultan by force of arms. He, on his side, 
assigned to Great Britain the island of Cyprus, to be oc- 
cupied and administered by her. He further promised 

1 Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 36 (1878). See, too, ibid.. No. 43. 



28o The European Nations 

"to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later 
between the two Powers, into the government, and for the 
protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte 
in these territories." On July ist Britain also covenanted 
to pay to the Porte the surplus of revenue over expenditure 
in Cyprus, calculated upon the average of the last five 
years, and to restore Cyprus to Turkey if Russia gave up 
Kars and her other acquisitions.^ 

Fortified by the secret understanding with Russia, and 
by the equally secret compact with Turkey, the British 
Government could enter the Congress of the Powers at 
Berlin with complete equanimity. It is true that news 
as to the agreement with Russia came out in a London 
newspaper which at once published a general description 
of the Anglo-Russian agreement of May 30th; and when 
the correctness of the news was stoutly denied by ministers, 
the original deed was given to the world by the same news- 
paper on June 14th; but again vigorous disclaimers and 
denials were given from the ministerial bench in Parlia- 
ment. ^ Thus, when Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury 
proceeded to Berlin for the opening of the Congress Qune 
13th), they were believed to hold the destinies of the 
British Empire in their hands, and the world waited with 
bated breath for the scraps of news that came from that 
centre of diplomacy. 

On various details there arose sharp differences which 
the tactful humour of the Grerman Chancellor could scarcely 
set at rest. The fate of nations seemed to waver in the 

» Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 36 (1878); Hertslet, iv., pp. 2722- 
2725; Holland, op. cit., pp. 354-356. 

2 Mr. Charles Marvin, a clerk in the Foreign Office, was charged 
with this offence, but the prosecution failed (July i6th) owing to 
lack of sufficient evidence 



The Balkan Settlement 281 

balance when Prince Gortchakoff gathered up his maps 
and threatened to hurry from the room, or when Lord 
Beaconsfield gave pressing orders for a special train to take 
him back to Calais; but there seemed good grounds for 
regarding these incidents rather as illustrative of char- 
acter, or of the electioneering needs of a sensational age, 
than as throes in the birth of nationalities. The "Peace 
with honour," which the Prime Minister on his return an- 
nounced at Charing Cross to an admiring crowd, had vir- 
tually been secured at Downing Street before the end of 
May respecting all the great points in dispute between 
England and Russia. 

We know little about the inner history of the Congress 
of Berlin, which is very different from the official protocols 
that half reveal and half conceal its debates. One fact 
and one incident claim attention as serving to throw 
curious side-lights on policy and character respectively. 
The Emperor William had been shot at and severely 
wounded by a socialist fanatic, Dr. Nobiling, on June 2, 
1878, and during the whole time of the Congress the 
Crown Prince Frederick acted as regent of the Empire. 
Limited as his powers were by law, etiquette, and Bis- 
marck, he is said to have used them on behalf of Austria 
and England. The old Emperor thought so; for in a 
moment of confiding indiscretion he hinted to the Princess 
Radziwill (a Russian by birth) that Russian interests 
would have fared better at Berlin had he then been steering 
the ship of State. ^ Possibly this explains why Bismarck 
always maintained that he had done what he could for his 
Eastern neighbour, and that he really deserved a Russian 
decoration for his services during the Congress. 

1 Princess Radziwill, My Recollections (Eng. edit., 1900), p. 91. 



282 The European Nations 

The incident, which flashes a search-hght into character 
and discloses the recherche joys of statecraft, is also de- 
scribed in the sprightly Memoirs of Princess Radziwill. 
She was present at a brilliant reception held on the evening 
of the day when the Cyprus Convention had come to light. 
Diplomatists and generals were buzzing eagerly and 
angrily when the Earl of Beaconsfield appeared. A slight 
hush came over the wasp-like clusters as he made his way 
among them, noting everything with his restless, inscrut- 
able eyes. At last he came near the Princess, once a bitter 
enemy, but now captivated and captured by his powers of 
polite irony. "What are you thinking of?" she asked. 
"I am not thinking at all," he replied; "I am enjoying 
myself." 1 After that one can understand why Jew-bait- 
ing became a favourite sport in Russia throughout the 
next two decades. 

We turn now to note the terms of the Treaty of Berlin 
(July 13, 1 8 78). 2 The importance of this compact will be 
seen if its provisions are compared with those of the Treaty 
of San Stefano, which it replaced. Instead of the greater 
Bulgaria, subjected for two years to Russian control, the 
Congress ordained that Bulgaria proper should not extend 
beyond the main chain of the Balkans, thus reducing its 
extent from 163,000 square kilometres to 64,000, and its 
population from four millions to a million and a half. The 
period of military occupation and supervision of the new 
administration by Russia was reduced to nine months. 
At the end of that time, and on the completion of the 
"organic law," a Prince was to be elected "freely" by the 

1 Princess Radziwill, My Recollections, p. 149. 

2 For the Protocols, see Pari. Papers, Turkey (1878), No. 39. 
For the Treaty, see ibid., No. 44; also The European Concert on the 
Eastern Question, by T. E. Holland, pp. 277-307. 



The Balkan Settlement 283 

population of the principality. The new State remained 
under the suzerainty of Turkey, the Sultan confirming the 
election of the new Prince of Bulgaria, "with the assent of 
the Powers." 

Another important departure from the San Stefano 
terms was the creation of the province of Eastern Rou- 
melia, with boundaries shown in the accompanying map. 
While having a Christian governor, and enjoying the rights 
of local self-government, it was to remain under "the 
direct political and military authority of the Sultan, under 
conditions of administrative autonomy." The Sultan re- 
tained the right of keeping garrisons there, though a local 
militia was to preserve internal order. As will be shown 
in the next chapter, this anomalous state of things passed 
away in 1885, when the province threw off Turkish control 
and joined Bulgaria. 

The other Christian States of the Balkans underwent 
changes of the highest importance. Montenegro lost half 
of her expected gains, but secured access to the sea at 
Antivari. The acquisitions of Servia were now effected 
at the expense of Bulgaria. These decisions were greatly 
in favour of Austria. To that Power the occupation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was now entrusted for an in- 
definite period in the interest of the peace of Europe, and 
she proceeded forthwith to drive a wedge between the 
Serbs of Servia and Montenegro. It is needless to say 
that, in spite of the armed opposition of the Mohammedan 
people of those provinces — which led to severe fighting in 
July to September of that year — Austria's occupation has 
been permanent, though nominally they still form part of 
the Turkish Empire. 

Roumania and Servia gained complete independence and 



284 The European Nations 

ceased to pay tribute to the Sultan, but both States com- 
plained of the lack of support accorded to them by Russia, 
considering the magnitude of their efforts for the Slavonic 
cause. Roumania certainly fared very badly at the hands 
of the Power for which it had done yeoman service in the 
war. The pride of the Roumanian people brooked no 
thought of accepting the Dobrudscha, a district in great 
part marshy and thinly populated, as an exchange for a 
fertile district peopled by their kith and kin. They let 
the world know that Russia appropriated their Bessarabian 
district by force, and that they accepted the Dobrudscha 
as a war indemnity. By dint of pressure exerted at the 
Congress their envoys secured a southern extension of its 
borders at the expense of Bulgaria, a proceeding which 
aroused the resentment of Russia, 

The conduct of the Czar's Government in this whole 
matter was most impolitic. It embittered the relations 
between the two States and drove the Government of 
Prince Charles to rely on Austria and the Triple Alliance. 
That is to say, Russia herself closed the door which had 
been so readily opened for her into the heart of the Sultan's 
dominions in 1828, 1854, and 1877.^ We may here remark 
that, on the motion of the French plenipotentiaries at the 
Congress, that body insisted that Jews must be admitted 
to the franchise in Roumania. This behest of the Powers 
aroused violent opposition in that State, but was finally, 
though by no means fully, carried out. 

Another Christian State of the peninsula received scant 

•Frederick, Crown Prince of Germany, expressed the general 
opinion in a letter written to Prince Charles after the Berlin Con- 
gress: "Russia's conduct, after the manful service you did for 
that colossal Empire, meets with censure on all sides" {Reminis- 
cences of the King of Roumania, p. 325). 



286 The European Nations 

consideration at the Congress. Greece, as we have seen, 
had recalled her troops from Thessaly on the understanding 
that her claims should be duly considered at the general 
peace. She now pressed those claims; but, apart from 
initial encouragement given by Lord Salisbury, she re- 
ceived little or no support. On the motion of the French 
plenipotentiary, M. Waddington, her desire to control the 
northern shores of the ^■Egean and the island of Crete was 
speedily set aside ; but he sought to win for her practically 
the whole of Thessaly and Epirus. This, however, was 
firmly opposed by Lord Beaconsfield, who objected to the 
cession to her of the southern and purely Greek districts 
of Thessaly and Epirus. He protested against the notion 
that the plenipotentiaries had come to Berlin in order to 
partition "a worn-out State" (Turkey). They were there 
to "strengthen an ancient Empire — essential to the main- 
tenance of peace." 

"As for Greece," he said, "States, like individuals, which 
have a future are in a position to be able to wait." True, 
he ended by expressing "the hope and even the convic- 
tion" that the Sultan would accept an equitable solution 
of the question of the Thessalian frontier; but the Con- 
gress acted on the other sage dictum and proceeded to 
subject the Hellenes to the educative influences of hope 
.deferred. Protocol 13 had recorded the opinion of the 
i?owers that the northern frontier of Greece should follow 
the courses of the rivers Salammaria and Kalamas; but 
they finally decided to offer their mediation to the dis- 
putants only in case no agreement could be framed. The 
Suplime Porte, as we shall see, improved on the procras- 
tinlating methods of the Nestors of European diplomacy.^ 

1 See Mr. L. Sergeant's Greece in the Nineteenth Century (1897), 



The Balkan Settlement 287 

As regards matters that directly concerned Turkey and 
Russia, we may note that the latter finally agreed to forego 
the acquisition of the Bayazid district and the lands ad- 
joining the caravan route from the Shah's dominions to 
Erzeroum. The Czar's Government also promised that 
Batoum should be a free port, and left unchanged the 
regulations respecting the navigation of the Dardanelles 
and Bosporus. By a subsequent treaty with Turkey of 
February, 1879, the Porte agreed to pay to Russia a war 
indemnity of about ^32,000,000. 

More important from our standpoint are the clauses re- 
lating to the good government of the Christians of Turkey. 
By Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin the Porte bound itself 
to carry out "the improvements and reforms demanded 
by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the 
Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the 
Circassians and Kurds." It even added the promise "pe- 
riodically" tb "make known the steps taken to this effect 
to the Powers who will superintend their application." 
In the next article Turkey promised to "maintain" the 
principle of religious liberty and to give it the widest ap- 
plication. Differences of religion were to be no bar to 
employment in any public capacity, and all persons were 
to "be admitted, without distinction of religion, to give 
evidence before the tribunals." 

Such was the Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878). Viewed 

in its broad outlines, it aimed at piecing together again 

the Turkish districts which had been severed at San Ste- 

fano ; the Bulgars and Serbs who there gained the hope of 

chap, xii., for the speeches of the Greek envoys at the Congress; 
also that of Sir Charles Dilke in the House of Commons in the de- 
bate of July 29-August 2,1878, as to England's desertion of the Greek 
cause after the ninth session (June 29th) of the Berlin Congress. 



288 The European Nations 

effecting a real union of those races were now sundered 
once more, the former in three divisions, while the Serbs of 
Servia, Bosnia, and Montenegro were wedged apart by the 
intrusion of the Hapsburg Power. Yet, imperfect though 
it was in several points, that treaty promised substantial 
gains for the Christians of Turkey. The collapse of the 
Sultan's power had been so complete, so notorious, that 
few persons believed he would ever dare to disregard the 
mandate of the Great Powers and his own solemn promises 
stated above. But no one could then foresee the ex- 
hibition of weakness and cynicism in the policy of those 
Powers toward Turkey, which disgraced the polity of 
Europe in the last decades of the century. The causes 
that brought about that state of mental torpor in the face 
of hideous massacres, and of moral weakness displayed by 
sovereigns and statesmen in the midst of their millions of 
armed men, will be to some extent set forth in the following 
chapters. 

As regards the welfare of the Christians in Asia Minor, 
the Treaty of Berlin assigned equal responsibilities to all 
the signatory Powers. But the British Government had 
already laid itself under a special charge on their behalf by 
the terms of the Cyprus Convention quoted above. Five 
days before that treaty was signed the world heard with a 
gasp of surprise that England had become practically mis- 
tress of Cyprus and assumed some measure of responsibility 
for the good government of the Christians of Asiatic 
Turkey. No limit of time was assigned for the duration 
of the Convention, and apparently it still holds good so far 
as relates to the material advantages accruing from the 
possession of that island. 

It is needless to say that the Cypriotes have benefited 



The Balkan Settlement 289 

greatly by the British administration; the value of the 
imports and exports nearly doubled between 1878 and 1888. 
But this fact does not and cannot dispose of the larger 
questions opened up as to the methods of acquisition and 
of the moral responsibilities which it entailed. These at 
once aroused sharp differences of opinion. Admiration at 
the skill and daring which had gained for Britain a point 
of vantage in the Levant and set back Russia's prestige in 
that quarter was chequered by protests against the methods 
of secrecy, sensationalism, and self-seeking that latterly 
had characterised British diplomacy. 

One more surprise was still forthcoming. Lord Derby, 
speaking in the House of Lords on July i8th, gave point to 
these protests by divulging a State secret of no small im- 
portance, namely, that one of the causes of his retirement 
at the end of March was a secret proposal of the Ministry 
to send an expedition from India to seize Cyprus and one 
of the Syrian ports with a view to operations against 
Russia, and that, too, with or without the consent of the 
Sultan. Whether the Cabinet arrived at anything like a 
decision in this question is very doubtful. Lord Salisbury 
stoutly denied the correctness of his predecessor's state- 
ment. The papers of Sir Stafford Northcote also show 
that the scheme at that time came up for discussion, but 
was "laid aside." ^ Lord Derby, however, stated that he 
had kept private notes of the discussion; and it is im- 
probable that he would have resigned on a question that 
was merely mooted and then entirely dismissed. The mys- 
tery in which the deliberations of the Cabinet are involved, 
and very rightly involved, broods over this as over so 
many topics in which Lord Beaconsfield was concerned. 
• Sir Stafford Northcote, ii., p. 108. 



b 



290 The European Nations 

On another and far weightier point no difference of 
opinion is possible. Viewed by the light of the Cyprus 
Convention, Britain's responsibility for assuring a mini- 
mum of good government for the Christians of Asiatic 
Turkey is undeniable. Unfortunately it admits of no 
denial that the duties which that responsibility involves 
have not been discharged. The story of the misgovem- 
ment and massacre of the Armenian Christians is one that 
will ever redound to the disgrace of all the signatories of 
the Treaty of Berlin ; it is doubly disgracefiil to the Power 
which framed the Cyprus Convention. 

A praiseworthy effort was made by the Beaconsfield 
Government to strengthen British influence and the cause 
of reform by sending a considerable number of well-edu- 
cated men as consuls to Asia Minor, under the supervision 
of the Consul-general, Sir Charles Wilson. In the first 
two years they effected much good, securing the dismissal 
of several of the worst Turkish officials, and implanting 
hope in the oppressed Greeks and Armenians. Had they 
been well supported from London, they might have 
wrought a permanent change. Such, at least, is the belief 
of Professor Ramsay after several years' experience in 
Asia Minor. 

Unfortunately, the Gladstone Government, which came 
into power in the spring of 1880, desired to limit its re- 
sponsibilities on all sides, especially in the Levant. The 
British Consuls ceased to be supported, and after the 
arrival of Mr. (now Lord) Goschen at Constantinople in 
May, 1880, as Ambassador Extraordinary, British influence 
began to suffer a decline everywhere through Turkey, 
partly owing to the events soon to be described. The out- 
break of war in Egypt in 1882 was made a pretext by the 



The Balkan Settlement 291 

British Government for the transference of the Consuls to 
Egypt ; and thereafter matters in Asia Minor sHd back into 
the old ruts. The progress of the Greeks and Armenians, 
the traders of that land, suffered a check, and the remark- 
able Moslem revival whicn the Sultan inaugurated in that 
year (the year 1300 of the Mohammedan calendar) gradu- 
ally led up to the troubles and massacres which culminated 
in the years 1896 and 1897. We may fixially note that 
when the Gladstone Ministry left the field open in Asia 
Minor, the German Government promptly took possession ; 
and since 1883 the influence of Berlin has more and 
more penetrated into the Sultan's lands in Europe and 
Asia.i 

The collapse of British influence at Constantinople was 
hastened on by the efforts made by the Cabinet of London, 
after Mr. Gladstone's accession to office, on behalf of 
Greece. It soon appeared that Abdul Hamid and his 
Ministers would pay no heed to the recommendations of 
the Great Powers on this head, for on July 20, 1878, they 
informed Sir Henry Lay ard of their ' ' final ' ' decision that no 
Thessalian districts would be given up to Greece. Owing 
to pressure exerted by the Dufaure-Waddington Ministry 
in France, the Powers decided that a European Commission 
should be appointed to consider the whole question. To 
this the Beaconsfield Government gave a not very willing 
assent. 

The Porte bettered the example. It took care to nami 
as the first place of meeting of the Commissioners a villagi 
to the north of the Gulf or Arta which was not discoverable 
on any map. When at last this mistake was rectified, and 

1 See Impressions of Turkey, by Prof. W. M. Ramsay (1897), 
chap. vi. 



292 The European Nations 

the Greek envoys on two occasions sought to steam into 
the gulf, they were fired on from the Turkish forts. After 
these amenities, the Commission finally met at Prevesa, 
only to have its report shelved by the Porte (January- 
March, 1879). Next, in answer to a French demand for 
European intervention, the Turks opposed various de- 
vices taken from the inexhaustible stock of Oriental subter- 
fuges. So the time wore on until, in the spring of 1880, the 
fall of the Beaconsfield Ministry brought about a new 
political situation. 

The new Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, was known as 
the statesman who had given the Ionian Isles to Greece, 
and who advocated the expulsion of the Turks, "bag and 
baggage," from Europe. At once the despatches from 
Downing Street took on a different complexion, and the 
substitution of Mr. Goschen for Sir Henry Layard at Con- 
stantinople enabled the Porte to hear the voice of the 
British people, undimmed by official checks. A Conference 
of the Powers met at Berlin to discuss the carrying out of 
their recommendations on the Greek Question, and of the 
terms of the late treaty respecting Montenegro. 

On this latter affair the Powers finally found it needful to 
make a joint naval demonstration against the troops of the 
Albanian League who sought to prevent the handing over 
of the seaport of Dulcigno to Montenegro, as prescribed by 
the Treaty of Berlin. But, as happened during the Con- 
cert of the Powers in the spring of 1876, a single discordant 
note sufficed to impair the effect of the collective voice. 
Then it was England which refused to employ any coercive 
measures; now it was Austria and Germany, and finally 
(after the resignation of the Waddington Ministry) France. 
When the Sultan heard of this discord in the European 



I 



The Balkan Settlement 293 

Concert, his Moslem scruples resumed their wonted sway, 
and the Albanians persisted in defying Europe. 

The warships of the Powers might have continued to 
threaten the Albanian coast with unshotted cannon to this 
da}', had not the Gladstone Cabinet proposed drastic 
means for bringing the Sultan to reason. The plan was 
that the united fleet should steam straightway to Smyrna 
and land marines for the sequestration of the customs 
dues of that important trading centre. Here again the 
Powers were not of one mind. The three dissentients 
again hung back; but they so far concealed their refusal, 
or reluctance, as to leave on Abdul Hamid's mind the im- 
pression that a united Christendom was about to seize 
Smyrna.^ This was enough. He could now (October lo, 
1880) bow his head resignedly before superior force without 
sinning against the Moslem's unwritten but inviolable 
creed of never giving way before Christians save under 
absolute necessity. At once he ordered his troops to carry 
out the behests of the Powers; and after some fighting. 
Dervish Pasha drove the Albanians out of Dulcigno, and 
surrendered it to the Montenegrins (November-December, 
1880). Such is the official account; but, seeing that the 
Porte knows how to turn to account the fanaticism and 
turbulence of the Albanians, ^ it may be that their resistance 
all along was but a device of that resourceful Government 
to thwart the will of Europe. 

The same threat as to the seizure of the Turkish customs- 
house at Smyrna sufficed to help on the solution of the 
Greek Question. The delays and insults of the Turks had 
driven the Greeks to desperation, and only the urgent 

» Life of Gladstone, by J. Morley, iii., p. 9. 

2 See Turkey in Europe, by "Odysseus," p. 434. 



294 The European Nations 

remonstrances of the Powers availed to hold back the Cabinet 
of Athens from a declaration of war. This danger by de- 
grees passed away; but, as usually happens where passions 
are excited on both sides, every compromise pressed on the 
litigants by the arbiters presented great difficulty. The 
Congress of Berlin had recommended the extension of 
Greek rule over the purely Hellenic districts of Thessaly, 
assigning as the new boundaries the course of the rivers 
Salammaria and Kalamas, the latter of which flows into 
the sea opposite the Island of Corfu. 

Another Conference of the Powers (it was the third) met 
to decide the details of that proposal; but owing to the 
change of government in France, along with other causes, 
the whole question proved to be very intricate. In the 
end, the Powers induced the Sultan to sign the Convention 
of May 24, 1 88 1, whereby the course of the river Arta was 
substituted for that of the Kalamas. 

As a set-off to this proposal, which involved the loss of 
Jannina and Prevesa for Greece, they awarded to the 
Hellenes some districts north of the Salammaria which 
helped partially to screen the town of Larissa from the 
danger of Turkish inroads.^ To this arrangement Moslems 
and Christians sullenly assented. On the whole the 
.Greeks gained 13,200 square kilometres in territory and 
about 150,000 inhabitants, but their failure to gain several 
Hellenic districts of Epirus rankled deep in the popular 
consciousness and prepared the way for the events of 1885 
and 1897. 

These later developments can receive here only the 
briefest reference. In the former year, when the two 

' The European Concert in the Eastern Question, by T. E. Holland, 
pp. 60—69. 



The Balkan Settlement 295 

Bulgarias framed their union, the Greeks threatened Tur- 
key with war, but were speedily brought to another frame 
of mind by a "pacific" blockade by the Powers. Em- 
bittered by this treatment, the Hellenes sought to push on 
their cause in Macedonia and Crete through a powerful 
Society, the "Ethnike Hetairia." The chronic discontent 
of the Cretans at Turkish misrule and the outrages of the 
Moslem troops led to grave complications in 1897. At 
the beginning of that year the Powers intervened with a 
proposal for the appointment of a foreign gendarmerie 
(January, 1897). In order to defeat this plan the Sultan 
stirred up Moslem fanaticism in the island, until the re- 
sulting atrocities brought Greece into the field both in 
Thessaly and Crete. During the ensuing strifes in Crete 
the Powers demeaned themselves by siding against the 
Christian, insurgents and some Greek troops sent from 
Athens to their aid. Few events in our age have caused 
a more painful sensation than the bombardment of Cretan 
villages by British and French warships. The Powers 
also proclaimed a "pacific" blockade of Crete (March- 
May, 1897). The inner reasons that prompted these 
actions are not fully known. It may safely be said that 
they will need far fuller justification than that which was 
given in the explanation of Ministers at Westminster. 

Meanwhile the passionate resentment felt by the Greeks 
had dragged the Government of King George into war with 
Turkey (April 18, 1897). The little kingdom was speedily 
overpowered by Turks and Albanians; and despite the 
recall of their troops from Crete, the Hellenes were unable 
to hold Phersala and other positions in the middle of 
Thessaly. The Powers, however, intervened on May 12 
and proceeded to pare down the exorbitant terms of the 



Territory Ceded to Turkev in 1897. 
shewn thus ,<r 



tR SUGGE5. ^^y .'*"^45J"J?Jo 

o;" ''Mettliova- 




C£0«1. CtTAtT. LOHOOMt 



MAP OF THESSALY 



296 



The Balkan Settlement 297 

Porte, allowing it to gain only small strips in the north of 
Thessaly, as a "strategic rectification" of the frontier. 
The Turkish demand of ^T 10,000,000 was reduced to 
;^T4,ooo,ooo (September 18). 

This successful war against Greece raised the prestige of 
Turkey and added fuel to the flames of Mohammedan 
bigotry. These, as we have seen, had been assiduously 
fanned by Abdul Hamid II. ever since the year 1882, 
when a Pan-Islam movement began. The results of this 
revival were far-reaching, being felt even among the hill 
tribes on the Afghan-Punjab border (see Chapter XIV.). 
Throughout the Ottoman Empire the Mohammedans be- 
gan to assert their superiority over Christians; and, as 
Professor Ramsay has observed, "the means whereby 
Turkish power is restored is always the same — massacre." ^ 

It would be premature to inquire which of the European 
Powers must be held chiefly responsible for the toleration 
of the hideous massacres of the Armenians in 1896-97, and 
the atrocious misgovernment of Macedonia, by the Turks. 
All the Great Powers who signed the Berlin Treaty are 
guilty; and, as has been stated above, the State which 
framed the Cyprus Convention is doubly guilty, so far as 
concerns the events in Armenia. A grave share of re- 
sponsibility also rests with those who succeeded in hand- 
ing back a large part of Macedonia to the Turks. But the 
writer who in the future undertakes to tell the story of the 
decline of European morality at the close of the nineteenth 
century, and the growth of cynicism and selfishness, will 
probably pass still severer censures on the Emperors of 
Germany and Russia, who, with the unequalled influence 
which they wielded over the Porte, might have intervened 
^ Impressions of Turkey, by W. M. Ramsay, p. 139. 



298 The European Nations 

with effect to screen their co-reHgionists from unutterable 
wrongs, and yet, as far as is known, raised not a finger on 
their behalf. The Treaty of Berlin, which might have 
inaugurated an era of good government throughout the 
whole of Turkey if the Powers had been true to their trust, 
will be cited as damning evidence in the account of the 
greatest betrayal of a trust which Modern History records. 



Note. — (Added to page as revised for volume', July, 1905.) For 
the efforts made by the British Government on behalf of the Ar- 
menians, the reader should consult the last chapter of Mr. James 
Bryce's book, Transcaucasia and Mount Ararat (new edition, 1896). 
Further information may be expected in the Life of Earl Granville, 
Soon to appear from the pen of Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice. 



CHAPTER X 

THE MAKING OF BULGARIA 

" al you can help to build up these peoples into a bulwark of ic- 
dependent States and thus screen the 'sick man' from the fury of 
the northern blast, for God's sake do it." — Sir R. Morier to Sir 
.W. White, December 27, 1885. 

THE failure which attended the forward Hellenic move- 
ment during the years 1896-97 stands in sharp relief 
with the fortunes of the Bulgarians. To the rise of this 
youngest, and not the least promising, of European States, 
we must devote a whole chapter; for during a decade the 
future of the Balkan Peninsula and the policy of the great 
Powers turned very largely on the emancipation ot this 
interesting race from the effective control of the Sultan 
and the Czar. 

The rise of this enigmatical people affords a striKing 
example of the power of national feeling to uplift the down- 
trodden. Until the year 1876, the very name Bulgarian 
was scarcely known except as a geographical term. King- 
lake, in his charming work, Eothen, does not mention the 
Bulgarians, though he travelled on horseback from Bel- 
grade to Sophia and thence to Adrianople. And yet in 
1828, the conquering march of the Russians to AdrianoDle 
had awakened that people to a passing thrill of national 
consciousness. Other travellers, for instance Cvprien 
Robert in the "thirties," noted their sturdy patience in 

299 



300 The European Nations 

toil, their slowness to act, but their great perseverance and 
will-power, when the resolve was formed. 

These qualities may perhaps be ascribed to their Tatar 
(Tartar) origin. Ethnically, they are closely akin to the 
Magyars and Turks, but, having been long settled on the 
banks of the Volga (hence their name, Bulgarian ='Vol- 
garian), they adopted the speech and religion of the Slavs. 
They have lived this new life for about a thousand years,^ 
and in this time have been completely changed. Though 
their flat lips and noses bespeak an Asiatic origin, they are 
practically Slavs, save that their temperament is less 
nervous, and their persistence greater than that of their 
co-religionists. 2 Their determined adhesion to Slav ideals 
and rejection of Turkish ways should serve as a reminder 
to anthropologists that peoples are not mainly to be judged 
and divided off by craniological peculiarities. Measure- 
ment of skulls may tell us something concerning the basal 
characteristics of tribes ; it leaves untouched the boundless 
fund of beliefs, thoughts, aspirations, and customs which 
mould the lives of nations. The peoples of to-day are 
what their creeds, customs, and hopes have made them; 
as regards their political life, they have little more likeness 
to their tribal forefathers than the average man has to the 
chimpanzee. 

The first outstanding event in the recent rise of the 
Bulgarian race was the acquisition of spiritual independ- 
ence in 1869-70. Hitherto they, in common with nearly 
all the Slavs, had belonged to the Greek Church, and had 
recognised the supremacy of its Patriarch at Constantinople, 

' The Peasant State: Bulgaria in 1894, by E. Dicey, C.B. (1904), 
p. II. 

'^Turkey in Europe, by "Odysseus," pp. 28, 356, 367. 



The Making of Bulgaria t^oi 

but, as the national idea progressed, the Bulgarians sought 
to have their own Church. It was in vain that the Greeks 
protested against this schismatic attempt. The Western 
Powers and Russia favoured it ; the Porte also was not loth 
to see the Christians further divided. Early in the year 
1870, the Bulgarian Church came into existence, with an 
Exarch of its own at Constantinople who has survived the 
numerous a,ttempts of the Greeks to ban him as a schis- 
matic from the "Universal Church." The Bulgarians 
therefore took rank with the other peoples of the Peninsula 
as a religious entity, the Roumanian and Servian Churches 
having been constituted early in the century. In fact, the 
Porte recognises the Bulgarians, even in Macedonia, as an 
independent religious community, a right which it does 
not accord to the Servians; the latter, in Macedonia, are 
counted only as "Greeks." ^ 

The Treaty of .San Stefano promised to make the Bul- 
garians the predominant race of the Balkan Peninsula for 
the benefit of Russia; but, as we have seen, the efforts of 
Great Britain and Austria, backed by the jealousies of 
Greeks and Servians, led to a radical change in those ar- 
rangements. The Treaty of Berlin divided that people 
into three unequal parts. The larger mass, dwelling in 
Bulgaria Proper, gained entire independence of the Sultan, 
save in the matter of suzerainty; the Bulgarians on the 
southern slopes of the Balkans acquired autonomy only in 
local affairs, and remained under the control of the Porte 
in military affairs and in matters of high policy ; while the 
Bulgarians who dwelt in Macedonia, about 1,120,000 in 
number, were led to hope something from articles 61 and 

'Turkey in Europe, by "Odysseus," pp. 280-283, 297; The 
Peasant State, by E, Dicey, pp. 75-77. 



302 The European Nations 

62 of the Treaty of Berlin, but remained otherwise at the 
mercy of the Sultan. ^ 

This unsatisfactory state of things promised to range the 
Principality of Bulgaria entirely on the side of Russia, and 
at the outset the hope of all Bulgarians was for a closed 
friendship with the great Power that had effected their 
liberation. These sentiments, however, speedily cooled. 
The officers appointed by the Czar to organise the Princi- 
pality carried out their task in a high-handed way that 
soon irritated the newly enfranchised people. Gratitude 
is a feeling that soon vanishes, especially in political life. 
There, far more than in private life, it is a great mistake 
for the party that has conferred a boon to remind the 
recipient of what he owes, especially if that recipient be 
young and aspiring. Yet that was the mistake com- 
mitted everywhere throughout Bulgaria. The army, the 
public service, everything, was modelled. on Russian lines 
during the time of the occupation, until the overbearing 
ways of the officials succeeded in dulling the memory of the 
services rendered in the war. The fact of the liberation 
was forgotten amidst the irritation aroused by the constant 
reminders of it. 

The Russians succeeded in alienating even the young 
German prince who came, with the full favour of the Czar 
Alexander II., to take up the reins of government. A 
scion of the House of Hesse Darmstadt by a morganatic 
marriage. Prince Alexander of Battenberg had been 
sounded by the Russian authorities, with a view to his 
acceptance of the Bulgarian crown. By the vote of the 
Bulgarian Chamber, it was offered to him on April 29 

' Rectus, Kiepert, Ritter, and other geographers and ethnologists, 
admit that the majority in Macedonia is Bulgarian. 



The Making of Bulgaria 303 

1879. He accepted it, knowing full well that it would be 
a thorny honour for a youth of twenty -two years of age. 
His tall commanding frame, handsome features, ability 
and prowess as a soldier, and, above all, his winsome ad- 
dress, seemed to mark him out as a natural leader of men; 
and he received a warm welcome from the Bulgarians in 
the month of July. 

His difficulties began at once. The chief Russian ad- 
ministrator, Dondukoff Korsakoff, had thrust his country- 
men into all the important and lucrative posts, thereby 
leaving out in the cold the many Bulgarians, who, after 
working hard for the liberation of their land, now saw it 
transferred from the slovenly overlordship of the Turk to 
the masterful grip of the Muscovite. The Principality 
heaved with discontent, and these feelings finally com- 
municated themselves to the sympathetic nature of the 
Prince. But duty and policy alike forbade him casting 
off the Russian influence. No position could be more 
trying for a young man of chivalrous and ambitious nature, 
endowed with a strain of sensitiveness which he probably 
derived from his Polish mother. He early set forth his 
feelings in a private letter to Prince Charles of Roumania : 

"Devoted with my whole heart to the Czar Alexander, 
I am anxious to do nothing that can be called anti-Russian. 
Unfortunately the Russian officials have acted with the 
utmost want of tact; confusion prevails in every office, 
and peculation, thanks to Dondukoff 's decrees, is all but 
sanctioned. I am daily confronted with the painful al- 
ternative of having to decide either to assent to the Russian 
demands or to be accused in Russia of ingratitude and of 
'injuring the most sacred feelings of the Bulgarians.' My 
position is truly terrible." 



,/ 



304 The European Nations 

The friction with Russia increased with time. Early in 
the year 1880, Prince Alexander determined to go to St. 
Petersburg to appeal to the Czar in the hope of allaying 
the violence of the Panslavonic intriguers. Matters im- 
proved for a time, but only because the Prince accepted 
the guidance of the Czar. Thereafter he retained most of 
his pro-Russian Ministers, even though the second Legis- 
lative Assembly, elected in the spring of that year, was 
strongly Liberal and anti-Russian. In April, 1881, he 
acted on the advice of one of his Ministers, a Russian 
General named Ehrenroth, and carried matters with a 
high hand; he dissolved the Assembly, suspended the con- 
stitution, encouraged his officials to browbeat the voters, 
and thereby gained a docile Chamber, which carried out 
his behests by decreeing a Septennate, or autocratic rule 
for seven years. In order to prop up his miniature czar- 
dom, he now asked the new Emperor, Alexander III., to 
send him two Russian Generals. His request was granted 
in the persons of Generals Soboleff and Kaulbars, who be- 
came Ministers of the Interior and for War, a third. General 
Tioharoff, being also added as Minister of Justice. 

The triumph of Muscovite influence now seemed to be 
complete, until the trio just named usurped the functions 
of the Bulgarian Ministers and informed the Prince that 
they took their orders from the Czar, not from him. Chaf- 
ing at these self-imposed Russian bonds, the Prince now 
leant more on the moderate Liberals, headed by Karave- 
loff ; and on the Muscovites intriguing in the same quarter, 
and with the troops, with a view to his deposition, they 
met with a complete repulse. An able and vigorous young 
Bulgarian, Stambuloff, was now fast rising in importance 
among the more resolute nationalists. The son of an 



The Making of Bulgaria 305 

innkeeper of Tirnova, he was sent away to be educated at 
Odessa; there he early became imbued with Nihihst ideas, 
and on returning to the Danubian lands, framed many 
plots for the expulsion of the Turks from Bulgaria. His 
thick-set frame, his force of will, his eloquence, passionate 
speech, and, above all, his burning patriotism, soon 
brought him to the front as the leader of the national 
party ; and he now strove with all his might to prevent his 
land falling to the position of a mere satrapy of the libera- 
tors. Better the puny autocracy of Prince Alexander than 
the very real despotism of the nominees of the Emperor 
Alexander III. 

The character of the new Czar will engage our attention 
in the following chapter; here we need only say that the 
more his narrow, hard, and overbearing nature asserted 
itself, the greater appeared the danger to the liberties of 
the Principality. At last, when the situation became un- 
bearable, the Prince resolved to restore the Bulgarian \ 
constitution; and he took this momentous step, on Sep- 
tember 18, 1883, without consulting the three Russian 
Ministers, who thereupon resigned.^ 

At once the Prince summoned Karaveloff, and said to V 
him: "My dear Karaveloff, for the second time I swear to 
thee that I will be entirely submissive to the will of the 
people, and that I will govern in full accordance with the 
constitution of Tirnova. Let us forget what passed during 

1 For the scenes which then occurred, see Le Prince Alexandre de 
Battenberg en Bulgarie, by A. G. Drandar, pp. 169 et seq.; also 
A. Koch, Fiirst Alexander von Bulgarien, pp. 144-147. 

For the secret aims of Russia, see Docu-mens secrets de la Politique s/ 
russe en Orient, by R. Leonoff (Berlin, 1893), pp. 49-65. General 
Soboleff, Der erste Fiirst von Bulgarien (Leipzig, 1896), has given a 
highly coloured Russian account of all these incidents. 



3o6 The European Nations 

the coup d'etat [of 1881], and work together for the pros- 
perity of the country." He embraced him; and that em- 
brace was the pledge of a close union of hearts between him 
and his people.^ 

The Czar forthwith showed his anger at this act of inde- 
pendence, and, counting it a sign of defiance, allowed or 
encouraged his agents in Bulgaria to undermine the power 
of the Prince, and procure his deposition. For two years 

V they struggled in vain. An attempt by the Russian 
Generals Soboleff and Kaulbars to kidnap the Prince by 
night failed, owing to the loyalty of Lieutenant Martinoff, 
then on duty at his palace; the two ministerial plotters 
forthwith left Bulgaria.^ 

Even now the scales did not fall from the eyes of the 
Emperor Alexander III. Bismarck was once questioned 
by the faithful Busch as to the character of that potentate. 

j The German Boswell remarked that he had heard Alex- 
ander III. described as "stupid, exceedingly stupid"; 
whereupon the Chancellor replied: "In a general way that 
is saying too much." ^ Leaving to posterity the- task of 
deciding that question, we may here point out that Mus- 
covite policy in the years 1878-85 achieved a truly re- '■^ 
markable feat in uniting all the liberated races of the 
Balkan Peninsula against their liberators. By the terms • 
of the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia had alienated the 
Roumanians, Servians, and Greeks; so that when the 

' See Laveleye's The Balkan Peninsula, pp. 259-262, for an ac- 
count of Karaveloff. 

2 J. G. C. Minchin, The Growth of Freedom in the Balkan Penin- 
sula (1886), p. 237. The author, Consui-General for Servia in 
London, had earlier contributed many articles to the Times and 
Morning Advertiser on Balkan affairs. 

i Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, by Dr. M. Busch 
(Note of January 5, 1886), iii., p. 150 (English edition). 



The Making of Bulgaria ^oy 

Princes of those two Slav Principalities decided to take the 
kingly title (as they did in the spring of 1881 and 1882 
respectively), it was after visits to Berlin and Vienna, 
whereby they tacitly signified their friendliness to the 
Central Powers. 

In the case of Sen,aa this went to the length of alliance. 
On June 25, 1881, the Foreign Minister, M. Mijatovich, 
concluded with Austria-Hungary a secret convention, 
whereb}^ vServda agreed to discourage any movement among 
the Slavs of Bosnia, while the Dual Monarchy promised to 
refrain from any action detrimental to vServian hopes for 
what is known as Old Servia. The agreement was for 
eight years; but it was not renewed in i88g.^ The fact, 
however, that such a compact could be framed within 
three years of the Berlin Congress, shows how keen was 
the resentment of the Servian Government at the neg- 
lect of its interests by Russia, both there and at San 
Stefano. 

The gulf between Bulgaria and Russia widened more 
slowly, but with the striking sequel that will be seen. 
The Dondukoffs, Soboleffs, and Kaulbars first awakened 
and then estranged the formerly passive and docile race 
for whose aggrandisement Russia had incurred the re- 
sentment of the neighbouring peoples. Under Muscovite 
tutelage the "ignorant Bulgarian peasants" were develop- 
ing a strong civic and political instinct. Further, the 
Czar's attacks, now on the Prince, and then on the popular 
party, ser\^ed to bind these formerly discordant elements 
into an alliance. Stambuloff, the xerj embodiraent of 
young Bulgaria in tenacity of purpose and love of freedom, 

1 The treaty has not been published ; for this general description 
of it I am indebted to the kindness of M. Mijatovich himself. 



3o8 The European Nations 

was now the President of the Sobranje, or National As- 
sembly, and he warmly supported Prince Alexander so 
long as he withstood Russian pretensions. At the outset 
the strifes at Sophia had resembled a triangular duel, and 
the Russian agents could readily have' disposed of the third 
combatant had they sided either with the Prince or with 
the liberals. By browbeating both they simplified the 
situation to the benefit both of the Prince and of the 
nascent liberties of Bulgaria. 

Alexander III. and his Chancellor, de Giers, had also tied 
their hands in Balkan affairs by a treaty which they 
framed with Austria and Germany, and signed and rati- 
fied at the meeting of the three Emperors at Skiernewice 
(September, 1884 — see Chapter XII.). The most import- 
ant of its provisions from our present standpoint was that 
by which, in the event of two of the three Empires dis- 
agreeing on Balkan questions, the casting vote rested with 
the third Power. This gave to Bismarck the same role of 
arbiter which he had played at the Berlin Congress. 

But in the years 1885 and 1886, the Czar and his agents 
committed a series of blunders, by the side of which their 
earlier actions seemed statesmanlike. The welfare of the 
Bulgarian people demanded an early reversal of the policy 
decided on at the Congress of Berlin (1878), whereby the 
southern Bulgarians were divided from their northern 
brethren in order that the Sultan might have the right to 
hold the Balkan passes in time of war. That is to say, the 
Powers, especially Great Britain and Austria, set aside the 
claims of a strong racial instinct for purely military reasons.] 
The breakdown of this artificial arrangement was con- 
fidently predicted at the time; and Russian agents at first 
took the lead in preparing for the future union. Skobeleff , 



The Making of Bulgaria 309 

Katkoff, and the Panslavonic societies of Russia encour- 
aged the formation of "gymnastic societies" in Eastern 
RoumeHa, and the youth of that province enrolled them- 
selves with such ardour that by the year 1885 more than 
40,000 were trained to the use of arms. As for the protests 
of the Sultan and those of his delegates at Philippopolis, 
they were stilled by hints from St. Petersburg, or by de- 
mands for the prompt payment of Turkey's war debt to 
Russia. All the world knew that, thanks to Russian ' 
patronage, Eastern Roumelia had slipped entirely from 
the control of Abdul Hamid. , ' 

By the summer of 1885, the unionist movement had 
acquired great strength. But now, at the critical time, 
when Russia should have led that movement, she let it 
drift, or even, we may say, cast off the tow-rope. Prob- 
ably the Czar and his Ministers looked on the Bulgarians 
as too weak or too stupid to act for themselves. It was a 
complete miscalculation ; for now Stambuloff and Karave- 
lofE had made that aim their own, and brought to its ac- 
complishment all the skill and zeal which they had learned 
in a long career of resistance to Turkish and Russian 
masters. There is reason to think that they and their 
coadjutors at Philippopolis pressed on events in the month 
of September, 1885, because the Czar was then known to 
disapprove any immediate action. 

In order to understand the reason for this strange re- 
versal of Russia's policy, we must scrutinise events more 
closely. The secret workings of that policy have been 
laid bare in a series of State documents, the genuineness 
of which is not altogether established. They are said 
to have been betrayed to the Bulgarian patriots by a 
Russian agent, and they certainly bear signs of authen- 



3IO The European Nations 

ticity. If we accept them (and up to the present they 
have been accepted by well-informed men) the truth is as 
follows : 
/ Russia would have worked hard for the union of Eastern 
Roumelia to Bulgaria, provided that the Prince abdicated 
and his people submitted completely to Russian control. 
Quite early in his reign Alexander III. discovered in them 
an independence which his masterful nature ill brooked. 
He therefore postponed that scheme until the Prince 
should abdicate or be driven out. As one of the Muscovite 
agents phrased it in the spring of 1881, the union must not 
be brought about until a Russian protectorate should be 
founded in the Principality; for if they made Bulgaria 
too strong, it would become "a second Roumania," that 
is, as "ungrateful" to Russia as Roumania had shown 
herself after the seizure of her Bessarabian lands. In 
fact, the Bulgarians could gain the wish of their hearts 
only on one condition, that of proclaiming the Em- 
peror Alexander Grand Duke of the greater State of the 
future.^ 

The chief obstacles in the way of Russia's aggrandise- 
ment were the susceptibilities of "the Battenberger," as 
her agents impertinently named him, and the will of 
Stambuloff. When the Czar, by his malevolent obstinacy^ 
finally brought these two men to accord, it was deemed 
needful to adopt various devices in order to shatter the 
forces which Russian diplomacy had succeeded in piling 

• Documents secrets de la Politique russe en Orient, ed. by R. Leon- 
off (Berlin, 1893), pp. 8, 48. This work is named by M. Malet in 
his Bibliographic on the Eastern Question on p. 446, vol. ix., of the 
Histoire Generale of MM. Lavisse and Rambaud. I have been 
assured of its genuineness by a gentleman well versed in the politics 
of the Balkan States. 



The Making of Bulgaria 311 

up in its own path. But here again we are reminded of 
the Horatian precept — 

Vis consili expers mole ruit sua. 

To the hectorings of Russian agents the "peasant State" 
offered an ever firmer resistance, and by the summer of 
1885 it was clear that bribery and bullying were equally 
futile. 

Of course the Emperor of all the Russias had it in his 
power to harry the Prince in many ways. Thus in the 
summer of 1885, when a marriage was being arranged be-, 
tween him and the Princess Victoria, daughter of the 
Crown Princess of Germany, the Czar's influence at Berlin 
availed to veto an engagement which is believed to have 
been the heartfelt wish of both the persons most nearly 
concerned. In this matter Bismarck, true to his policy of 
softening the Czar's annoyance at the Austro-German 
alliance by complaisance in all other matters, made him- 
self Russia's henchman, and urged his press-trumpet, 
Busch, to write newspaper articles abusing Queen Victoria I 
as having instigated this match solely with a view to the 1 
substitution of British for Russian influence in Bulgaria. ^ 
The more servile part of the German press improved on 
these suggestions, and stigmatised the Bulgarian Revolu- 
tion of the ensuing autumn as an affair trumped up at 
London. So far is it possible for minds of a certain type 
to read their own pettiness into events. 

• For Bismarck's action and that of the Emperor William I. in 
1885, see Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, by M. Busch, 
iii., pp. 171, 180, 292, also p. 335. Russian agents came to Stam- 
buloff in the summer of 1885 to say that "Prince Alexander must 
be got rid of before he can ally himself with the German family 
regnant." Stambuloff informed the Prince of this. See Stam- 
buloff, by A. H. Beaman, p. 52. 



S^ 



3^2 The European Nations 

Meanwhile, if we may credit the despatches above re- 
' f erred to, the Russian Government was seeking to drag 
Bulgaria into fratricidal strife with Roumania over some 
trifling disputes about the new border near Silistria. That 
quarrel, if well managed, promised to be materially ad- 
vantageous to Russia and mentally soothing to her ruler. 
It would weaken the Danubian States and help to bring 
them back to the heel of their former protector. Further, 
seeing that the behaviour of King Charles to his Russian 
benefactors was no less "ungrateful" than that of Prince 
Alexander, it would be a fit Nemesis for these ingrats to be 
set by the ears. Accordingly, in the month of August, 
1885, orders were issued to Russian agents to fan the bor- 
der dispute; and on August 12/30 the Director of the 
Asiatic Department at St. Petersburg wrote the following 
instructions to the Russian Consul-General at Rustchuk: 
/ "You remember that the union [of the two Bulgarias] 
must not take place until after the abdication of Prince 
Alexander. However, the ill-advised and hostile attitude 
of King Charles of Roumania [to Russia] obliges the im- 
perial government to postpone for some time the projected 
union of Eastern Roumelia to the Principality, as well as 
the abdication and expulsion of the Prince of Bulgaria. In 
the session of the Council of [Russian] Ministers held yes- 
terday it was decided to beg the Emperor to call Prince 
Alexander to Copenhagen or to St. Petersburg in order to 
inform him that, according to the will of His Majesty, 
Bulgaria must defend by armed force her rights over 
the points hereinbefore mentioned." ^ 

I The despatch then states that Russia will keep Turkey 

'quiet and will eventually make war on Roumania; also, 

» R. Leonoff, op. cit., pp. 81-84. 



The Making of Bulgaria 313 

that if Bulgaria triumphs over Roumania, the latter will 
pay her in territory or money, or in both. Possibly, how- 
ever, the whole scheme may have been devised to serve as 
a decoy to bring Prince Alexander within the power of his 
imperial patrons, who, in that case, would probably have 
detained and dethroned him. 

Further light was thrown on the tortuous course of 
Russian diplomacy by a speech of Count Eugen Zichy to 
the Hungarian Delegations about a year later. He made" 
the startling declaration that in the summer of 1885 Russia 
concluded a treaty with Montenegro with the aim of de- 
throning King Milan and Prince Alexander, and the divi- 
sion of the Balkan States between Prince Nicholas of 
Montenegro and. the Karageorgevich Pretender who has 
since made his way to the throne at Belgrade. The details 
of these schemes are not known, but the searchlight thrown 
upon them from Buda-Pesth revealed the shifts of the 
policy of those "friends of peace," the Czar Alexander III. 
and his Chancellor, de Giers. 

Prince Alexander may not have been aware of these 
schemes in their full extent, but he and his friends certainly 
felt the meshes closing around them. There were only two 
courses open, either completely to submit to the Czar 
(which, for the Prince, implied abdication) or to rely on 
the Bulgarian people. The Prince took the course which 
would have been taken by every man worthy of the name. 
It is, however, almost certain that he did not foresee the 
events at Philippopolis. He gave his word to a German 
officer, Major von Huhn, that he had not in the least degree 
expected the unionist movement to take so speedy and 
decisive a step forward as it did in the middle of September. 
The Prince, in fact, had been on a tour throughout Europe, 



314 The European Nations 

and expressed the same opinion to the Russian Chancellor, 
de Giers, at Franzensbad. 

But by this time everything was ready at Philippopolis. 
As the men of Eastern Roumelia were all of one mind in 
this matter, it was the easiest of tasks to surprise the Sul- 
tan's representative, Gavril Pasha, to surround his office 
with soldiers, and to request him to leave the province 
(September i8). A carriage was ready to conduct him 
towards Sophia. In it sat a gaily dressed peasant girl hold- 
ing a drawn sword. Gavril turned red with rage at this 
insult, but he mounted the vehicle, and was driven through 
the town and thence towards the Balkans. 

Such was the departure of the last official of the Sultan 
from the land which the Turks had often drenched with 
blood; such was the revenge of the southern Bulgarians 
for the atrocities of 1876. Not a drop of blood was shed; 
and Major von Huhn, who soon arrived at Philippopolis, 
found Greeks and Turks living contentedly under the new 
government. The word "revolution" is in such cases a 
misnomer. South Bulgaria merely returned to its natural 
state. ^ But nothing will convince diplomatists that 
events can happen without the pulling of wires by them- 
selves or their rivals. In this instance they found that 
Prince Alexander had made the revolution. 

At first, however, the Prince doubted whether he should 
accept the crown of a Greater Bulgaria which the men of 
Philippopolis now enthusiastically offered to him. Stam- 
buloff strongly urged him to accept, even if he thereby 
still further enraged the Czar: "Sire," he said, "two roads ^ 

1 The Struggle of the Bulgarians for National Independence, by 
Major A. von Huhn, chap. ii. See, too, Pari. Papers, Turkey,, No. i 
(1886), p. 83. 



The Making of Bulgaria 3 ' 5 

lie before you : the one to Philippopolis and as far beyond 
as God may lead; the other to Sistova and Darmstadt. 
I counsel you to take the crown the nation offers you." 
On the 2oth the Prince announced his acceptance of the 
crown of a united Bulgaria. As he said to the British 
Consul at Philippopolis, he would have been a "sharper" 
(filou) not to side with his people. ^ 

Few persons were prepared for the outburst of wrath 
of the Czar at hearing this news. Early in his reign he 
had concerrtrated into a single phrase — "silly Pole" — -the 
spleen of an essentially narrow nature at seeing a kinsman 
and a dependant dare to think and act for himself.^ But 
on this occasion, as we can now see, the Prince had marred 
Russia's plans in the most serious way. Stambuloff and 
he had deprived her of her unionist trump card. The Czar 
found his project of becoming Grand Duke of a Greater 
Bulgaria blocked by the action of this same hated kinsman. 
Is it surprising that his usual stohdity gave way to one of 
those fits of bull-like fury which aroused the fear of all who 
beheld them? Thenceforth between the Emperor Alex- 
ander and Prince Alexander the relations might be char- 
acterised by the curt phrase which Palafox hurled at the 
^French from the weak walls of Saragossa — "War to the 
knife." Like Palafox, the Prince now had no hope but in 
the bravery of his people. 

In the ciphered telegrams of September 19th and 20th, 
which the Director of the Asiatic Department at St. 
Petersburg sent to the Russian Consul-General at Rust- 
chuk, the note of resentment and revenge was clearly 

' Stambuloff, by A. H. Beaman, chap, iii.; Pari. Papers, ibid., 
p. 81. 

2 Bismarck: Reflections and Reminiscences, ii., p. 116 (Eng. ed.). 



3i6 The European Nations 

sounded. The events in Eastern Roumelia had changed 
"all our intentions." The agent was therefore directed 
to summon the chief Russian officers in Bulgaria and 
ask them whether the "young" Bulgarian officers could 
really command brigades and regiments, and organise the 
artillery; also whether that army could alone meet the 
army of "a neighbouring State." The replies of the 
officers being decidedly in the negative, they were ordered 
to leave Bulgaria.^ Nelidoff, the Russian ambassador at 
Constantinople, also worked furiously to spur on the Sultan 
to revenge the insult inflicted on him by Prince Alexander. 

Sir William White believed that the volte face in Russian 
policy was due solely to Nelidoff's desire to thwart the 
peaceful policy of the Russian Chancellor, de Giers, who at 
that time chanced to be absent in Tyrol, while the Czar 
also was away at Copenhagen. 2 But it now appears that 
the Russian Foreign Office took Nelidoff's view, and bade 
him press Turkey to restore the "legal order" of things in 
Eastern Roumelia. Further, the Ministers of the Czar 
found that Servia, Greece, and perhaps also Roumania, 
intended to oppose the aggrandisement of Bulgaria; and 
it therefore seemed easy to chastise "the Battenberger" 
for his wanton disturbance of the peace of Europe. 

Possibly Russia would herself have struck at Bulgaria 
but for the difficulties of the general situation. How great 
these were will be realised by a perusal of the following 
chapters, which deal with the spread of Nihilism in Russia, 
the formation of the Austro-German alliance, and the 
favour soon shown to it by Italy, the estrangement of 

< R. Leonofif, op. cit., Nos. 75, 77. 

2 Sir William White: Memoirs and Correspondence, by H. Suther- 
land Edwards, pp. 231-232. 



The Making of Bulgaria 317 

England and the Porte owing to the action taken by the 
former in Egypt, and the sharp colhsion of interests be- 
tween Russia and England at Panjdeh on the Afghan 
frontier. When it is further remembered that France 
fretted at the untoward results of M. Ferry's forward 
policy in Tonquin; that Germany was deeply engaged in 
colonial efforts; and that the United Kingdom was dis- 
tracted by those efforts, by the failure of the expedition to 
Khartum, and by the Parnellite agitation in Ireland- — ^the 
complexity of the European situation will be sufficiently 
evident. Assuredly the events of the year 1885 were 
among the most distracting ever recorded in the history of 
Europe. 

This clash of interests among nations wearied by war, 
and alarmed at the apparition of the red spectre of revolu- 
tion in their midst, told by no means unfavourably on the 
fortunes of the Balkan States. The dominant facts of the 
situation were, firstly, that Russia no longer had a free 
hand in the Balkan Peninsula in face of the compact be- 
tween the three Emperors ratified at Skiernewice in the 
previous autumn (see Chapter XII.); and, secondly, that 
the traditional friendship between England and the Porte 
had been replaced by something like hostility. Seeing 
that the Sultan had estranged the British Government by 
his very suspicious action during the revolts of Arabi Pasha 
and of the Mahdi, even those who had loudly proclaimed 
the need of propping up his authority as essential to the 
stability of our Eastern Empire now began to revise their 
prejudices. 

Thus, when Lord Salisbury came to office, if not pre- 
cisely to pov/er, in June, 1885, he found affairs in the East 
rapidly ripening for a change of British policy — -a change 



3i8 The European Nations 

which is known to have corresponded with his own con- 
victions. Finally, the marriage of Princess Beatrice to 
Prince Henry of Battenberg, on July 23, 1885, added that 
touch of personal interest which enabled Court circles to 
break with the traditions of the past and to face the new 
situation with equanimity. Accordingly the power of 
Britain, which in 1876-78 had been used to thwart the 
growth of freedom in the Balkan Peninsula, was now put 
forth to safeguard the union of Bulgaria. During these 
critical months Sir William White acted as ambassador at 
Constantinople, and used his great knowledge of the Bal- 
kan peoples with telling effect for this salutary purpose. 

Lord Salisbury advised the Sultan not to send troops 
into Southern Bulgaria; and the warning chimed in with 
the note of timorous cunning which formed the undertone 
of that monarch's thought and policy. Distracted by the 
news of the warlike preparations of Servia and Greece 
Abdul Hamid looked on Russia's advice in a contrary 
sense as a piece of Muscovite treachery. About the same 
time, too, there were rumours of palace plots at Con- 
stantinople; and the capricious recluse of Yildiz finally 
decided to keep his best troops near at hand. It appears, 
then, that Nihilism in Russia and the spectre of con- 
spiracy always haunting the brain of Abdul Hamid played 
their part in assuring the liberties of Bulgaria. 

Meanwhile the Powers directed their ambassadors at 
Constantinople to hold a preliminary Conference at which 
Turkey would be represented. The result was a declara- 
tion expressing formal disapproval of the violation of the 
Treaty of Berlin, and a hope that all parties concerned 
would keep the peace. This mild protest very inade- 
quately reflected the character of the discussions which 



The Making of Bulgaria 319 

had been going on between the several Courts. Russia, it 
is known, wished to fasten the blame for the revolution on 
Prince Alexander; but all public censure was vetoed by 
England. 

Probably her action was as effective in still weightier 
matters. A formal Conference of the ambassadors of the 
Powers met at Constantinople on November 5th ; and there 
again Sir William White, acting on instructions from 
Lord Salisbury, defended the Bulgarian cause, and sought 
to bring about a friendly understanding between the Porte 
and "a people occupying so important a position in the 
Sultan's dominions." Lord Salisbury also warned the 
Turkish ambassador in London that if Turkey sought to 
expel Prince Alexander from Eastern Roumelia, she 
would "be making herself the instrument of those who 
desired the fall of the Ottoman Empire." ^ 

This reference to the insidious means used by Russia for 
bringing the Turks to a state of tutelage, as a preliminary 
to partition, was an effective reminder of the humiliations 
which they had undergone at the hands of Russia by the 
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833). France also showed no 
disposition to join the Russian and Austrian demand that 
the Sultan should at once re-establish the status quo; and 
by degrees the more intelligent Turks came to see that a 
strong Bulgaria, independent of Russian control, might be 
an additional safeguard against the Colossus of the North. 
Russia's insistence on the exact fulfilment of the Treaty 

1 Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. i (1886), pp. 214-215. See, too, 
ibid., pp. igy et seq. for Lord Salisbury's instructions to Sir William 
White for the Conference. In view of them it is needless to waste 
space in refuting the arguments of the Russophil A. G. Grandar, 
op. cit., p. 147, that England sought to make war between the 
Balkan States. 



320 The European Nations 

of Berlin helped to open their eyes, and lent force to Sir 
William White's arguments as to the need of strengthening 
that treaty by "introducing into it a timely improvement." ^ 

Owing to the opposition offered by Great Britain, and to 
some extent by France, to the proposed restoration of the 
old order of things in Eastern Roumelia, the Conference 
came to an end at the close of November, the three Im- 
perial Powers blaming Sir William White for his obstruc- 
tive tactics. The charges will not bear examination, but 
they show the irritation of those Governments at England's 
championship of the Bulgarian cause.^ The Bulgarians 
always remember the names of Lord Salisbury and Sir 
William White as those of friends in need. 

In the main, however, the consolidation of Bulgaria was 
achieved by her own stalwart sons. While the Imperial 
Powers were proposing to put back the hands of the clock, 
an alarum sounded forth, proclaiming the advent of a new 
era in the history of the Balkan peoples. The action which 
brought about this change was startling alike in its incep- 
tion, in the accompanying incidents, and still more in its 
results. 

Where Abdul Hamid forebore to enter, even as the 
mandatory of the Continental Courts, there Milan of Servia 
rushed in. As an excuse for his aggression, the kinglet of 
Belgrade alleged the harm done to Servian trade by a 
recent revision of the Bulgarian tariff. But the Powers 
assessed this complaint and others at their due value, and 
saw in his action merely the desire to seize a part of Western 
Bulgaria as a set-off to the recent growth of that Princi- 



1 Pari. Papers, Turkey No. i (1886), pp. 273-274, 288, for Rus- 
sia's policy; p. 284 for Sir W. White's argument. 

2 Ibid., pp. 370-372. 



The Making of Bulgaria 321 

pality. On all sides his action in declaring war against 
Prince Alexander (November 14th) met with reprobation, 
even on the part of his guide and friend, Austria. A recent 
report of the Hungarian Committee on Foreign Affairs con- 
tained a recommendation which implied that he ought to 
receive compensation ; and this seemed to show the wish of 
the more active part of the Dual Monarchy peacefully but 
effectively to champion his cause. ^ 

Nevertheless, the King decided to carve out his fortunes 
by his own sword. He had some grounds for confidence. 
If a Bulgarian fait accompli could win tacit recognition 
from the Powers, why should not a Servian triumph over 
Bulgaria force their hands once more ? Prince Alexander 
was unsafe on his throne'; thanks to the action of Russia 
his troops had very few experienced officers; and in view 
of the Sultan's resentment his southern border could not 
be denuded of troops. Never did a case seem more des- 
perate than that of the "peasant State," deserted and 
flouted by Russia, disliked by the Sultan, on bad terms 
with Roumania, and publicly lectured by the Continental 
Powers for her irregular conduct. Servia's triumph seemed 
assured. 

But now there came forth one more proof of the vitalis- 
ing force of the national principle. In seven years the 
down-trodden peasants of Bulgaria had become men, and 
now astonished the world by their prowess. The with- 
drawal of the Russian officers left half of the captaincies 
vacant; but they were promptly filled up by enthusiastic 
young lieutenants. Owing to the blowing up of the line 
from Philippopolis to Adrianople, only five locomotives 
were available for carrying back northwards the troops 
» Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. i (1886), p. 250. 



322 The European Nations 

which had hitherto been massed on the southern border; 
and these five were already overstrained. Yet the en- 
gineers now worked them still harder and they did not 
break down.i The hardy peasants tramped impossibly 
long distances in their longing to meet the Servians. The 
arrangements were carried through with a success which 
seems miraculous in an inexperienced race. The ex- 
planation was afterwards rightly discerned by an English 
visitor to Bulgaria. "This is the secret of Bulgarian in- 
dependence — everybody is in grim earnest. The Bul- 
garians do not care about amusements." ^ In that remark 
there is food for thought. Inefficiency has no place among 
a people that looks to the welfare of the State as all in all. 
Breakdowns occur when men think more about "sport" 
and pleasure than about doing their utmost for their 
country. 

The results of this grim earnestness were to astonish the 
world. The Servians at first gained some successes in 
front of Widdin and Slivnitza; but the defenders of the 
latter place (an all-important position northwest of Sophia) 
hurried up all possible forces. Two Bulgarian regiments 
are said to have marched 123 kilometres in thirty hours in 
order to defend that military outwork of their capital; 
while others, worn out with marching, rode forward on 
horseback, two men to each horse, and then threw them- 
selves into the fight. The Bulgarian artillery was well 
served, and proved to be very superior to that of the 
Servians. 

Thus, on the first two days of conflict at Slivnitza, the 
defenders beat back the Servians with some loss. On the 

1 A. von Huhn, op. cit., p. 105. 

2 E. A. B. Hodgetts, Round about Armenia, p. 7. 



The Making of Bulgaria 323 

third day (November 19th), after receiving reinforcements, 
they took the offensive, with surprising vigour. A talented 
young ofificer, Bendereff , led their right wing, with bands 
playing and colours flying, to storm the hillsides that 
dominated the Servian position. The hardy peasants 
scaled the hills and delivered the final bayonet charge so 
furiously that there and on all sides the invaders fled in 
wild panic, and scarcely halted until they reached their 
own frontier. 

Thenceforth King Milan had hard work to keep his n;ien 
together. Many of them were raw troops; their ammu- 
nition was nearly exhausted; and their morale had van- 
ished utterly. Prince Alexander had little difficulty in 
thrusting them forth from Pirot, and seemed to have 
before him a clear road to Belgrade, when suddenly he was 
brought to a halt by a menace from the north. ^ 

A special envoy sent by the Hapsburgs, Count Kheven- 
huller, came in haste to the headquarters of the Prince on 
November 28th, and in imperious terms bade him grant an 
armistice to Servia, otherwise Austrian troops would forth- 
with cross the frontier to her assistance. Before this 
threat Alexander gave way, and was blamed by some of 
his people for this act of complaisance. But assuredly he 
could not well have acted otherwise. The three Emperors, 
of late acting in accord in Balkan questions, had it in their 
power to crush him by launching the Turks against Philip- 
popolis, or their own troops against Sophia. He had satis- 
fied the claims of honour; he had punished Servia for her 
peevish and unsisterly jealously. Under his lead the 
Bulgarians had covered themselves with glory and had 

1 Drandar, Evenements politiques en Bulgarie, pp. 89-116; von 
Huhn, op. cit., chaps, x., xi. 



324 The European Nations 

leaped at a bound from political youth to manhood. Why 
should he risk their new-found unity merely in order to 
abase Servia? The Prince never acted more prudently 
than when he decided not to bring into the field the Power 
which, as he believed, had pushed on Servia to war.^ 

Had he known that the Russian Chancellor, de Giers, on 
hearing of Austria's threat to Bulgaria, informed the Court 
of Vienna of the Czar's condign displeasure if that threat 
were carried into effect, perhaps he would have played a 
grand game, advancing on Belgrade, dethroning the al- 
ready unpopular King Milan, and offering to the Czar the 
headship of a united Servo-Bulgarian State. He might 
thus have appeased that sovereign, but at the cost of a 
European war. Whether from lack of information, or from 
a sense of prudence and humanity, the Prince held back 
and decided for peace with Servia. Despite many diffi- 
culties thrown in the way by King Milan, this was the 
upshot of the ensuing negotiations. The two States 
finally came to terms by the Treaty of Bukharest, where, 
thanks to the good sense of the negotiators and the efforts 
of Turkey to compose these strifes, peace was assured on 
the basis of the status quo ante helium (March 3, 1886). 

Already the Porte had manifested its good-will towards 
Bulgaria in the most signal manner. This complete re- 
versal of policy may be assigned to several causes. Firstly, 
Prince Alexander, on marching against the Servians, had 
very tactfully proclaimed that he did so on behalf of the 
existing order of things, which they were bent on over- 
throwing. His actions having corresponded to his words, 
the Porte gradually came to see in him a potent defender 
against Russia. This change in the attitude of the Sultan 
' Drandar, op. cit., chap. iii. ; Kuhn, op. cit., chap, xviii. 



The Making of Bulgaria 325 

was undoubtedly helped on by the arguments of Lord 
Salisbury to the Turkish ambassador at London. He 
summarised the whole case for a recognition of the union 
of the two Bulgarias in the following remarks (December 
23, 1885): 

"Every week's experience showed that the Porte had 
little to dread from the subserviency of Bulgaria to foreign 
influence, if only Bulgaria were allowed enjoyment of her 
unanimous desires, and the Porte did not gratuitously 
place itself in opposition to the general feeling of the people. 
A Bulgaria friendly to the Porte, and jealous of foreign 
influence, would be a far surer bulwark against foreign 
aggression than two Bulgarias, severed in administration, 
but united in considering the Porte as the only obstacle to 
their national development." ^ 

Events served to reveal the soundness of this statesman- 
like pronouncement. At the close of the year Prince 
Alexander returned from the front to Sophia and received 
an overwhelming ovation as the champion of Bulgarian 
liberties. Further, he now found no difficulty in coming 
to an understanding with the Turkish Commissioners sent 
to investigate the state of opinion in Southern Bulgaria. 
Most significant of all was the wrath of the Czar at the 
sight of his popularity, and the utter collapse of the Russian 
party at Sophia. 

Meanwhile the Powers found themselves obliged little by 
little to abandon their pedantic resolve to restore the 
Treaty of Berlin. Sir Robert Morier, British ambassador 
at St. Petersburg, in a letter of December 27, 1885, to Sir 
William White, thus commented on the causes that as- 
sured success to the Bulgarian cause: 

» Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. i (1886), p. 424. 



326 The European Nations 

"The very great prudence shown by Lord Sahsbury, 
and the consummate abihty with which you played your 
part, have made it a successful game ; but the one crowning 
good fortune, which we mainly owe to the incalculable 
folly of the Servian attack, has been that Prince Alex- 
ander's generalship and the fighting capacities of his 
soldiers have placed our rival action [his own and that of 
Sir W. White] in perfect harmony with the crushing logic 
of fact. The rivalry is thus completely swamped in the 
bit of cosmic work so successfully accomplished. A State 
has been evolved out of the protoplasm of Balkan chaos." 

Sir Robert Morier finally stated that if Sir William 
White succeeded in building up an independent Bulgaria 
friendly to Roumania, he would have achieved the greatest 
feat of diplomacy since Sir James Hudson's statesmanlike 
moves at Turin in the critical months of 1859-60 gained 
for England a more influential position in Italy than France 
had secured by her aid in the campaign of Solferino. The 
praise is over-strained, inasmuch as it leaves out of count 
the statecraft of Bismarck in the years 1863-64 and 
1869-70; but certainly among the peaceful triumphs of 
recent years that of Sir William White must rank very 
high. 

If, however, we examine the inner cause of the success of 
the diplomacy of Hudson and White we must assign it in 
part to the mistakes of the liberating Powers, France and 
Russia. Napoleon III., by requiring the cession of Savoy 
and Nice, and by revealing his design to Gallicise the 
Italian Peninsula, speedily succeeded in alienating the 
Italians. The action of Russia in compelling Bulgaria to 
give up the Dobrudscha, as an equivalent to the part of 
Bessarabia which she took from Roumania, also strained 



The Making of Bulgaria 327 

the sense of gratitude of those peoples; and the conduct 
of Muscovite agents in Bulgaria provoked in that Princi- 
pality feelings bitterer than those which the Italians felt 
at the loss of Savoy and Nice. So true is it that in public 
as in private life the manner in which a wrong is inflicted 
counts for more than the wrong itself. It was on this sense 
of resentment (misnamed "ingratitude" by the "libera- 
tors") that British diplomacy worked with telling effect 
in both cases. It conferred on the "liberated" substantial 
benefits: but their worth was doubled by the contrast 
which they offered to the losses or the irritation consequent 
on the actions of Napoleon III. and of Alexander III. 

To the present writer it seems that the great achieve- 
ments of Sir William White were, first, that he kept the 
Sultan quiet (a course, be it remarked, from which that 
nervous recluse was never averse) when Nelidoff sought to 
hound him on against Bulgaria; and, still more, that he 
helped to bring about a good understanding between Con- ; 
stantinople and Sophia. In view of the hatred which Abdul 
Hamid bore to England after her intervention in Egypt in 
1882, this was certainly a great diplomatic achievement; 
but possibly Abdul Hamid hoped to reap advantages on 
the Nile from his complaisance to British policy in the 
Balkans. 

The outcome of it all was the framing of a Turco-Bul- 
garian Convention (February i, 1886) whereby the Porte 
recognised Prince Alexander as Governor of Eastern 
Roumelia for a term of five years; a few border districts 
in Rhodope, inhabited by Moslems, were ceded to the 
Sultan, and (wonder of wonders!) Turkey and Bulgaria 
concluded an offensive and defensive alliance. In case of 
foreign aggression on Bulgaria, Turkish troops would be 



328 The European Nations 

sent thither to be commanded by the Prince; if Turkey 
were invaded, Bulgarian troops would form part of the 
Sultan's army repelling the invader. In other respects 
the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin remained in force 
for Southern Bulgaria.^ 

On that same day, as it chanced, the Salisbury Cabinet 
resigned office, and Mr. Gladstone became Prime Minister, 
Lord Rosebery taking the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. 
This event produced little variation in Britain's Eastern 
policy, and that statement will serve to emphasise the im- 
portance of the change of attitude of the Conservative 
party towards those affairs in the years 1878-85, a change 
undoubtedly due in the main to the Marquis of Salisbury. 

In the official notes of the Earl of Rosebery there is 
manifest somewhat more complaisance to Russia, as when 
on February 12th he instructed Sir William White to ad- 
vise the Porte to modify its convention with Bulgaria by 
abandoning the stipulation as to mutual military aid. 
Doubtless this advice was sound. It coincided with the 
known opinions of the Court of Vienna; and at the same 
time Russia formally declared that she could never accept 
that condition. 2 As Germany took the same view the 
Porte agreed to expunge the obnoxious clause. The 
Government of the Czar also objected to the naming of 
Prince Alexander in the Convention. This unlooked-for 
slight naturally aroused the indignation of the Prince ; but 
as the British Government deferred to Russian views on 
this matter, the Convention was finally signed at Constan- 
tinople on April 5, 1886. The Powers, including Turkey, 
thereby recognised "the Prince of Bulgaria" (not named) 
as Governor of Eastern Roumelia for a term of five years, 

> Pari. Papers, Turkey, No. 2 (1886). 2 Ibid., pp. 96-98. 



The Making of Bulgaria 329 

and referred the "Organic Statute" of that province to 
revision by a joint Conference. 

The Prince submitted to this arrangement, provisional 
and humiliating though it was. But the insults inflicted 
by Russia bound him the more closely to his people; and 
at the united Parliament, where 182 members out of the 
total 300 supported his Ministers, he advocated measures 
that would cement the union. Bulgarian soon became the 
official language throughout South Bulgaria, to the an- 
noyance of the Greek and Turkish minorities. But the 
chief cause of unrest continued to be the intrigues of 
Russian agents. 

The anger of the Czar at the success of his hated kinsman 
showed itself in various ways. Not content with inflicting J 
every possible slight and disturbing the peace of Bulgaria 
through his agents, he even menaced Europe with war 
over that question. At Sevastopol on May 19th, he de- 
clared that circumstances might compel him "to defend 
by force of arms the dignity of the Empire" — a threat 
probably aimed at Bulgaria and Turkey. On his return 
to Moscow he received an enthusiastic welcome from the 
fervid Slavophils of the old Russian capital, the Mayor 
expressing in his address the hope that "the cross of Christ 
will soon shine on St. Sophia" at Constantinople. At the 
end of June the Russian Government repudiated the clause 
of the Treaty of Berlin constituting Batoum a free port.^ 
Despite a vigorous protest by Lord Rosebery against this 
infraction of treaty engagements, the Czar and M. de Giers 
held to their resolve, evidently by way of retort to the- 
help given from London to the union of the two Bulgarias. 

The Dual Monarchy, especially Hungary, also felt the 
1 Pari. Papers, Russia (1886), p. 828. 



330 The European Nations 

weight of Russia's displeasure in return for the sympathy 
manifested for the Prince at Pesth and Vienna; and but 
for the strength which the friendship of Germany afforded, 
that Power would almost certainly have encountered war 
from the irate potentate of the North. 

Turkey, having no champion, was in still greater danger; 
her conduct in condoning the irregularities of Prince Alex- 
ander was as odious to Alexander III. as the atrocities of 
her Bashi-bazouks ten years before had been to his more 
chivalrous sire. It is an open secret that during the 
summer of 1886 the Czar was preparing to deal a heavy- 
blow. The Sultan evaded it by adroitly shifting his 
ground and posing as a well-wisher of the Czar, whereupon 
M. Nelidoff, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, 
proposed an offensive and defensive alliance, and went to 
the length of suggesting that they should wage war against 
Austria and England in order to restore the Sultan's 
authority over Bosnia and Egypt at the expense of those 
intrusive Powers. How far negotiations went on this 
matter and why they failed is not known. The ordinary 
explanation, that the Czar forbore to draw the sword be- 
cause of his love of peace, hardly tallies with what is now 
known of his character and his diplomacy. It is more 
likely that he was appeased by the events now to be de- 
scribed, and thereafter attached less importance to a direct 
intervention in Balkan affairs. 

No greater surprise has happened in this generation than 
the kidnapping of Prince Alexander by officers of the army 
which he had lately led to victory. Yet the affair admits 
of explanation. Certain of their number nourished re- 
sentment against him for his imperfect recognition of their 



The Making of Bulgaria 331 

services during the Servian War, and for the introduction 
of German mihtary instructors at its close. Among the 
malcontents was Bendereff, the hero of Slivnitza, who, 
having been guilty of discourtesy to the Prince, was left 
unrewarded. On this discontented knot of men Russian 
intriguers fastened themselves profitably, with the result 
that one regiment at least began to waver in its allegiance. 

A military plot was held in reserve as a last resort. In 
the first place, a Russian subject, Captain Nabokoff, sought 
to simplify the situation by hiring some Montenegrin des- 
peradoes, and by seeking to murder or carry off the Prince 
as he drew near to Bourgas during a tour in Eastern Bul- 
garia. This plan came to light through the fidelity of a 
Bulgarian peasant, whereupon Nabokoff and a Montene- 
grin priest were arrested (May i8th). At once the Russian 
Consul at that seaport appeared, demanded the release of 
the conspirators, and, when this was refused, threatened 
the Bulgarian authorities if justice took its course. It is 
not without significance that the Czar's warlike speech at 
Sevastapol startled the world on the day after the arrest 
of the conspirators at Bourgas. Apparently the arrest of 
Nabokoff impelled the Czar of all the Russias to uphold the 
dignity of his Empire by hurling threats against a State 
which protected itself from conspiracy. The champion of 
order in Russia thereby figured as the abettor of plotters in 
the Balkans. 

The menaces of the Northern Power availed to defer the 
trial of the conspirators, and the affair was still undecided 
when the conspirators at Sophia played their last card. 
Bendereff was at that time acting as Minister of War, and 
found means to spread broadcast a rumour that Servia 
was arming as if for war. Sending northwards some 



332 The European Nations 

faithful troops to guard against this baseless danger, he 
left the capital at the mercy of the real enemy. 

On August 2ist, when all was ready, the Struma Regi- 
ment hastily marched back by night to Sophia, disarmed 
the few faithful troops there in garrison, surrounded the 
palace of the Prince, while the ringleaders burst into his 
bedchamber. He succeeded in fleeing through a corridor 
which led to the garden, only to be met with levelled 
bayonets and cries of hatred. The leaders thrust him into 
a corner, tore a sheet out of the visitors' book which lay on 
a table close by, and on it hastily scrawled words implying 
abdication; the Prince added his signature, along with the 
prayer, "God save Bulgaria." At dawn the mutineers 
forced him into a carriage, Bendereff and his accomplices 
crowding round to dismiss him with jeers and screen him 
from the sight of the public. Thence he was driven at the 
utmost speed through byways towards the Danube. There 
the conspirators had in readiness his own yacht, which they 
had seized, and carried him down the stream towards 
Russian territory. 

The outburst of indignation with which the civilised 
world heard of this foul deed had its counterpart in Bul- 
garia. So general and so keen was the reprobation (save 
in the Russian and Bismarckian press) that the Russian 
Government took some steps to dissociate itself from the 
plot, while profiting by its results. On August 24th, when 
the Prince was put on shore at Reni, the Russian author- 
ities kept him under guard, and that, too, despite an order 
of the Czar empowering him to "continue his journey ex- 
actly as he might please." Far from this, he was detained 
for some little time, and then was suffered to depart by 
train only in a northerly direction. He ultimately en- 



The Making of Bulgaria 33s 

tered Austrian territory by way of Lemberg in Galicia, on 
August 27th. The aim of the St. Petersburg Government 
evidently was to give full time for the conspirators at 
Sophia to consolidate their power.^ 

Meanwhile, by military display, the distribution of 
money, and a Te Deum at the Cathedral for "liberation 
from Prince Battenberg," the mutineers sought to per- 
suade the men of Sophia that peace and prosperity would 
infallibly result from the returning favour of the Czar. 
The populace accepted the first tokens of his good-will and 
awaited developments. These were not promising for the 
mutineers. The British Consul at Philippopolis, Captain 
Jones, on hearing of the affair, hurried to the commander 
of the garrison, General Mutkuroff, and besought him to 
crush the plotters.^ The General speedily enlisted his own 
troops and those in garrison elsewhere on the side of the 
Prince, with the result that a large part of the army refused 
to take the oath of allegiance to the new Russophil Minis- 
try, composed of trimmers like Bishop Clement and Zan- 
koff. Karaveloff also cast in his influence against them. 

Above all, Stambuloff worked furiously for the Prince; 
and when a mitred Vicar of Bray held the seals of office 
and enjoyed the official counsels of traitors and place- 
hunters, not all the prayers of the Greek Church and the 
gold of Russian agents could long avail to support the 
Government against the attacks of that strong-willed, 
clean-handed patriot. Shame at the disgrace thus brought 
on his people doubled his powers ; and, with the aid of all 
that was best in the public life of Bulgaria, he succeeded in 

1 A. von Huhn, op. cit., chap. iv. 

2 See Mr. Minchin's account in the Morning Advertiser for Sep- 
tember 23, 1886. 



334 The European Nations 

sweeping Clement and his Comus rout back to their mum- 
meries and their underground plots. So speedy was the 
reverse of fortune that the new Provisional Government 
succeeded in thwarting the despatch of a Russian special 
Commissioner, General Dolgorukoff, through whom Alex- 
ander III. sought to bestow the promised blessings on that 
"much-tried" Principality. 

The voice of Bulgaria now made itself heard. There was 
but one cry — for the return of Prince Alexander. At once 
he consented to fulfil his people's desire; and, travelling by 
railway through Bukharest, he reached the banks .of the 
Danube and set foot on his yacht, not now a prisoner, but 
the hero of the German, Magyar, and Balkan peoples. At 
Rustchuk officers and deputies bore him ashore shoulder- 
high to the enthusiastic people. He received a welcome 
even from the Consul-General for Russia — a fact which led 
him to take a false step. Later in the day, when Stam- 
buloff was not present, he had an interview with this agent, 
and then sent a telegram to the Czar, announcing his re- 
turn, his thanks for his friendly reception by Russia's 
chief agent, and his readiness to accept the advice of 
General Dolgorukoff. The telegram ended thus: 

"I should be happy to be able to give to Your Majesty 
the definitive proof of the devotion with which I am ani- 
mated towards Your august person. The monarchical 
principle forces me to re-establish the reign of law (la 
legalite) in Bulgaria and Roumelia. Russia having given 
me my crown, I am ready to give it back into the hand of 
its Sovereign." 

To this the Czar sent the following telegraphic reply, and 
allowed it to appear at once in the official paper at St. 
Petersburg : 



The Making of Bulgaria 335 

"I have received Your Highness's telegram. I cannot 
approve your return to Bulgaria, as I foresee the sinister 
consequences that it may bring on Bulgaria, already so 
much tried. The mission of General Dolgorukoff is now 
inopportune. I shall abstain from it in the sad state of 
things to which Bulgaria is reduced so long as you remain 
there. Your Highness will understand what you have to 
do. I reserve my judgment as to what is commanded me 
by the venerated memory of my father, the interests of 
Russia, and the peace of the Orient." ^ 

What led the Prince to use the extraordinary words con- 
tained in the last sentence of his telegram can only be con- 
jectured. The substance of his conversation with the 
Russian Consul-General is not known ; and until the words 
of that official are fully explained he must be held open to 
the suspicion of having played on the Prince a diplomatic 
version of the confidence trick. Another version, that of 
M. Elie de Cyon, is that he acted on instructions from the 
Russian Chancellor, de Giers, who believed that the Czar 
would relent. On the contrary, he broke loose, and sent 
the answer given above. ^ 

It is not surprising that, after receiving the Czar's retort, 
the Prince seemed gloomy and depressed where all around 
him were full of joy. At Tirnova and Philippopolis he had 
the same reception; but an attempt to derail his train on 

» A. von Huhn, The Kidnapping of Prince Alexander, chap. xi. 
(London, 1887). 

Article III. of the Treaty of Berlin ran thus: "The Prince of 
Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the population and confirmed by 
the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers." Russia had no 
right to choose the Prince, and her assent to his election was only 
that of one among the six Great Powers. The mistake of Prince 
Alexander is therefore inexplicable. 

2 Histoire de I' Entente franco-russe, by Elie de Cyon, p. 185. 



336 The European Nations 

the journey to Sophia showed that the maHce of his foes was 
still unsated. The absence of the Russian and German 
Consuls from the State reception accorded to the Prince at 
the ca-pital on September 3rd showed that he had to reckon 
with the hostility or disapprobation of those Governments ; 
and there was the ominous fact that the Russian agent at 
Sophia had recently intervened to prevent the punishment 
of the mutineers and Bishop Clement. Few, however, 
were prepared for what followed. On entering his palace, 
the Prince called his officers about him and announced 
that, despairing of overcoming the antipathy of the Czar 
to him, he must abdicate. Many of them burst into tears, 
and one of them cried, "Without your Highness there is 
no Bulgaria." 

This action, when the Prince seemed at the height of 
popularity, caused intense astonishment. The following 
are the reasons that probably dictated it: First, he may 
have felt impelled to redeem the pledges which he too 
trustfully made to the Czar in his Rustchuk telegram, and 
of which that potentate took so unchivalrous an advantage. 
Second, the intervention of Russia to protect the mutineers 
from their just punishment betokened her intention to 
foment further plots. In this intervention, strange to 
say, she had the support of the German Government, 
Bismarck using his influence at Berlin persistently against 
the Prince, in order to avert the danger of war, which once 
or twice seemed to be imminent between Russia and 
Germany. 

Further, w^e may note that Austria and the other States 
had no desire to court an attack from the Eastern Power, 
on account of a personal affair between the two Alexanders. 
Great Britain also was at that time too hampered by 



The Making of Bulgaria 337 

domestic and colonial difficulties to be able to do more 
than offer good wishes. 

Thus the weakness or the weariness of the States friendly 
to Bulgaria left the Czar a free hand in the personal feud on 
which he set such store. Accordingly, on September 7th, 
the Prince left Bulgaria amidst the lamentations of that 
usually stolid people and the sympathy of manly hearts 
throughout the world. At Buda-Pesth and London there 
were ominous signs that the Czar must not push his 
triumph further. Herr Tisza at the end of the month 
assured the Hungarian deputies that, if the Sultan did not 
choose to restore the old order of things in Southern Bul- 
garia, no other Power had the right to intervene there by 
force of arms. Lord Salisbury, also, at the Lord Mayor's 
banquet, on November 9th, inveighed with startling frank- 
ness against the "officers debauched by foreign gold," who 
had betrayed their Prince. He further stated that all in- 
terest in foreign affairs centred in Bulgaria, and expressed 
the belief that the freedom of that State would be assured. 

These speeches were certainly intended as a warning to 
Russia and a protest against her action in Bulgaria. After 
the departure of Prince Alexander, the Czar hit upon the 
device of restoring order to that "much-tried" country 
through the instrumentality of General Kaulbars, a brother 
of the General who had sought to kidnap Prince Alex- 
ander three years before. It is known that the despatch 
of the younger Kaulbars was distasteful to the more 
pacific and Germanophil Chancellor, de Giers, who is said 
to have worked against the success of his mission. Such 
at least is the version given by his private enemies, Kat- 
koff and de Cyon.^ Kaulbars soon succeeded in adding 

» Elie de Cyon, Histoire de V Entente franco-russe, pp. 177-178. 



338 The European Nations 

to the reputation of his family. On reaching Sophia, on 
September 25th, he ordered the Hberation of the military- 
plotters still under arrest, and the adjournment of the 
forthcoming elections for the Sobranje; otherwise Russia 
would not regard them as legal. The Bulgarian Regents, 
Stambuloff at their head, stoutly opposed these demands 
and fixed the elections for October the loth; whereupon 
Kaulbars treated the men of Sophia, and thereafter of all 
the chief towns, to displays of bullying rhetoric, which suc- 
ceeded in blotting out all memories of Russian exploits of 
nine years before. 1 

Despite his menace that 100,000 Russian troops were 
ready to occupy Bulgaria, despite the murder of four 
patriots by his bravos at Dubnitza, Bulgaria flung back 
the threats by electing 470 supporters of independence 
and unity, as against 30 Russophils and 20 deputies of 
doubtful views. The Sobranje met at Tirnova, and, dis- 
regarding his protest, proceeded to elect Prince Waldemar 
of Denmark; it then confirmed Stambuloff in his almost 
dictatorial powers. The Czar's influence over the Danish 
Royal- House led to the Prince promptly refusing that 
dangerous honour, which it is believed that Russia then 
designed for the Prince of Mingrelia, a dignitary of Russian 
Caucasia. 

The aim of the Czar and of Kaulbars now was to render 
all government impossible; but they had to deal with a 
maifL far more resolute and astute than Prince Alexander. 
Sta,mbuloff and his countrymen fairly wearied out Kaul- 
bars, until that imperial agent was suddenly recalled 

» The Russophil Drandar {op. cit., p. 214) calls these demands; 
" remarqueblement mod^rees et sages"! For further details of 
Katilbars's electioneering devices, see Minchin, op. cit., pp. 327-330. 



The Making of Bulgaria 339 

(November 19th). He also ordered the Russian Consuls 
to withdraw. 

It is believed that the Czar recalled him partly because 
of the obvious failure of a hectoring policy, but also owing 
to the growing restlessness of Austria-Hungary, England, 
and Italy at Russia's treatment of Bulgaria. For several 
months European diplomacy turned on the question of 
Bulgaria's independence; and here Russia could not yet 
count on a French alliance. As has been noted above, 
Alexander III. and de Giers had tied their hands by the 
alliance contracted at Skiernewice in 1884; and the Czar 
had reason to expect that the Austro-German compact 
would hold good against him if he forced on his solution 
of the Balkan Question. 

Probably it was this consideration which led him to 
trust to underground means for assuring the dependence 
of Bulgaria. If so, he was again disappointed. Stambu- 
loff met his agents everywhere, above ground and below 
ground. That son of an innkeeper at Tirnova now showed 
a power of inspiring men and controlling events equal to 
that of the innkeeper of the Pusterthal, Andreas Hofer. 
The discouraged Bulgarians everywhere responded to his 
call; at Rustchuk they crushed a rising of Russophil 
officers, and Stambuloff had nine of the rebels shot (March 
7, 1887). Thereafter he acted as dictator and imprisoned 
numbers of suspects. His countrymen put up with the 
loss of civic freedom in order to secure the higher boon of 
national independence. 

In the main, however, the freedom of Bulgaria from 
Russian control was due to events transpiring in Central 
Europe. As will appear in Chapter XII. of this work, the 
Czar and de Giers became convinced, early in the year 



340 The European Nations 

1887, that Bismarck was preparing for war against France, 
and they determined to hold aloof from other questions, 
in order to be free to checkmate the designs of the war 
party at Berlin. The organ usually inspired by de Giers, 
the Nord, uttered an unmistakable warning on February 
20, 1887, and even stated that, with this aim in view, 
Russia would let matters take their course in Bulgaria. 

Thus, once again, the complexities of the general situa- 
tion promoted the cause of freedom in the Balkans; and 
the way was cleared for a resolute man to mount the 
throne at Sophia. In the course of a tour to the European 
capitals, a Bulgarian delegation found that man. The 
envoys were informed that Prince Ferdinand of Sax^e- 
Coburg, a grandson of Louis Philippe on the spindle side, 
would welcome the dangerous honour. He was young, 
ambitious, and, as events were to prove, equally tactful 
and forceful according to circumstances. In vain did 
Russia seek to prevent his election by pushing on the 
Sultan to intervene. Abdul Hamid was not the man to 
let himself long be the catspaw of Russia, and now invited 
the Powers to name one or two candidates for the throne 
of Bulgaria. StambuloflE worked hard for the election of 
Prince Ferdinand; and on July 7, 1887, he was unani- 
m.ously elected by the Sobranje. Alone among the Great 
Powers, Russia protested against his election and threw 
many difficulties in his path. In order to please the Czar, 
the Sultan added his protest; but this act was soon seen 
to be merely a move in the diplomatic game. 

Limits of space, however, preclude the possibility of 
noting later events in the history of Bulgaria, such as the 
coolness that clouded the relations of the Prince to Stam- 
buloff , the murder of the latter, and the final recognition 



The Making of Bulgaria 341 

of the Prince by the Russian Government after the "con- 
version" of his little son, Boris, to the Greek Church 
(February, 1896). In this curious way was fulfilled the 
prophetic advice given by Bismarck to the Prince not 
long after his acceptance of the crown of Bulgaria: "Play 
the dead (faire mort). . . . Let yourself be driven 
gently by the stream, and keep yourself, as hitherto, 
above water. Your greatest ally is time — force of habit. 
Avoid everything that might irritate your enemies. Unless 
you give them provocation, they cannot do you much 
harm, and in course of time, the world will become accus- 
tomed to see you on the throne of Bulgaria." ^ 

Time has worked on behalf of Bulgaria, and has helped 
to strengthen this Benjamin of the European family. 
Among the events which have made the chief States of 
to-day, none are more remarkable than those which en- 
dowed a population of downtrodden peasants with a 
passionate desire for national existence. Thanks to the 
liberating armies of Russia, to the prowess of Bulgarians 
themselves, to the inspiring personality of Prince Alex- 
ander and the stubborn tenacity of Stambuloff , the young 
State gained a firm grip on life. But other and stranger 
influences were at work compelling that people to act for 
itself; these are to be found in the perverse conduct of 
Alexander III. and his agents. The policy of Russia to- 
wards Bulgaria may be characterised b}^ a remark made by 
Sir Robert Morier to Sir M. Grant Duff in 1888: "Russia 
is a great bicephalic creature, having one head European, 
and the other Asiatic, but with the persistent habit of 
turning its European face to the East, and its Asiatic face 

> Personal Reminiscences of Prince Bismarck, by S. Whitman, p. 
179. 



342 The European Nations 

to the West."^ Asiatic methods, put in force against 
Slavised Tartars, have certainly played no small part in 
the upbuilding of this youngest of the European States. 

In taking leave of the Balkan peoples, we may note the 
strange tendency of events towards equipoise in the Europe 
of the present age. Thirty years ago the Turkish Empire 
seemed at the point of dissolution. To-day it is stronger 
than ever; and the cause is to be found, not so much in 
the watchful cunning of Abdul Hamid, as in the vivifying 
principle of nationality, which has made of Bulgaria and 
Roumania two strong barriers against Russian aggression 
in that quarter. The feuds of those States have been re- 
placed by something like friendship, which in its turn will 
probably ripen into alliance. Together they could put 
250,000 good troops in the field, that is, a larger force than 
that which the Turks had in Europe during the war with 
Russia. Turkey is therefore fully as safe as she was under 
Abdul Aziz. 

An enlightened ruler could consolidate her position still 
further. Just as Austria has gained in strength by having 
Venetia as a friendly and allied land, rather than a subject 
province heaving with discontent, so, too, it is open to the 
Porte to secure the alliance of the Balkan States by treating 
them in an honourable way, and by according good govern- 
ment to Macedonia. 

Possibly the future may see the formation of a federation 
of all the States of European Turkey. If so, Russia will 
lose all foothold in a quarter where she formerly had the 
active support of three-fourths of the population. How 
ever that may be, it is certain that her mistakes in and 
after the year 1878 have profoundly modified the Eastern 

> Sir M. Grant Duff, Notes from a Diary (1886-88), ii., p. 139. 



The Making of Bulgaria 343 

Question. They have served to cancel those which, as it 
seems to the present writer, Lord Beaconsfield committed 
in the years 1876-77; and the skilful diplomacy of Lord 
Salisbury and Sir William White has regained for England 
the prestige which she then lost among the rising peoples 
of the Peninsula. 

The final solution of the tangled racial problems of 
Macedonia cannot be long deferred, in spite of the timorous 
selfishness of the Powers who incurred treaty obligations 
for the welfare of that land; and, when that question can 
be no longer postponed or explained away, it is to be hoped 
that the British people, taking heed of the lessons of the 
past, will insist on a solution that will conform to the 
claims of humanity, which have been proved to be those 
of enlightened statesmanship.^ 

» For the recent developments of the Macedonian Question, see 
Turkey in Europe, by "Odysseus" (1900); The Middle Eastern 
Question, by V. Chirol, 185. net (Murray) ; A Tour in Macedonia, by 
G. F. Abbot (1903); The Burden of the Balkans, by Miss Edith 
Durham (1904); The Balkans from Within, by R. Wyon (1904); 
The Balkan Question, edited by L. Villari (1904); Critical Times 
in Turkey, by G. King-Lewis (1904); Pro Macedonia, by V. BerArd 
(Paris, 1904); La Peninsule halkanique, by Capitaine Lamouche 
(Paris, 1899). 



CHAPTER XI 



NIHILISM AND ABSOLUTISM IN RUSSIA 



THE HOUSE OF ROMANOFF 

Catherine II. 
(1762-1796.) 

Paul. 
(1796-1801.) 



Alexander I. Nicholas I. 

(1801-1825.) (1825-1855.) 



Nicholas. 


Alexander III. 


(Died in 


(1881-1894.) 


1865.) 


1 




Nicholas II. 




(1894— .) 



Alexander II. Constantine. Nicholas. Michael 
(1855-1881.) 



Alexis. Marie. Sergius. Paul. 

■ (Duchess of (Assassinated 
Edinburgh.) Feb. 17, 1905.) 



THE Whig statesman, Charles James Fox, once made 
the profound though seemingly paradoxical assertion 
that the most dangerous part of a revolution was the 
restoration that ended it. In a similar way we may 
hazard the statement that the greatest danger brought 
about by war lies in the period of peace immediately 
following. Just as the strain involved by any physical 
effort is most felt when the muscles and nerves resume 
their normal action, so, too, the body politic is liable to 
depression when once the time of excitement is over and 

344 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 345 

the artificial activities of war give place to the tiresome 
work of paying the bill. England after Waterloo, France 
and Germany after the War of 1870, afford examples of 
this truth ; but never perhaps has it been more signally 
illustrated than in the Russia of 1878-82. 

There were several reasons why the reaction should be 
especially sharp in Russia. The Slav peoples that form 
the great bulk of her population are notoriously sensitive. 
Shut up for nearly half the 3^ear by the rigours of winter, 
they naturally develop habits of brooding introspection or 
coarse animalism — ^witness the plaintive strains of their 
folk-songs, the pessimism that haunts their literature, and 
the dram-drinking habits of the peasantry. The Mus- 
covite temperament and the Muscovite climate naturally 
lead to idealist strivings against the hardships of life or a 
dull grovelling amongst them. Melancholy or vodka is 
the outcome of it all. 

The giant of the East was first aroused to a conscious- 
ness of his strength by the invasion of Napoleon the Great. 
The comparative ease with which the Grand Army was 
engulfed left on the national mind of Russia a conscious- 
ness of pride never to be lost even amidst the cruel dis- 
appointments of the Crimean War. Holy Russia had 
once beaten back the forces of Europe marshalled by the 
greatest captain of all time. She was therefore a match 
for the rest of the continent. Such was the belief of every 
patriotic Muscovite. As for the Turks, they were not 
worthy of entering the lists against the soldiers of the Czar. 
Did not every decade bring further proofs of the decline 
of the Ottomans in governing capacity and military prow- 
ess ? They might harry Bulgarian peasants and win laurels 
over the Servian militia. But how could that bankrupt 



346 The European Nations 

State and its undisciplined hordes hold up against the might 
of Russia and the fervour of her liberating legions? 

After the indulgence of these day-dreams the disillu- 
sionment caused by the events at Plevna came the more 
cruelly. One general after another became the scapegoat 
for the popular indignation. Then the general staff was 
freely censured, and whispers went round that the Grand 
Duke Nicholas, brother of the Czar, was not only incom- 
petent to conduct a great war, but guilty of underhand 
dealings with the contractors, who defrauded the troops 
and battened on the public funds. Letters from the rank 
and file showed that the bread was bad, the shoes were 
rotten, the rifles outclassed by those of the Turks, and that 
trenching-tools were lacking for many precious weeks. ^ 
Then, too, the Bulgarian peasants were found to be in a 
state of comfort superior to that of the bulk of their 
liberators — a discovery which aroused in the Russian 
soldiery feelings like those of the troops of the old French 
monarchy when they fought side by side with the soldiers 
of Washington for the triumph of democracy in the New 
World. In both cases the lessons were stored up, to be 
used when the champions of liberty returned home and 
found the old order of things clanking on as slowly and rust- 
ily as ever. 

Finally, there came the crushing blow of the Treaty of 

Berlin. The Russian people had fought for an ideal: they 

longed to see the cross take the place of the crescent which 

for five centuries had flashed defiance to Christendom from 

the summit of St. Sophia at Constantinople. But Britain's 

' Russia Before and After the War, translated by E. F. Taylor 
(London, 1880), chap, xvi.: "We have been cheated by block- 
heads, robbed by people whose incapacity was even greater than 
their villainy." 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 347 

ironclads, Austria's legions, and German diplomacy barred 
the way in the very hour of triumph; and Russia drew 
back. To the Slav enthusiasts of Moscow even the 
Treaty of San Stefano had seemed a dereliction of a sacred 
duty; that of Berlin seemed the most cowardly of be- 
trayals. As the Princess Radziwill confesses in her Recol- 
lections, that event made Nihilism possible. 

As usual, the populace, whether reactionary Slavophils 
or Liberals of the type of Western Europe, vented its 
spleen on the Government. For a time the strongest 
bureaucracy in Europe was driven to act on the defensive. 
The Czar returned stricken with asthma and prematurely 
aged by the privations and cares of the campaign. The 
Grand Duke Nicholas was recalled from his command, and, 
after bearing the signs of studied hostility of the Czare- 
vitch, was exiled to his estates in February, 1879. The 
Government inspired contempt rather than fear; and a 
new spirit of independence pervaded all classes. This Was 
seen even as far back as February, 1878, in the acquittal 
of Vera Zazulich, a lady who had shot the Chief of Po- 
lice at St. Petersburg, by a jury consisting of nobles and 
high officials; and the verdict, given in the face of damn-, 
ing evidence, was generally approved. Similar crimes 
occurred nearly every week.i Everything, therefore, fa- 
voured the designs of those who sought to overthrow all 
government. In a word, the outcome of the war was 
Nihilism. 

The father of this sombre creed was a wealthy Rus- 
sian landlord named Bakunin; or rather, he shares this 

1 Russia Before and After the War, chap. xvii. The Govern- 
ment thereafter dispensed with the ordinary forms of justice for 
poHtical crimes and judged them by special commissions. 



34^ The European Nations 

doubtful honour with the Frenchman Prudhon. Bakunin, 
who was born in 1814, entered on active Hfe in the time of 
soulless repression inaugurated by the Czar Nicholas I 
(182 5- 1855). Disgusted by Russian bureaucracy, the 
youth eagerly drank in the philosophy of Western Europe, 
especially that of Hegel. During a residence at Paris he 
embraced and developed Prudhon 's creed that "property 
is theft," and sought to prepare the way for a crusade 
against all governments by forming the Alliance of Social 
Democracy (1869), which speedily became merged in the 
famous " Internationale." Driven successively from France 
and Central Europe, he was finally handed over to the 
Russians and sent to Siberia; thence he escaped to Japan 
and came to England, finally settling in Switzerland. 
His writings and speeches did much to rouse the Slavs of 
Austria, Poland, and Russia to a sense of their national 
importance, and to the duty of overthrowing the Govern- 
ments that cramped their energies. 

As in the case of Prudohn, his zeal for the non-existent 
and hatred of the actual bordered on madness, as when he 
included most of the results of art, literature, and science in 
, his comprehensive anathemas. Nevertheless his crusade 
for destruction appealed to no small part of the sensitive 
peoples of the Slavonic race, who, differing in many details, 
yet all have a dislike of repression and a longing to have 
their "fling." ' A union in a Panslavonic League for the 
overthrow of the Houses of Romanoff, Hapsburg, and 
Hohenzollem promised to satisfy the vague longings of 
that much-baffled race, whose name, denoting "glorious," 
had become the synonym for servitude of the lowest type, 

» For this peculiarity and a consequent tendency to extremes, 
see Prof. G. Brandes, Impressions of Russia, p. 22. 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 349 

Such was the creed that disturbed Eastern and Central 
Europe throughout the period 1847-78, now and again de- 
veloping a kind of iconoclastic frenzy among its votaries. 

This revolutionary creed absorbed another of a different 
kind. The second creed was scientific and self-centred; it 
had its origin in the Liberal movement of the sixties, when 
reforms set in, even in governmental circles. The Czar, 
Alexander II., in 1861 freed the serfs from the control of 
their lords, and allotted to them part of the plots which 
they had hitherto worked on a servile tenure. For various 
reasons, which we cannot here detail, the peasants were far 
from satisfied with this change, weighted, as it was, by 
somewhat onerous terms, irksome restrictions, and warped 
sometimes by dishonest or hostile officials. Limited 
powers of local government were also granted in 1864 to 
the local Zemstvos or land-organisations; but these again 
failed to satisfy the new cravings for a real system of self- 
government ; and the Czar, seeing that his work produced 
more ferment than gratitude, began at the close of the 
sixties to fall back into the old absolutist ways.^ 

At that time, too, a. band of writers, of whom the novel- 
ist Turgenieff is the best known, were extolling the triumphs 
of scientific research and the benefits of Western demo- 
cracy. He it was who adapted to scientific or ethical use 
the word "Nihilism" (already in use in France to designate 
Prudhon's theories), so as to represent the revolt of the in- 
dividual against the religious creed and patriarchal customs 
of Old Russia. "The fundamental principle of Nihilism," 
says "Stepniak," "was absolute individualism. It was 

' See Wallace's Russia, 2 vols.; Russia Under th? Czars, by 
"Stepniak," ii., chap, xxix.; also two lectures on Russian affairs 
by Prof. Vinogradoff, in Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth 
Century (Camb., 1902). 



350 The European Nations 

the negation, in the name of individual liberty, of all the 
obligations imposed upon the individual by society, by 
family life, and by religion." ^ 

For a time these disciples of Darwin and Herbert Spencer 
were satisfied with academic protests against autocracy; 
but the uselessness of such methods soon became manifest ; 
the influence of professors and philosophic Epicureans 
could never permeate the masses of Russia and stir them 
to their dull depths. What "the intellectuals" needed 
was a creed which would appeal to the many. 

This they gained mainly from Balcunin. He had pointed 
the way to what seemed a practical policy, the ownership 
of the soil of Russia by the Mirs, the communes of her 
myriad villages. As to methods, he advocated a propa- 
ganda of violence. " Go among the people," he said, " and 
convert them to your aims." The example of the Paris 
communists in 187 1 enforced his pleas; and in the sub- 
sequent years thousands of students, many of them of the 
highest families, quietly left their homes, donned the 
peasant's garb, smirched their faces, tarred their hands, and 
went into the villages or the factories in the hope of stirring 
up the thick sedimentary deposit of the Russian system. ^ 
In many cases their utmost efforts ended in failure, the 
tragi-comedy of which is finely set forth in Turgenieff's 
Virgin Soil. Still more frequently their goal proved to be 

1 Underground Russia, by "Stepniak," Introduction, p. 4. Or, 
as Turgenieff phrased it in one of his novels: "a Nihilist is a man 
who submits to no authority, who accepts not a single principle 
upon faith merely, however high such a principle may stand in the 
eyes of men." In short, a Nihilist was an extreme individualist 
and rationalist. 

2 Russia in Revolution, by G. H. Perriss, pp. 204-206, 210-214; 
Arnaudo, II Nihilismo (Turin, 1879). See, too, the chapters added 
by Sir D. M. Wallace to the new edition of his work, Russia (1905). 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 351 

— Siberia. But these young men and women did not toil 
for nought. Their efforts hastened the absorption of 
philosophic Nihilism in the creed of Prudhon and Bakunin. 
The Nihilist of Turgenieff's day had been a hedonist of 
the clubs, or a harmless weaver of scientific Utopias; the 
Nihilist of the new age was that most dangerous of men, 
a desperado girt with a fighting creed. 

The fusing of these two diverse elements was powerfully 
helped on by the white heat of indignation that glowed 
throughout Russia when details of the official pecula- 
tion and mismanagement of the war with Turkey became 
known. Everything combined to discredit the Govern- 
ment; and enthusiasts of all kinds felt that the days for 
scientific propaganda and stealthy' agitation were past. 
Voltaire must give way to Marat. It was time for the 
bomb and the dagger to do their work. 

The new Nihilists organised an executive committee for 
the removal of the most obnoxious officials. Its success 
was startling. To name only a few of their chief deeds: 
on August 15, 1878, a Chief of the Police was slain near 
one of the imperial palaces at the capital ; and in Febru- 
ary, 1879, the Governor of Kharkov was shot, the Nihilists 
succeeding in announcing his condemnation by placards 
mysteriously posted up in every large town. In vain did 
the Government intervene and substitute a military com- 
mission in place of trial by jury. Exile and hanging only 
made the Nihilists more daring, and on more than one 
occasion the Czar nearly fell a victim to these desperadoes. 

The most astounding of these attempts was the explosion 
of a mine under the banqueting-hall of the Winter Palace 
at St. Petersburg on the evening of February 17, 1880, 
when the imperial family escaped owing to a delay in the 



352 The European Nations 

arrival of the Grand Duke of Hesse. Ten soldiers were killed 
and forty -eight wounded in and near the guard-room. 

The Czar answered outrage by terrorism. A week after 
this outrage he issued a ukase suspending the few remain- 
ing rights of local self-government hitherto spared by the 
reaction, and vesting practically all executive powers in a 
special commission, presided over by General Loris Melikoff . 
This man was an Armenian by descent, aiid had distin- 
guished himself as commander in the recent war in Asia, 
the capture of Kars being largely due to his dispositions. 
To these warlike gifts, uncommon in the Armenians of 
to-day, he added administrative abilities of a high order. 
Enjoying in a peculiar degree the confidence of Alexander 
II., he was charged with the supervision of all political 
trials and a virtual control of all the governors-general of 
the Empire. Thereupon the central committee of the 
Nihilists proclaimed war a outrance until the Czar con- 
ceded to a popularly elected National Assembly the right 
to reform the life of Russia. 

Here was the strength of the Nihilist party. By violent 
means it sought to extort what a large proportion of the 
townsfolk wished for and found no means of demanding 
in a lawful manner. Loris Melikoff, gifted with the shrewd- 
ness of his race, saw that the Government would effect 
little by terrorism alone. Wholesale arrests, banishment, 
and hangings only added to the number of the disaffected, 
especially as the condemned went to their doom with a 
calm heroism that inspired the desire of imitation or 
revenge. Repression must clearly be accompanied by 
reforms that would bridge over the gulf ever widening 
between the Government and the thinking classes of the 
people. He began by persuading the Emperor to release 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 353 

several hundreds of suspects and to relax the severe 
measures adopted against the students of the universities. 
Lastly, he sought to induce the Czar to establish repre- 
sentative institutions, for which even the nobles were 
beginning to petition. Little by little he familiarised him 
with the plan of extending the system of the Zemstvos, so 
that there should be elective councils for towns and 
provinces, as well as delegations from the provincial 
noblesse. He did not propose to democratise the Central 
Government. In his scheme the deputies of nobles and 
representatives of provinces and towns were to send dele- 
gates to the Council of State, a purely consultative body 
which Alexander I. had founded in 1802. 

Despite the tentative nature of these proposals, and the 
favourable reception accorded to them by the Council of 
State, the Czar for several days withheld his assent. On 
March 9th he signed the ukase, only to postpone its publi- 
cation until March 12th. Not until the morning of March 
13th did he give the final order for its publication in the 
Messager Offlciel. It was his last act as lawgiver. On that 
day (March ist, and Sunday, in the Russian calendar) he 
went to the usual military parade, despite the earnest 
warnings of the Czarevitch and Loris Melikoff as to a 
rumoured Nihilist plot. To their pleadings he returned 
the answer, "Only Providence can protect me, and when 
it ceases to do so, these Cossacks cannot possibly help." 
On his return, alongside of the Catherine Canal, a bomb 
was thrown under his carriage; the explosion tore the 
back off the carriage, injuring some of his Cossack escort, 
but leaving the Emperor unhurt. True to his usual feel- 
ings of compassion, he at once alighted to inquire after the 
wounded. This act cost him his life. Another Nihilist 



354 The European Nations 

quickly approached and flung a bomb right at his feet. As 
soon as the smoke cleared away, Alexander was seen to be 
frightfully mangled and lying in his blood. He could only 
murmur, "Quick, home; carry to the palace; there die." 
There, surrounded by his dearest ones, Alexander II. 
breathed his last. 

In striking down the liberator of the serfs when on the 
point of recurring to earlier and better methods of rule, the 
Nihilists had dealt the death-blow to their own cause. As 
soon as the details of the outrage were known, the old love 
for the Czar Avelled forth: his imperfections in public and 
private life, the seeming weakness of his foreign policy, and 
his recent use of terrorism against the party of progress 
were forgotten; and to the sensitive Russian nature, ever 
prone to extremes, his figure stood forth as the friend of 
peace, and the would-be reformer, hindered in his efforts 
by unwise advisers and an untoward destiny. 

His successor was a man cast in a different mould. It is 
one of the peculiarities of the recent history of Russia that 
her rulers have broken away from the policy of their im- 
mediate predecessors to recur to that which they had dis- 
carded. The vague and generous Liberalism of Alexander 
I. gave way in 1825 to the stern autocracy of his brother, 
Nicholas I. This being shattered by the Crimean War, 
Alexander II. harked back to the ideals of his uncle, and 
that, too, in the wavering and unsatisfactory way which 
had brought woe to that ruler and unrest to the people. 
Alexander III., raised to the throne by the bombs of the 
revolutionaries, determined to mould his policy on the 
principles of autocracy and orthodoxy. To pose as a 
reformer would have betokened fear of the Nihilists; and 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 355 

the new ruler, gifted with a magnificent physique, a narrow 
mind, and a stern will, ever based his conduct on element- 
ary notions that appealed to the peasant and the common 
soldier. In 1825 Nicholas I. had cowed the would-be re- 
bels at his capital by a display of defiant animal courage. 
Alexander III. resolved to do the like. He had always been 
noted for a quiet persistence on which arguments fell in 
vain. The nickname "bullock," which his father early 
gave him (shortened by his future subjects to "bull"), 
sufficiently summed up the supremacy of the material over 
the mental that characterised the new ruler, Bismarck, 
who knew him, had a poor idea of his abilities, and summed 
up his character by saying that he looked at things from the 
point of view of a Russian peasant. ^ That remark sup- 
plies a key to Russian politics during the years 1881-94. 

At first, when informed by MelikofT that the late Czar 
was on the point of making the constitutional experiment 
described above, Alexander III. exclaimed, "Change no- 
thing in the orders of my father. This shall count as his will 
and testament." If he had held to this generous resolve 
the world's history would perhaps have been very different. 
Had he published his father's last orders ; had he appealed 
to the people, like, another Antony over the corpse of. 
Csesar, the enthusiastic Slav temperament would have 
eagerly responded to this mark of imperial confidence. 
Loyalty to the throne and fury against the Nihilists would 
have been the dominant feelings of the age, impelling all 
men to make the wisest use of the thenceforth sacred 
bequest of constitutional freedom. 

The man who is believed to have blighted these hopes 

> Reminiscences of Bismarck, by S. Whitman, p. 114 Bism,arck: 
Some Secret Pages of his History, by M. Busch, iii., p. 150, 



35^ The European Nations 

was Pobyedonosteff, the procureur of the highest ecclesi- 
astical court of the Empire. To him had been confided 
the education of the present Czar; and the fervour of his 
orthodoxy, as Well as the clear-cut simplicity of his belief 
in Muscovite customs, had gained complete ascendancy 
over the mind of his pupil. Different estimates have been 
formed as to the character of Pobyedonosteff. In the 
eyes of some he is a conscientious zealot who believes in 
the mission of Holy Russia to vivify an age corrupted by 
democracy and unbelief; others regard him as the Russian 
Macchiavelli, straining his beliefs to an extent which his 
reason rejects, in order to gain power through the mechan- 
ism of the autocracy and the Greek Church. The thin 
face, passionless gaze, and coldly logical utterance bespeak 
the politician rather than the zealot ; yet there seems to be 
good reason for believing that he is a "fanatic by reflec- 
tion," not by temperament.* A volume of Reflections 
which he has given to the world contains some entertaining 
judgments on the civilisation of the West. It may be 
worth while to select a few, as showing the views of the man 
who, through his pupil, influenced the fate of Russia and 
of the world. 

"Parliament is an institution serving for the satisfaction 
of the personal ambition, vanity, and self-interest of its 
members. The institution of Parliament is indeed one of 
the greatest illustrations of human delusion. . . . On 
the pediment of this edifice is inscribed, ' All for the public 
good,' This is no more than a lying formula: Parlia- 
mentarism is the triumph of egoisjn — its highest expres- 
sion. . . ." 

' Russia under Alexander III., by H. von Samson-Himmel- 
stierna, Eng. ed., chap. vii. 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 357 

" From the day that man first fell, faLseliood has ruled 
the world — ruled it in human speech, in the practical 
business of life, in all its relations and institutions. But 
never did the Father of Lies spin such webs of falsehood of 
every kind as in this restless age. . . . The press is 
one of the falsest institutions of our time." 

In the chapter " Power and Authority" the author holds 
up to the gaze of a weary world a refreshing vision of 
a benevolent despotism which will save men in spite of 
themselves : 

"Power is the depository of truth, and needs, above 
all things, men of truth, of clear intellects, of strong 
understandings, and of sincere speech, who know the 
limits of 'yes' and 'no,' and never transcend them, 
etc."i 

To this Muscovite Laud was now entrusted the task of 
drafting a manifesto in the interests of "power" and 
"truth." 

Meanwhile the Nihilists themselves had helped on the 
cause of reaction. Even before the funeral of Alexander 
IL their executive committee had forwarded to his suc- 
cessor a document beseeching him to give up arbitrary 
power and to take the people into his confidence. While 
purporting to impose no conditions, the Nihilist chiefs 
urged him to remember that two measures were needful 
preliminaries to any general pacification, namely, a general 
amnesty of all political offenders, as being merely " executors 
of a hard civic duty"; and "the convocation of repre- 
sentatives of all the Russian people for a revision and re- 
form of all the private laws of the State, according to the 
will of the nation." In order that the election of this 
' l^ubycdonoslcfj : His Reflections, Kn^. cd. 



35^ The European Nations 

Assembly might be a reality, the Czar was pressed to grant 
freedom of speech and of public meetings. ^ 

It is difficult to say whether the Nihilists meant this 
document as an appeal, or whether the addition of the 
demand of a general amnesty was intended to anger the 
Czar and drive him into the arms of the reactionaries. In 
either case, to press for the immediate pardon of his father's 
murderers appeared to Alexander III. an unpardonable 
insult. Thenceforth between him and the revolutionaries 
there could be no truce. As a sop to quiet the more 
moderate reformers, he ordered the appointment of a com- 
mission, including a few members of Zemstvos, and even 
one peasant, to inquire into the condition of public -houses 
and the excessive consumption of vodka. Beyond this 
humdrum though useful question the imperial reformer did 
not deign to move. 

After a short truce, the revolutionaries speedily renewed 
their efforts against the chief officials who were told ofE to 
crush them; but it soon became clear that they had lost 
the good-will of the middle class. The Liberals looked on 
them not merely as the murderers of the liberating Czar, 
but as the destroyers of the nascent constitution; and the 
masses looked on unmoved while five of the accomplices 
in the outrage of March '13th were slowly done to death. 
In the next year twenty -two more suspects were arrested 
on the same count ; ten were hanged and the rest exiled to 
Siberia. Despite these inroads into the little band of 
desperadoes, the survivors compassed the murder of the 
public prosecutor as he sat in a cafe at Odessa (March 30, 
1882). On the other hand, the official police were helped 

' The whole document is printed in the Appendix to "Step- 
niak's" Underground Russia. 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 359 

for a time by zealous loyalists who formed a " Holy Band" 
for secretly countermining the Nihilist organisation. These 
amateur detectives, however, did little except appropriate 
large donations, arrest a few harmless travellers, and no 
small number of the secret police force. The professionals 
thereupon complained to the Czar, who suppressed the 
"Holy Band." 

The events of the years 1883 and 1884 showed that even 
the army, on which the Czar was bestowing every care, was 
permeated with Nihilism, women having by their arts won 
over many officers to the revolutionary cause. Poland, 
also, writhing with discontent under the Czar's stern 
despotism, was worked on with success by their emxissaries ; 
and the ardour of the Poles made the recruits especially 
dangerous to the authorities, ever fearful of another revolt 
in that unhappy land. Finally, the Czar was fain to shut 
himself up in nearly complete seclusion in his palace at 
Gatchina, near St. Petersburg, or in his winter retreat at 
Livadia, on the southern shores of the Crimea. 

These facts are of more than personal and local im- 
portance. They powerfully affected the European polity. 
These were the years which saw the Bulgarian Question 
come to a climax; and the impotence of Russia enabled 
that people and their later champions to press on to a 
solution which would have been impossible had the Czar 
been free to strike as he undoubtedly willed. For the 
present he favoured the cause of peace, upheld by his 
Chancellor, de Giers; and in the autumn of the year 1884, 
as will be shown in the following chapter, he entered into 
a compact at Skiernewice, which virtually allotted to Bis- 
marck the arbitration on all urgent questions in the Bal- 
kans. As late as November, 1885, we find Sir Robert 



360 The European Nations 

Morier, British ambassador at the Russian Court, writing 
privately and in very homely phrase to his colleague at 
Constantinople, Sir William White: "I am convinced 
Russia does not want a general war in Europe about 
Turkey now, and that she is really suffering from a gigantic 
Katzenjammer (surfeit) caused by the last war." 1 It is 
safe to say that Bulgaria largely owes her freedom from 
Russian control to the Nihilists. 

For the Czar the strain of prolonged warfare against 
unseen and desperate foes was terrible. Surrounded by 
sentries, shadowed by secret police, the lonely man yet 
persisted in governing with the assiduity and thoroughness 
of the great Napoleon. He tried to pry into all the affairs 
of his vast Empire; and, as he held aloof even from his 
chief ministers, he insisted that they should send to him 
detailed reports on all the affairs of State, foreign and 
domestic, military and naval, religious and agrarian. 
What wonder that the Nihilists persisted in their efforts, 
in the hope that even his giant strength must break down 
under the crushing burdens of toil and isolation! That he 
held up so long shows him to have been one of the 
strongest men and most persistent workers known to his- 
tory. He had but one source of inspiration, religious zeal, 
and but one form of relaxation, the love of his devoted 
Empress. 

It is needless to refer to the later phases of the revolu- 
tionary movement. Despite their well-laid plans, the 
revolutionaries gradually lost ground; and in 1892 even 
Stepniak confessed that they alone could not hope to 
overthrow the autocracy. About that time, too, their 

• Memoirs and Correspondence of Sir William White, edited by 
H. S. Edwards, chap, xviii. 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 361 

party began to split in twain, a younger group claiming 
that the old terrorist methods must be replaced by eco- 
nomic propaganda of an advanced socialistic type among 
the workers of the towns. For this new departure and its 
results we must refer our readers to the new materials 
brought to light by Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace in the new 
edition of his work, Russia (1905). 

Here we can point out only a few of the more general 
causes that contributed to the triumph of the Czar, In the 
first place, the difficulties in the way of common action 
among the proletariate of Russia are very great. Millions 
of peasants, scattered over vast plains, where the great 
struggle is ever against the forces of nature, cannot ef- 
fectively combine. Students of history will observe that 
even where the grievances are mainly agrarian, as in the 
France of 1789, the first definite outbreak is wont to occur 
in great towns. Russia has no Paris, eager to voice the 
needs of the many. 

Then, again, the Russian peasants are rooted in customs 
and superstitions which cling about the Czar with strange 
tenacity and are proof against the reasoning of strangers. 
Their rising could, therefore, be very partial; besides which 
the land is for the most part unsuited to the guerrilla 
tactics that so often have favoured the cause of liberty in 
mountainous lands. The Czar and his officials know that 
the strength of their system lies in the ignorance of the 
peasants, in the soldierly instincts of their immense army, 
and in the spread of railways and telegraphs, which enable 
the central power to crush the beginnings of revolt. Thus 
the Czar's authority, resting incongruously on a faith dumb 
and grovelling as that of the Dark Ages and on the latest 
developments of mechanical scji^nce, has been able to defy 



362 The European Nations 

the tendencies of the age and the strivings of Russian 
reformers. 



The aim of this work prescribes a survey of those events 
iione which have made modern states what they are 
to-day; but the victory of absolutism in Russia has had 
so enormous an influence on the modern world — not least 
in the warping of democracy in France — that it will be well 
to examine the operation of other forces which contributed 
to the setback of reform in that Empire, especially as hey 
involved a change in the relations of the central power to 
alien races in general, and to the Grand Duchy of Finland 
in particular. 

These forces, or ideals, may be summed up in the old 
Slavophil motto, "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality." 
These old Muscovite ideals had lent strength to Nicholas 

I. in his day; and his grandson now determined to appeal 
to the feeling of nationality in its narrowest and strongest 
form. That instinct, which Mazzini looked on as the 
means of raising in turn all the peoples of the world to the 
loftier plane of Humanity, was now to be the chief motive 
in the propulsion of the Juggernaut car of the Russian 
autocracy. 

The first to feel the weight of the governmental machine 
were the Jews. Rightly or wrongly, they were thought to 
be concerned in the peculations that disgraced the cam- 
paign of 1877 and in the plot for the murder of Alexander 

II. In quick succession the officials and the populace 
found out that outrages on the Jews would not be dis- 
pleasing at headquarters. The secret once known, the 
rabble of several towns took the law into their own hands. 
In scores of places throu^Hbut the years 1881 and 1882, 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 363 

the mob plundered and fired their shops and houses, beat 
the wretched inmates, and in some cases killed them out- 
right. At Elisabetgrad and Kiev the Jewish quarters 
were systematically pillaged and then given over to 
the flames. The fury reached its climax at the small 
town of Balta ; the rabble pillaged 976 Jewish houses, 
and, not content with seizing all the wealth that came to 
hand, killed eight of the traders, besides wounding 211 
others. 

Doubtless these outrages were largely due to race-hatred 
as well as to spite on the part of the heedless, slovenly 
natives against the keen and grasping Hebrews. The same 
feelings have at times swept over Roumania, Austria, Ger- 
many, and France. Jew-baiting has appealed even to 
nominally enlightened peoples as a novel and profitable 
kind of sport ; and few of its votaries have had the hypo- 
critical effrontery to cloak their conduct under the plea of 
religious zeal. The movement has at bottom everywhere 
been a hunt after Jewish treasure, embittered by the 
hatred of the clown for the successful trader, of the in- 
dividualist native for an alien, clannish, and successful 
community. In Russia religious motives may possibly 
have weighed with the Czar and the more ignorant and 
bigoted of the peasantry; but levelling and communistic 
ideas certainly accounted for the widespread plundering — 
witness the words often on the lips of the rioters: "We are 
breakfasting on the Jews; we shall dine on the landlords, 
and sup on the priests." In 1890 there appeared a ukase 
ordering the return of the Jews to those provinces and 
districts where they had been formerly allowed to settle, 
that is, chiefly in the South and West ; and all foreign Jews 
were expelled from the Empire, It is believed that as 



364 The European Nations 

many as 225,000 Jewish families left Russia in the sixteen 
months following. ^ 

The next onslaught was made against a body of Christian 
dissenters, the humble community known as Stundists. 
These God-fearing peasants had taken a Grtsrman name 
because the founder of their sect had been converted at the 
Stunden, or hour-long services, of German Lutherans long 
settled in the south of Russia; they held a simple evan- 
gelical faith; their conduct was admittedly far better than 
that of the peasants, who held to the mass of customs and 
superstitions dignified by the name of the orthodox Greek 
creed ; and their piety and zeal served to spread the evan- 
gelical faith, especially among the more emotional people 
of South Russia, known as Little Russians. 

Up to the year 1878, Alexander IL refrained from per- 
secuting them, possibly because he felt some sympathy with 
men who were fast raising themselves and their fellows 
above the old level of brutish ignorance. But in that year 
the Greek Church pressed him to take action. If he chas- 
tised them with whips, his son lashed them with scorpions. 
He saw that they were sapping the base of one of the three 
pillars that supported the imperial fabric — orthodoxy, in 
the Russian sense. Orders went forth to stamp out the 
heretic pest. At once all the strength of the governmental 
machine was brought to bear on these non-resisting 
peasants. Imprisonment, exile, execution, — such was 
their lot. Their communities, perhaps the happiest then 
to be found in rural Russia, were broken up, to be flung 
into remote corners of Transcaucasia or Siberia, and there 



' Rambaud, Histoire de la Russie, chap, xxxviii. ; Lowe, Alex- 
ander HI. of Russia, chap. viii. ; H. Frederic, The New Exodus; 
Professor Errera, The Russian Jews. 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 365 

doomed to the regime of the knout or the darkness of the 
mines. ^ According to present appearances the persecut- 
ors have succeeded. The evangelical faith seems to have 
been almost stamped out even in South Russia; and the 
Greek Church has regained its hold on the allegiance, if not 
on the beliefs and affections, of the masses. 

To account for this fact, we must remember the im- 
mense force of tradition and custom among a simple rural 
folk, also that very many Russians sincerely believe that 
their institutions and their national creed were destined to 
regenerate Europe. See, they said in effect, Western 
Europe oscillates between Papal control and free thought ; 
its industries, with their laissez-faire methods, raise the 
few to enormous wealth and crush the many into a new 
serfdom worse than the old. For all these evils Russia has 
a cure ; her autocracy saves her from the profitless wrang- 
ling of Parliaments; her national Church sums up the 
beliefs and traditions of nobles and peasants; and at the 
base of her social system she possesses in the " Mir" a patri- 
archial communism against which the forces of the West 
will beat in vain. Looking on the Greek Church as a 
necessary part of the national life, they sought to wield its 
powers for nationalising all the races of that motley Em- 
pire. "Russia for the Russians! " cried the Slavophils. 
"Let us be one people, with one creed. Let us reverence 
the Czar as head of the Church and of the State. In this 
unity lies our strength." However defective the argument 
logically, yet in the realm of sentiment, in which the 
Slavs live, move, and have their being, the plea passed mus- 
ter. National pride was pressed into the service of the 

• See an article by Count Leo Tolstoy in the Contemporary Re- 
view for November, 1895; also a pamphlet on The Stundists, 
with Preface by Rev. J. Brown, D.D. 



366 The European Nations 

persecutors; and all dissenters, whether Roman Catholics of 
Poland, Lutherans of the Baltic provinces, or Stundists of 
the Ukraine, felt the remorseless grinding of the State 
machine, while the Greek Church exalted its horn as it had 
not done for a century past. 

Other sides of this narrowly nationalising policy were 
seen in the determined repression of Polish feeling, of the 
Germans in the Baltic provinces, and of the Armenians of 
Transcaucasia. Finally, remorseless pressure was brought 
to bear on that interesting people, the Finns. We can here 
refer only to the last of these topics. The Germans in the 
provinces of Livonia, Courland, and Esthonia formed the 
majority only among the landholding and merchant 
classes; and the curbing of their semi-feudal privileges 
wore the look of a democratic reform. 

The case was far different with the Finns. They are a 
non- Aryan people, and therefore differ widely from the 
Swedes and Russians. For centuries they formed part of 
the Swedish monarchy, deriving thence in large measure 
their literature, civilisation, and institutions. To this day 
the Swedish tongue is used by about one-half of their 
gentry and burghers. On the annexation of Finland by 
Alexander L, in consequence of the Franco-Russian com- 
pact framed at Tilsit in 1807, he made to their Estates a 
solemn promise to respect their constitution and laws. 
Similar engagements have been made by his successors. 
Despite some attempts by Nicholas L to shelve the con- 
stitution of the Grand Duch}^, local liberties remained al- 
most intact up to a comparatively recent time. In the 
year 1869 the Finns gained further guarantees of their 
rights. Alexander n. then ratified the laws of Finland, 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 367 

and caused a statement of the relations between Finland 
and Russia to be drawn up. 

In view of the recent struggle between the Czar and the 
Finnish people, it may be well to give a sketch of their 
constitution. The sovereign governs, not as Emperor of 
Russia, but as Grand Duke of Finland. He delegates his 
administrative powers to a Senate, which is presided over 
by a Governor-General. This important official, as a mat- 
ter of fact, has always been a Russian; his powers are, or 
rather were,i shared by two sections of the Finnish Senats 
each composed of ten members nominated by the Grand 
Duke. The Senate prepares laws and ordinances which 
the Grand Duke then submits to the Diet. This body 
consists of four orders — nobles, clergy, burghers, and 
peasants. Since 1886 it has enjoyed to a limited extent the 
right of initiating laws. The orders sit and vote separ- 
ately. In most cases a resolution that is passed by three 
of them becomes law, when it has received the assent of the 
Grand Duke. But the assent of a majority in each of the 
four orders is needed in the case of a proposal that affects 
the constitution of the Grand Duchy and the privileges of 
tlae orders. In case a bill is accepted by two orders and is 
rejected by the other two, a deadlock. is averted by each 
of the orders appointing fifteen delegates; these sixty 
delegates, meeting without discussion, vote by ballot, and 
a bare majority carries the day. Measures, are then re- 
ferred to the Grand Duke, who, after consulting the Senate, 
gives or withholds his assent. ^ 

> A law of the autumn of 1902 altered this. It delegated the 
administration to the Governor-General, assisted by the Senate. 

2 For the constitution of Finland and its relation to Russia, see 
A Precis of the Public Law of Finland, by L. Mechelin, translated 
bj^ C. J. Cooke (1889); Pour la Finlande, par Jean Deck; Pour Jn. 



368 The European Nations 

A very important clause of the law of 1869 declares that 
"Fundamental laws can be made, altered, explained, or 
repealed, only on the representation of the Emperor and 
Grand Duke, and with the consent of all the Estates." 
This clause sharply marked off Finland from Russia, where 
the power of the Czar is theoretically unlimited. New 
taxes may not be imposed nor old taxes altered without 
the consent of the Finnish Diet; but, strange to say, the 
customs dues are fixed by the Government (that is, by the 
Grand Duke and the Senate) without the co-operation of 
the Diet. Despite the archaic form of its representation, 
the Finnish constitution (an offshoot of that of Sweden) 
has worked extremely well ; and in regard to civil freedom 
and religious toleration, the Finns take their place among 
the most progressive communities of the world. More- 
over, the constitution is no recent and artificial creation; 
it represents customs and beliefs that are deeply ingrained 
in a people who, like their Magyar kinsmen, cling firmly 
to the old, even while they hopefully confront the facts of 
the present. There was every ground for hope. Between 
the years 1812 and 1886 the population grew from 900,000 
to 2,300,000, and the revenue from less than 7,000,000 
marks (a Finnish mark = about ten pence) to 40,000,000 
marks. 

Possibly this prosperity prompted in the Russian bureau- 
cracy the desire to bring the Grand Duchy into line with 
the rest of the Empire. On grounds other than constitu- 
tional, the bureaucrats had a case. They argued that 
while the revenue of Finland was increasing faster than 

Finlande, La Constitution du Grand Duche de Finlande (Paris, 
1900) ; J. R. Danielsson, Finland's Union with the Russian Empire 
(Borga, 189 1;. 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 369 

that of Russia proper, yet the Grand Duchy bore no share 

of the added mihtary burdens. It voted only 17 per cent. 

of its revenue for mihtary defence as against 28 per cent. 

set apart in the Russian Budget. The fact that the 

Swedish and Finnish languages, as well as Finnish money, 

were alone used on the railways of the Grand Duchy, even 

within a few miles of St. Petersburg, also formed a cause 

of complaint. When, therefore, the Slavophils began to 

raise a hue and cry against everything that marred the 

symmetry of the Empire, an anti-Finnish campaign lay 

in the nature of things. Historical students discovered 

that the constitution was the gift of the Czars, and that 

their goodwill had been grossly misused by the Finns. 

Others, who could not deny the validity of the Finnish 

constitution, claimed that even constitutions and laws 

must change with changing circumstances; that a narrow 

particularism was out of place in an age of railways and 

telegraphs ; and that Finland must take its fair share in the 

work of national defence.^ 

Little by little Alexander III, put in force this Slavophil 

creed against Finland. His position as Grand Duke gave 

him the right of initiating laws; but he overstepped his 

constitutional powers by imposing various changes. In 

January, 1890, he appointed three committees, sitting at 

St. Petersburg, to bring the coinage, the customs system, 

and the postal service of Finland into harmony with those 

of Russia. In June there appeared an imperial ukase 

assimilating the postal service of Finland to that of Russia — 

1 See for the Russian case d'Elenew, Les Pretentions des Separa- 
tistes finlandais (1895); also La Conquete de la Finlande, by K. 
Ordine (1889) — answered by J. R. Danielsson, op. cit.; also Russ- 
land und Finland vom russischen Standpunkte aus betrachtet, by 
"Sarmatus" (1903). 



370 The European Nations 

an illegal act which led to the resignation of the Finnish 
ministers. In May, 1891, the Committee for Finnish 
Affairs, sitting at St. Petersburg, was abolished; and that 
year saw other efforts curbing the liberty of the press, and 
extending the use of the Russian language in the govern- 
ment of the Grand Duchy. 

The trenches having now been pushed forward against 
the outworks of Finnish freedom, an assault was prepared 
against the ramparts — the constitution itself. The as- 
sailants discovered in it a weak point, a lack of clearness in 
the clauses specifying the procedure to be followed in 
matters where common action had to be taken in Finland 
and in Russia. They saw here a chance of setting up an 
independent authority, which, under the guise of inter- 
preting the constitution, could be used for its suspension 
and overthrow. A committee, consisting of six Russians 
and four Finns, was appointed at the close of the year 
11892 to codify laws and take the necessary action. It sat 
at St. Petersburg; but the opposition of the Finnish mem- 
bers, backed up by the public opionion of the whole Duchy, 
sufficed to postpone any definite decision. Probably this 
time of respite was due to the reluctance felt by Alexander 
III. in his closing days to push matters to an extreme. 

The alternating tendencies so well marked in the genera- 
tions of the Romanoff rulers made themselves felt at the 
accession of Nicholas II. (November i, 1894). Lacking 
the almost animal force which carried Alexander III. so 
far in certain grooves, he resembles the earlier sovereigns 
of that name in the generous cosmopolitanism and dreamy 
good-nature which shed an autumnal haze over their 
careers. Unfortunately the reforming Czars have been 
without the grit of the crowned Boyars, who trusted in 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 371 

Cossack, priest, and knout; and too often they have bent 
before the reactionary influences, always strong at the 
Russian Court. To this pecuHarity in the nature of 
Nicholas II. we may probably refer the oscillations in his 
Finnish policy. In the first years of his reign he gradually 
abated the rigour of his father's regime, and allowed greater 
liberty of the press in Finland. The numbcT of articles 
suppressed sank from 216 in the year 1893 to 40 in 1897.1 

The hopes aroused by this display of moderation soon 
vanished. Early in 1898 the appointment of General 
Kuropatkin to the Ministry for War for Russia foreboded 
evil to the Grand Duchy. The new Minister speedily 
counselled the exploitation of the resources of Finland for 
the benefit of the Empire. Already the Russian general 
staff had made efforts in this direction; and now Kuro- 
patkin, supported by the whole weight of the Slavophil 
party, sought to convince the Czar of the danger of leaving 
the Finns with a separate military organisation. A mili- 
tary committee, in which there was only one Finn, the 
Minister Procope, had for some time been sitting at St. 
Petersburg, and finally gained over Nicholas II. to its 
views. He is said to have formed his final decision during 
his winter stay at Livadia in the Crimea, owing to the 
personal intervention of Kuropatkin, and that, too, in face 
of a protest from the Finnish Minister, Procope, against 
the suspension by imperial ukase of a fundamental law of 
the Grand Duchy. The Czar must have known of the 
unlawfulness of the present procedure, for on November 
6-18, 1894, shortly after his accession, he signed the 
following declaration: 

" . . . We have hereby desired to confirm and ratify 
J Pour la Finlctnde, par Jean Deck, p, 36. 



Z7^ The European Nations 

the religion, the fundamental laws, the rights and priv- 
ileges of every class in the said Grand Duchy, in particular, 
and all its inhabitants high and low in general, which they, 
according to the constitution of this country, had enjoyed, 
promising to preserve the same steadfastly and in full 
force." 1 

The military system of Finland having been definitely 
organised by the Finnish law of 1878, that statute clearly 
came within the scope of those "fundamental laws" which 
Nicholas II. had promised to uphold in full force. We can 
imagine, then, the astonishment which fell on the Finnish 
Diet and people on the presentation of the famous Imperial 
Manifesto of February 3-15, 1899. While expressing a 
desire to leave purely Finnish affairs to the consideration 
of the Government and Diet of the Grand Duchy, the Czar 
warned his Finnish subjects that there were others that 
could not be so treated, seeing that they were "closely 
bound up with the needs of the whole Empire." As the 
Finnish constitution pointed out no way of treating such 
subjects, it was needful now to complete the existing in- 
stitutions of the Duchy. The Manifesto proceeded as 
follows : 

"Whilst maintaining in full force the now prevailing 
statutes which concern the promulgation of local laws 
touching exclusively the internal affairs of Finland, We 
have found it necessary to reserve to Ourselves the ultimate 
decision as to which laws come within the scope of the 
general legislation of the Empire. With this in view. We 
have with Our Royal Hand established and confirmed the 

» The Rights of Finland, p. 4 (Stockholm, 1899). See, too, for 
the whole quest'on, Finland and the Tsars, 1809— 1899, by J. R. 
Fisher (London, 2nd ed., 1900). 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 373 

fundamental statutes for the working out, revision, and 
promulgation of laws issued for the Empire, including the 
Grand Duchy of Finland, which are proclaimed simul^ 
taneously herewith." i 

The accompanying enactments made it clear that the 
Finnish Diet would thenceforth have only consultative 
duties in respect to any measure which seemed to the Czar 
to involve the interests of Russia as well as of Finland. In 
fact, the proposals of February 15th struck at the root of 
the constitution, subjecting it in all important matters to 
the will of the autocrat at St. Petersburg. At once the 
Finns saw the full extent of the calamity. They observed 
the following Sunday as a day of mourning; the people 
of Helsingfors, the capital, gathered around the statue of 
Alexander II., the organiser of their liberties, as a mute 
appeal to the generous instincts of his grandson. Every- 
where, even in remote villages, solemn meetings of protest 
were held; but no violent act marred the impressiveness 
of these demonstrations attesting the surprise and grief 
of a loyal people. 

By an almost spontaneous impulse a petition was set on 
foot begging the Czar to reconsider his decision. If ever 
a petition deserved the name "national," it was that of 
Finland. Towns and villages signed almost . en masse. 
Ski-runners braved the hardships of a severe winter in the 
effort to reach remote villages within the Arctic Circle; 
and within five days (March 10-14) 529,931 names were 
signed, the marks of illiterates being rejected. All was in 
vain. The Czar refused to receive the petition, and 
ordered the bearers of it to return home.^ 

' The Rights of Finland, pp. 6-7 ; also in Pour la Finlande, par 
J. Deck, p. 43. * Ibid., pp. 23-30. 



374 The European Nations 

The Russian Governor-General of Finland then began a 
brisk campaign against the Finnish newspapers. Four 
were promptly suppressed, while there were forty-three 
cases of "suspension" in the year 1899 alone. The public 
administration also underwent a drastic process of russifi- 
cation, Finnish officials and policemen being in very many 
cases ousted by Muscovites. Early in the year 1901 local 
postage stamps gave place to those of the Empire. Above 
all, General Kuropatkin was able almost completely to 
carry out his designs against the Finnish army, the law 
of 1 90 1 practically abolishing the old constitutional force 
and compelling Finns to serve in any part of the Empire 
— in defiance of the old statutes which limited their serv- 
ices to the Grand Duchy itself. 

The later developments of this interesting question fall 
without the scope of this volume. We can therefore only 
state that the steadfast opposition of the Finns to these 
illegal proceedings led to still harsher treatment, and that 
the few concessions granted since the outbreak of the 
Japanese War have apparently failed to soothe the resent- 
ment aroused by the former unprovoked attacks upon the 
liberties of Finland. 

One fact, which cannot fail to elicit the attention of 
thoughtful students of contemporary history, is the ab- 
sence of able leaders in the popular struggles of the age. 
Whether we look at the orderly resistance of the Finns, the 
efforts of the Russian revolutionaries, or the fitful efforts 
now and again put forth by the Poles, the same discour- 
aging symptom is everywhere apparent. More than once 
the hour seemed to have struck for the overthrow of the 
old order, but no man appeared. Other instances might, 



Nihilism and Absolutism in Russia 375 

of course, be cited to show that the adage about the hour 
and the man is more picturesque than true. The demo- 
cratic movements of 1848-49 went to pieces largely owing 
to the coyness of the requisite hero. Or, rather, perhaps 
we ought to say that the heroes were there, in the persons 
of Cavour and Garibaldi, Bismarck and Moltke, but no- 
one was at hand to set them in the places which they filled 
so ably in 1858-70. Will the future see the hapless, un- 
guided efforts of to-day championed in an equally master- 
ful way? If so, the next generation may see strange 
things happen in Russia, as also elsewhere. 

Two suggestions may be advanced, with all diffidence, as 
to the reasons for the absence of great leaders in the move- 
ments of to-day. As we noted in the chapter dealing with 
the suppression of the Paris Commune of 1871, the cen- 
tralised governments now have a great material advantage 
in dealing with local disaffection, owing to their control of 
telegraphs, railways, and machine-guns. This fact tells 
with crushing force, not only at the time of popular rising, 
but also on the men who work to that end. Little assur- 
ance was needed in the old days to compass the overthrow 
of Italian Dukes and German Translucencies. To-day he 
would be a man of boundlessly inspiring power who could 
hopefully challenge Czar or Kaiser to a conflict. The 
other advantage which Governments possess is in the in- 
tellectual sphere. There can be no doubt that the mere 
size of the States and Governments of the present age 
exercises a deadening effect on the minds of individuals. 
As the vastness of London produces inertia in civic affairs, 
so, too, the great Empires tend to deaden the initiative 
and boldness of their subjects. Those priceless qualities 
are always seen to greatest advantage in small states like 



376 The European Nations 

the Athens of Pericles, the England of Elizabeth, or the 
Geneva of Rousseau; they are stifled under the pyramidal 
mass of the Empire of the Czars ; and as a result there is 
seen a respectable mediocrity, equal only to the task of 
organising street demonstrations and abortive mutinies. 
It may be that in the future some commanding genius will 
arise, able to free himself from the paralysing incubus, to 
fire the dull masses with hope, and to turn the very vast- 
ness of the governmental machine into a means of de- 
struction. But, for that achievement, he will need the 
magnetism of a Mirabeau, the savagery of a Marat, and 
the organising powers of a Bonaparte. 



END OF VOLUME 1 



CHAPTER I 

THE TRIPLE AND DUAL ALLIANCES 

"International policy is a fluid element which, under certain 
conditions, will solidify, but, on a change of atmosphere, reverts to 
its original condition." — Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences. 

IT is one thing to build up a system of states ; it is quite 
another thing to guarantee their existence. As in the 
life of individuals, so in that of nations, longevity is gener- 
ally the result of a sound constitution, a healthy environ- 
ment, and prudent conduct. That the new States of 
Europe possessed the first two of these requisites will be 
obvious to all who remember that they are co-extensive 
with those great limbs of Humanity, nations. Yet even 
so they needed protection from the intrigues of jealous 
dynasties and of dispossessed princes or priests, which 
have so often doomed promising experiments to failure. 
It is therefore essential to our present study to observe the 
means which endowed the European system with stability. 
Here again the master-builder was Bismarck. As he had 
concentrated all the powers of his mind on the completion 
of German unity (with its natural counterpart in Italy), 

VOL. II. 1 



2 The European Nations 

so, too, he kept them on the stretch for its preservation. 
For two decades his poHcy bestrode the continent like a 
Colossus. It rested on two supporting ideas. The one 
was the maintenance of alliance with Russia, which had 
brought the events of the years 1863-70 within the bounds 
of possibility; the other aim was the isolation of France. 
Subsidiary notions now and again influenced him, as in 
1884 when he sought to make bad blood between Russia 
and England in Central Asian affairs (see Chapter III.), 
or to busy all the Powers in colonial undertakings; but 
these considerations were secondary to the two main 
motives, which at one point converged and begot a haunt- 
ing fear (the realisation of which overclouded his last years) 
that Russia and France would unite against Germany. 

In order, as he thought, to obviate for ever a renewal of 
the "policy of Tilsit" of the year 1807, he sought to favour 
the establishment of the Republic in France. In his eyes, 
the more radical it was, the better; and when Count von 
Amim, the German Ambassador at Paris, ventured to con- 
travene his instructions in this matter, he subjected him 
to severe reproof and finally to disgrace. However harsh 
in his methods, Bismarck was undoubtedly right in sub- 
stance. The main consideration was that which he set forth 
in his letter of December 20, 1872, to the Count: "We 
want France to leave us in peace, and we have to prevent 
France's finding an ally if she does not keep the peace. As 
long as France has no allies she is not dangerous to Ger- 
many." A monarchical reaction, he thought, might lead 
France to accord with Russia or Austria. A republic of 
the type sought for by Gambetta could never achieve that 
task. Better, then, the red flag waving at Paris than the 
fieur-de-lys. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 3 

Still more important was it to bring about complete ac- 
cord between the three Empires. Here again the red 
spectre proved to be useful. Various signs seemed to 
point to socialism as the common enemy of them all. The 
doctrines of Bakunin, Herzen, and Lassalle had already 
begun to work threateningly in their midst, and Bismarck 
discreetly used this community of interest in one particular 
to bring about an agreement on matters purely political. 
In the month of September, 1872, he realised one of his 
dearest hopes. The Czar, Alexander II., and the Austrian 
Emperor, Francis Joseph, visited Berlin, where they were 
most cordially received. At that city the Chancellors of 
the three Emjjires exchanged official memoranda — there 
seems to have been no formal treaty 1 — whereby they 
agreed to work together for the following purposes: the 
maintenance of the boundaries recently laid down, the 
settlement of problems arising from the Eastern Question, 
and the repression of revolutionary movements in Europe. 

Such was the purport of the Three Emperors' League of 
1872. There is little doubt that Bismarck had worked on 
the Czar, always nervous as to the growth of the Nihilist 
movement in Russia, in order to secure his adhesion to 
the first two provisions of the new compact, which cer- 
tainly did not benefit Russia. The German Chancellor 
has since told us that, as early as the month of September, 
1870, he sought to form such a league, with the addi- 
tion of the newly united Italian realm, in order to safe- 
guard the interests of monarchy against republicans and 

1 In his speech of February 19, 1878, Bismarck said: "The 
liaison of the three Emperors, which is habitually designated an 
alliance, rests on no written agreement and does not compel any- 
one of the three Emperors to submit to the decisions of the two 
others." 



4 The European Nations 

revolutionaries.^ After the lapse of two years his wish took 
effect, though Italy as yet did not join the cause of order. 
The new league stood forth as the embodiment of autocracy 
and a terror to the dissatisfied, whether revengeful Gauls, 
Danes, or Poles, intriguing cardinals — it was the time of 
the " May Laws" — or excited men who waved the red flag. 
It was a new version of the Holy Alliance formed after 
Waterloo by the monarchs of the very same Powers, which, 
under the plea of watching against French enterprises, 
succeeded in bolstering up despotism on the Continent for 
a whole generation. 

Fortunately for the cause of liberty, the new league had 
little of the solidity of its predecessor. Either because the 
dangers against which it guarded were less serious, or 
owing to the jealousies which strained its structure from 
within, signs of weakness soon appeared, and the imposing 
fabric was disfigured by cracks which all the plastering of 
diplomatists failed to conceal. An eminent Russian his- 
torian, M. Tatischeff, has recently discovered the hidden 
divulsive agency. It seems that, not long after the forma- 
tion of the Three Emperors' League, Germany and Austria 
secretly formed a separate compact, whereby the former 
agreed eventually to secure to the latter due compensation 
in the Balkan Peninsula for her losses in the wars of 1859 
and 1866 (Lombardy, Venetia, and the control of the Ger- 
man Confederation, along with Holstein).^ 

That is, the two Central Powers in 1872 secretly agreed 
to take action in the way in which Austria advanced in 
1877-78, when she secured Herzegovina. When and to 

' Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de I'Europe, ii., pp. 458-459; 
Bismarck, Rejections and Reminiscences, vii., chap. xxix. 

2 The Emperor Alexander II.: His Life and Reign, by S. S. 
Tatischeff (St. Petersburg, 1903), Appendix to vol. ii. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 5 

what extent Rtissian diplomatists became aware of this 
separate agreement is not known, but their suspicion or 
their resentment appears to have prompted them to the 
unfriendly action towards Germany which they took in 
the year 1875. According to the Bismarck Reflections and 
Reminiscences, the Russian Chancellor, Prince Gortcha- 
koff , felt so keenly jealous of the rapid rise of the German 
Chancellor to fame and pre-eminence as to spread "the 
lie" that Germany was about to fall upon France. Even 
the uninitiated reader might feel some surprise that the 
Russian Chancellor should have endangered the peace of 
Europe and his own credit as a statesman for so slight a 
motive; but it now seems that Bismarck's assertion must 
be looked on as a "reflection," not as a "reminiscence." 

The same remark may perhaps apply to his treatment 
of the "affair of 1875," which largely determined the future 
groupings of the Powers. At that time the recovery of 
France from the wounds of 1870 was well-nigh complete; 
her military and constitutional systems were taking con- 
crete form; and in the early part of the year 1875 the 
Chambers decreed a large increase to the armed forces in 
the form of "the fourth battalions." At once the military 
party at Berlin took alarm, and through their chief, 
Moltke, pressed on the Emperor William the need of 
striking promptly at France. The Republic, so they 
argued, could not endure the strain which it now volun- 
tarily underwent; the outcome must be war; and war at 
once would be the most statesmanlike and merciful course. 
Whether the Emperor in any way acceded to these views 
is not known. He is said to have more than once expressed 
a keen desire to end his reign in peace. 

The part which Bismarck played at this crisis is also 



6 The European Nations 

somewhat obscure. If the German Government wished 
to attack France, the natural plan would have been to keep 
that design secret until the time for action arrived.- But 
it did not do so. Early in the month of April, von Rado- 
witz, a man of high standing at the Court of Berlin, took 
occasion to speak to the French Ambassador, de Gontaut- 
Biron, at a ball, and warned him in the most significant 
manner of the danger of war owing to the increase of 
French armaments. According to de Blowitz, the Paris 
correspondent of the Times (who had his information 
direct from the French Premier, the Due Decazes), Ger- 
many intended to "bleed France white" by compelling 
her finally to pay ten milliards of francs in twenty instal- 
ments, and by keeping an army of occupation in her 
Eastern Departments until the last half-milliard was paid. 
The French Ambassador also states in his account of these 
stirring weeks that Bismarck had mentioned to the Belgian 
envoy the impossibility of France keeping up armaments, 
the outcome of which must be war.^ 

As Radowitz continued in favour with Bismarck, his dis- 
closure of German intentions seems to have been made with 
the Chancellor's approval ; and we may explain his actions 
as either a threat to compel France to reduce her army, a 
provocation to lead her to commit some indiscretion, or 
a means of undermining the plans of the German military 
party. Leaving these questions on one side, we may note 
that Gontaut-Biron's report to the Due Decazes produced 
the utmost anxiety in official circles at Paris. The Duke 
took the unusual step of confiding the secret to Blowitz, 

' De Blowitz, Memoirs, chap, v.; An Ambassador of the Van- 
quished (ed. by the Due de Broglie), pp. i8o et seq. Probably the 
article "Krieg in Sicht," published in the Berlin Post of April 15, 
1875, was "inspired." 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 7 

showed him the document, along with other proofs of 
German preparations for war, and requested him to pub- 
Hsh the chief facts in the Times. Delane, the editor of 
the Times, having investigated the affair, published the 
information on May 4th. It produced an immense sensa- 
tion. The Continental press denounced it as an impudent 
fabrication designed to bring on war. We now know that 
it was substantially correct. Meanwhile Marshal Mac- 
Mahon and the Due Decazes had taken steps to solicit the 
help of the Czar if need arose. They despatched to St. 
Petersburg General Lefi6, armed with proofs of the hostile 
designs of the German military chiefs. A perusal of them 
convinced Alexander II. of the seriousness of the situation; 
and he assured Lefio of his resolve to prevent an unpro- 
voked attack on France. He was then about to visit his 
uncle, the German Emperor; and there is little doubt that 
his influence at Berlin helped to end the crisis. 

Other influences were also at work, emanating from 
Queen Victoria and the British Government. It is well 
known that Her late Majesty wrote to the Emperor William 
stating that it would be "easy to prove her fears [of a 
Franco-German war] were not exaggerated." 1 The source 
of her information is now known to have been unexcep- 
tionable. It reached the British Foreign Office through the 
medium of German Ambassadors. Such is the story im- 
parted by Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador at 
Berlin, to his brother, and by him communicated to Sir 
Mountstuart Grant Duff. It concerns an interview be- 
tween Gortchakoff and Bismarck in which the German 
Chancellor inveighed against the Russian Prince for blurt- 

' Bismarck: Reflections, tetc, ii., pp. 191— 193, 249—253 (Eng. 
ed.); the Bismarck Jahrbuch, iv., p. 35. 



8 The European Nations 

ing out, at a State banquet held the day before, the news 
that he had received a letter from Queen Victoria, begging 
him to work in the interests of peace. Bismarck thereafter 
sharply upbraided Gortchakoff for this amazing indiscre- 
tion. Lord Odo Russell was present at their interview in 
order to support the Russian Chancellor, who parried Bis- 
marck's attack by affecting a paternal interest in his health : 
'Come, come, my dear Bismarck, be calm. You know 
that I am very fond of you. I have known you since your 
childhood. But I do not like you when you are hysterical. 
Come, you are going to be hysterical. Pray be calm: 
come, come, my dear fellow.' A short time after this 
interview Bismarck complained to Odo of 'the preposterous 
folly and ignorance of the English and all other Cabinets, 
who had mistaken stories got up for speculations on the 
Bourse for the true policy of the German Government.' 
' Then will you,' asked Odo, ' censure your four ambassadors 
who have misled us and the other Powers?' Bismarck 
made no reply." i 

It seems, then, that the German Chancellor had no 
ground for suspicion against the Crown Princess as having 
informed Queen Victoria of the suggested attack on France ; 
but thenceforth he had an intense dislike of these august 
ladies, and lost no opportunity of maligning them in 
diplomatic circles and through the medium of the press. 
Yet, while nursing resentful thoughts against Queen Vic- 
toria, her daughter, and the British Ministry, the German 
Chancellor reserved his wrath mainly for his personal rival 
at St. Petersburg. The publication of Gortchakoff 's cir- 

' Sir M. Grant Duflf, Notes from a Diary, 1886-88, i., p. 129. 
See, too, other proofs of the probability of an attack by Germany 
on France in Professor Geflfcken's Frankreich, Russland, und der 
Dreibund, pp. 90 et seq. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 9 

cular despatch of May lo. 1S75, beginning with the words 
" Maintenant la paix est assuree," was in his eyes the crown- 
ing offence. 

The result was the beginning of a good understanding 
between Russia and France, and the weakening of the 
Three Emperors' League. ^ That league went to pieces for 
a time amidst the disputes at the Berlin Congress on the 
Eastern Question, where Germany's support of Austria's 
resolve to limit the sphere of Muscovite influence robbed 
the Czar of prospective spoils and placed a rival Power as 
"sentinel on the Balkans." Further, when Germany 
favoured Austrian interests in the many matters of detail 
that carne up for settlement in those States, the rage in 
Russian official circles knew no bounds. Newspapers like 
the Journal de St. Petershourg, the Russki Mir, and the 
Golos, daily poured out the vials of their wrath against 
everything German ; and that prince of publicists, Katkoff, 
with his coadjutor, Elie de Cyon, moved heaven and earth 
in the endeavour to prove that Bismarck alone had pushed 
Russia on to war with Turkey, and then had intervened to 
rob her of the fruits of victory. Amidst these clouds of 
invective, friendly hands were thrust forth from Paris and 
Moscow, and the effusive salutations of the would-be 
statesmen marked the first beginnings of the present 
alliance. A Russian General — Obretchoff — went to Paris 
and "sounded the leading personages in Paris respecting a 
Franco-Russian alliance." ^ 

Clearly, it was high time for the two Central Powers to 
draw together. There was little to hinder their rapproche- 
ment. Bismarck's clemency to the Hapsburg Power in the 

« Histoire de renienle Franco-Russe, by Elie de Cyon, ch. i. (1895), 
' Our Chancelior, by M. Busch, ii., pp. 137-138. 



lo The European Nations 

hour of Prussia's triumph in 1866 now bore fruit; for when 
Russia sent a specific demand that the Court of Berlin 
must cease to support Austrian interests or forfeit the 
friendship of Russia, the German Chancellor speedily 
came to an understanding with Count Andrassy in an in- 
terview at Gastein on August 27-28, 1879. At first it had 
reference only to a defensive alliance against an attack 
by Russia, Count Andrassy, then about to retire from 
his arduous duties, declining to extend the arrange- 
raent to an attack by another Power — obviously France. 
The plan of the Austro-German alliance was secretly sub- 
mitted by Bismarck to the King of Bavaria, who signified 
his complete approval. 1 It received a warm welcome 
from the Hapsburg Court ; and, when the secret leaked out, 
Bismarck had enthusiastic greetings on his journey to 
Vienna and thence northwards to Berlin. The reason is 
obvious. For the first time in modern histor}^ the centre 
of Europe seemed about to form a lasting compact, strong 
enough to impose respect on the restless extremities. That 
of 18 13 and 18 14 had aimed only at the driving of Napoleon 
from Germany. The present alliance had its roots in more 
abiding needs. 

Strange to say, the chief obstacle was Kaiser Wilhelm 
himself. The old sovereign had very many claims on the 
gratitude of the German race, for his staunchness of char- 
acter, singleness of aim, and homely good sense had made 
the triumphs of his reign possible. But the newer light of 
to-d^jr reveals the limitations of his character. He never 
saw far ahead, and even in his survey of the present 
situation Prussian interests and family considerations held 
far too large a space. It was so now. Against the wishes 
iBismarck: Reflections and Reminiscences, ii., pp. 251-289. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 1 1 

of his Chancellor, he went to meet the Czar at Alexandrovo ; 
and while the Austro-German compact took form at Gas- 
tein and Vienna, Czar and Kaiser were assuring each other 
of their unchanging friendship. Doubtless Alexander II. 
was sincere in these professions of affection for his august 
uncle; but Bismarck paid more heed to the fact that 
Russia had recently made large additions to her army, 
while dense clouds of her horsemen hung about the Polish 
border, ready to flood the Prussian plains. He saw 
safety only by opposing force to force. As he said to his 
secretary, Busch: "When we [Germany and Austria] are 
united, with our two million soldiers back to back, they 
[the Russians] with their Nihilism will doubtless think 
twice before disturbing the peace." Finally the Emperor 
William agreed to the Austro-German compact, provided 
that the Czar should be informed that if he attacked 
Austria he would be opposed by both Powers.^ 

It was not until November 5, 1887, that the terms of the 
treaty were made known, and then through the medium 
of the Times. The official publication did not take place 
until February 3, 1888, at Berlin, Vienna, and Buda-Pesth. 
The compact provides that if either Germany or Austria 
shall be attacked by Russia, each Power must assist its 
neighbour with all its forces. If, however, the attack 
shall come from any other Power, the ally is pledged 
merely to observe neutrality; and not until Russia enters 
the field is the ally bound to set its armies in motion. 
Obviously the second case implies an attack by France on 
Germany; in that case Austria would remain neutral, 
carefully watching the conduct of Russia. As far as is 

» Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, by M. Busch, ii., 
p. 404; Bismarck: Reflections and Reminiscences, ii., p. 268. 



12 The European Nations 

known, the treaty does not provide for joint action, or 
mutual support, in regard to the Eastern Question, still 
less in matters further afield. 

In order to give pause to Russia, Bismarck even in- 
dulged in a passing flirtation with England. At the close 
of 1879, Lord Dufferin, then British Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg, was passing through Berlin, and the Chancellor 
invited him to his estate at Varzin, and informed him that 
Russian overtures had been made to France through 
General Obretcheff, "but Chanzy [French Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg] having reported that Russia was not 
ready, the French Government became less disposed than 
ever to embark on an adventurous policy." ^ 

To the end of his days Bismarck maintained that the 
Austro-German alliance did not imply the lapse of the 
Three Emperors' League, but that the new compact, by 
making a Russian attack on Austria highly dangerous, if 
not impossible, helped to prolong the life of the old alliance. 
Obviously, however, the League was a mere "loud-sound- 
ing nothing" (to use a phrase of Mettemich's) when two 
of its members had to unite to guard the weakest of the 
trio against the most aggressive. In the spirit of that 
statesmanlike utterance of Prince Bismarck quoted as 
motto at the head of this chapter, we may say that the old 
Triple Alliance slowly dissolved under the influence of new 
atmospheric conditions. The three Emperors met for 
friendly intercourse in 1881, 1884, and 1885; and at or 
after the meeting of 1884, a Russo-German agreement was 
formed, by which the two Powers promised to observe a 
friendly neutrality in case either was attacked by a third 

« The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, by Sir A. Lyall 
(1905), i., p. 304. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 13 

Power. Probably the Afghan question, or Nihilism, 
brought Russia to accept Bismarck's advances; but when 
the fear of an Anglo-Russian war passed away, and the 
revolutionists were curbed, this agreement fell to the 
ground; and after the fall of Bismarck the compact was 
not renewed.! 

It will be well now to turn to the events which brought 
Italy into line with the Central Powers and thus laid the 
foundation of the Triple Alliance of to-day. 

The complex and uninteresting annals of Italy after the 
completion of her unity do not concern us here. The men 
whose achievements had ennobled the struggle for in- 
dependence passed away in quick succession after the 
capture of Rome for the national cause. Mazzini died in 
March, 1872, at Pisa, mourning that united Italy was so 
largely the outcome of foreign help and monarchical bar- 
gainings. Garibaldi spent his last years in fulminating 
against the Government of Victor Emmanuel. The soldier- 
king himself passed away in January, 1878, and his relent- 
less opponent Pius IX. expired a month later. The 
accession of Umberto I. and the election of Leo XIII. 
promised at first to assuage the feud between the Vatican 
and the Quirinal, but neither the tact of the new sovereign 
nor the personal suavity of the Pope brought about any 
real change. Italy remained a prey to the schism between 
Church and State. A further cause of weakness was the 
unfitness of many parts of the Peninsula for constitu- 
tional rule. Naples and the south were a century behind 
the north in all that made for civic efficiency, the taint of 

' On October 24, 1896, the Hamburger Nachrichten, a paper often 
inspired by Bismarck, gave some information (all that is known) 
about this shadowy agreement. 



14 The European Nations 

favouritism and corruption having spread from the govern- 
ing circles to all classes of society. Clearly the time of 
wooing had been too short and feverish to lead up to a 
placid married life. 

During this period of debt and disenchantment came 
news of a- slight inflicted by the Latin sister of the north. 
France had seized Tunis, a land on which Italian patriots 
looked as theirs by reversion, whereas the exigencies of 
statecraft assigned it to the French. It seeins that during 
the Congress of Berlin (June-July, 1878) Bismarck and 
Lord Salisbury unofficially dropped suggestions that their 
Governments would raise no objections to the occupation 
of Tunis by France. According to de Blowitz, Bismarck 
there took an early opportunity of seeing Lord Beacons- 
field and of pointing out the folly of England quarrelling 
with Russia, when she might arrange matters more peace- 
ably and profitably with her. England, said he, should 
let Russia have Constantinople and take Egypt in ex- 
change; "France would not prove inexorable — besides, 
one might give her Tunis or Syria." ^ Another Congress 
story is to the effect that Lord Salisbury, on hearing of the 
annoyance felt in France at England's control over Cyprus, 
sp-id to M. Waddington at Berlin: " Do what you like with 
Tunis; England will raise no objections." A little later, 
the two Governments came to a written understanding 
that France might occupy Tunis at a convenient oppor- 
tunity. 

The seizure of Tunis by France aroused all the more 
annoyance in Italy owing to the manner of its accom- 
plishment. On May 11, 1881, when a large expedition was 

1 De Blowitz, Memoirs, ch. vi. ; also Busch, Our Chancellor, ii., 
pp. 92-93. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 15 

being prepared in her southern ports, M. Barthelemy de 
St. Hilaire disclaimed all idea of annexation, and asserted 
that the sole aim of France was the chastisement of a 
troublesome border tribe, the Kroumirs; but on the entry 
of the "red breeches" into Kairwan and the collapse of the 
Moslem resistance, the official assurance proved to be as 
unsubstantial as the inroads of the Kroumirs. Despite 
the protests that came from Rome and Constantinople, 
France virtually annexed that land, though the Sultan's 
representative, the Bey, still retains the shadow of author- 
ity.i 

In vain did King Umberto's Ministers appeal to Berlin 
for help against France. They received the reply that the 
affair had been virtually settled at the time of the Berlin 
Congress. 2 The resentment produced by these events in 
Italy led to the fall of the Cairoli Ministry, which had been 
too credulous of French assurances ; and Depretis took the 
helm of State. Seeing that Bismarck had confessed his 
share in encouraging France to take Tunis, Italy's rap- 
prochement to Germany might seem to be unnatural. It 
was so. In truth, her alliance with the Central Powers was 
based, not on good will to them, but on resentment against 
France. The Italian Nationalists saw in Austria the 
former oppressor, and still raised the cry of Italia irredenta 
for the recovery of the Italian districts of Tyrol, Istria, and 

1 It transpired later on that Barthelemy de St. Hilaire did not 
know of the extent of the aims of the French military party, and 
that these subsequent!}' gained the day; but this does not absolve 
the Cabinet and him of bad faith. Later on France fortified 
Bizerta, in contravention (so it is said) of an understanding with 
the British Government that no part of that coast should be for- 
tified. 

2 Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart, for 1881, p. 176; quoted by 
Lowe, Life of Bismarck, ii., p. 133. 



1 6 The European Nations 

Dalmatia. In January, 1880, we find Bismarck writing: 
"Italy must not be numbered to-day among the peace- 
loving and conservative Powers, who must reckon with 
this fact. . . . We have much more ground to fear 
that Italy will join our adversaries than to hope that she 
will unite with us, seeing that we have, no more induce- 
ments to offer her." 1 

This frame of mind changed after the French acquisition 

of Tunis. 

Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes 

should have been the feeling of MM. Waddington and Ferry 
when Bismarck encouraged them to undertake that easiest 
but most expensive of conquests. The nineteenth century 
offers, perhaps,, no more successful example of Macchiavel- 
lian statecraft. The estrangement of France and Italy 
postponed at any rate for a whole generation, possibly for 
the present age, that war of revenge in which up to the 
spring of 1881 the French might easily have gained the 
help of Italy. Thenceforth they had to reckon on her 
hostility. The irony of the situation was enhanced by the 
fact that the Tunis affair, with the recriminations, to which 
it led, served to bring to power at Paris the very man who 
could best have marshalled the French people against 
Germany. 

Gambetta was the incarnation of the spirit of revenge. 
On more than one occasion he had abstained from taking 
high office in the shifting Ministries of the seventies; and 
it seems likely that by this calculating coyness he sought 
to keep his influence intact, not for the petty personal ends 
which have often been alleged, but rather with a view to 
the more effective embattling of all the national energies 
> Bismarck: Some Secret Pages, etc., iii., p. 291. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 17 

against Germany. Good will to England and to the Latin 
peoples, hostility to the Power which had torn Elsass- 
Lothringen from France, such was the policy of Gambetta. 
He had therefore protested, though in vain, against the 
expedition to Tunis; and now, on his accession to power 
(November 9, 1881), he found Italy sullenly defiant, while 
he and his Radical friends could expect no help from the 
new autocrat of all the Russias. All hope of a war of re- 
venge proved to be futile; and he himself fell from powei 
on January 26,. 1882. ^ The year to which he looked for- 
ward with high hopes proved to be singularly fatal to the 
foes of Germany. The armed intervention of Britain in 
Egypt turned the thoughts of Frenchmen from the Rhine 
to the Nile. Skobeleff, the arch enemy of all things 
Teutonic, passed away in the autumn; and its closing 
days witnessed the death of Gambetta at the hands of his 
mistress. 

The resignation of Gambetta having slackened the ten- 
sion between Germany and France, Bismarck displayed 
less desire for the alliance of Italy. Latterly, as a move in 
the German parliamentary game, he had coquetted with 
the Vatican ; and as a result of this off-hand behaviour, 
Italy was slow in coming to accord with the Central Powers. 
Nevertheless, her resentment respecting Tunis overcame 
her annoyance at Bismarck's procedure; and on May 20, 
1882, treaties were signed which bound Italy to the Central 
Powers for a term of five years. Their conditions have not 
been published, but there are good grounds for thinking 
that the three allies reciprocally guaranteed the possession 
of their present territories, agreed to resist attack on the 

1 Seignobos, A Political History of Contemporary Europe, i., p. 210 
(Eng. ed.). 



1 8 The European Nations 

lands of any one of them, and stipulated the amount of 
aid to be rendered by each in case of hostilities with France 
or Russia, or both Powers combined. Subsequent events 
would seem to show that the Roman Government gained 
from its northern allies no guarantee whatever for its 
colonial policy, or for the maintenance of the balance of 
power in the Mediterranean. i 

Very many Italians have sharply qtiestioned the value 
of the Triple Alliance to their country. Probably, when 
the truth comes fully to light, it will be found that the 
King and his Ministers needed some solid guarantee 
against the schemes of the Vatican to drive the monarchy 
from Rome. The relations between the Vatican and the 
Quirinal were very strained in the year 1882; and the 
alliance of Italy with Austria removed all fear of the 
Hapsburgs acting on behalf of the Jesuits and other 
clerical intriguers. The annoyance with which the clerical 
party in Italy received the news of the alliance shows that 
it must have interfered with their schemes. Another ex- 
planation is that Italy actually feared an attack from 
France in 1882 and sought protection from the Central 
Powers. We may add that on the renewal of the Triple 
Alliance in 1891, Italy pledged herself to send two corps 
through Tyrol to fight the French on their eastern frontier 
if they attacked Germany. But it is said that that clause 
was omitted from the treaty on its last renewal, in 1902. 

The accession of Italy to the Austro-German Alliance 

gave pause to Russia. The troubles with the Nihilists 

also indisposed Alexander III. from attempting any rash 

> For the Triple Alliance see the Rev. des deux Mondes, May i, 
1883; also Chiala, Storia Contemporanea — La Triplice e la Duplice 
Alleanza (1898). 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 19 

adventures, especially in concert with a democratic Repub- 
lic which changed its Ministers every few months. His 
hatred of the Republic as the symbol of democracy equalled 
his distrust of it as a political kaleidoscope ; and more than 
once he rejected the idea of a rapprochement to the western 
Proteus because of "the absence of any personage author- 
ised to assume the responsibility for a treaty of alliance." ^ 
These were the considerations, doubtless, which led him to 
dismiss the warlike Ignatieff, and to entrust the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to a hard-headed diplomatist, de Giers 
(June 12, 1882). His policy was peaceful and decidedly 
opposed to the Slavophil propaganda of Katkoff, who now 
for a time lost favour. 

For the present, then, Germany was safe. Russia turned 
her energies against England and achieved the easy and 
profitable triumphs in Central Asia which nearly brought 
her to war with the British Government (see Chapter 
III.). 

In the year 1884 Bismarck gained another success in 
bringing about the signature of a treaty of alliance between 
the three Empires. It was signed on March 24, 1884, at 
Berlin, but was not ratified until September, during a 
meeting of the three Emperors at Skiemowice. M. Elie 
de Cyon gives its terms as follows: (i) If one of the three 
contracting parties makes war on a fourth Power, the other 
two will maintain a benevolent neutrality. (To this Bis- 
marck sought to add a corollary, that if two of them made 
war on a fourth Power, the third would equally remain 
neutral; but the Czar is said to have rejected this, in the 
interests of France.) (2) In case of a conflict in the Balkan 
Peninsula, the three Powers shall consult their own interests ; 
> Elie de Cyon, op. cit., p. 38. 



20 The European Nations 

and in the case of disagreement the third Power shall 
give a casting vote. (A protocol added here that Austria 
might annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and occupy N vi- 
Bazar.) (3) The former special treaties between Russia 
and Germany, or Russia and Austria, are annulled. (4) 
The three Powers will supervise the execution of the terms 
of the Treaty of Berlin respecting Turkey ; and if the Porte 
allows a fourth Power (evidently England) to enter the 
Dardanelles, it will incur the hostility of one of the three 
Powers (Russia). (5) They will not oppose the union of 
Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia "if it comes about by the 
force of circumstances"; and will not allow Turkey to 
fortify the Balkan Passes. Finalh^ by Article 6, they 
forbid any one of the contracting Powers to occupy the 
Balkan Principalities. The compact held good only for 
three years. 

If these tenns are correctly stated, the treaty was a great 
triumph for Austria and Germany at the expense of Russia. 
It is not surprising that the Czar finally broke away from 
the constraint imposed by the Skiernewice compact. As 
we have seen, his conduct towards Bulgaria in 1885-86 
brought him very near to a conflict with the Central 
Powers. The mystery is why he ever joined them on 
terms so disadvantageous. The explanation would seem 
to be that, like the King of Italy, he felt an alliance with 
the "conservative" Powers of Central Europe to be some 
safeguard against the revolutionary elements then so 
strong in Russia. 

In the years 1886-87 that danger became less acute, and 
the dictates of self-interest in foreign affairs resumed their 
normal sway. At the beginning of the year 1887 Katkoff 
regained his influence over the mind of the Czar by con- 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 21 

vincing him that the troubles in the Balkan Peninsula 
were fomented by the statesmen of Berlin and Vienna in 
order to distract his attention from Franco-German affairs. 
Let Russia and France join hands, said Katkoff in effect, 
and then Russia would have a free hand in Balkan politics 
and could lay down the law in European matters generally. 

In France the advantage of a Russian alliance was being 
loudly asserted by General Boulanger— then nearing the 
zenith of his popularity — as also by that brilliant leader 
of society, Mme. Adam, and a cluster of satellites in the 
press. Even de Giers bowed before the idea of the hour, 
and allowed the newspaper which he inspired, Le Nord, to 
use these remarkable words (February 20, 1887): 

"Henceforth Russia will watch the events on the Rhine, 
and relegates the Eastern Question to the second place. 
The interests of Russia forbid her, in case of another 
Franco-German war, observing the same benevolent neu- 
trality which she previously observed. The Cabinet of 
St. Petersburg , will in no case permit a further weakening 
of France. In order to keep her freedom of action for 
this case, Russia will avoid all conflict with Austria and 
England, and will allow events to take their course in 
Bulgaria." 

Thus, early in the year 1887, the tendency towards that 
equilibrium of the Powers, which is the great fact of recent 
European history, began to exercise a sedative effect on 
Russian policy in Bulgaria and in Central Asia. That 
year saw the delimitation of the Russo-Afghan border, 
and the adjustment in Central Asian affairs of a bal- 
ance corresponding to the equilibrium soon to be reached 
in European politics. That, too, was the time when 
Bulgaria began firmly and successfully to assert her 



22 The European Nations 

independence and to crush every attempt at a rising on 
the part of her Russophil officers. This was seen after an 
attempt which they made at Rustchuk, when Stambuloff 
condemned nine of them to death. The Russian Govern- 
ment having recalled all its agents from Bulgaria, the task 
of saving these rebels devolved on the German Consuls, 
who were then doing duty for Russia. Their efforts were 
futile, and Katkoff used their failure as a means of poison- 
ing the Czar's mind not only against Germany, but also 
against de Giers, who had suggested the supervision of 
Russian interests by German Consuls. i 

Another incident of the springtide of 1887 kindled the 
Czar's anger against the Teutons more fiercely and with 
more reason. On April 20th, a- French police commissioner, 
Schnaebele, was arrested by two German agents or spies 
on the Alsacian border in a suspiciously brutal manner, 
and thrown into prison. Far from soothing the profound 
irritation which this affair produced in France, Bismarck 
poured oil upon the flames a few days later by a speech 
which seemed designed to extort from France a declaration 
of war. That, at least, was the impression produced on 
the mind of Alexander III., who took the unusual step of 
sending an autograph letter to the Emperor William I. 
He, in his turn, without referring the matter to Bismarck, 
gave orders for the instant release of Schnaebele. ^ Thus 
the incident closed ; but the disagreeable impression which 
it created ended all chance of renewing the Three Em- 
perors' League. The Skiemewice compact, which had 
been formed for three years, therefore came to an end. 

' Elie de Cyon, op. cit., p. 274. 

2 See the Nouvelle Revue for April 15, 1890, for Cyon's version of 
the whole affair, which is treated with prudent brevity by Oncken, 
Blum, and Delbriick. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 23 

Already, if we may trust the imperfect information yet 
available, France and Russia had sought to break up the 
Triple Alliance. In the closing weeks of 1886 de Giers 
sought to entice Italy into a compact with Russia with a 
view to an attack on the Central States (her treaty with 
them expired in the month of May following), and pointed 
to Trieste and the Italian districts of Istria as a reward tor 
this treachery. The French Government is also believed 
to have made similar overtures, holding out the Trentino 
(the southern part of Tyrol) as the bait. Signor Depretis. 
true to the policy of the Triple Alliance, repelled these 
offers — an act of constancy all the more creditable seeing 
that Bismarck had on more than one occasion shown scant 
regard for the interests of Italy. 

Even now he did little to encourage the King's Gov- 
ernment to renew the alliance framed in 1882. Events 
however, again brought the Roman 'Cabinet to seek for 
support. The Italian enterprise in Abyssinia had long been 
a drain on the treasury, and the annihilation of a force by 
those warlike mountaineers on January 26, 1887, sent a 
thrill of horror through the Peninsula. The internal 
situation was also far from promising. The breakdown 
of the attempts at compromise between the monarchy and 
Pope Leo XIII. revealed the adamantine hostility of the 
Vatican to the King's Government in Rome. A prey to 
these discouragements, King Umberto and his advisers 
were willing to renew the Triple Alliance (March, 1887), 
though on terms no more advantageous than before. 
Signor Depretis, the chief champion of the alliance, died in 
July ; but Signor Crispi, who thereafter held office, proved 
to be no less firm in its support. After a visit to Prince 
Bismarck at his abode of Friedrichsruh, near Hamburg. 



24 . The European Nations 

the Italian Prime Minister came back a convinced Teuto- 
phil, and announced that Italy adhered to the Central 
Powers in order to assure peace to Europe. 

Crispi also hinted that the naval support of England 
might be forthcoming if Italy were seriously threatened; 
and when the naval preparations at Toulon seemed to 
portend a raid on the ill-protected dockyard of Spezzia, 
British warships took up positions at Genoa in order to 
render help if it were needed. This incident led to a dis- 
cussion in the Neu£ Freie Presse of Vienna, owing to a 
speech made by Signor Chiala at Rome. Mr. Labouchert 
also, on February lo, 1888, sharply questioned Sir James 
Fergusson in the House of Commons on the alleged under- 
standing between England and Italy. All information, 
however, was refused. ^ 

Next to nothing, then, is known on the interesting ques- 
tion how far the British Government went in framing an 
agreement with Italy, and, through her, with the Triple 
Alliance. We can only conjecture the motives which in- 
duced the Salisbury Cabinet to make a strategic turn 
towards that "conservative" alliance, and yet not defi- 
nitely join it. The isolation of England proved, in the 
sequel, to be not only a source of annoyance to the Con- 
tinental Powers but of weakness to herself, because her 
statesmen failed to use to the full the potential advantages 
of their position at the middle of the see-saw. Bismarck's 
dislike of England was not incurable; he was never a 
thorough-going "colonial"; and it is probable that the 
adhesion of England to his league would have inaugurated 

' Hansard, cccxii., pp. 11 80 et seq.; Chiala, La TripUce e la 
Duplice Alleanza, app. ii. ; Mr. Stillman. Francesco Crispi (p. 177), 
believes in the danger to Spezzia. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 25 

a period of mutual good will in politics, colonial policy, and 
commerce. The abstention of England has in the sequel 
led German statesmen to show all possible deference to 
Russia, generally at the expense of British interests. 

The importance of this consideration becomes obvious 
when the dangers of the year 1887 are remembered. The 
excitement caused in Russia and France by the Rustchuk 
and Schnaebele affairs, the tension in Germany produced 
by the drastic proposals of a new Army Bill, and, above all, 
the prospect of the triumph of Boulangist militarism in 
France, kept the Continent in a state of tension for many 
months. In May, Katkoff nearly succeeded in persuading 
the Czar to dismiss de Giers and adopt a warlike policy, in 
the belief that a strong Cabinet was about to be formed at 
Paris with Boulanger as the real motive power. After a 
long ministerial crisis the proposed ministerial combination 
broke down; Boulanger was shelved, and the Czar is be- 
lieved to have sharply rebuked Katkoff for his presump- 
tion. ^ This disappointment of his dearest hopes preyed 
on the health of that brilliant publicist and hastened his 
end, which occurred on August i, 1887. 

The seed which Katkoff had sown was, however, to 
bring forth fruit. Despite the temporary discomfiture of 
the Slavophils, events tended to draw France and Russia 
more closely together. The formal statement of Signor 
Crispi that the Triple Alliance was a great and solid fact 
would alone have led to some counter move; and all 
the proofs of the instability of French politics furnished 
by the Grevy-Wilson scandals could not blind Russian 

' This version (the usual one) is contested by Cyon, who says that 
Katkoff's influence over the Czar was undermined by a mean 
German intrigue. 



26 The European Nations 

statesmen to the need of some understanding with a great 
Power. 1 

Bismarck sought to give the needed hand-grip. In 
November, 1887, during an interview with the Czar at 
BerHn, he succeeded in exposing the forgery of some 
documents concerning Bulgaria which had prejudiced 
Alexander against him. He followed up this advantage 
by secretly offering the Cabinet of St. Petersburg a guar- 
antee of German support in case of an attack from Austria ; 
but it does not appear that the Czar placed much trust in 
the assurance, especially when Bismarck made his rhetori- 
cal fanfare of February 6, 1888, in order to ensure the 
raising of a loan of 28,000,000 marks for buying munitions 
of war. 

That speech stands forth as a landmark in European 
politics. In a simple, unadorned style the German Chan- 
cellor set forth the salient facts of the recent history of his 
land, showing how often its peace had been disturbed, and 
deducing the need for constant preparation in a State 
bordered, as Germany was, by powerful neighbours: — 
"The pike in the European pool prevent us from becoming 
carp; but we must fulfil the designs of Providence by 
making ourselves so strong that the pike can do no more 
than amuse us." He also traced the course of events 
which led to the treaties with Austria and Italy, and 
asserted that by their formation and by the recent publica- 
tion of the treaty of 1882 with Austria the German Govern- 
ment had not sought in any way to threaten Russia. The 
present misunderstandings with that Power would doubt- 

1 See the Chauvinist pamphlets Echec et Mat a la Politique de 
VEnnemi de la France, by "un Russe" (Paris, 1887), and Necessity 
de V Alliance franco-russe. by P. Pader (Toulouse, 1888"). 



The Triple and Dual Alliances I'j 

less pass away ; but seeing that the Russian press had 
"shown the door to an old, powerful, and efEe.\ tive friend, 
which we were, we shall not knock at it again." 

Bismarck's closing words — "We Germans fear God and 
nothing else in the wond; and it is the fear of God which 
makes us seek peace and ensue it" — carried the Reichstag 
with him, with the result that the proposals of the Govern- 
ment were adopted almost unanimously, and Bismarck 
received an overwhelming ovation from the crowd outside. 
These days marked the climax of the Chancellor's career 
and the triumph of the policy which led to the Triple 
Alliance. 

The question, which of the two great hostile groups was 
the more sincere in its championship of peace principles, 
must remain one of the riddles of the age. Bismarck had 
certainly given much pro^'ocation to France in the Schnae- 
bele affair; but in the year 1888 the chief danger to the 
cause of peace came from Boulanger and the Slavophils of 
Russia. The Chancellor, having carried through his army 
proposals, posed as a peacemaker; and Germany for some 
weeks bent all her thoughts on the struggle between life 
and death which made up the ninety days' reign of the 
Emperor Frederick III. Cyon and other French writers 
have laboured to prove that Bismarck's efforts to prevent 
his accession to the throne, on the ground that he was a 
victim of an incurable disease, betokened a desire for 
immediate war with France. 

It appears, however, that the contention of the Chan- 
cellor was strictly in accord with one of the fundamental 
laws of the Empire. His att'tude towards France through- 
out the later phases of the Boulanger afifair was coldly 
"correct," while he manifested the greatest deference 



2S The European Nations 

towards the private prejudices of the Czar when the Em- 
press Frederick allowed the proposals of marriage between 
her daughter and Prince Alexander of Battenberg to be 
renewed. Knowing the unchangeable hatred of the Czar 
for the ex-Prince of Bulgaria, Bismarck used all his in- 
fluence to thwart the proposal, which was defeated by the 
personal intervention of the present Kaiser. i Accord- 
ing to our present information, then, German policy was 
sincerely peaceful, alike in aim and in tone, during the 
first six months of the year; and the piling up of arma- 
ments which then went on from the Urals to the Pyrenees 
may be regarded as an unconsciously ironical tribute paid 
by the Continental Powers to the cause of peace. 

A change came over the scene when William II. ascended 
the throne of Germany (June 15, 1888). At once he sig- 
nalised the event by issuing a proclamation to the army, in 
which occurred the words: "I swear ever to remember 
that the eyes of my ancestors look down upon me from the 
other world, and that I shall one day have to render ac- 
count to them of the glory and honour of the army," The 
navy received his salutation on that same day; and not 
until three days later did a proclamation go forth to his 
people. Men everywhere remembered that "Frederick 
the Noble" had first addressed his people, and then his 
army and navy. The inference was unavoidable that the 
young Kaiser meant to be a Frederick the Great rather 
than a "citizen Emperor," as his father had longed to be 
known. The world has now learnt to discount the utter- 
ances of the most impulsive of Hohenzollern rulers; but 
in those days, when it knew not his complex character, 
1 Bismarck: Some Secret Pages, etc., iii., p. 335. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 29 

such an army order seemed to portend the advent of 
another Napoleon. 

Not only France but Russia felt some alarm. True, the 
young Kaiser speedily paid a visit to his relative at St. 
Petersburg; but it soon appeared that the stolid and very 
reserved Alexander III. knew not what to make of the 
versatile personality that now controlled the policy of 
Central Europe. It was therefore natural that France and 
Russia should take precautionary measures; and we now 
know that these were begun in the autumn of that year. 

In the first instance, they took the form of loans. A 
Parisian financier, M Hoskier, Danish by descent, but 
French by naturalisation and sympathy, had long desired 
to use the resources of Paris as a means of cementing 
friendship, and, if possible, alliance with Russia. For some 
time he made financial overtures at St. Petersburg, only to 
find all doors closed against him by German capitalists. 
But in the spring of the year 1888 the Berlin Bourse had 
been seized by a panic at the excessive amount of Russian 
securities held by German houses; large sales took place, 
and thenceforth it seemed impossible for Russia to raise 
money at Berlin or Frankfurt except on very hard terms. 

Now was the opportunity for which the French houses 
had been waiting and working. In October, 1888, Hoskier 
received an invitation to repair to St. Petersburg secretly, 
in order to consider the taking up of a loan of 500,000,000 
francs at 4 per cent., to replace war loans contracted in 
1877 at 5 per cent. At once he assured the Russian 
authorities that his syndicate would accept the offer, and 
though the German financiers raged and plotted against 
him, the loan went to Paris. This was the beginning of 
a series of loans launched bv Russia at Paris, and so 



30 The Ruropean Nations 

successfully that by the year 1894 as much as four milliards 
of francs (^'160,000,000) is said to have been subscribed in 
that way.i Thus the wealth of France enabled Russia to 
consolidate her debt on easier terms, to undertake strategic 
railways, to build a new navy, and arm her immense 
forces with new and improved weapons. It is well known 
that Russia could not otherwise have ventured on these 
and other costly enterprises; and one cannot but admire 
the skill which she showed in making so timely a use of 
Gallic enthusiasm, as well as the statesmanlike foresight 
of the French in piling up these armaments on the weakest 
flank of Germany. 

Meanwhile the Boulangist bubble had burst. After his 
removal from the army on the score of insubordination. 
le brav' general entered into politics, and, to the surprise 
of all, gained an enormous majority in the election for 
a district of Paris (January, i88g). It is believed that, 
had he rallied his supporters and marched against the 
Elysdc, he might have overthrown the parliamentary Re- 
public. But, like Robespierre at the crisis of his career, 
he did not strike — he discoursed of reason and moderation. 
For once the authorities took the initiative ; and when the 
new Premier, Tirard, took action against him for treason, 
he fled to Brussels on the appropriate date of the ist of 
April. Thenceforth, the Royalist-Bonapartist-Radical hy- 
brid, known as Boulangism, ceased to scare the world; and 
its challenging snorts died away in sounds which were 
finally recognised as convulsive brayings. How far the 
Slavophils of Russia had a hand in goading on the creature 
is not known. Elie de Cyon, writing at a later date, de- 

• E. Daudet, Histoire diplomatique de V Alliance Fraitco-Russe, 
pp. 270-279. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances ^r 

clared that he all alon^ saw tlirout^h an'] dislrustc'l lioulan- 
gcr. Disclaimers of this kind wen; j^lcntiftil in thf; follow 
ing years. ^ 

After the exposure of that hero of the Boulevards, it was 
natural that the Czar should decline to make a binding 
compact with France; and he signalised the isolation of 
Russia by proposing a toast to the Prince of Montenegro 
as "the only sincere and faithful friend of Russia." Never- 
theless, the dismissal of Bismarck by William f I., ii March, 
1890, brought about a time of strain and friction between 
Russia and Germany which furthered the prospects of a 
Franco-Russian entente. Thenceforth peace depended on 
the will of a young autocrat who now and again gave the 
impression that he was about to draw the sword for the 
satisfaction of his ancestral manes. A sharp and long- 
continued tariff war between Germany and Russia also 
embittered the relations between the two Powers. 

Rumours of war were widesj^read in the year 1891. 
Wild tales were told as to a secret treaty between G(;rmany 
and Belgium for procuring a passage to the Teutonic hosts 
through that neutralised kingdom, and thus turning the 
nev/ eastern fortresses which France had constructed at 
enormous cost.^ Parts of northern France v/ere to be ihe 
reward of King Leopold's complaisance, and the help of 
England and Turkey was to be secured by substantial 
h»ribes.2 The whole scheme wears a look of amateurish 
grandiosity; but, on the principle that there is no smoke 

' De Cyon, op. rAt., pp. 394 el seq. 

2 In the French Chamber of Deputies it was officially stated in 
1893, that in two decades France had spent the sum of ^614,000,000 
on her army and the new fortresses, apart from that on strategic 
railways and the fleet. 

3 Notovich, L' Empereur Alexandre III., ch. viii. 



32 The European Nations 

without fire (which does not always hold good for diplo- 
matic smoke) , much alarm was felt at Paris. The renewal 
of the Triple Alliance in June, 1891, for a term of six 
years, was followed up a month later by a visit of the Em- 
peror William to England, during which he took occasion 
at the Guildhall to state his desire "to maintain the his- 
torical friendship between these our two nations" (July 
10). Balanced though this assertion was by an expression 
of a hope in the peaceful progress of all peoples, the words 
sent an imaginative thrill to the banks of the Seine and the 
Neva. 

The outcome of it all was the visit of the French Channel 
Fleet to Cronstadt at the close of July; and the French 
statesman M. Flourens asserts that the Czar himself took 
the initiative in this matter.^ The fleet received an effu- 
sive welcome, and, to the surprise of all Europe, the Em- 
peror visited the flagship of Admiral Gervais and remained 
uncovered while the band played the national airs of the 
two nations. Few persons ever expected the autocrat of 
the East to pay that tribute to the Marseillaise. But, in 
truth, French democracy was then entering on a new 
phase at home. Politicians of many shades of opinion had 
begun to cloak themselves with "opportunism" — a con- 
veniently vague term, first employed by Gambetta, but 
finally used to designate any serviceable compromise 
between parliamentary rule, autocracy, and flamboyant 
militarism. The Cronstadt fetes helped on the warping 
process. 

Whether any definite compact was there signed is open 
to doubt. The Times correspondent, writing on July 31st 
from St. Petersburg, stated that Admiral Gervais had 

'L. E. Flourens, Alexandre III.: sa Vie, son CEuvre, p. 319. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 33 

brought with him from Paris a draft of a convention, which 
was to be considered and thereafter signed by the Russian 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and the Navy, but not 
by the Czar himself until the need for it arose. Probably, 
then, no alliance was formed, but military and naval con- 
ventions were drawn up to serve as bases for common 
action if an emergency should arise. These agreements 
were elaborated in conferences held by the Russian generals 
Vanoffski and Obrucheff with the French generals Saussier, 
Miribel, and Boisdeffre. A Russian loan was soon after- 
wards floated at Paris amidst great enthusiasm. 

For the present the French had to be satisfied with this 
exchange of secret assurances and hard cash. The Czar 
refused to move further, mainly because the scandals con- 
nected with the Panama affair once more aroused his fears 
and disgust. De Cyon states that the degrading revela- 
tions which came to light, at the close of 1891 and early in 
1892, did more than anything to delay the advent of a 
definite alliance. The return visit of a Russian squadron 
to French waters was therefore postponed to the month of 
October, 1893, when there were wild rejoicings at Toulon. 
The Czar and President exchanged telegrams, the former 
referring to "the bonds which unite the two countries." 

It appeared for a time that Russia meant to keep her 
squadron in the Mediterranean; and representations on 
this subject are known to have been made by England and 
Italy, which once again drew close together. A British 
squadron visited Italian ports — an event which seemed to 
foreshadow the entrance of the Island Power to the Triple 
Alliance. The Russian fleet, however, left the Mediter- 
ranean, and the diplomatic situation remained unchanged. 
Despite all the passionate wooing of the Gallic race, no 



34 The European Nations 

contract of marriage took place during the life of Alexander 
III. He died on November i, 1894, and his memory was 
extolled in many quarters as that of ihe great peacemaker 
of the age. 

How far he deserved this praise, to which every states- 
man of the first rank laid claim, is matter for doubt. It is 
certain that he disliked war on account of the evil results 
accruing from the Russo-Turkish conflict; but whether 
his love of peace rested on grounds other than prudential 
will be questioned by those who remember his savage re- 
pression of non-Russian peoples in his Empire, his brutal 
treatment of the Bulgarians and of their Prince, his under- 
hand intrigues against Servia and Roumania, and the 
favour which he showed to the commander who violated 
international law at Panjdeh. That the P'rench should 
enshrine his memory in phrases to which their literary 
skill gives a world-wide vogue is natural, seeing that he 
ended their days of isolation and saved them from the 
consequences of Boulangism; but it still has to be proved 
that, apart from the Schnaebele affair, Germany ever 
sought a quarrel with France during the reign of Alexander 
III.; and it may finally appear that the Triple Alliance 
was the genuinely conservative league which saved Europe 
from the designs of the restless Republic and the exacting 
egotism of Alexander III. 

Another explanation of the Franco-Russian entente is 
fully as tenable as the theory that the Czar based his 
policy on the seventh beatitude. A careful survey of the 
whole of that policy in Asia, as well as in Europe, seems 
to show that he drew near to the Republic in order to bring 
about an equilibrium in Europe which would enable him 
to throw his whole weight into the affairs of the Far East. 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 35 

Russian policy has oscillated now towards the West, now 
towards the East; but old-fashioned Russians have al- 
ways deplored entanglement in European affairs, and have 
pointed to the more hopeful Orient. Even during the 
pursuit of Napoleon's shattered forces in their retreat 
from Moscow in 1812, the Russian Commander, Kutusoff, 
told Sir Robert Wilson that Napoleon's overthrow would 
benefit, not the world at large, but only England. ^ He failed 
to do his utmost, largely because he looked forward to peace 
with France and a renewal of the Russian advance on India. 

The belief that England was the enemy came to be in- 
creasingly held by leading Russians, especially, of course, 
after the Crimean War and the Berlin Congress. Russia's 
true mission, they said, lay in Asia. There, among those 
ill-compacted races, she could easily build up an empire 
that never could be firmly founded on tough, recalcitrant 
Bulgars or warlike Turks. The Triple Alliance having 
closed the door to Russia on the West, there was the greater 
temptation to take the other alternative course, that line 
of least resistance which led towards Afghanistan and 
Manchuria. The value of an understanding with France 
was now clear to all. As we have seen, it guarded Russia's 
exposed frontier in Poland, and poured into the exchequer 
treasures which speedily took visible form in the Siberian 
railway, as well as the extensions of the lines leading to 
Merv and Tashkend. 

But this eastern trend of Russian policy can scarcely be 
called peaceful. The Panjdeh incident (March 29, 1885) 
would have led any other government than that of Mr, 
Gladstone to declare war on the aggressor. Events soon 
turned the gaze of the Russians towards Manchuria, and 
1 The French Invasion of Russia, by Sir R. Wilson, p. 234. 



36 The European Nations 

the Franco-Russian agreement enabled them to throw 
their undivided energies in that direction (see Chapter 
IX.). It was French money which enabled Russia to 
dominate Manchuria, and, for the time, to overawe Japan. 
In short, the Dual Alliance peacefully conducted the 
Muscovites to Port Arthur. 

The death of Alexander III. in November, 1894, brought 
to power a very different personality, kindlier and more 
generous, but lacking the strength and prudence of the 
deceased ruler. Nicholas II. had none of that dislike of 
Western institutions which haunted his father. The way 
was therefore open for a more binding compact with 
France, the need for which was emphasised by the events 
of the years 1894—95 in the Far East. But the manner in 
which it came about is still but dimly known. Members 
of the House of Orleans are said to have taken part in the 
overtures, perhaps with the view of helping on the hypno- 
tising influence which alliance with the autocracy of the 
East exerts on the democracy of the West. 

The Franco-Russian entente ripened into an alliance in 
the year 1895. So, at least, we may judge from the 
reference to Russia as notre allie by the Prime Minister, 
M. Ribot, in the debate of June 10, 1895. Nicholas II., at 
the time of his visit to Paris in 1896, proclaimed his close 
friendship with the Republic ; and during the return visit 
of President Faure to Cronstadt and St. Petersburg he gave 
an even more significant sign that the two nations were 
united by something more than sentiment and what 
Carlyle would have called the cashnexus. On board the 
French warship Pothuau he referred in his farewell speech 
to the "nations amies et alliees" (August 26, 1897). 



The Triple and Dual Alliances zi 

The treaty has never been made public, but a version of 
it appeared in the Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung of September 
21, 1901, and in the Paris paper, La Liberie^ five days later. 
Mr. Henry Norman gives the following summary of the 
information there unofficially communicated. After stat- 
ing that the treaty contains no direct reference to Germany, 
he proceeds: "It declares that if either nation is attacked, 
the other will come to its assistance with the whole of its 
military and naval forces, and that peace shall only be 
concluded in concert and by agreement between the two. 
No other casus belli is mentioned, no term is fixed to the 
duration of the treaty, and the whole instrument consists 
of only a few clauses." * 

Obviously France and Russia cannot help one another 
with all their forces unless the common foe were Grermany, 
or the Triple Alliance as a whole. In that case alone would 
such a clause be operative. The pressure of France and 
Russia on the flanks of the German Empire would be 
terrible; and it is inconceivable that Germany would 
attack France, knowing that such action would bring the 
weight of Russia upon her weakest frontier. It is, how- 
ever, conceivable that the three central allies might deem 
the strain of an armed peace to be unendurable and attack 
France or Russia. To such an attack the Dual Alliance 
would oppose about equal forces, though now hampered 
by the weakening of the Empire in the Far East. 

Another account, also unofficial and discretely vague, 
was given to the world by a diplomatist at the time when 

' H. Norman, M.P., All the Russias, p. 390 (Heinemann, 1902). 
See the articles on the alliance as it affects Anglo-French relations 
by M. de Pressense in the Nineteenth Century for February and 
November, 1896: also Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's The Nation's 
Awakening, ch. v. 



38 The European Nations 

the Armenian outrages had for a time quickened the dull 
conscience of Christendom. i Assuming that the Sick 
Man of the East was at the point of death, the anonymous 
writer hinted at the profitable results obtainable by the 
Continental States if, leaving England out of count, they 
arranged the Eastern Question a Vaimahle among them- 
selves. The Dual Alliance, he averred, would not meet 
the needs of the situation; for it did not contemplate the 
partition of Turkey or a general war in the East. 

"Both parties [France and Russia] have examined the 
course to be taken in the case of aggression by one or more 
members of the Triple Alliance; an understanding has 
been arrived at on the great lines of general policy ; but of 
necessity they did not go further. If the Russian Govern- 
ment could not undertake to place its sword at the service 
of France with a view to a revision of the Treaty of Frank- 
furt — a demand, moreover, which France did not make — 
it cannot claim that France should mobilise her forces to 
permit it to extend its territory in Europe or in Asia. 
They know that very well on the banks of the Neva." 

To this interesting statement we may add that France 
and Russia have been at variance on the Eastern Question. 
Thus, when, in order to press her rightful claims on the 
Sultan, France determined to coerce him by the seizure of 
Mitylene, if need be, the Czar's Government is known tc 
have discountenanced this drastic proceeding. Speaking 
generally, it is open to conjecture whether the Dual Alliance 
refers to other than European questions. This may be 
inferred from the following fact. On the announcement 
of the Anglo-Japanese compact early in 1902, by which 

1 V Alliance Franco-Russe devant la Crise Orientale, par un Dip- 
lomate etranger. (Paris, Plon. 1897.) 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 39 

England agreed to intervene in the Far Eastern Question 
if another Power helped Russia against Japan, the Govern- 
ments of St. Petersburg and Paris framed a somewhat 
similar convention whereby France definitely agreed to 
take action if Russia were confronted by Japan and a 
European or American Power in these quarters. No such 
compact would have been needed if the Franco-Russian 
alliance had referred to the problems of the Far East. 

Another "disclosure" of the early part of 1904 is also 
noteworthy. The Paris Figaro published official docu- 
ments purporting to prove that the Czar Nicholas II., on 
being sounded by the French Government at the time of 
the Fashoda incident, declared his readiness to abide by 
his engagements in case France took action against Great 
Britain. The Figaro used this as an argument in favour 
of France actively supporting Russia against Japan, if an 
appeal came from St. Petersburg. This contention would 
now meet with little support in France. The events of 
the Russo-Japanese War and the massacre of workmen in 
St. Petersburg on January 22, 1905, have visibly strained 
Franco-Russian relations. This is seen in the following 
speech of M. Anatole France on February i, 1905, with 
respect to his interview with the Premier, M. Combes: 

"At the beginning of this war I had heard it said very 
vaguely that there existed between France and Russia 
firm and fast engagements, and that, if Russia came to 
blows with a second Power, France would have to inter- 
vene. I asked M. Combes, then Prime Minister, whether 
anything of the kind existed. M. Combes thought it due 
to his position not to give a precise answer; but he de- 
clared to me in the clearest way that so long as he was 
Minister we need not fear that our sailors and our soldier? 



40 The European Nations 

would be sent to Japan. My own opinion is that this 
folly is not to be apprehended under any Ministry." (The 
Times, February 3d.) 

At present, then, everything tends to show that the 
Franco-Russian alliance refers solely to European ques- 
tions and is merely a defensive agreement in view of a 
possible attack from one or more members of the Triple 
Alliance. Seeing that the purely defensive character of 
the latter has always been emphasised, doubts are very 
naturally expressed in many quarters as to the use of these 
alliances. Th« only tangible advantage gained by any 
one of the five Powers is that Russia has had greater 
facilities for raising loans in France and in securing her 
hold on Manchuria. On the other hand. Frenchmen 
complain that the alliance has entailed an immense finan- 
cial responsibility, which is dearly bought by the cessation 
of those irritating frontier incidents of the Schnaebele type 
which they had to put up with from Bismarck in the days 
of their isolation. ^ 

Italy also questions the wisdom of her alliance with the 
Central Powers, which brings no obvious return except in 
the form of slightly enhanced consideration from her Latin 
sister. In cultured circles on both sides of the Maritime 
Alps there is a strong feeling that the present international 
situation violates racial instincts and tradition; and, as 
we have already seen, Italy's attitude towards France is 
far different now from what it was in 1882. It is now 
practically certain that Italians would not allow the 
King's Government to fight France in the interests of the 
Central Powers. Their feelings are quite natural. What 

> See an article by Jules Simon in the Contemporary Review, May, 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 41 

have Italians in common with Austrians and Prussians? 
Little more, we may reply, than French republicans with 
the subjects of the Czar. In truth both of these alliances 
rest, not on whole-hearted regard or affection, but on fear 
and on the compulsion which it exerts. 

To this fact we may, perhaps, largely attribute the 
malaise of Europe. The Greek philosopher Empedocles 
looked on the world as the product' of two all-pervading 
forces, love and hate, acting on blind matter: love brought 
cognate particles together and held them in union ; hate 
or repulsion kept asunder the unlike or hostile elements. 
We may use the terms of this old cosmogony in reference 
to existing political conditions, and assert that these two 
elemental principles have drawn Europe apart into two 
hostile masses; with this difference, that the allies for the 
most part are held together not so much by mutual regard 
as by hatred of their opposites. From this somewhat 
sweeping statement we must mark off one exception. 
There were two allies who came together with the ease 
which betokens a certain amount of affinity. Thanks to 
the statesmanlike moderation of Bismarck after Konig- 
gratz, Austria willingly entered into a close compact with 
her former rival. At least that was the feeling among the 
Germans and Magyars of the Dual Monarchy. The Austro- 
German alliance, it may be predicted, will hold good while 
the Dual Monarchy exists in its present form; but even in 
that case fear of Russia is the one great binding force where 
so much else is centrifugal. If ever the Empire of the 
Czars should lose its prestige, possibly the two Central 
Powers would drift apart. 

Although there are signs of weakness in both alliances 
they will doubtless remain standing as long as the need 



42 The European Nations 

which called them into being remains. Despite all the 
efforts made on both sides, the military and naval re- 
sources of the two great leagues are approximately equal. 
In one respect, and in one alone, Europe has benefited 
from these well-matched efforts. The uneasy truce that 
has been dignified by the name of peace since the year 
1878 results ultimately from the fact that war will in- 
volve the conflict of "enormous citizen armies of nearly 
equal strength. 

So it has come to this, that in an age when the very 
conception of Christendom has vanished, and ideal prin- 
ciples have been well-nigh crushed out of life by the 
pressure of material needs, peace again depends on the 
once-derided principle of the balance of power. That it 
should be so is distressing to all who looked to see man- 
kind win its way to a higher level of thought on inter- 
national affairs. The level of thought in these matters 
could scarcely be lower than it has been since the Ar- 
menian massacres. The collective conscience of Europe 
is as torpid as it was in the eighteenth century, when weak 
States were crushed or partitioned, and armed sticngth 
came to be the only guarantee of safety. 

At the close of this volume we shall glance at ^ome of the 
influences which the Tantalus toil of the European nations 
has exerted on the life of our age. It is not for nothing 
that hundreds of millions of men are ever striving to pro- 
vide the sinews of war, and that rulers keep those sinews 
in a state of tension. The result is felt in all the other 
organs of the body politic. Certainly the governing classes 
of the Continent must be suffering from atrophy of the 
humorous instinct if they fail to note the practical nullity 
of the efforts which they and their subjects have long 



The Triple and Dual Alliances 43 

put forth. Perhaps some statistical satirist of the twen- 
tieth century will assess the economy of the process which 
requires nearly twelve millions of soldiers for the main- 
tenance of peace in the most enlightened quarter of the 
globe. 



CHAPTER II 

THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION 

"The Germans have reached their day, the Enghsh their mid-day, 
the French their afternoon, the Italians their evening, the Spanish 
their night ; but the Slavs stand on the threshold of the morning. " — 
Madame Novikoff ("O. K.") — The Friends and Foes of Russia. 

THE years 1879-85 which witnessed the conclusion of 
the various questions opened up by the Treaty of 
BerHn and the formation of the Triple Alliance mark the 
end of a momentous period in European history. The 
quarter of a century which followed the Franco-Austrian 
War of 1859 in Northern Italy will always stand out as one 
of the most momentous epochs in State-building that the 
world has ever seen. Italy, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, 
Germany, and Turkey, assumed their present form. The 
Christians of the Balkan Peninsula made greater strides 
towards liberty than they had taken in the previous cen- 
tury. Finally, the new diplomatic grouping of the Powers 
helped to endow these changes with a permanence which 
was altogether wanting to the fitful efforts of the period 
1815-59. That earlier period was ore of feverish impulse 
and picturfesque failure; the two later decades were char- 
acterised by stern organisation and prosaic success. 

It generally happens to nations as to individuals that 
a period devoted to recovery from internal disorders is 
followed by a time of great productive and expansive 

44 



The Central Asian Question 45 

power. The introspective epoch gives place to one of 
practical achievement. Faust gives up his barren specu- 
lations and feels his way from thought to action. From 
" In the beginning was the Word" he wins his way onward 
through "the Thought" and "the Might" until he re- 
writes the dictum " In the beginning was the Deed." That 
is the change which came over Germany and Europe in 
the years 1850-80. The age of the theorisers of the Vor- 
Parlament at Frankfurt gave place to the age of Bismarck. 
The ideals of Mazzini paled in the garish noonday of the 
monarchical triumph at Rome. 

Alas! too, the age of great achievement, that of the 
years 1859-85, makes way for a period characterised by 
satiety, torpor, and an indefinable malaise. Europe rests 
from the generous struggles of the past, and settles down 
uneasily into a time of veiled hostility and armed peace. 
Having framed their state systems and covering alliances, 
the nations no longer give heed to constitutions, rights of 
jian, or duties of man; they plunge into commercialism, 
Xnd search for new markets. Their attitude now is that 
of ancient Pistol when he exclaims 

"The world 's mine oyster, 
Which I with sword will open." 

In Europe itself there is little to chronicle in the years 
1885-1900, which are singularly dull in regard to political 
achievement. No popular movement (not even those of 
the distressed Cretans and Armenians) has aroused enough 
sympathy to bring it to the goal. The reason for this fact 
seems to be that the human race, like the individual, is 
subject to certain alternating moods which may be termed 
the enthusiastic and the practical; and that, during the 



46 The European Nations 

latter phase, the material needs of life are so far exalted at 
the expense of the higher impulses that small struggling 
communities receive not a tithe of the sympathy which 
they would have aroused in more generous times. 

The fact need not beget despair. On the contrary, it 
should inspire the belief that, when the fit passes away, the 
healthier, nobler mood will once more come : and then the 
world will pulsate with new life making wholesome use of 
the wealth previously stored up but not assimilated. It 
is significant that Gervinus, writing in 1853, spoke of that 
epoch as showing signs of disenchantment and exhaustion 
in the political sphere. In reality he was but six years 
removed from the beginning of an age of constructive 
activity the like of which has never been seen. 

Further, we may point out that the ebb in the tide of 
human affairs which set in about the year 1885 was due 
to specific causes operating with varied force on different 
peoples. First in point of time, at the close of the year 
1879, came the decision of Bismarck and of the German 
Reichstag to abandon the cause of Free Trade in favour of 
a narrow commercial nationalism. Next came the murder 
of the Czar Alexander II. (March, 1881), and the grinding 
down of the reformers and of all alien elements by his stern 
successor. Thus, the national impulse, which had helped 
on that of democracy in the previous generation, now lent 
its strength to the cause of economic, religious, and political 
reaction in the two greatest of European States, 

In other lands that vital force frittered itself away in the 
frothy rhetoric of Deroulede and the futile prancings of 
Boulanger, in the gibberings of Italia Irredenta, or in the 
noisy obstruction of Czechs and Parnellites in the parlia- 
ments of Vienna and London. Everything proclaimed 



The Central Asian Question 47 

that the national principle had spent its force and could 
now merely turn and wobble until it came to rest. 

A curious series of events also served to discredit • the 
party of progress in the constitutional states. Italian 
politics during the ascendency of Depretis, Mancini, and 
Crispi became on the one side a mere scramble for power, 
on the other a nervous edging away from the gulf of bank- 
ruptcy ever yawning in front. France, too, was slow to 
habituate herself to parliamentary institutions, and her 
history in the years 1887 to 1893 is largely that of a suc- 
cession of political scandals and screechy recriminations, 
from the time of the Grevy -Wilson affair to the loathsome 
end of the Panama Company. In the United Kingdom 
the wheels of progress lurched along heavily after the year 
1886, when Gladstone made his sudden strategic turn 
towards the following of Parnell. Thus it came about 
that the parties of progress found themselves almost help- 
less or even discredited ; and the young giant of Democracy 
suddenly stooped and shrivelled as if with premature 
decay. 

The causes of this seeming paralysis were not merely 
political and dynamic: they were also ethical. The fer- 
vour of religious faith was waning under the breath of a 
remorseless criticism and dogmatic materialism. Already, 
under their influence, the teachers of the earlier age, 
Carlyle, Tennyson, and Browning, had lost their joyousness 
and spontaneity; and the characteristic thinkers of the 
new age were chiefly remarkable for the arid formalism 
with which they preached the gospel of salvation for 
the strong and damnation to the weak. The results of 
the new creed were not long in showing themselves in the 
political sphere. If the survival of the fittest were the last 



48 The European Nations 

word of philosophy, where was the need to struggle on 
behalf of the weak and oppressed? In that case, it might 
be better to leave them to the following clutch of the new 
scientific devil; while those who had charged through to 
the head of the rout enjoyed themselves with utmost 
abandon. Such was, and is, the deduction from the new 
gospel (crude enough, doubtless, in many respects), which 
has finally petrified in the lordly egotism of Nietzsche and 
in the unlovely outlines of one or two up-to-date Utopias. 

These fashions will have their day. Meanwhile it is the 
duty of the historian to note that self-sacrifice and heroism 
have a hard struggle for life in an age which for a time ex- 
alted Herbert Spencer to the highest pinnacle of greatness, 
which still riots in the calculating selfishness of Nietzsche 
and raves about Omar Khayyam. 

Seeing, then, that the last fifteen years of the nineteenth 
century in Europe were almost barren of great formative 
movements such as had ennobled the previous decades, we 
may well leave that over-governed, over -drilled continent 
weltering in its riches and discontent, its militarism and 
moral weakness, in order to survey events farther afield 
which carried on the State-bmlding process to lands as yet 
chaotic or ill-organised. There, at least, we may chronicle 
some advance, hampered though it has been by the moral 
languor or laxity that has warped the action of Europeans 
in their new spheres. 

The transference of human interest from European his- 
tory to that of Asia and Africa is certainly one of the dis- 
tinguishing features of the years in question. The scene 
of great events shifts from the Rhine and the Danube to 
the Oxus and the Nile. The affairs of Rome, Alsace, and 
Bulgaria being settled for the present, the passions of great 



The Central Asian Question 49 

nations centre on Herat and Candaliar, Alexandria and 
Khartum, the Cameroons, Zanzibar, and Johannesburg, 
Port Arthur and Korea. The United States, after re- 
covering from the Civil War and completing their work of 
internal development, enter the lists as a colonising power, 
and drive forth Spain from two of her historic possessions. 
Strife becomes keen over the islands of the Pacific. Aus- 
tralia seeks to lay hands on New Guinea, and the European 
Powers enter into hot discussions over Madagascar, the 
Carolines, Samoa, and many other isles. 

In short, these years saw a repetition of the colonial 
strifes that marked the latter half of the eighteenth century. 
Just as Europe, after solving the questions arising out of 
the religious wars, betook itself to marketing in the waste 
lands over the seas; so, too, when the impulses arising 
from the incoming of the principles of democracy and 
nationality had worn themselves out, the commercial and 
colonial motive again came uppermost. And, as in the 
eighteenth century, so, too, after 1880, there was at hand 
an economic incentive spurring on the Powers to an- 
nexation of new lands. France had recurred to protective 
tariffs in 1870. Germany, im.der Bismarck, followed suit 
ten years later; and all the Continental Powers in tiu-n, op- 
pressed by armaments and girt around with hostile tariffs, 
turned instinctively to the unclaimed territories oversea as 
life-saving annexes for their own over-stocked industrial 
centres. 

It will be convenient to begin the recital of extra- 
European events by considering the expansion of Russia 
and Great Britain in Central Asia. There, it is true, the 
commercial motive is less prominent than that of political 
rivalry; and the foregoing remarks apply rather to the 

VOL. II. 4. 



50 The European Nations 

recent history of Africa than to that of Central Asia. But, 
as the plan of this work is to some extent chronological, it 
seems better to deal first with events which had their be- 
ginning farther back than those which relate to the par- 
tition of Africa. 

The two great colonising and conquering movements of 
recent times are those which have proceeded from London 
and Moscow as starting-points. In comparison with them 
the story of the enterprise of the Portuguese and Dutch has 
little more than the interest that clings around an almost 
vanished past. The halo of romance that hovers over the 
exploits of Spaniards in the New World has all but faded 
away. Even the more solid achievements of the gallant 
sons of France in a later age are of small account when 
compared with the five mighty commonwealths that bear 
witness to the strength of the English stock and the 
adaptability of its institutions, or with the portentous 
growth of the Russian Empire in Asia. 

The methods of expansion of these two great colonial 
Empires are curiously different; and students of ancient 
history will recall a similar contrast in the story of the 
expansion of the Greek and Latin races. The colonial 
Empire of England has been sown broadcast over the seas 
by adventurous sailors, the freshness and spontaneity of 
whose actions recall corresponding traits in the maritime 
life of Athens. Nursed by the sea, and filled with the love 
of enterprise and freedom which that element inspires, 
both peoples sought wider spheres for their commerce, and 
homes more spacious and wealthy than their narrow 
cradles offered; but, above all, they longed to found a 
microcosm of Athens or England, with as little control 
from the mother-land as might be. 



The Central Asian Question 51 

The Russian Empire, on the other hand, somewhat re- 
sembles that of Rome in its steady, persistent extension of 
land boundaries by military and governmental methods. 
The Czars, like the Consuls and Emperors of Rome, set to 
work with a definite purpose, and brought to bear on the 
shifting, restless tribes beyond their borders the pressure 
of an unchanging policy and of a well-organised adminis- 
tration. Both States relied 6n discipline and civilisation 
to overcome animal strength and barbarism; and what 
they won by the sword, they kept by means of a good 
system of roads and by military colonies. In brief, while 
ancient Greece and modern England worked through 
sailors and traders, Rome and Russia worked through 
soldiers, road-makers, and proconsuls. The sea powers 
trusted mainly to individual initiative and civic freedom; 
the land powers founded their empires on organisation 
and order. The dominion of the former was sporadic and 
easily dissolvable; that of the latter was solid, and liable 
to be destroyed only by some mighty cataclysm. The 
contrast between them is as old and ineffaceable as that 
which subsists between the restless sea and the unchanging 
plain. 

While the comparison between England and Athens is 
incomplete, and at some points fallacious, that between the 
Czars and the Caesars is in many ways curiously close and 
suggestive. As soon as the Roman eagles soared beyond 
the mighty ring of the Alps and perched securely on the 
slopes of Gaul and Rhaetia, the great Republic had the 
military advantage of holding the central position as 
against the mutually hostile tribes of western, central, 
and eastern Europe. Thanks to that advantage, to her 
organisation, and to her military colonies, she pushed 



52 The European Nations 

forward an ever -widening girdle of empire, finally con- 
ferring the blessings of the pax Romana on districts as far 
remote as the Tyne, the lower Rhine and Danube, the 
Caucasus, and the Pillars of Hercules. 

Russia also has used to the full the advantages conferred 
by a central position, an inflexible policy, and a military- 
agrarian system well adapted to the needs of the nomadic 
peoples on her borders. In the fifteenth century, her 
polity emerged victorious from the long struggle with the 
Golden Horde of Tartars [I keep the usual spelling, though 
"Tatars" is the correct form]; and, as the barbarous Mon- 
golians lost their hold on the districts of the middle Volga, 
the power of the Czars began its forward march, pressing 
back Asiatics on the east and Poles on the west. In 
1556, Ivan, the Terrible, seized Astrakan at the mouth of 
the Volga, and victoriously held Russia's natural frontiers 
on the east, the Ural Mountains, and the northern shore 
of the Caspian Sea. We shall deal in a later chapter with 
her conquest of Siberia, and need only note here that 
Muscovite pioneers reached the shores of the northern 
Pacific as early as the year 1636. 

Russia's conquests at the expense of Turks, Circassians, 
and Persians is a subject alien to this narrative; and the 
tragic story of the overthrow of Poland at the hand of 
the three partitioning Powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, 
does not concern us here. 

It is, however, needful to observe the means by which 
she was able to survive the dire perils of her early youth 
and to develop the colonising and conquering agencies of 
her maturer years. They may be summed up in the 
single word, "Cossacks." 

The Cossacks are often spoken of as though they were 



The Central Asian Question 53 

a race. They are not; they are bands or communities, 
partly mihtary, partly nomadic or agricultural, as the case 
may be. They can be traced back to bands of outlaws 
who in the time of Russia's weakness roamed about on 
the verge of her settlements, plundering indifferently their 
Slavonic kinsmen, or the Tartars and Turks farther south. 
They were the "men of the plain," who had fled from the 
villages of the Slavs, or (in fewer cases) from the caravans 
of the Tartars, owing to private feuds, or from love of a 
freer and more lucrative life than that of the village or the 
encampment. In this debatable land their numbers in- 
creased until, Slavs though they mainly were, they became 
a menace to the growing power of the Czars. Ivan, the 
Terrible, sent expeditions against them, transplanted many 
of their number, and compelled those who remained in 
the space between the rivers Don and Ural to submit to 
his authority, and to give military service in time of war 
in return for rights of pasturage and tillage in the districts 
thenceforth recognised as their own. Some of them trans- 
ferred their energies to Asia ; and it was a Cossack outlaw, 
Jermak, who conquered a great part of Siberia. The 
Russian pioneers, who early penetrated into Siberia or 
Turkestan, found it possible at a later time to use these 
children of the plain as a kind of protective belt against 
the warlike natives. The same use was made of them in 
the south against Turks. Catharine II. broke the power 
of the " Zaporoghians " (Cossacks of the Dnieper), and 
settled large numbers of them on the river Kuban to 
fight the Circassians. 

In short, out of the driftwood and wreckage of their 
primitive social system the Russians framed a bulwark 
against the swirling currents of the nomad world outside. 



54 The European Nations 

In some respects the Cossacks resemble the roving bands 
of Saxons and Franks who pushed forward roughly but 
ceaselessly the boundaries of the Teutonic race.^ But, 
whereas those offshoots soon came to have a life of their 
own, apart from the parent stems, Russia, on the other 
hand, has known how to keep a hold on her boisterous 
youth, turning their predatory instincts against her worst 
neighbours, and using them as hardy iriegulars in her 
wars. 

Considering the number of times that the Russian 
Government crushed the Cossack revolts, broke up their 
self-made organisation, and transplanted unruly bands to 
distant parts, their almost invariable loyalty to the central 
authority is very remarkable. It may be ascribed either 
to the veneration which they felt for the Czar, to the 
racial sentiment which dwells within the breast of nearly 
every Slav, or to their proximity to alien peoples whom 
they hated as Mohammedans or despised as godless pagans. 
In any case, the Russian autocracy gained untold advan- 
tages from the Cossack fringe on the confines of the Empire. 

Some faint conception of the magnitude of that gain 
may be formed, if, by way of contrast, we try to picture the 
Teutonic peoples always acting together, even through 
their distant offshoots; or, again, if by a flight of fancy we 
can imagine the British Government making a v/ise use of 
its old soldiers and the flotsam and jetsam of our cities for 
the formation of semi-militarv colonies on the most ex- 
posed frontiers of the Empire. That which our senators 
have done only in the case of the Grahamstown experiment 
of 1819, Russia has done persistently and successfully with 

1 See Csesar, Gallic War, bk. vi., for an account of the formation, 
at the tribal meeting, of a roving band. 



The Central Asian Question 55 

materials far less premising — a triumph of organisation for 
which she has received scant credit. 

The rovin'g Cossacks have become practically a mounted 
militia, highly mobile in peace and in war. Free from 
taxes, and enjoying certain agrarian or pastoral rights in 
the. district which they protect, their position in the State 
is fully assured. At times the ordinary Russian settlers 
are turned into Cossacks. Either by that means, or by 
migration from Russia, or by a process of accretion from 
among the conquered nomads, their ranks are easily re- 
cruited ; and the readiness with which Tartars and Turko- 
mans are absorbed into this cheap and effective militia has 
helped to strengthen Russia alike in peace and war. The 
source of strength open to her on this side of her social 
system did not escape the notice of Napoleon — witness his 
famous remark that within fifty years Europe would be 
either Republican or Cossack.^ 

The firm organisation which Central Europe gained under 
the French Emperor's hammer-like blows served to falsify 
the prophecy; and the stream of Russian conquest, 
dammed up on the west by the newly consolidated strength 
of Prussia and Austria, set strongly towards Asia. Pride 
at her overthrow of the great conqueror in 1812 had 
quickened the national consciousness of Russia; and be- 
sides this praiseworthy motive there was another perhaps 
equally potent, namely, the covetousness of her ruling 
class. The memoirs written by her bureaucrats and 
generals reveal the extravagance, dissipation, and luxury 

1 For the Cossacks, see D. M. Wallace's Russia, ii., pp. 80-95 
and Vladimir's Russia on the Pacific, pp. 46-49. The former points 
out that their once democratic organisation has vanished under the 
autocracy; and that their officers, appointed by the Czar, own most 
of the land, formerly held in common. 



56 The European Nations 

of the Court circles. Fashionable society had as its main 
characteristic a barbaric and ostentatious extravagance, 
alike in gambling and feasting, in the festivals of the 
Court or in the scarcely veiled debauchery of its devotees. 
Baron Lowenstem, who moved in its higher ranks, tells of 
cases of a license almost incredible to those who have not 
pried among the garbage of the Court of Catharine II. 
This recklessness, resulting from the tendency of the Mus- 
covite nature, as of the Muscovite climate, to indulge in 
extremes, begot an imperious need of large supplies of 
money; and, ground down as were the serfs on thv"^ broad 
domains of the nobles, the resulting revenues were all too 
scanty to fill up the financial void created by the urgent 
needs of St. Petersburg, Gatchina, or Monte Carlo. Larger 
domains had to be won in order to outvie rivals or stave 
off bankruptcy; and these new domains could most easily 
come by foreign conquest. 

For an analogous reason, the State itself suffered from 
land hunger. Its public service was no less corrupt than 
inefficient. Large sums frequently vanished, no one knew 
whither ; but one infallible cure for bankruptcy was always 
at hand, namely, conquests over Poles, Turks, Circassians, 
or Tartars. To this Catharine II. had looked when she 
instituted the vicious practice of paying the nobles for 
their services at Court ; and during her long career of con- 
quest she greatly developed the old Muscovite system of 
meeting the costs of war out of the domains of the van- 
quished, besides richly dowering the crown, and her 
generals and favoured courtiers. One of the Russian 
Ministers, referring to the notorious fact that his Govern- 
ment made war for the sake of booty as well as glory, said 
to a Frenchman, "We have remained somewhat Asiatic 



The Central Asian Question 57 

in that respect." ^ It is not always that a Minister reveals 
so frankly the motives that help to mould the policy of a 
great State. 

The predatory instinct, once acquired, does not readily 
pass away. Alexander I. gratified it by forays in Circassia, 
even at the time when he was face to face with the might 
of the great Napoleon; and after the fall of the latter, 
Russia pushed on her confines in Georgia until they touched 
those of Persia. Under Nicholas I. little territory was 
added except the Kuban coast on the Black Sea, Erivan 
to the south of Georgia, and part of the Kirghiz lands in 
Turkestan. 

The reason for this quiescence was that almost up to the 
verge of the Crimean War Nicholas hoped to come to an 
understanding with England respecting an eventual par- 
tition of the Turkish Empire, Austria also gaining a share 
of the spoils. With the aim of baiting these proposals, he 
offered, during his visit to London in 1844, to refrain from 
any movement against the Khanates of Central Asia, con- 
cerning which British susceptibilities were becoming keen. 
His Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, embodied these pro- 
posals in an important memorandum, containing a promise 
that Russia would leave the Khanates of Turkestan as a 
neutral zone in order to keep the Russian and British 
possessions in Asia "from dangerous contact." 2 
, , For reasons which we need not detail, British Ministers 
rejected these overtures, and by degrees England entered 
upon the task of defending the Sultan's dominions, largely 
on the assumption that they formed a necessary bulwark 

» Quoted by Vandal, Napoleon I. et Alexandre, i., p. 136. 

2 Quoted on p. 14 oi A Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War, 
issued by the Russian Foreign Office, and attributed to Baron 
Jomini (Russian edition, 1879; English edition, 1882). 



/ 



58 The European Nations 

of her Indian Empire. It is not our purpose to criticise 
British poUcy at that time. We merely call attention to 
the fact that there seemed to be a prospect of a friendly 
understanding with Russia respecting Turkey, Asia Minor, 
Egypt, and Central Asia; and that the British Govern- 
ment decided to maintain the integrity of Turkey by at- 
tacking the power which seemed about to impugn it. As 
a result, Turkey secured a new lease of life by the Crimean 
War, while Alexander II. deemed himself entirely free to 
press on Asiatic conquests from which his father had re- 
frained. Thus, the two great expanding Powers entered 
anew on that course of rivalry in Asia which has never 
ceased, and which forms to-day the sole barrier to a good 
understanding between them. 

After the Crimean War circumstances favoured the ad- 
vance of the Russian arms. England, busied with the 
Sepoy mutiny in India, cared little what became of the 
rival Khans of Turkestan ; and Lord Lawrence, Governor- 
General of India in 1863-69, enunciated the soothing 
doctrine that "Russia might prove a safer neighbour than 
the wild tribes of Central Asia." The Czar's emissaries 
therefore had easy work in fomenting the strifes that con- 
stantly arose in Bokhara, Khiva, and Tashkend, with the 
result that in 1864 the last-named was easily acquired by 
Russia. We may add here that Tashkend is now an im- 
portant railway centre in the Russian Central Asian line, 
and that large stores of food and material are there ac- 
cumulated, which may be utilised in case Russia makes a 
move against Afghanistan or Northern India. 

In 1868 an outbreak of Mohammedan fanaticism in 
Bokhara brought the Ameer of that town into collision 
with the Russians, who thereupon succeeded in taking 



The Central Asian Question 59 

Samarcand. The capital of the Empire of Tamerlane, 
"the scourge of Asia," now sank to the level of an outpost 
of Russian power, and ultimately to that of a mart for 
cotton. The Khan of Bokhara fell into a position of com- 
plete subservience, and ceded to the conquerors the whole 
of his province of Samarcand.^ 

It is believed that the annexation of Samarcand was con- 
trary to the intentions of the Czar. Alexander II. was a 
friend of peace ; and he had no desire to push forward his 
frontiers to the verge of Afghanistan, where friction would 
probably ensue with the British Government. Already 
he had sought to allay the irritation prevalent in Russo- 
phobe circles in England. In November, 1864, his Chan- 
cellor, Prince Gortchakoff, issued a circular setting forth 
the causes that impelled the Russians on their forward 
march. It was impossible, he said, to keep peace with 
uncivilised and predatory tribes on their frontiers. Russia 
must press on until she came into touch with a state 
whose authority would guarantee order on the boundaries. 
The argument was a strong one; and it may readily be 
granted that good government, civilisation, and com- 
merce have benefited by the extension of the pax Russica 
over the slave-hunting Turkomans and the inert tribes of 
Siberia. 

Nevertheless, as Gortchakoff 's circular expressed the in- 
tention of refraining from conquest for the sake of con- 
quest, the irritation in England became very great when 
the conquest of Tashkend, and thereafter of Samarcand, 

> For an account of Samarcand and Bokhara, see Russia in 
Central Asia, by Hon. G. (Lord) Curzon (1889); A. Vambery, 
Travels in Central Asia (1867-68); Rev. H. Lansdell, Russian Cen- 
tral Asia, 2 vols. (1885) ; E. Schuyler, Journey in Russian Turkestan, 
etc., 2 vols. (1876); E. O'Donovan, The Merv Oasis, 2 vols. (1883). 



6o The European Nations 

was ascribed, apparently on good grounds, to the ambition 
of the Russian commanders, Tchemaieff and Kaufmann 
respectively. On the news of the capture of Samarcand 
reaching London, the Russian Ambassador hastened to 
assure the British Cabinet that his master did not intend 
to retain his conquest. Nevertheless, it was retained. 
The doctrine of political necessity proved to be as ex- 
pansive as Russia's boundaries; and, after the rapid 
growth of the Indian Empire under Lord Dalhousie, the 
British Government could not deny the force of the 
plea. 

This mighty stride forward brought Russia to the north- 
ern bounds of Afghanistan, a land which was thenceforth 
to be the central knot of diplomatic problems of vast 
magnitude. It will therefore be well, in beginning our 
survey of a question which was to test the efficacy of 
autocracy and democracy in international affairs, to gain 
some notion of the physical and political conditions of the 
life of that people. 

As generally happens in a mountainous region in the 
midst of a great continent, their country exhibits various 
strata of conquest and settlement. The northern dis- 
trict, sloping towards Turkestan, is inhabited mainly b}"- 
Turkomans who have not yet given up their roving habits. 
The rugged hill country bordering on the Punjab is held 
by Pathans and Ghilzais, who are said by some to be of the 
same stock as the Af'^hans. On the other hand, a well- 
marked local legend identifies the Afghans proper with 
the lost ten tribes of Israel ; and those who love to speculate 
on that elusive and delusive subject may long use their 
ingenuity in speculating whether the oft -quoted text as 
to the chosen people possessing the gates of their enemies 



The Central Asian Question 6i 

is more applicable to the sea-faring and sea-holding Anglo- 
Saxons or to the pass-holding Afghans. 

That elevated plateau, ridged with lofty mountains and 
furrowed with long clefts, has seen Turkomans, Persians, 
and many other races sweep over it; and the mixture of 
these and other races, perhaps including errant Hebrews, 
has there acquired the sturdiness, tenacity, and clannish-, 
ness that mark the fragments of three nations cluster- 
ing together in the Alpine valleys; while it retains the 
turbulence and fierceness of a full-blooded Asiatic stock. 
The Afghan problem is complicated by these local differ- 
ences and rivalries; the north cohering with the Turko- 
mans, Herat and the west having many affinities and 
interests in common with Persia, Candahar being in- 
fluenced by Baluchistan, while the hill tribes of the north- 
east bristle with local peculiarities and aboriginal savagery. 
These districts can be welded together only by the will of 
a great ruler or in the white heat of religious fanaticism; 
and while Moslem fury s'^metimes unites all the Afghan 
clans, the Moslem marriage customs result fully as often in 
a superfluity of royal heirs, which gives rein to all the 
forces that make for disruption. Afghanistan is a hornet's 
nest ; and yet, as we shall see presently, owing to geograph- 
ical and strategical reasons, it cannot be left severely alone. 
The people are to the last degree clannish, and nothing but 
the grinding pressure of two mighty Empires has endowed 
them with political solidarity. 

It is not surprising that British statesmen long sought 
to avoid all responsibility for the internal affairs of such a 
land. As we have seen, the theory which found favour 
with Lord Lawrence was that of intervening as little as 
possible in the affairs of States bordering on India, a policy 



62 The European Nations 

which was termed "masterly inactivity" by the late Mr. 
J. W. S. Wyllie. It was the outcome of the experience 
gained in the years 1839-42, when, after alienating Dost 
Mohammed, the Ameer of Afghanistan, by its coolness, 
the Indian Government rushed to the other extreme and 
invaded the country in order to tear him from the arms of 
the more effusive Russians. 

The results are well known. Overweening confidence 
and military incapacity finally led to the worst disaster 
that befell a British army during the nineteenth century, 
only one officer escaping from among the 4500 troops and 
12,000 camp followers who sought to cut their way back 
through the Khyber Pass.^ A policy of non-intervention 
in the affairs of so fickle and savage a people naturally 
ensued, and was stoutly maintained by Lords Canning, 
Elgin, and Lawrence, who held sway during and after the 
great storm of the Indian Mutiny. The worth of that 
theory of conduct came to be tested in 1863, on the occa- 
sion of the death of Dost Mohammed, who had latterly 
recovered Herat from Persia, and brought nearly the 
whole of the Afghan clans under his sway. He had been 
our friend during the Mutiny, when his hostility might 
readily have turned the wavering scales of war; and he 
looked for some tangible return for his loyal behaviour in 
preventing the attempt of some of his restless tribesmen 
to recover the once Afghan city of Peshawur. 

To his surprise and disgust he met with no return what- 
ever, even in a matter which most nearly concerned his 
dynasty and the future of Afghanistan. As generally 
happens with Moslem rulers, the aged Ameer occupied his 
declining days with seeking to provide against the troubles 

> Sir J. W. Kaye, History of the War in Afghanistan, 5 vols. 
(1851-78). 



The Central Asian Question 63 

that naturally resulted from the oriental profusion of his 
marriages. Dost Mohammed's quiver was blessed with 
the patriarchal equipment of sixteen sons — ^most of them 
stalwart, warlike, and ambitious. Eleven of them limited 
their desires to parts of Afghanistan, but five of them as- 
pired to rule over all the tribes that go to make up that 
seething medley. Of these, Shere Ali was the third in age 
but the first in capacity, if not in prowess. Moreover, he 
was the favourite son of Dost Mohammed; but where 
rival mothers and rival tribes were concerned, none could 
foresee the issue of the pending conflict.^ 

Dost Mohammed sought to avert it by gaining the 
effective support of the Indian Government for his Benja- 
min. He pleaded in vain. Lord Canning, Governor- 
General of India at the time of the Mutiny, recognised 
Shere Ali as heir apparent, but declined to give any promise 
of support either in arms or money. Even after the Mutiny 
was crushed, Lord Canning and his successor. Lord Elgin, 
adhered to the former decision, refusing even a grant of 
money and rifles for which father and son pleaded. 

As we have said, Dost Mohammed died in 1863; but 
even when Shere Ali was face to face with formidable 
family schisms and a widespread revolt. Lord Lawrence 
clung to the policy of recognising only '' de facto powers," 
that is, powers which actually existed and could assert 
their authority. All that he offered was to receive Shere 
Ali in conference, and give him good advice; but he would 
only recognise him as Ameer of Afghanistan if he could 
prevail over his brothers and their tribesmen. He summed 
it up in this official letter of April 17, 1866, sent to the 
Governor of the Punjab : 

• G. B. Malleson, History of Afghanistan, p. 421. 



64 The European Nations 

"It should be our policy to show clearly that we will not 
interfere in the struggle, that we will not aid either party, 
that we will leave the Afghans to settle their own quarrels, 
and that we are willing to be on terms of amity and good- 
will with the nation and with their rulers de facto. Suitable 
opportunities can be taken to declare that these are the 
principles which will guide our policy; and it is the belief 
of the Governor-General that such a policy will in the end 
be appreciated." ^ 

The Afghans did not appreciate it, Shere Ali protested 
that it placed a premium on revolt; he also complained 
that the Viceroy not only gave him no help, but even 
recognised his rival, Ufzul, when the latter captured Cabul. 
After the death of Ufzul and the assumption of authority 
at Cabul by a third brother, Azam, Shere Ali by a sudden 
and desperate attempt drove his rival from Cabul (Septem- 
ber 8, 1868) and practically ended the schisms and strifes 
which for five years had rent Afghanistan in twain. Then, 
but then only, did Lord Lawrence consent to recognise 
him as Ameer of the whole land, and furnish him with 
;^6o,ooo and a supply of arms. An act which, five years 
before, would probably have ensured the speedy triumph 
of Shere Ali and his lasting gratitude to Great Britain, now 
laid him under no sense of obligation.^ He might have 

1 Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. i (1878), p. 10. For a defence of 
this policy of "masterly inactivity," see Mr. Bosworth Smith's 
Life of Lord Lawrence, ii., pp. 570-590; also Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie's 
Essays on the External Policy of India. 

2 The late Duke of Argyll in his Eastern Question (ii., p. 42) 
cited the fact of this offer of money and arms as a proof that Lord 
Lawrence was not wedded to the theory of "masterly inactivity," 
and stated that the gift helped Shere Ali to complete his success. 
It is clear, however, that Lord Lawrence waited to see whether 
that success was well assured before the offer was made. 

The Duke of Argyll proves one thing, that the action of Lord 



The Central Asian Question 65 

replied to Lord Lawrence with the ironical question with 
which Dr. Johnson declined Lord Chesterfield's belated 
offer of patronage: "Is not a patron, my lord, one who 
looks with unconcern on a man struggling for life in the 
water, and, when he has reached ground, encumbers him 
with help?" 

Moreover, there is every reason to think that Shere Ali 
with the proneness of Orientals to refer all actions to the 
most elemental motives, attributed the change of front at 
Calcutta solely to fear. That was the time when the 
Russian capture of Samarcand cowed the Khan of Bokhara 
and sent a thrill through Central Asia. In the political 
psychology of the Afghans, the tardy arrival at Cabul of 
presents from India argued little friendship for Shere Ali, 
but great dread of the conquering Muscovites. 

Such, then, was the policy of "masterly inactivity" in 
1863-68, cheap for India, but excessively costly for Afghan- 
istan. Lord Lawrence rendered incalculable services to 
India before and during the course of the Mutiny, but his 
conduct towards Shere Ali is certainly open to criticism. 
The late Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India in the 
Gladstone Ministry (1868-74), supported it in his work. 
The Eastern Question, on the ground that the Anglo-Afghan 
treaty of 1855 pledged the British not to interfere in the 
affair? of Afghanistan,^ But imcalled for interference is 
one thing; to refuse even a slight measure of help to an 

Lawrence in September 1868 was not due to Sir Henry Rawlinson's 
despatch from London (dated July 20, 1868) in favour of more 
vigorous action. It was due to Lawrence's perception of the change 
brought about by Russian action in the Khanate of Bokhara, near 
the Afghan border. 

1 The Duke of Argyll, op. cit. ii., p. 226 (London, 1879). For the 
treaty, see Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. i (1878), p. i. 



66 The European Nations 

ally, who begs it as a return for most valuable services, is 
quite another thing. 

Moreover, the Viceroy himself was brought by the stem 
logic of events implicitly to give up his policy. In one of 
his last official despatches, written on January 4, 1869, he 
recognised the gain to Russia that must accrue from our 
adherence to a merely passive policy in Central Asian 
affairs. He suggested that we should come to a "clear 
understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its 
projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be 
given to understand in firm but courteous language, that 
it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghan- 
istan, or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our 
frontier." 

This sentence tacitly implies a change of front ; for any 
prohibition to Russia to interfere in the affairs of Afghan- 
istan virtually involved Britain's claim to exercise some 
degree of suzerainty in that land. The way therefore 
seemed open for a new departure, especially as the new 
Governor-General, Lord Mayo, was thought to favour the 
more vigorous ideas latterly prevalent at Westminster. 
But when Shere Ali met the new Viceroy in a splendid 
Durbar at Umballa (March, 1869) and formulated his re- 
quests for effective British support, in case of need, they 
were, in the main, refused.^ 

We may here use the words in which the late Duke of 
Argyll summed up the wishes of the Ameer and the replies 
of Lord Mayo: 

"He [the Ameer] wanted to have an tmconditional 
treaty, offensive and defensive. He wanted to have a 

» Sir W. W. Hunter, The Earl of Mayo, p. 125 (Oxford, 189 1); 
the Duke of Argyll, op. cit., ii., p. 252. 



The Central Asian Question 67 

fixed subsidy. He wanted to have a dynastic guarantee. 
He would have liked sometimes to get the loan of English 
ofificers to drill his troops, or to construct his forts — pro- 
vided they retired the moment they had done this work 
for him. On the other hand, officers 'resident' in his 
country as political agents of the British Government were 
his abhorrence." 

Lord Mayo's replies, or pledges, were virtually as follows: 

"The first pledge," says the Duke of Argyll, "was that 
of non-interference in his [the Ameer's] affairs. The 
second pledge was that 'we would support his independ- 
ence.' The third pledge was 'that we would not force 
European officers, or residents, upon him against his 
wish.'"i 

There seems to have been no hopeless contrariety be- 
tween the views of the Ameer and the Viceroy save in one 
matter that will be noted presently. It is also of interest 
to learn from the Duke's narrative, which claims to be 
official in substance, however partisan it may be in form, 
that there was no difference of opinion on this important 
subject between Lord Mayo and the Gladstone Ministry, 
which came to power shortly after his departure for India. 
The new Viceroy summed up his views in the following 
sentence, written to the Duke of Argyll: "The safe course 
lies in watchfulness, and friendly intercourse with neigh- 
bouring tribes." 

Apparently, then, there was a fair chance of arriving at 
an agreement with the Ameer. But the understanding 
broke down on the question of the amount of support to be 
accorded to Shere All's dynasty. That ruler wished for 
an important modification of the Anglo- Afghan treaty of 

> Argyll, op. cit., i. Preface, pp. xxiii.-xxvi. , 



68 The European Nations 

1855, which had bound his father to close friendship with 
the old company without binding the company to inter- 
vene in his favour. That, said Shere AH, was a "dry 
friendship." He wanted a friendship more fruitful than 
that of the years 1863-67, and a direct support to his 
dynasty whenever he claimed it. The utmost concession 
that Lord Mayo would grant was that the British Govern- 
ment would "view with severe displeasure any attempt to 
disturb your position as ruler of Cabul, and rekindle civil 



war. 



1 



It seems that Shere AH thought lightly of Britain's " dis- 
pleasure " for he departed ill at ease. Not even the occa- 
sional presents of money and weapons that found their way 
from Calcutta to Cabul could therefore keep his thoughts 
from turning northwards towards Russia. At Umballa 
he had said little about that power; and the Viceroy had 
very wisely repressed any feelings of anxiety that he ma}'^ 
have had on that score. Possibly the strength and cheeri- 
ness of Lord Mayo's personality would have helped to 
assuage the Ameer's wounded feelings; but that genial 
Irishman fell under the dagger of a fanatic during a tour 
in the Andaman Islands (February, 1872). His death was 
a serious event. Shere AH cherished towards him feelings 
which he did not extend to his successor, Lord North- 
brook (1872-76). 

Yet, during that vice-royalty, the diplomatic action of 
Great Britain secured for the Ameer the recognition of his 
claims over the northern part of Afghanistan, as far as the 
banks of the upper Oxus. In the years 1870-72 Russia 
stoutly contested those claims, but finally withdrew them, 
the Emperor declaring at the close of the latter year "that 
» Argyll, op. cit., ii., p. 263. 



The Central Asian Question 69 

such a question should not be a cause of difEerence between 
the two countries and he was determined it should not be 
so." It is further noteworthy that Russian official com- 
munications more than once referred to the Ameer of 
Afghanistan as being "under the protection of the Indian 
Government." ^ 

These signal services of British diplomacy counted for 
little at Cabul in comparison with the question of the dy- 
nastic guarantee which we persistently withheld. In the 
spring of 1873, when matters relating to the Afghan-Persian 
frontier had to be adjusted, the Ameer sent his Prime 
Minister to Simla with the intention of using every diplo- 
matic means for the extortion of that long-delayed boon. 

The time seemed to favour his design. Apart from the 
Persian boundary questions (which were settled in a 
manner displeasing to the Ameer), trouble loomed ahead 
in Central Asia. The Russians were advancing on Khiva ; 
and the Afghan statesman, during his stay at Simla, sought 
to intimidate Lord Northbrook by parading this fact. He 
pointed out that Russia would easily conquer Khiva and 
then would capture Merv, near the western frontier of 
Afghanistan "either in the current year or the next." 
Equally obvious was his aim in insisting that " the interests 
of the Afghan and English Governments are identical," 
and that "the border of Afghanistan is in truth the border 
of India." These were ingenious ways of working his in- 
trenchments up to the hitherto inaccessible citadel of 
Indian border policy. The news of the Russian advance 
on Khiva lent strength to his argument. 

» Argyll, op. cit., ii., pp. 289, 292. For the Czar's assurance that 
"extension of territory" was "extension of weakness," see Pari. 
Papers, Afghanistan, No. i (1878), p. loi. 



70 The European Nations 

Yet, when he came to the question of the guarantee of 
Shere All's dynasty, he again met with a rebuff. In truth. 
Lord Northbrook and his advisers saw that the Ameer was 
seeking to frighten them about Russia in order to improve 
his own family prospects in Afghanistan; and, paying too 
much attention, perhaps, to the Oriental artfulness of the 
method of request, and too little to the importance of the 
questions then at stake, he decided to meet the Ameer in 
regard to non-essentials, though he failed to satisfy him on 
the one thing held to be needful at the palace of Cabul. 

Anxious, however, to consult the Home Government on 
a matter of such importance, now that the Russians were 
known to be at Khiva, Lord Northbrook telegraphed to 
the Duke of Argyll on July 24, 1873: 

"Ameer of Cabul alarmed at Russian progress, dis- 
satisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know how 
far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose assuring 
him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice 
in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms, 
and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked aggression. 
We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph 
quickly." 

The Gladstone Ministry was here at the parting of the 
ways. The Ameer asked them to form an alliance on 
equal terms. They refused, believing, as it seems, that 
they could keep to the old one-sided arrangement of 1855, 
whereby the Ameer promised effective help to the Indian 
Government, if need be, and gained only friendly assurance 
.-n return. The Duke of Argyll telegraphed in reply on 
July 26th: 

"Cabinet thinks you should inform Ameer that we do 
not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause 



,o\0'",'>/''"'"/^ ^"^^ - ' 




7» 



72 The European Nations 

for it; but you may assure him we shall maintain our 
settled policy in favour of Afghanistan if he abides by our 
advice in external afEairs." i 

This answer, together with a present of ;^i 00,000 and 
20,000 rifles, was all that the Ameer gained; his own 
shrewd sense had shown him long before that Britain must 
in any case defend Afghanistan against Russia. What he 
wanted was an official recognition of his own personal 
position as ruler, while he acted, so to speak, as the " Count 
of the Marches" of India. The Gladstone Government 
held out no hopes of assuring the future of their Markgraf 
or of his children after him. The remembrance of the 
disaster in the Khyber Pass in 1841 haunted them, as it 
had done their predecessors, like a ghost, and scared them 
from the course of action which might probably have led 
to the conclusion of a close offensive and defensive alliance 
between India and Afghanistan. 

Such a consummation was devoutly to be hoped for in 

view of events which had transpired in Central Asia. 

Khiva had been captured by the Russians. This Khanate 

intervened between Bokhara and the Caspian Sea, which 

the Russians used as their base of operations on the west. 

The plea of necessity was again put forward, and it might 

have been urged as forcibly on geographical and strategic 

grounds as on the causes that were alleged for the rupture. 

They consisted mainly of the frontier incidents that are 

1 Argyll, op. cit., ii., 331. The Gladstone Cabinet clearly- 
weakened Lord Northbrook's original proposal, and must therefore 
bear a large share of responsibility for the alienation of the Ameer 
which soon ensued. The Duke succeeded in showing up many in- 
accuracies in the versions of these events afterwards given by Lord 
Lytton and Lord Cranbrook; but he was seemingly quite uncon- 
scious of the consequences resulting from adherence to an outworn 
theory. 



The Central Asian Question 73 

wont to occur with restless, uncivilised neighbours. The 
Czar's Government also accused the Khivans of holding 
some Russian subjects in captivity, and of breaking their 
treaty of 1842 with Russia by helping the Khirgiz horde 
in a recent revolt against their new masters. 

Russia soon had ready three columns, which were to 
converge on Khiva: one was stationed on the river Ural, 
a second at the rising port of Krasnovodsk on the Caspian 
Sea, and a third, under General Kaufmann, at Tashkend. 
So well were their operations timed that, though the dis- 
tances to be traversed varied from 480 to 840 miles, in 
parts over a waterless desert, yet the three chief forces 
arrived almost simultaneously at Khiva and met with the 
merest show of resistance (June, 1873). Setting the young 
Khan on the throne of his father, they took -from him his 
ancestral lands on the right bank of the Amu Daria (Oxus) 
and imposed on him a crushing war indemnity of 2,200,000 
roubles, which assured his entire dependence on his new 
creditors. They further secured their hold on these 
diminished territories by erecting two forts on the river.'' 
The Czar's Government was content with assuring its hold 
upon Khiva, without annexing the Khanate outright, 
seeing that it had disclaimed any such intention. 2 All the 
same, Russia was now mistress of nearly the whole of 
Central Asia; and the advance of roads and railways por- 
tended further conquests at the expense of Persia and the 
few remaining Turkoman tribes. 

In order to estimate the importance of these facts, it 

' J. Popowski, The Rival Powers in Central Asia, -p. 4'j (Eng. edit.) ; 
A. Vambery, The Coming Struggle for India, p. 2 1 ; A. R. Colquhoun, 
Russia against India, pp. 24-26; Lavisse and Rambaud, Histoire 
Generale, xii., pp. 793-794. 

2 Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. i (1878), p. loi. 



74 The European Nations 

must be remembered that the teachings of geography and 
history concur in showing the practicability of an invasion 
of India from Central Asia. Touching first the geographi- 
cal facts, we may point out that India and Afghanistan 
stand in somewhat the same relation to the Asiatic con- 
tinent that Italy and Switzerland hold to that of Europe. 
The rich lands and soft climate of both peninsulas have 
always been an irresistible attraction to the dwellers 
among the more barren mountains and plains of the North ; 
and the lie of the land on the borders of both of these seem- 
ing Eldorados favours the advance of more virile peoples 
in their seach for more genial conditions of life. Nature, 
which enervates the defenders in their sultry plains, by 
her rigorous training imparts a touch 'of the wolf to the 
mountaineers or plain-dwellers of the North; and her 
guides (rivers and streams) conduct the hardy seekers for 
the sun by easy routes up to the final mountain barriers. 
Finally, those barriers, the Alps and the Hindu Koosh, are 
notched by passes that are practicable for large armies, as 
has been seen now and again from the times of Alexander the 
Great and Hannibal to those of Nadir Shah and Napoleon. 
In these conditions, physical and climatic, is to be found 
the reason for the success that has so often attended the 
invasions of Italy and India. Only when the Romans 
organised all the forces of their peninsula and the fresh 
young life beyond, were the defensive powers of Italy equal 
to her fatally attractive powers. Only when Britain under- 
took the defence of India, could her peoples feel sure of 
holding the North-west against the restless Pathans and 
Afghans; and the situation was wholly changed when a 
great military Empire pushed its power to the river-gates 
of Afghanistan. 



The Central Asian Question 75 

• The friendship of the Ameer was now a matter of vital 
concern; and yet, as we have seen, Lord Northbrook 
aHenated him, firstly, by giving an unfavourable verdict in 
regard to the Persian boundary in the district of Seistan, 
and still more so by refusing to grant the long-wished-for 
guaranty of his dynasty. 

The year 1873 marks a fatal turning-point in Anglo- 
Afghan relations. Yakub Khan told Lord Roberts at Ca- 
bul in 1879 that his father, Shere AH, had been thoroughly 
disgusted with Lord Northbrook in 1873, "and at once 
made overtures to the Russians, with whom constant 
intercourse had since been kept up." ^ 

In fact, all who are familiar with the events preceding 
the first Afghan War (1839-42) can now see that events 
were fast drifting into a position dangerously like that 
which led Dost Mohammed to throw himself into the arms 
of Russia. At that time, also, the Afghan ruler had sought 
to gain the best possible terms for himself and his dynasty 
from the two rivals ; and, finding that the Russian promises 
were far more alluring than those emanating from Calcutta, 
he went over to the Muscovites. At bottom that had been 
the determining cause of the first Afghan War, and affairs 
were once more beginning to revolve in the same vicious 
circle. Looking back on the events leading up to the 
second Afghan War, we can now see that a frank com- 
pliance with the demands of Shere AH would have been 
far less costly than the non-committal policy which in 1873 
alienated him. Outwardly he posed as the aggrieved but 
still faithful friend. In reality he was looking northwards 
for the personal guaranty which never came from Calcutta. 

» Lord Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, ii., p. 247; also Life of 
Abdur Rahman, by Mohammed Khan, 2 vols. (1900), i., p. 149. 



76 The European Nations 

It sho lid, however, be stated that up to the time of the 
fall of the Gladstone Ministry (February, 1874), Russia 
seemed to have no desire to meddle in Afghan affairs. 
The Russian Note of January 21, 1874, stated that the 
Imperial Government "continued to consider Afghanistan 
as entirely beyond its sphere of action." ^ Nevertheless, 
that declaration inspired little confidence. The Russo- 
phobes, headed by Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle 
Frere, could reply that they distrusted Russian disclaimers 
concerning Afghanistan, when the plea of necessity had so 
frequently and so speedily relegated to oblivion the earlier 
"assurances of intention." 

Such was the state of affairs when, in February, 1874, 
Disraeli came to power at Westminster, with Lord Salis- 
bury as Secretary of State for India. The new Ministry 
soon showed the desire to adopt a more spirited foreign 
policy than their predecessors, who had fretted public opin- 
ion by their numerous acts of complaisance or surrender. 
Russia soon gave cause for complaint. In June, 1874, the 
Governor of the trans-Caspian province issued a circular, 
warning the nomad Turkomans of the Persian border- 
lands against raiding; it applied to tribes inhabiting dis- 
tricts within what were considered to be the northern 
boundaries of Persia. This seemed to contravene the 
assurances previously given by Russia that she would not 
extend her possessions in the southern part of Central Asia.^ 
It also foreshadowed another stride forward at the expense 
of the Turkoman districts both of Persia and Afghanistan. 

' Argyll, Eastern Question, ii. p. 347. See, however, the letters 
that passed between General Kaufmann, Governor of Turkestan, 
and Cabul in 1870-72, in Pari. Papers, Central Asia, No. i (1881), 
pp. 2-10. 

2 Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 1 (1878), p. 107. 



The Central Asian Question TJ 

As no sufficient disclaimer appeared, the London par- 
tisans of the Indian "forward policy" sought to induce 
Lord Derby and Lord Salisbury to take precautionary 
measures. Their advice was summed up in the note of 
January ii, 1875, written by that charming man and able 
administrator, Sir Bartle Frere. Its chief practical recom- 
mendation was, firstly, the despatch of British officers to 
act as political agents at Cabul, Candahar, and Herat; and, 
secondly, the occupation of the commanding position of 
Quetta, in Baluchistan, as an outpost commanding the 
chief line of advance from Central Asia into India. ^ 

This note soon gained the ear of the Cabinet, and on 
January 22, 1875, Lord Salisbury urged Lord Northbrook 
to take measures to procure the assent of the Ameer to the 
establishment of British officers at Candahar and Herat 
(not at Cabul). 2 The request placed Lord Northbrook in 
an embarrassing position, seeing that he knew full well the 
great reluctance of the Ameer at all times to receive any 
British Mission. On examining the evidence as to the 
Ameer's objection to receive British residents the Viceroy 
found it to be very strong, while there is ground for think- 
ing that ministers and officials in London either ignored it 
or sought to minimise its importance. The pressure which 
they brought to bear on Lord Northbrook was one of the 
causes that led to his resignation (February, 1876). He 
believed that he was in honour bound by the promise 
given to the Ameer at the Umballa Conference not to im- 
pose a British resident on him against his will. 

> General Jacob had long before advocated the occupation of this 
strong flanking position. It was supported by Sir C. Dilke in his 
Greater Britain (1867). 

it Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. i (1878), pp. 128-129. 



78 The European Nations 

He was succeeded by a man of marked personality, Lord 
Lytton. The only son of the celebrated novelist, he in- 
herited decided literary gifts, especially an unusual facility 
of expression both in speech and writing, in prose and 
verse. Any tendency to redundance in speech is generally 
counted unfavourable to advancement in diplomatic cir- 
cles, where Talleyrand's mot as to language being a means 
of concealing thought still finds favour. Owing, however, 
to the influence of his uncle, then British Ambassador at 
Washington, but far more to his own talents, Lytton rose 
rapidly in the diplomatic service holding office in the chief 
embassies, until Disraeli discerned in the brilliant speaker 
and writer the gifts that would grace the new Imperial 
policy in the East. 

In ordinary times the new Viceroy would probably have 
crowned the new programme with success. His charm 
and vivacity of manner appealed to Orientals all the more 
by contrast with the cold and repellent behaviour that too 
often characterises Anglo-Indian officials in their dealings 
with natives. Lytton's mind was tinged with the Eastern 
glow that lit up alike the stories, the speeches, and the 
policy of his chief. It is true the Imperialist programme 
was as grandiosely vague as the meaning of Tancred itself; 
but in a land where forms and words count for much the 
lack of backbone in the new policy was less observed and 
commented on than by the matter-of-fact islanders whom 
it was designed to glorify. 

The apotheosis of the new policy was the proclamation of 
Queen Victoria as Empress of India (July i, 1877), an 
event which was signalised by a splendid Durbar at Delhi 
on January i, 1878. The new title warned the world that, 
however far Russia advanced in Central Asia, England 



The Central Asian Question 79 

nailed the flag of India to her masthead. It was also a 
useful reminder to the small but not uninfiuential Positivist 
school in England that their " disapproval " of the existence 
of a British Empire in India was wholly Platonic. Seeing 
also that the name "Queen" in Hindu (Malika) was one 
of merely respectable mediocrity in that land of splendour, 
the new title, " Kaisar-i-Hind," helped to emphasise the 
supremacy of the British Raj over the Nizam and Gaekwar. 
In fact, it is difficult now to take seriously the impassioned 
protests with which a number of insulars greeted the 
proposal. 

Nevertheless, in one sense the change of title came about 
most inopportunely. Fate willed that over against the 
Durbar at Delhi there stood forth the spectral form of 
Famine, bestriding the dusty plains of the Carnatic. By 
the glint of her eyes the splendours of Delhi shone pale, and 
the viceregal eloquence was hushed in the distant hum 
of her multitudinous wailing. The contrast shocked all 
beholders, and unfitted them for a proper appreciation of 
the new foreign policy. 

That policy may also be arraigned on less sentimental 
grounds. The year 1876 witnessed the re-opening of 
the Eastern Question in a most threatening manner, the 
Disraeli Ministry taking up what may be termed the 
Palmerstonian view that the maintenance of Turkey was 
essential to the stability of the Indian Empire. As 
happened in and after 1854, Russia, when thwarted in 
Europe, sought for her revenge in the lands bordering on 
India. No district was so favourable to Muscovite schemes 
as the Afghan frontier, then, as now, the weakest point in 
Great Britain's imperial armour. Thenceforth the Afghan 
Question became a pendant of the Eastern Question. 



8o The European Nations 

Russia found ready to hand the means of impressing the 
Ameer with a sense of her irresistible power. The Czar's 
officials had little difficulty in picking a quarrel with the 
Khanate of Khokand. Under the pretext of suppressing 
a revolt (which Vambery and others consider to have been 
prepared through Muscovite agencies) they sent troops, 
ostensibly with the view of favouring the Khan. The ex- 
pedition gained a complete success alike over the rebels 
and the Khan himself who thenceforth sank to the level 
of pensioner of his liberators (1876). It is significant that 
General Kaufmann at once sent to the Ameer at Cabul a 
glowing account of the Russian success^ ; and the news of 
this communication increased the desire of the British 
Government to come to a clear understanding with the 
Ameer. 

Unfortunately the authorities of great Britain set to work 
in a way that increased his irritation. Lord Salisbury on 
February 28, 1876, instructed Lord Lytton to offer slightly 
larger concessions to Shere AH ; but he refused to go further 
than to allow "a frank recognition [not a guaranty] of a de 
facto order in the succession" to the throne of Afghanistan, 
and undertook to defend his dominions against external 
attack "only in some clear case of unprovoked aggression." 
On the other hand, the British Government stated that " they 
must have, for their own agents, undisputed access to [the] 
frontier positions [of Afghanistan]." ^ Thus, while grant- 
ing very little more than before, the new Ministry claimed 
for British agents and officers a right of entry which wounded 
the pride of a suspicious ruler and a fanatical people. 

> Pari. Papers, Central Asia, No. i (1881), pp. 12-14; Shere Ali's 
letters to him (some of them suspicious) and the replies are also 
printed. 

a Pari. Papers, Central Asia, No. i (1881), pp. 156-159. 



The Central Asian Question 8i 

To sum up, the English gave Shere AH no help while he was 
struggling for power with his rivals, and after he had won 
the day, they pinned him to the terms of a one-sided alliance. 
In the matter of the Seistan frontier dispute with Persia 
British arbitration was insolently defied by the latter 
Power, yet England urged the Ameer to accept the Shah's 
terms. According to Lord Napier of Magdala, he felt the 
loss of the once Afghan district of Seistan more keenly than 
anything else, and thenceforth regarded the British as 
weak and untrustworthy. 

The Ameer's irritation increased at the close of the year 
when the Viceroy concluded an important treaty with the 
Khan of Khelat in Baluchistan. It would take us too far 
from our main path to turn aside into the jungle of Balu- 
chee politics. Suffice it to say that the long series of civil 
strifes in that land had come to an end largely owing to 
the influence of Major (afterwards Sir Robert) Sandeman. 
His fine presence, masterful personality, frank,- straight- 
forward, and kindly demeanour early impressed the Khan 
and his turbulent Sirdars. In two Missions which he 
undertook to Khelat in the years 1875 ^^^ 1876, he suc- 
ceeded in stilling their internal feuds and in clearing away 
the misunderstandings which had arisen with the Indian 
Government. But he saw still farther ahead. Detecting 
signs of foreign intrigue in that land, he urged that British 
mediation should, if possible, become permanent. His 
arguments before long convinced the new viceroy, Lord 
Lytton, who had at first doubted the advisability of the 
second Mission ; and in the course of a tour along the north- 
west frontier, he held at Jacobabad a grand Durbar, 
which was attended by the Khan of Khelat and his once 

> Ibid., pp. 225-226. 



82 The European Nations 

rebellious Sirdars. There, on December 8, 1876, he signed 
a treaty with the Khan, whereby the British Government 
became the final arbiter in all disputes between him and 
his Sirdars, obtained the right of stationing British troops 
in certain parts of Baluchistan, and of constructing rail- 
ways and telegraphs. Three lakhs of rupees were given 
to the Khan, and his yearly subsidy of 50,000 rupees was 
doubled.! 

The Treaty of Jacobabad is one of the most satisfactory 
diplomatic triumphs of the present age. It came, not as 
the sequel to a sanguinary war, but as a sign of the con- 
fidence inspired in turbulent and sometimes treacherous 
chiefs by the sterling qualities of those able frontier states- 
men, the Napiers, the Lawrences, General Jacob, and 
Major Sandeman. It spread the pax Britannica over a 
land as large as Great Britain, and quietly brought a war- 
like people within the sphere of influence of India. It may 
be compared with Bonaparte's Act of Mediation in Switzer- 
land (1803), as marking the triumph of a strong organis- 
ing intelligence over factious groups, to which it imparted 
peace and order under the shelter of a generally beneficent 
suzerainty. Before long a strong garrison was posted at 
Quetta, and we gained the right to enlist Baluchee troops 
of excellent fighting powers. The Quetta position is a 
mountain bastion which strengthens the outer defences of 
India, just as the Alps and Juras, when under Napoleon's 
control, menaced any invaders of France. 

This great advantage was weighted by one considerable 

» Sir Robert Sandeman, by T. H. Thornton, chaps, ix.-x. ; Pari. 
Papers relating to the Treaty ... of 8th Dec, 1876; The 
Forward Policy andits Results, by R. I. Bruce; Lord Lytton's Indian 
Administration, by Lady Betty Balfour, chap. iii. 

The Indian rupee is worth sixteen pence. 



The Central Asian Question 83 

drawback. The victory of British influence in Baluchistan 
aroused the utmost resentment of Shere AH, who now saw 
his southern frontier outflanked by Britain. Efforts were 
made in January-February, 1877, to come to an under- 
standing; but, as Lord Lytton insisted on the admission 
of British residents to Afghanistan, a long succession of 
interviews at Peshawur, between the Ameer's chief ad- 
viser and Sir Lewis Pelly, led to no other result than an 
increase of suspicion on both sides. The Viceroy thereupon 
warned the Ameer that all supplies and subsidies would be 
stopped until he became amenable to advice and ceased to 
maltreat subjects known to be favourable to the British 
alliance. As a retort the Ameer sought to call the border 
tribes to a Jehad, or holy war, against the British, but with 
little success. He had no hold over the tribes between 
Chitral and the Khyber Pass ; and the incident served only 
to strengthen the Viceroy's aim of subjecting them to 
Britain. In the case of the Jowakis England succeeded, 
though only after a campaign which proved to be costly 
in men and money. 

In fact. Lord Lytton was now convinced of the need of 
a radical change of frontier policy. He summed up his 
contentions in the following phrases in his despatches of 
the early summer of 1877: "Shere Ali has irrevocably 
slipped out of our hands; ... I conceive that it is 
rather the disintegration and weakening, than the con- 
solidation and establishment, of the Afghan power at 
which we must now begin to aim." As for the mountain 
barrier, in which men of the Lawrence school had been 
wont to trust, he termed it "a military mouse- trap," and 
he stated that Napoleon I. had once for all shown the 
futility of relying on a mountain range that had several 



84 The European Nations 

passes.^ These assertions show what perhaps were the 
weak points of Lord Lytton in practical politics — an eager 
and impetuous disposition, too prone to be dazzled by the 
very brilliance of the phrases which he coined. 

At the close of his despatch of April 8, 1878, to Lord 
Cranbrook (Lord Salisbury's successor at the India Office) 
he sketched out, as "the best arrangement," a scheme for 
breaking up the Cabul power and bringing about "the 
creation of a West Afghan Khanate, including Merv, 
Maimena, Balkh, Candahar, and Herat, under some prince 
of our own selection, who would be dependent on our 
support. With western Afghanistan thus disposed of, 
and a small station our own, close to our frontier in the 
Kurram valley, the destinies of Cabul itself would be to us 
a matter of no importance." ^ 

This, then, was the new policy in its widest- scope. 
Naturally it met with sharp opposition from Lord Law- 
rence and others in the India Council at Whitehall. Be- 
sides involving a complete change of front, it would 
naturally lead to war with the Ameer, and (if the intentions 
about Merv were persisted in) with Russia as well. And 
for what purpose? In order that Britain might gain an 
advanced frontier and break in pieces the one important 
state which remained as a buffer between India and 
Russian Asia. In the eyes of all but military men this 
policy stood self-condemned. Its opponents pointed out 
that doubtless Russian intrigues were going on at Cabul; 
but they were the result of the marked hostility between 
England and Russia in Europe, and a natural retort to the 
sending of Indian troops to Malta. Besides, was it true 

' Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 166-185, 247-248. 
» Ibid., pp. 246-247. 



The Central Asian Question 85 

that British influence at Cabul was permanently lost? 
Might it not be restored by money and diplomacy? Or, if 
these means failed, could not affairs be so worked at Cabul 
as to bring about the deposition of the Ameer in favour of 
some claimant who would support England? In any 
case, the extension of British responsibilities to centres so 
remote as Balkh and Herat would overstrain the already 
burdened finances of India, and impair her power of defence 
at vital points. 

These objections seem to have had some weight at 
Whitehall, for by the month of August the Viceroy some- 
what lowered his tone; he gave up all hope of influencing 
Merv, and consented to make another effort to win back 
The Ameer, or to seek to replace him by a more tractable 
prince. But, failing this, he advised, though with re- 
luctance on political grounds, the conquest and occupation 
of so much of Afghan territory as would "be absolutely 
requisite for the permanent maintenance of our north-west 
frontier." ^ 

But by this time all hope of peace had become pre- 
carious. On June 13th, the day of opening of the Con- 
gress of Berlin, a Russian Mission, under General Stolieteff, 
left Samarcand for Cabul. The Ameer is said to have 
heard this news with deep concern, and to have sought to 
prevent its crossing the frontier. The Russians, however, 
refused to turn back, and entered Cabul on July 22116..^ As 
will be seen by reference to Skobeleff's "Plan for the In-^ 
vasion of India" (Appendix, p. 000), the Mission was to 

> Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 255. For a defence of this on 
military grounds see Lord Roberts's Forty-one Years in India, ii., p. 
187, and Thorburn's Asiatic Neighbours, chap. xiv. 

2 Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. i (1878), pp. 242-243; ibid.. 
Central Asia, No. i, pp. 165 et seq. 



86 The European Nations 

be backed up by columns of troops; and, with the aim of 
redoubling the pressure of Russian diplomacy in Europe, 
the Minister for War at St. Petersburg had issued orders 
on April 25, 1878, for the despatch of three columns of 
troops which were to make a demonstration against Jndia. 
The chief force, 12,000 strong, with 44 guns and a rocket 
battery, was to march from Samarcand and Tashkend on 
Cabul; the second, consisting of only 1700 men, was to 
stir up the mountain tribes of the Chitral district to raid 
the north of the Punjab; while the third, of the same 
strength, moved from the middle part of the Amu Daria 
(Oxus) towards Merv and Herat. The main force set out 
from Tashkend on June 13th, and after a most trying 
march reached the Russo-Bokharan border, only to find 
that its toils were fruitless owing to the signature of the 
Treaty of Berlin (July 13th) . The same disappointing news 
dispelled the dreams of conquest which had nerved the 
other columns in their burning march. 

Thus ended the scheme of invasion of India to which 
Skobeleff had lately given shape and body. In January, 
1877, while in his Central Asian command, he had drawn 
up a detailed plan, the important parts of which will be 
found in the Appendices of this volume. During the early 
spring of 1878, when the Russian army lay at San Stefano, 
near Constantinople, he drew up another plan of the same 
tenor. It seems certain that the general outline of these 
projects haunted the minds of officers and men in the ex- 
peditions just referred to ; for the columns withdrew north- 
wards most slowly and reluctantly.^ 

A perusal of Skobeleff 's plan will show that he relied also 

' For details see Russia's Advance towards India, by "an Indian 
Officer," ii., pp. 109 et seq. 



The Central Asian Question 87 

on a diplomatic Mission to Cabul and on the despatch of 
the Afghan pretender, Abdur Rahman, from Samarcand 
to the Afghan frontier. Both of these expedients were 
adopted in turn; the former achieved a startHng but tem- 
porary success. 

As has been stated above, General Stolieteff's Mission 
entered Cabul on July 22nd. The chief himself returned on 
August 24th, but other members of his Mission remained 
several weeks longer. There seem to be good grounds for 
believing that the Ameer, Shere Ali, signed a treaty with 
Stolieteff , but as to its purport we have no other clue than 
the draft which purports to be written out from memory 
by a secret agent of the Indian Government. Other 
Russian documents, some of which Lord Granville after- 
wards described as containing "some very disagreeable 
passages . . . written subsequently to the Treaty of 
Berlin," were found by Lord Roberts; and the Russian 
Government found it difficult to give a satisfactory ex- 
planation of them.^ 

In any case the Government of India could not stand by 
and witness the intrusion of Muscovite influence into 
Afghanistan. Action, however, was very difficult owing 
to the alienation of the Ameer. His resentment had now 
settled into lasting hatred. As a test question Lord Lytton 
sought to impose on him the reception of a British Mission. 
On August 8th he received telegraphic permission from 
London to make this demand. The Ameer, however, re- 
fused to allow a single British officer to enter the country; 
and the death of his son and heir on August 17th enabled 

> The alleged treaty is printed, along with the other documents 
in Paris. Papers, Central Asia, No. i (r88r), pp. 17-30. See also, 
Lord Roberts's Forty -one Years in India, ii., p. 477. 



88 The European Nations 

him to decline to attend to affairs of State for a whole 
month. 

His conduct in this matter was condoned by the cham- 
pions of "masterly inactivity" in this country, who pro- 
ceeded to accuse the Viceroy of haste in sending forward 
the British Mission to the frontier before the full time of 
mourning was over.^ We now know, however, that this 
sympathy was misplaced. Shere Ali's grief did not pre- 
vent his seeing officers of the Russian Mission after his 
bereavement, and (as it seems) signing an alliance with the 
emissaries of the Czar. Lord Lytton was better informed 
as to the state of things at Cabul than were his very 
numerous critics, one of whom, under the shield of ano- 
nymity, confidently stated that the Russian Mission to 
Cabul was either an affair of etiquette or a means of ward- 
ing off a prospective attack from India on Russian Tur- 
kestan ; that the Ameer signed no treaty with the Mission, 
and was deeply embarrassed by its presence; while Lord 
Lytton 's treatment of the Ameer was discourteous. ^ 

In the light of facts as now known, these charges are 
seen to be the outcome of a vivid imagination or of partisan 
malice. There can be no doubt that Shere AH had played 
the British false. Apart from his intrigues with Russia, he 
had condoned the murder of a British officer by keeping the 
murderer in office, and had sotight to push on the frontier 
tribes into a holy war. Finally, he sent orders to stop the 
British Mission at Ali Musjid, the fort commanding the en- 
trance to the Khyber Pass. This action, which occurred 
on September 22nd, must be pronounced a deliberate in- 
sult, seeing that the progress of that Mission had been 

« Duke of Argyll, The Eastern Question, ii., pp. 504-507. 
2 The Causes of the Afghan War, pp. 305, etc. 



The Central Asian Question 89 

so timed that it should reach Cabul after the days of 
mourning were over. In the Viceroy's view, the proper 
retort would have been a declaration of war ; but again the 
Home Government imposed caution, urging the despatch 
of an ultimatum so as to give time for repentance at Cabul. 
It was sent on November 2nd, with the intimation that if 
no answer reached the frontier by November 20th, hos- 
tilities would begin. No answer came until a later date, 
and then it proved to be of an evasive character. 

Such, in brief outline, were the causes of the second 
Afghan War. In the fuller light of to-day it is difficult 
to account for the passion which the discussion of them 
aroused at the time. But the critics of the Government 
held strong ground at two points. They could show, first, 
that the war resulted in the main from Lord Beaconsfield's 
persistent opposition to Russia in the Eastern Question, 
also that the Muscovite intrigues at Cabul, were a natural 
and very effective retort to the showy and ineffective ex- 
pedient of bringing Indian troops to Malta ; in short, that the 
Afghan War was due largely to Russia's desire for revenge. 

Secondly, they fastened on what was undoubtedly a 
weak point in the ministerial case, namely, that Lord 
Beaconsfield's speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet, on 
November 9, 1878, laid stress almost solely on the need for 
acquiring a scientific frontier on the north-west of India. 
In the parliamentary debate of December 9th, he sought 
to rectify this mistake by stating that he had never asserted 
that a new frontier was the object of the war, but rather 
a possible consequence. His critics refused to accept the 
correction. They pinned him to his first words. If this 
were so, they said, what need of recounting our complaints 
against Shere Ali? These were merely the pretexts, not 



90 The European Nations 

the causes, of a war which was to be waged solely in the 
cold-blooded quest for a scientific frontier. Perish India, 
they cried, if her fancied interests required the sacrifice of 
thousands of lives of brave hillmen on the altar of the new 
Imperialism ! 

These accusations were logically justifiable against min- 
isters who dwelt largely on that frigid abstraction, the 
"scientific frontier," and laid less stress on the danger of 
leaving an ally of Russia on the throne of Afghanistan. 
The strong point of Lord Lytton's case lay in the fact that 
the policy of the Gladstone Ministry had led Shere Ali to 
side with Russia ; but this fact was inadequately explained, 
or, at least, not in such a way as to influence public opinion. 
The popular fancy caught at the phrase "scientific fron- 
tier"; and for once Lord Beaconsfield's cleverness in 
phrase-making conspired to bring about his overthrow. 

But the logic of words does not correspond to the logic 
of facts. Words are for the most part simple, downright, 
and absolute. The facts of history are very rarely so. 
Their importance is very often relative, and is conditioned 
by changing circumstances. It was so with the events 
that led up to the second Afghan War. They were very 
complex, and could not be summed up, or disposed of, by 
reference to a single formula. Undoubtedly the question 
of the frontier was important; but it did not become of 
supreme importance until, firstly, Shere Ali became our 
enemy, and, secondly, showed unmistakable signs of hav- 
ing a close understanding with Russia. Thenceforth it 
became a matter of vital import for India to have a frontier 
readily defensible against so strong a combination as that 
of Russia and Afghanistan. 

It would be interesting to know what Mr. Gladstone and 



The Central Asian Question 91 

his supporters would have done if they had come into 
power in the summer of 1878. That they blamed their 
opponents on many points of detail does not prove that 
they would not have taken drastic means to get rid of 
Shere AH. In the unfortunate state into which affairs had 
drifted in 1878, how was that to be effected without war? 
The situation then existing may perhaps best be summed 
up in the words which General Roberts penned at Cabul 
on November 22, 1879, after a long and illuminating con- 
versation with the new Ameer concerning his father's 
leanings towards Russia: "Our recent rupture with Sherc 
Ali has, in fact, been the means of unmasking and checking 
a very serious conspiracy against the peace and security 
of our Indian Empire." ^ 

Given the situation actually existing in 1878, the action 
of the British Government is justifiable as regards details. 
The weak point of the Beaconsfield policy was this, — that 
the situation need not have existed. So far as can be 
judged from the evidence hitherto published (if we except 
some wild talk on the part of Muscovite Chauvinists), 
Russia would not have interfered in Afghanistan except 
in order to paralyse England's action in Turkish affairs. 
As has been pointed out above, the Afghan trouble was a 
natural sequel to the opposition offered by Disraeli to 
Russia from the time of the re-opening of the Balkan 
problem in 1875-76; and the consideration of the events 
to be described in the following chapter will add one more 
to the many proofs already existing as to the f atefulness of 
the blunder committed by him when he wrecked the Berlin 
Memorandum, dissolved the Concert of the Powers, and ren- 
dered hopeless a peaceful solution of the Eastern Question. 
» Pari. Papers Afghanistan, No. i (1880), p. 171. 



CHAPTER III 

THE AFGHAN AND TURKOMAN CAMPAIGNS 

'"The Forward Policy — in other words, the policy of endeavouring 
to extend our influence over, and establish law and order on, that 
part of the [Indian] Border, where anarchy, murder, and robbery 
up to the present time have reigned supreme, a policy which has 
been attended with the happiest results in Baluchistan and on the 
Gilgit frontier — is necessitated by the incontrovertible fact that a 
great Military Power is now within striking distance of our Indian 
possessions, and in immediate contact with a State for the integrity 
of which we have made ourselves responsible." — Lord Roberts. 
Speech in the House of Lords, March 7, 1898. 

THE operations at the outset of the Afghan War ended 
with so easy a triumph for the British arms that it 
is needless to describe them in much detail. They were 
planned to proceed at three points on the irregular arc 
of the southeastern border of Afghanistan. The most 
northerly column, that of General Sir Samuel Browne, had 
Peshawur as its base of supplies. Some sixteen thousand 
strong, it easily captured the fort of AH Musjid at the 
mouth of the Khyber Pass, then threaded that defile with 
little or no opposition, and pushed on to Jelalabad. Around 
that town (rendered famous by General Sale's defence in 
1841—42) it dealt out punishment to the raiding clans of 
Afridis. 

The column of the centre, acting from Kohat as a base 
against the Kurram valley, was commanded by a general 
destined to win renown in the later phases of the war. 

92 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 93 

Major-General Roberts represented all that was noblest and 
most chivalrous in the annals of the British army in India. 
The second son of General Sir Abraham Roberts, G.C.B., 
and born at Cawnpore in 1832, he inherited the traditions 
of the service which he was to render still more illustrious. 
His frame, short and slight, seemed scarcely to fit him for 
warlike pursuits ; and in ages when great stature and sturdy 
sinews were alone held in repute, he might have been 
relegated to civil liffe; but the careers of William III., 
Luxemburg, Nelson, and Roberts show that wiriness is 
more essential to a commander than animal strength, and 
that mind rather than muscle determines the course of 
campaigns. That the young aspirant for fame was not 
deficient in personal prowess appeared at Khudaganj, one 
of the battles of the Mutiny, when he captured a standard 
from two sepoys, and, later on the same day, cut down a 
third sepoy. But it was his clear insight into men and 
affairs, his hold on the principles of war, his alertness of 
mind, and his organising power, that raised him above the 
crowd of meritorious officers who saved India for Britain 
in those stormy days. 

His achievements as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- 
General at Delhi and elsewhere at that time need not be 
referred to here; for he himself has related them in clear, 
lifelike, homely terms which reveal one of the sources of 
his personal influence. Englishmen admire a man who is 
active without being fussy, who combines greatness with 
simplicity, whose kindliness is as devoid of ostentation as 
his religion is of mawkishness, and with whom ambition 
is ever the handmaid of patriotism. The character of a # 
commander perhaps counts for more with British troops 
than with any others, except the French; and the men 



94 The European Nations 

who marched with Roberts from Cabul to Candahar, and 
from Paardeberg to Bloemfontein, could scarcely have 
carried out those feats of endurance for a general who did 
not possess both their trust and their love. 

The devotion of the Kurram column to its chief was 
soon put to the test. After advancing up that valley, 
girt on both sides with lofty mountains and scored with 
numerous gulleys, the force descried the Piewar Kotal 
Pass at its head — a precipitous slope furrowed only in one 
place, where a narrow zigzag path ran upwards through 
pines and giant boulders. A reconnaissance proved that 
the Afghans held the upper part in force; and for some 
time Roberts felt the gravest misgivings. Hiding these 
feelings, especially from his native troops, he spent a few 
days in reconnoitring this formidable position. These 
efforts resulted in the discovery by Major Collett of another 
practicable gorge farther to the north, leading up to a 
neighbouring height, the Peiwar Spingawi, whence the 
head of the Kotal might possibly be turned. 

To divide a column, comprising only 889 British and 
2415 native troops, and that, too, in face of the superior 
numbers of the enemy, was a risky enterprise, but General 
Roberts determined to try the effect of a night march up 
to the Spingawi. He hoped by an attack at dawn on the 
Afghan detachment posted there, to turn the main position 
on the Kotal, and bring about its evacuation. This plan 
had often succeeded against Afghans. Their character- 
istics both in peace and war are distinctly feline. Prone 
to ease and enjoyment at ordinary times, yet, when stirred 
% by lust of blood or booty, they are capable of great feats 
of swift, fierce onset ; but, like all men and animals domin- 
ated by sudden impulses, their bravery is fitful, and is apt 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 95 

to give way under persistent attack, or when their rear is 
threatened. The cat-Hke, stalking instinct has something 
of strategic caution, even in its wildest moods; it likes to 
be sure of the line of retreat.^ 

The British commander counted on exploiting these 
peculiarities to the full by stalking the enemy on their left 
flank, while he left about looo men to attack them once 
more in front. Setting out at nightfall of December ist, 
he led the remainder northwards through a side valley, 
and then up a gully on the side of the Spingawi. The 
ascent through pine woods and rocks, in the teeth of an 
icy wind, was most trying; and the movement came near 
to failure owing to the treachery of two Pathan soldiers in 
the ranks, who fired off their rifles in the hope of warn- 
ing the Afghans above them. The reports, it afterwards 
transpired, were heard by a sentry, who reported the 
matter to the commander of the Afghan detachment; he, 
for his part, did nothing. Much alarm was felt in the 
British column when the shots rang out in the darkness; 
a native officer hard by came up at once, and, by smelling 
the rifles of all his men, found out the offenders; but as 
they were Mohammedans he said nothing, in the hope of 
screening his co-religionists. Later on, these facts tran- 
spired at a court-martial, whereupon the elder of the two 
offenders, who was also the first to fire, was condemned to 
death, and the younger to a long term of imprisonment. 
The defaulting officer likewise received due punishment. 2 

1 General Sir J. L. Vaughan, in a lecture on "Afghanistan and the 
Military Operations Therein" (December 6, 1878), said of the 
Afghans: "When resolutely attacked they rarely hold their ground 
with any tenacity, and are always anxious about their rear." 

^ Lord Roberts, Forty- one Years in India, ii., p. 130 et seq.; Major 
], K.S.Co\quhomi,With the Kurrarn Field F orce, 1878-79, pp. 10 i-io 2. 



9^ The European Nations 

After this alarming incident, the 72nd Highlanders were 
sent forward to take the place of the native regiment pre- 
viously leading, and once more the little column struggled 
on through the darkness up the rocky path. Their staunch- 
ness met its reward. At dawn the Highlanders and 5 th 
Gurkhas charged the Afghan detachment in its entrench- 
ments and breastworks of trees, and were soon masters of 
the Spingawi position. A long and anxious time of waiting 
now ensued, caused by the failure of the first frontal attack 
on the Kotal; but Roberts's pressure on the flank of the 
main Afghan position and another frontal attack sent the 
enemy flying in utter rout, leaving behind guns and 
waggons. The Kurram column had driven eight Afghan 
regiments and numbers of hillmen from a seemingly im- 
pregnable position, and now held the second of the outer 
passes leading towards Cabul (December 2, 1878). The Af- 
ghans offered but slight resistance at the Shutargardan Pass 
farther on, and from that point the invaders looked down 
on valleys that conducted them easily to the Ameer'scapital.^ 

Meanwhile equal success was attending the 3rd British 
column, that of General Biddulph, which operated from 
Quetta. It occupied Sibi and the Khojak Pass; and on 
January 8, 1879, General Stewart and the vanguard reached 
Candahar, which they entered in triumph. The people 
seemed to regard their entry with indifference. This was 
but natural. Shere AH had ruined his own cause. Hear- 
ing of the first defeats, he fled from Cabul in company with 
the remaining members of the Russian Mission still at that 
city (December 13th), and made for Afghan Turkestan in 
the hope of inducing his northern allies to give active aid. 

1 Lord Roberts, op. cit., ii., pp. 135-149; S. H. Shadbolt, The 
Afghan Campaigns of i8j8—8o, i., pp. 21-25 (with plan). 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 97 

He now discovered his error. The Czar's Government 
had been most active in making mischief between England 
and the Ameer, especially while the diplomatic struggle 
was going on at Berlin; but after the signature of the 
Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878), the natural leaning of 
Alexander II. towards peace and quietness began by 
degrees to assert itself. The warlike designs of Kauf- 
mann and his officials in Turkestan received a check, 
though not so promptly as was consistent with strict 
neutrality. 

Gradually the veil fell from the ex-Ameer's eyes. On 
the day of his flight (December 13 th) , he wrote to the " Offi- 
cers of the British Government," stating that he was about 
to proceed to St. Petersburg, "where, before a Congress, 
the whole history of the transactions between myself and 
yourselves will be submitted to all the Powers." ^ But 
nine days later he published a firman containing a very 
remarkable letter purporting to come from General Stolie- 
teff at Livadia in the Crimea, where he was staying with 
the Czar. After telling him that the British desired to 
come to terms with him (the Ameer) through the inter- 
vention of the Sultan, the letter proceeded as follows: 

"But the Emperor's desire is that you should not admit 
the English into your country, and like last year, you are 
to treat them with deceit and deception until the present 
cold season passes away. Then the Almighty's will will be 
made manifest to you, that is to say, the [Russian] Govern- 

1 Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 7 (1879), p. 9. He also states, 
on p. 172, that the advice of the Afghan officials who accompanied 
Shere Ali in his flight was (even in April-May, 1879) favourable to 
a Russian alliance, and that they advised Yakub in this sense. See 
Kaufmann's letters to Yakub, in Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 9 
(1879). 

VOL. II. — 7. 



9^ The European Nations 

ment having repeated the Bismillah, the Bismillah will 
come to your assistance. In short, you are to rest assured 
that matters will end well. If God permits, we will con- 
vene a Government meeting at St. Petersburg, that is to 
say, a Congress, which means an assemblage of Powers. 
We will then open an ofhcial discussion with the English 
Government, and either by force of words and diplomatic 
action we will entirely cut off all English communications 
and interference with Afghanistan, or else events will end 
in a mighty and important war. By the help of God, by 
spring not a symptom or a vestige of trouble and dis- 
satisfaction will remain in Afghanistan." 

It is impossible to think that the Czar had any know- 
ledge of this treacherous epistle, which, it is to be hoped, 
originated with the lowest of Russian agents, or emanated 
from some Afghan chief in their pay. Nevertheless the 
fact that Shere Ali published it shows that he hoped for 
Russian help, even when the British held the keys of his 
country in their hands. But one hope after another faded 
away, and in his last days he must have come to see that 
he had been merely the cat's-paw of the Russian bear. He 
died on February 21, 1879, hard by the city of Bactra, the 
modern Balkh. 

That "mother of cities" has seen strange vicissitudes. 
It nourished the Zoroastrian and Buddhist creeds in their 
youth ; from its crowded monasteries there shone forth light 
to the teeming millions of Asia, until culture was stamped 
out under the heel of Genghis Khan, and later, of Timur. 
In a still later day it saw the dawning greatness of that 
most brilliant but ill-starred of the Mogul Emperors, 
Aurungzebe. Its fallen temples and convents, stretching 
over many a mile, proclaim it to be the city of buried 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 99 

hopes. There was, then, something fitting in the place of 
Shere AH's death. He might so readily have built up a 
powerful Afghan state in friendly union with the British 
Raj ; he chose otherwise, and ended his life amidst the 
wreckage of his plans and the ruin of his kingdom. This 
result of the trust which he had reposed in Muscovite 
promises was not lost on the Afghan people and their 
rulers. 

There is no need to detail the events of the first half of 
the year 1879 in Afghanistan. On the assembly of Par- 
liament in February, Lord Beaconsfield declared that the 
English objects had been attained in that land now that the 
three chief mountain highways between Afghanistan and 
India were completely in Great Britain's power. It re- 
mained to find a responsible ruler with whom a lasting peace 
could be signed. Many difficulties were in the way, owing to 
the clannish feuds of the Afghans and the number of possible 
claimants for the crown. Two men stood forth as the 
most likely rulers: Shere AH's rebellious son, Yakub Khan, 
who had lately been released from his long confinement, 
and Abdur Rahman, son of Ufzal Khan, who was still 
kept by the Russians in Turkestan under some measure of 
constraint, doubtless in the hope that he would be a ser- 
viceable trump card in the intricate play of rival interests 
certain to ensue at Cabul. 

About February 20th, Yakub sent overtures for peace 
to the British Government ; and, as the death of his father 
at that time greatly strengthened his claim, it was favour- 
ably considered at London and Calcutta. Despite one act 
at least of flagrant treachery, he was recognised as Ameer. 
On May 8th, he entered the British camp at Gandamak, 
near Jelalabad, and after negotiations a treaty was signed 



loo The European Nations 

there, May 26th. It provided for an amnesty, the control 
of the Ameer's foreign poUcy by the British Government, 
the estabhshment of a British Resident at Cabul, the con- 
struction of a telegraph line to that city, the grant of com- 
mercial facilities, and the cession to India of the frontier 
districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi (the latter two are 
near Quetta). The British Government retained control 
over the Khyber and Michnee Passes and over the neigh- 
bouring tribes (which had never definitely acknowledged 
Afghan rule). It further agreed to pay to the Ameer and 
his successors a yearly subsidy of six lakhs of rupees 
(nearly ;^5o,ooo).^ 

General Roberts and many others feared that the treaty 
had been signed too hastily, and that the Afghans, "an 
essentially arrogant and conceited people," needed a 
severer lesson before they acquiesced in British suzerainty. 
But no sense of foreboding depressed Major Sir Louis 
Cavagnari, the gallant and able officer who had carried 
out so much of the work on the frontier, when he pro- 
ceeded to take up his abode at Cabul as a British resident 
(July 24th). The chief danger lay in the Afghan troops, 
particularly the regiments previously garrisoned at Herat, 
who knew little or nothing of British prowess, and whose 
fanaticism was inflamed by arrears of pay. Cavagnari's 
Journal, kept at Cabul ^ ended on August 19th with the 
statement that thirty-three Russians were coming up the 
Oxus to the Afghan frontier. But the real disturbing 
cause seems to have been the hatred of the Afghan troops 
to foreigners. 

Failure to pay was so usual a circumstance in Afghanistan 

> Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 7 (1879), p. 23; Roberts, op.cit., 
pp. 170-173. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns loi 

as scarcely to account for the events that ensued. Yet it 
furnished the excuse for an outbreak. Early on September 
3rd, when assembled for what proved to be the farce of 
payment at Bala Hissar (the citadel), three regiments 
mutinied, stoned their officers, and then rushed towards 
the British Embassy. These regiments took part in the 
first onset against an unfortified building held by the 
Mission and a small escort. A steady musketry fire from 
the defenders long held them at bay; but, when joined by 
townsfolk and other troops, the mutineers set fire to the 
gates, and then, bursting in, overpowered the gallant 
garrison. The Ameer made only slight efforts to quell this 
treacherous outbreak, and, while defending his own 
palaces by faithful troops, sent none to help the envoy. 
These facts, as reported by trustworthy witnesses, did not 
correspond to the magniloquent assurances of fidelity that 
came from Yakub himself.^ 

Arrangements were at once made to retrieve this dis- 
aster, but staff and transport arrangements caused serious 
delay. At length General Roberts was able to advance up 
the Kurram valley and carry the Shutargardan Pass by 
storm, an exploit fully equal to his former capture of the 
Peiwar Kotal in the same mountain range. Somewhat 
farther on he met the Ameer, and was unfavourably im- 
pressed with him: " An insignificant-looking man, 
with a receding forehead, a conical-shaped head, and no 
chin to speak of, . . . possessed, moreover, of a very 
shifty eye." Yakub justified this opinion by seeking on 
various pretexts to delay the British advance, and by 
sending to Cabul news as to the numbers of the British 
force. 

• Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. i (1880), pp. 32-42, 89-96. 



I02 The European Nations 

All told, it numbered only 4000 fighting men with 18 
cannon. Nevertheless, on nearing Cabul, it assailed a 
strong position at Charasia, held by 13 regular regiments 
of the enemy and some 10,000 irregulars. The charges 
of Highlanders (the 72nd and 92nd), Gurkhas, and Pun- 
jabis proved to be irresistible, and drove the Afghans from 
two ridges in succession. This feat of arms, which bor- 
dered on the miraculous, served to reveal the feelings of the 
Ameer in a manner equally ludicrous and sinister. Sitting 
in the British camp, he watched the fight with great 
eagerness, then with growing concern, until he finally 
needed all his Oriental composure for the final compliment 
which he bestowed on the victor. Later on it transpired 
that he and his adherents had laid careful plans for profit- 
ing by the defeat of the venturesome little force, so as to 
ensure its annihilation.^ 

The brilliant affair at Charasia served to bring out the 
conspicuous gallantry of two men, who were later on to 
win distinction in wider fields, Major White and Colour- 
Sergeant Hector Macdonald. White carried a ridge at the 
head of a body of fifty Highlanders.. When the enemy 
fled to a second ridge, he resolved to spare the lives of his 
men by taking a rifle and stalking the enemy alone, until 
he suddenly appeared on their flank. Believing that his 
men were at his back, the Afghans turned and fled. 

On October 9th Roberts occupied the Siah Sang ridge, 
overlooking Cabul, and on the next day entered the 
citadel, Bala Hissar, to inspect the charred and blood- 
stained ruins of the British Embassy. In the embers of 
a fire he and his staff found numbers of human bones. On 

' Roberts, op. cit., ii., pp. 213-224; Hensman, The Afghan War 
of 1878-1880. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 103 

October 12th Yakub came to the General to announce his 
intention of resigning the Ameership, as he "would rather 
be a grass-cutter in the English camp than ruler of Afghan- 
istan." On the next day the British force entered the 
city itself in triumph, and Roberts put the Ameer's Min- 
isters under arrest. The citizens were silent but respectful, 
and manifested their satisfaction when he proclaimed that 
only those guilty of the treacherous attack on the Resi- 
dency would be punished. Cabul itself was much more 
Russian than English. The Afghan officers wore Russian 
uniforms, Russian goods were sold in the bazaars, and 
Russian money was found in the treasury. It is evident 
that the Czar's officials had long been pushing on their 
designs, and that further persistency on the part of England 
in the antiquated policy of "masterly inactivity" would 
have led to Afghanistan's becoming a Muscovite satrapy. 

The pendulum now swung sharply in favour of India. 
To that land Roberts despatched the ex-Ameer on Decem- 
ber ist, on the finding of the Commission that he had been 
guilty of criminal negligence (if not worse) at the time of 
the massacre of Cavagnari and his escort. Two Afghan 
Sirdars, whose guilt respecting that tragedy had been 
clearly proven, were also deported and imprisoned. This 
caused much commotion, and towards the close of the 
year the preaching of a fanatic, whose name denoted 
"fragrance of the universe," stirred up hatred to the 
conquerors. 

Bands of tribesmen began to cluster around Cabul, and 
an endeavour to disperse them led to a temporary British 
reverse not far from the Sherpur cantonments where 
Roberts held his troops. The situation was serious. As 
generally happens with Asiatics, the hill men rose by 



I04 The European Nations 

thousands at the news, and beset the Hne of communica- 
tions with India. Sir Frederick Roberts, however, staunchly 
held his ground at the Sherpur camp, beating off one very 
serious attack of the tribesmen on December 20-23. On 
the next day General Gough succeeded in breaking through 
from Gandamak to his relief. Other troops were hurried 
up from India, and this news ended the anxiety which had 
throbbed through the Empire at the news of Roberts's 
being surrounded near Cabul. 

Now that the league of hillmen had been for the time 
broken up, it became more than ever necessary to find a 
ruler for Afghanistan, and settle affairs with all speed. 
This was also desirable in view of the probability of a 
General Election in the United Kingdom in the early part 
of the year 1880, the Ministry wishing to have ready an 
Afghan settlement to act as a soporific drug on the ravening 
Cerberus of democracy at home. Unhappily, the out- 
break of the Zulu War on January 11, 1880, speedily 
followed by the disaster of Isandlana, redoubled the com- 
plaints in the United Kingdom, with the result that matters 
were more than ever pressed on in Afghanistan. Some 
of the tribes clamoured for the return of Yakub, only to be 
informed by General Roberts that such a step would never 
be allowed. 

In the midst of this uncertainty, when the hour for the 
advent of a strong man seemed to have struck, he oppor- 
tunely appeared. Strange to say, he came from Russian 
Turkestan. 

As has been stated above, Abdur Rahman, son of Ufzal 
Khan, had long lived there as a pensioner of the Czar ; his 
bravery and skill in intrigue had been well known. The 
Russian writer, Petrovsky, described him as longing, above 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 105 

all things, to get square with the English and Shere Ali. 
It was doubtless with this belief in the exile's aims that 
the Russians gave him twenty-five hundred pounds and 
two hundred rifles. His advent in Afghanistan seemed 
well calculated to add to the confusion there and to the 
difficulties of England. With only one hundred followers 
he forded the Oxus and, early in 1880, began to gather 
around him a band in Afghan Turkestan. His success 
was startlingly rapid, and by the end of March he was 
master of all that district.^ 

But the political results of this first success were still 
more surprising. Lord Lytton, Sir Frederick Roberts, and 
Mr. Lepel Griffin (political commissioner in Afghanistan) 
soon saw the advantage of treating with him for his suc- 
cession to the throne of Cabul. The Viceroy, however, 
true to his earlier resolve to break up Afghanistan, added 
the unpleasant condition that the districts of Candahar 
and Herat must now be severed from the north of Afghan- 
istan. Abdur Rahman's first request that the whole land 
should form a neutral State under the joint protection of 
Great Britain and Russia was decisively negatived, on the 
ground that the former Power stood pledged by the treaty 
of Gandamak not to allow the intervention of any foreign 
State in Afghan affairs. A strong man like Abdur 
Rahman appreciated the decisiveness of this statement; 
and, while holding back with the caution and suspicion 
natural to Afghans, he thenceforth leaned more to the 
British side, despite the fact that Lord Lytton had re- 
cognised a second Shere Ali as " Wali," or Governor,^ of 

» See his adventures in The Life of Abdur Rahman, by Sultan 
Mohammed Khan, ii., chaps, v., vi. He gave out that he came to 
expel the English (pp. 173-175). 

2 Roberts, op. cit, ii., pp. 315-323. 



io6 The European Nations 

Candahar and its district. On April 19th, Sir Donald 
Stewart routed a large Afghan force near Ghaznee, and 
thereafter occupied that town. He reached Cabul on 
May 5th. It appeared that the resistance of the natives 
was broken. 

Such was the state of affairs when the General Election 
of April, 1880, installed Mr. Gladstone in power in place of 
Lord Beaconsfield. As has been hinted above, Afghan 
affairs had helped to bring about this change; and the 
world now waited to see what would be the action of the 
party which had fulminated against the "forward policy" 
in India. As is usually the case after ministerial changes, 
the new Prime Minister disappointed the hopes of his most 
ardent friends and the fears of his bitterest opponents. 
The policy of "scuttle" was, of course, never thought of; 
but, as the new Government stood pledged to limit its 
responsibilities in India as far as possible, one great change 
took place. Lord Lytton laid down his Viceroyalty when 
the full results of the General Election manifested them- 
selves; and the world saw the strange sight of a brilliant 
and powerful ruler, who took precedence of ancient dynas- 
ties in India, retiring into private life at the bidding of votes 
silently cast in ballot-boxes far away in islands of the north. 

No more startling result of the working of the demo= 
cratic system has ever been seen in Imperial affairs, and 
it may lead the student of Roman history to speculate 
what might have been the results in that ancient Empire 
if the populace of Italy could honestly have discharged 
the like duties with regard to the action of their proconsuls. 
Roman policy might have lacked some of its stateliness 
and solidity, but assuredly the government of the provinces 
would have improved. Whatever may be said as to the 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 107 

evils of change brought about by popular caprice, they are 
less serious than those which grow up under the shadow of 
an uncriticised and irresponsible bureaucracy. 

Some time elapsed before the new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, 
could take up the reins of power. In that interval diffi- 
culties had arisen with Abdur Rahman, but on July 20th 
the British authorities at Cabul publicly recognised him as 
Ameer of Northern Afghanistan. The question as to the 
severance of Candahar from Cabul, and the amount of the 
subsidy to be paid to the new ruler, were left open and 
caused some difference of opinion; but a friendly arrange- 
ment was practically assured a few days later. 

For many reasons this was desirable. As far back as 
April II, 1880, Mr. (now Sir) Lepel Griffin had announced 
in a Durbar at Cabul that the British forces would with- 
draw from Afghanistan when the Government considered 
that a satisfactory settlement had been made; that it was 
the friend, not the enemy, of Islam, and would keep the 
sword for its enemies. The time had now come to make 
good these statements. In the closing days of July Abdur 
Rahman was duly installed in power at Cabul, and received 
19^ lakhs of rupees (;^i90,5oo).i Meanwhile his champions 
prepared to evacuate that city and to avenge a disaster 
which had overtaken their arms in the province of Canda- 
har. On July 29th news arrived that a British brigade 
had been cut to pieces at Maiwand. 

The fact that we supported the Sirdar named Shere Ali 
at Candahar seemed to blight his authority over the tribes- 
men in that quarter. All hope of maintaining his rule 

> The Life of Abdur Rahman, ii., pp. 197-198. For these ne- 
gotiations and the final recognition, see Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, 
No. I (1881), pp. 16-51. 



io8 The European Nations 

vanished when tidings arrived that Ayub Khan, a younger 
brother of the deported Yakub, was marching from the 
side of Herat to claim the crown. Already the new pre- 
tender had gained the support of several Afghan chiefs 
around Herat, and now proclaimed a jehad, or holy war, 
against the infidels holding Cabul. With a force of seven 
thousand five hundred men and ten guns he left Herat on 
June 15th, and moved towards the river Helmand, gather- 
ing around him numbers of tribesmen and ghazis.^ 

In order to break this gathering cloud of war betimes, 
the Indian Government ordered General Primrose, who 
commanded the British garrison at Candahar, to despatch 
a brigade to the Helmand. Accordingly, Brigadier- 
General Burrows, with 2300 British and Indian troops, 
marched out from Candahar on July nth. On the other 
side of the Helmand lay an Afghan force, acting in the 
British interest, sent thither by the Sirdar, Shere Ali. 
Two days later the whole native force mutinied and 
marched off towards Ayub Khan. Burrows promptly 
pursued them, captured their six guns, and scattered the 
mutineers with loss. 

Even so, his position was most serious. In front of him, 
at no great distance, was a far superior force flushed with 
fanaticism and the hope of easy triumph; the river Hel- 
mand offered little, if any, protection, for at that season 
it was everywhere fordable ; behind him stretched twenty- 
five miles of burning desert. By a speedy retreat across 
this arid zone to Khushk-i-Nakhud, Burrows averted the 
disaster then imminent, but his anxiety to carry out the 

' "A ghazi is a man who, purely for Ihe sake of his religion, kills 
an unbeliever, Kaflfir, Sikh, Hindu, Buddhist, or Christian, in the 
belief that in so doing he gains a sure title to Paradise" (R. I. Bruce. 
The Forward Policy, p. 245). 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 109 

telegraphic orders of the Commander-in-chief, and to 
prevent Ayub's force from reaching Ghaznee, led him into an 
enterprise which proved to be far beyond his strength. 

Hearing that 2000 of the enemy's horsemen and a large 
number of ghazis had hurried forward in advance of the 
main body to Maiwand, he determined to attack them 
there. At 6.30 a.m. on July 27th he struck camp and 
moved forwards with his little force of 2599 fighting men. 
Daring has wrought wonders in Indian warfare, but rarely 
has any British commander undertaken so dangerous a 
task as that to which Burrows set his hand on that morning. 

During his march he heard news from a spy that the 
Afghan main body was about to join their vanguard; but 
either because he distrusted the news, or hoped even at 
the last to "pluck the flower, safety, out of the nettle, 
danger," he pushed on and sought to cut through the line 
of the enemy's advance as it made for Maiwand. About 
10 A.M. his column passed the village of Khig and, crossing 
a dried watercourse, entered a parched plain whereon the 
fringe of the enemy's force could dimly be seen through the 
thick and sultry air. Believing that he had to deal with 
no large body of men. Burrows pushed on, and two of 
Lieutenant Maclaine's guns began to shell their scattered 
groups. Like wasps roused to fury, the ghazis rushed 
together as if for a charge, and lines of Afghan regulars 
came into view. The deceitful haze yielded up its secret, — 
Burrows's brigade stood face to face with 15,000 Afghans ! 
Moreover, some influence, • baleful to England, kept back 
those Asiatics from their usually heedless rush. Their 
guns came up and opened fire on Burrows's line. Even the 
white, quivering groups of their ghazis forbore to charge 
with their whetted knives, but clung to a gully which 




no 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 1 1 1 

afforded good cover five hundred yards away from the 
British front and right flank; there the Afghan regulars 
galled the exposed khaki line, while their cannon, now 
numbering thirty pieces, kept up a fire to which Maclaine's 
twelve guns could give no adequate reply. 

It has been stated by military critics that Burrows erred 
in letting the fight at the outset become an affair of artillery, 
in which he was plainly the weaker. Some of his guns 
were put out of action ; and in that open plain there was no 
cover for the fighting line, the reserves, or the supporting 
horse. All of them sustained heavy losses from the un- 
usually accurate aim of the Afghan gunners. But the 
enemy had also suffered under our cannonade and mus- 
ketry; and it is consonant with the traditions of Indian 
warfare to suppose that a charge firmly pushed home at 
the first signs of wavering in the hostile mass would have 
retrieved the day. Plassey and Assaye were won by sheer 
boldness. Such a chance is said to have occurred about 
noon at Maiwand. However that may be, Burrows de- 
cided to remain on the defensive, perhaps because the 
hostile masses were too dense and too full of fight to 
warrant the adoption of dashing tactics. 

After the sun passed his zenith the enemy began to press 
on the front and flanks. Burrows swung round his wings 
to meet these threatening moves; but, as the feline and 
predatory instincts of the Afghans kindled more and more 
at the sight of the weak, bent, and stationary line, so, too, 
the morale of the defenders fell. The British and Indian 
troops alike were exhausted by the long march and by the 
torments of thirst in the sultry heat. Under the fire of 
the Afghan cannon and the frontal and flank advance of 
the enemy, the line began to waVer about 2 p.m., and two 



1 1 2 The European Nations 

of the foremost guns were lost. A native regiment in the 
centre, Jacob's Rifles, fled in utter confusion and spread 
disorder on the flanks, where the ist Grenadier Guards and 
the 66th line regiment had long maintained a desperate 
fight. General Nuttall now ordered several squadrons of 
the 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse to recover the 
guns and stay the onrushing tide, but their numbers were 
too small for the task, and the charge was not pressed 
home. Finally the whole mass of pursued and pursuers 
rolled towards the village of Khig and its outlying en- 
closures. 

There a final stand was made. Colonel Galbraith and 
about one hundred officers and men of the 66th threw 
themselves into a garden enclosure, plied the enemy fiercely 
with bullets, and time after time beat back every rush of 
the ghazis, now rioting in that carnival of death. Sur- 
rounded by the flood of the Afghan advance, the little band 
fought on, hopeless of life, but determined to uphold to the 
last the honour of their flag and country. At last only 
eleven were left. These heroes determined to die in the 
open; charging out on the masses around, they formed 
square, and back to back stood firing on the foe. Not 
until the last of them fell under the Afghan rifles did the 
ghazis venture to close in with their knives, so dauntless 
had been the bearing of this band.^ 

They had not fought in vain. Their stubborn stand 
held back the Afghan pursuit and gave time for the fugi- 
tives to come together on the way back to Candahar. 
Had the pursuit been pushed on with vigour few, if any, 
could have survived. Even so, Maiwand was one of the 

• Report of General Primrose in Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 3 
(1880), p. 156. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 113 

gravest disasters ever sustained by England's Indian army. 
It cost Burrows's force nearly half its numbers: 934 ofificers 
and men were killed and 175 wounded. The strange dis- 
proportion between these totals may serve as a measure 
of the ferocity of Afghans in the hour of victory. Of the 
non-combatants 790 fell under the knives of the ghazis. 
The remnant struggled towards Candahar, whence, on the 
28th, General Primrose despatched a column to the aid of 
the exhausted survivors. In the citadel of that fortress 
there mustered as many as 4360 effectives as night fell. 
But what were these in face of Ayub's victorious army, 
now joined by tribesmen eager for revenge and plunder? ^ 

In face of this disaster, the British generals in Northern 
Afghanistan formed a decision commendable alike for its 
boldness and its sagacity. They decided to despatch at 
once all available troops from Cabul to the relief of the 
beleaguered garrison at Candahar. General Sir Frederick 
Roberts had handed over the command at Cabul to Sir 
Donald Stewart, and was about to operate among the 
tribes on the Afghan frontier, when the news of the disaster 
sent him hurrying back to confer with the new Commander- 
in-chief. Together they recommended the plan named 
above. 

It involved grave dangers, for affairs in the north of 
Afghanistan were unsettled, and to withdraw the rest of 
our force from Cabul to the Khyber would give the rein to 
local disaffection. The Indian authorities at Simla in- 
clined to the despatch of the force at Quetta, comprising 
seven regiments of native troops, from Bombay. The 

1 S. H. Shadbolt, The Afghan Campaigns of i8y8-8o, pp. 96-100; 
Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 2 (1880), p. 21; No. 3, pp. 103-105; 
Lord Roberts, op. cit., ii., pp. 333-335; Hensman, op. cit., pp. 553- 
554- 



114 The European Nations 

route was certainly far easier; for, thanks to the toil of 
engineers, the railway from the Indus valley towards 
Quetta had been completed up to a point in advance of 
Sibi; and the labours of Major Sandeman, Bruce, and 
others, had kept that district fairly quiet.i But the 
troops at Quetta and Pishin were held to be incapable of 
facing a superior force of victorious Afghans. At Cabul 
there were nine regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, 
and three mountain batteries, all of them British or picked 
Indian troops. On August 3rd, Lord Ripon telegraphed 
his permission for the despatch of the Cabul field-force to 
Candahar. It amounted to 2835 British (the 72nd and 
92nd Highlanders and 2nd battalion of the 60th Rifles, and 
9th Lancers), 71 51 Indian troops, together with 18 guns. 
On August 9th it struck camp and set out on a march 
which was destined to be famous. 

Fortunately, before it left the Cabul camp on August 9th, 
matters were skilfully arranged by Mr. Griffin with Abdur 
Rahman, on terms which will be noticed presently. In 
spite of one or two suspicious incidents, his loyalty to the 
British cause now seemed to be assured, and that, too, in 
spite of the remonstrances of many of his supporters. He 
therefore sent forward messengers to prepare the way for 
Roberts's force. They did so by telling the tribesmen that 
the new Ameer was sending the foreign army out of the 
land by way of Candahar! This pleasing fiction in some 
measure helped on the progress of the force, and the issue of 
events proved it to be no very great travesty of the truth. 

» Colonel Sandeman: His Life and Work on our Indian Frontier, by 
T. H. Thornton; R. I. Bruce, The Forward Policy and its Results 
(1900), chaps, iv., v.; Candahar in i8yg; Being the Diary of Major 
he Mesurier, R.E. (i88o). The last had reported in 1879 that the 
fortifications of Candahar were weak and the citadel in bad repair. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 1 1 5 

Every possible device was needed to ensure triumph 
over physical obstacles. In order to expedite the march 
through the difficult country between Cabul and Candahar, 
no wheeled guns or waggons went with the force. As many 
as eight thousand native bearers or drivers set out with 
the force, but very many of them deserted, and the 8255 
horses, mules, and donkeys were thenceforth driven by 
men told off from the regiments. The line of march led at 
first through the fertile valley of the Logar river, where 
the troops and followers were able to reap the ripening 
crops and subsist in comfort. Money was paid for the 
crops thus appropriated. After leaving this fertile dis- 
trict for the barren uplands, the question of food and fuel 
became very serious; but it was overcome by ingenuity 
and patience, though occasional times of privation had to 
be faced, as, for instance, when only very small roots were 
found for the cooking of corn and meat. A lofty range, 
the Zamburak Kotal, was crossed with great toil and 
amidst biting cold at night-time; but the ability of the 
commander, the forethought and organising power of his 
staff, and the hardihood of the men overcame all trials and 
obstacles. 

The army then reached the more fertile districts around 
Ghazni, and on August 15th gained an entry without re- 
sistance to that once formidable stronghold. Steady 
marching brought the force eight days later to the hill fort 
of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, where it received a hearty welcome from 
the British garrison of nine hundred men. Sir Frederick 
Roberts determined to take on these troops with him, as 
he needed all his strength to cope with the growing power 
of Yakub. After a day's rest (well earned, seeing that 
the force had traversed 225 miles in 14 days), the column 



ii6 The European Nations 

set forth on its last stages, cheered by the thought of 
rescuing their comrades at Candahar, but more and more 
oppressed by the heat, which, in the lower districts of 
South Afghanistan, is as fierce as anywhere in the world. 
Mr. Hensman, the war correspondent of the Daily News, 
summed up in one telling phrase the chief difficulties of 
the troops. "The sun laughed to scorn ioo° F. in the 
shade." On the 27th the commander fell ill with a sharp 
attack of fever. 

Nevertheless he instructed the Indian cavalry to push 
on to Robat and open up heliographic communication 
with Candahar. It then transpired that the approach of 
the column had already changed the situation. Already, 
on August 23rd, Ayub had raised the siege and retired to 
the hills north of the city. That relief came none too soon 
appeared on the morning of the 31st, when the thin and 
feeble cheering that greeted the rescuers on their entrance 
to the long-beleaguered town told its sad tale of want, 
disease, and depression of heart. The men who had 
marched 313 miles in 22 days — an average of 14^ miles a 
day — felt a thrill of sympathy, not unmixed with disgust 
in some cases, at the want of spirit too plainly discernible 
among the defenders. The Union Jack was not hoisted on 
the citadel until the rescuers were near at hand.i General 
Roberts might have applied to them Hecuba's words to 
Priam (during the sack of Troy:) 

Non tali auxilio nee defensoribus istis 
tern pus eget; 

As for the morale of the relieving force, it now stood a 

the zenith, as was seen on the following day. Framing his 

measures so as to encourage Ayub to stand his ground, 

' Roberts, op. cit., ii., p. 357. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 117 

Roberts planned his attack in the way that had already 
led to success, namely, a frontal attack more imposing 
than serious, while the enemy's flank was turned and his 
communications were threatened. These moves were carried 
out by Generals Ross and Baker with great skill. Under 
the persistent pressure of the British onset the Afghans 
fell back from position to position, north-west of Candahar, 
until finally Major White with the 92nd, supported by 
Gurkhas and the 23rd Pioneers, drove them back to their 
last ridge, the Baba Wali Kotal, swarmed up its western 
flank, and threw the whole of the hostile mass in utter con- 
fusion into the plain beyond. Owing to the very broken 
nature of the ground, few British and Indian horsemen 
were at hand to reap the full fruits of victory; but many 
of Ayub's regulars and ghazis fell under their avenging 
sabres. The beaten force deserved no mercy. When the 
British triumph was assured, the Afghan chief ordered his 
prisoner. Lieutenant Maclaine, to be butchered; where- 
upon he himself and his suite took to flight. The whole 
of his artillery, twenty-seven pieces, including the two 
British guns lost at Maiwand, fell into the victor's hands. 
In fact, Ayub's force ceased to exist; many of his troops 
at once assumed the garb of peaceful cultivators, and the 
Pretender himself fled to Herat.* 

Thus ended an enterprise which, but for the exercise of 
the highest qualities on the part of General Roberts, his 
staff, the officers, and rank and file, might easily have 
ended in irretrievable disaster. This will appear from the 
following considerations : The question of food and water 

' Pari. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 3 (1880), p. 82; Hensman, The 
Afghan War; Shadbolt, op. cit., pp. 108-110. The last reckons 
Ayub's force at 12,800, of whom 1200 were slain. 



ii8 The European Nations 

during a prolonged march in that parched season of the 
year might have caused the gravest difficulties; but they 
were solved by a wise choice of route along or near water- 
courses where water could generally be procured. The 
few days when little or no water could be had showed what 
might have happened. Further, the help assured by the 
action of the Ameer's emissaries among the tribesmen was 
of little avkil after the valley of the Logar was left behind. 
Many of the tribes were actively hostile, and cut off 
stragglers and baggage-animals. 

Above and beyond these daily difficulties, there was the 
problem as to the line of retreat to be taken in case of a 
reverse inflicted by the tribes en route. The army had 
given up its base of operations; for at the same time the 
remaining British and Indian regiments at Cabul were 
withdrawn to the Khyber Pass. True, there was General 
Phayre's force holding Quetta and endeavouring to 
stretch out a hand towards Candahar; but the natural 
obstacles and lack of transport prevented the arrival of 
help from that quarter. It is, however, scarcely correct 
to say that Roberts had no line of retreat assured in case 
of defeat.^ No serious fighting was to be expected before 
Candahar; for the Afghan plundering instinct was likely 
to keep Ayub near to that city, where the garrison was 
hard pressed. After leaving Ghazni, the Quetta route 
became the natural way of retirement. 

As it happened, the difficulties were mainly those inflicted 
by the stern hand of Nature herself; and their severity 
may be gauged by tha fact that out of a well-seasoned 
force of less than ten thousand fighting men as many as 
940 sick had at once to go into hospital at Candahar. The 
» Shadbolt, op. cii. p. 107. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 119 

burning days and frosty nights of the Afghan uplands were 
more fatal than the rifles of Ayub and the knives of the 
ghazis. As Lord Roberts has modestly admitted, the long 
march gained in dramatic effect because for three weeks 
he and his army were lost to the world, and, suddenly 
emerging from the unknown, gained a decisive triumph. 
But, allowing for this element of picturesqueness, so 
unusual in an age when the daily din of telegrams dulls 
the perception of readers, we may still maintain that the 
march from Cabul to Candahar will bear comparison with 
any similar achievement in modern history. 

The story of British relations with Afghanistan is one 
which illustrates the infinite capacity of our race to "mud- 
dle through" to some more or less satisfactory settlement. 
This was especially the case in the spring and summer of 
1880, when the accession of Mr. Gladstone to power and 
the disaster of Maiwand changed the diplomatic and 
military situation. In one sense, and that not a cryptic 
one, these events served to supplement one another. They 
rendered inevitable the entire evacuation of Afghanistan. 
That, it need hardly be said, was the policy of Mr. Glad- 
stone, of the Secretary for India, Lord Hartington (now 
Duke of Devonshire) , and of Lord Ripon. 

On one point both parties were agreed. Events had 
shown how undesirable it was to hold Cabul and Central 
Afghanistan. The evacuation of all these districts was 
specified in Lord Lytton's last official Memorandum, that 
which he signed on June 7, 1880, as certain to take place 
as soon as the political arrangements at Cabul were duly 
settled. The retiring Viceroy, however, declared that in 
his judgment the whole province of Candahar must be 
severed from the Cabul power, whether Abdur Rahman 



I20 The European Nations 

assented to it or not.^ Obviously this implied the sub- 
jection of Candahar to British rule in some form. General 
Roberts himself argued stoutly for the retention of that 
city and district; and so did most of the military men. 
Lord Wolseley, on the other hand, urged that it would 
place an undesirable strain upon the resources of India, 
and that the city could readily be occupied from the 
Quetta position if ever the Russians advanced to Herat. 
The Cabinet strongly held this opinion; the exponents 
of Whig ideas. Lord Hartington and the Duke of Argyll, 
herein agreeing with the exponents of a peaceful un- 
Imperial commercialism, Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain. 
Consequently the last of the British troops were with- 
drawn from Candahar on April 15, 1881. 

The retirement was more serious in appearance than in 
reality. The war had brought some substantial gains. 
The new frontier acquired by the Treaty of Gandamak — 
and the terms of that compact were practically void until 
Roberts's victory at Candahar gave them body and life — 
provided ample means for sending troops easily to the 
neighbourhood of Cabul, Ghazni, and Candahar; and ex- 
perience showed that troops kept in the hill stations on the 
frontier preserved their mettle far better than those can- 
toned in or near the unhealthy cities just named. The 
Afghans had also learnt a sharp lesson of the danger and 
futility of leaning on Russia; and to this fact must be 
attributed the steady adherence of the new Ameer to the 
British side. 

Moreover, the success of his rule depended largely on 

» Lady B. Balfour, op. cit., pp. 430, 445. On June 8th Lord 
Ripon arrived at Simla and took over the viceroyalty from Lord 
Lytton ; the latter was raised to an earldom. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 121 

our evacuation of his land. Experience has shown that 
a practically independent and united Afghanistan forms a 
better barrier to a Russian advance than an Afghanistan 
rent by the fanatical feuds that spring up during a foreign 
occupation. Finally, the great need of India after the 
long famine was economy. A prosperous and contented 
India might be trusted to beat off any army that Russia 
could send; a bankrupt India would be the breeding- 
ground of strife and mutiny; and on these fell powers 
•Skobeleff counted as his most formidable allies. i 

It remained to be seen whether Abdur Rahman could 
win Candahar and Herat, and, having won them, keep 
them. At first Fortune smiled on his rival, Ayub. That 
pretender sent a force from Herat southwards against the 
Am_eer's troops, defeated them, and took Candahar (July, 
1 881). But Abdur Rahman had learnt to scorn the shifts 
of the fickle goddess. With a large force he marched to 
that city, bought over a part of Ayub's following, and then 
utterly defeated the remainder. This defeat was the end 
of Ayub's career. Flying back to Herat, he found it in 
the hands of the Ameer's supporters, and was fain to seek 
refuge in Persia. Both of these successes seem to have 
been due to the subsidies which the new Ameer drew from 
India. 2 

We may here refer to the last scene in which Ayub 
played a part before Englishmen. Foiled of his hopes in 
Persia, he finally retired to India. At a later day he ap- 
peared as a pensioner on the bounty of that Government 
at a review held at Rawal Pindi in the Punjab in honour 

'• See Appendix: also Lord Hartington's speeches in the House of 
Commons, March 25-26, 1881. 

2 Abdur Rahman's own account {^op. cit., ch. ix.) ascribes his 
triumph to his own skill and to Ayub's cowardice. 



122 The European Nations 

of the visit of H.R.H. Prince Victor. The Prince, on being 
informed of his presence, rode up to his carriage and 
saluted the fallen Sirdar. The incident profoundly touched 
the Afghans who were present. One of them said: " It 
was a noble act. It shows that you English are worthy 
to be the rulers of this land." ^ 

The Afghans were accustomed to see the conquered 
crushed and scorned by the conqueror. Hence they did not 
resent the truculent methods resorted to by Abdur Rahman 
in the consolidation of his power. In his relentless grip the 
Afghan tribes soon acquired something of stability. Cer- 
tainly Lord Lytton never made a wiser choice than that of 
Abdur Rahman for the ameership; and, strange to say, 
that choice obviated the evils which the Viceroy predicted 
as certain to accrue from the British withdrawal from 
Candahar.2 Contrasting the action of Great Britain 
towards himself with that of Russia towards Shere Ali in 
his closing days, the new Ameer could scarcely waver in 
his choice of an alliance. And while he held the Indian 
Government away at arm's length, he never wavered at 
heart. 

For in the meantime Russia had resumed her southward 
march, setting to work with the doggedness that she 
usually displays in the task of avenging slights and over- 
bearing opposition. The penury of the exchequer, the 
plots of the Nihilists, and the discontent of the whole 
people after the inglorious struggle with Turkey, would 
have imposed on any other Government a policy of rest 

» Eighteen Yearsin the Khyber Pass (1879-1898), by Colonel Sir R. 
Warburton, p. 213. The author's father had married a niece of the 
Ameer Dost Mohammed. 

» Lord Lytton's speech in the House of Lords, Jan., 1881. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 123 

and economy. To the stiff bureaucracy of St. Petersburg 
these were so many motives for adopting a forward policy 
in Asia. Conquests of Turkoman territory would bring 
wealth, at least to the bureaucrats and generals; and mili- 
tary triumphs might be counted on to raise the spirit of the 
troops, silence the talk about official peculations during 
the Turkish campaign, and act in the manner so saga- 
ciously pointed out by Henry IV. to Prince Hal: 

Therefore, my Harry, 
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds 
With foreign quarrels, that action, hence borne out, 
May waste the memory of the former days. 

In the autumn of 1878 General Lomakin had waged an 
unsuccessful campaign against the Tekke Turkomans, and 
finally fell back with heavy losses on Krasnovodsk, his base 
of operations on the Caspian Sea. In the summer of 1879 
another expedition set out from that port to avenge the 
defeat. Owing to the death of the chief, Lomakin again 
rose to the command. His bad dispositions at the climax 
of the campaign led him to a more serious disaster. On 
coming up to the fortress of Denghil Tepe, near the town 
of Geok Tepe, he led only fourteen hundred men, or less 
than half of his force, to bombard and storm a stronghold 
held by some fifteen thousand Turkomans, and fortified 01 
the plan suggested by a British ofificer. Lieutenant Butler. V 
Preluding his attack by a murderous cannonade, he sent 
round his cavalry to check the flight of the faint-hearted 

' This officer wrote to the Globe on January 25, 1881, stating that 
he had fortified two other posts east of Denghil Tepe. This led 
Skobeleff to push on to Askabad after the capture of that place; 
but he found no strongholds. See Marvin's Russian Advance 
towards India, p. 85. 



124 The European Nations 

among the garrison; and before his guns had fully done 
their work he ordered the whole line to advance and carry 
the walls by storm. At once the Turkoman fire redoubled 
in strength, tore away the front of every attacking party, 
and finally drove back the assailants everywhere with heavy 
loss (September 9, 1879). On the morrow the invaders 
fell back on the river Atrek and thence' made their way 
back to the Caspian in sore straits.^ 

The next year witnessed the advent of a great soldier on 
the scene. Skobeleff, the stormy petrel of Russian life, the 
man whose giant frame was animated by a hero's soul, who, 
when pitched from his horse in the rush on one of the 
death-dealing redoubts at Plevna, rose undaunted to his 
feet, brandished his broken sword in the air, and yelled at 
the enemy a defiance which thrilled his broken lines to a 
final mad charge over the rampart — Skobeleff was at hand. 
He had culled his first laurels at Khiva and Khokand, and 
now came to the shores of the Caspian to carry forward the 
standards which he hoped one day to plant on the walls of 
Delhi. That he cherished this hope is proved by the 
memorandum which will be found in the Appendix of this 
volume. His disclaimer of any such intention to Mr. 
Charles Marvin (which will also be found there) shows that 
under his frank exterior there lay hidden the strain of 
Oriental duplicity so often found among his countrymen 
in political life. 

At once the operations felt the influence of his active, 
cheery, and commanding personality. The materials for a 
railway, which had been lying unused at Bender, were now 
brought up ; and Russia found the money to set about the 
construction of a railway from Michaelovsk to the Tekke 

1 Pari. Papers, Central Asia, No. i (1880), pp. 167-173, 182. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 125 

Turkoman country — an undertaking which was destined 
wholly to change the conditions of warfare in South 
Turkestan and on the Afghan border. By the close of the 
year more than forty miles were roughly laid down, and 
Skobeleff was ready for his final advance from Kizil Arvat 
towards Denghil Tepe. 

.. Meanwhile the Tekkes had gained reinforcements from 
their kinsmen in the Merv oasis, and had massed nearly 
fourty thousand men — so rumour ran — at their stronghold. 
Nevertheless, they offered no serious resistance to the Rus- 
sian advance, doubtless because they hoped to increase 
the difficulties of his retreat after the repulse which they 
determined to inflict at their hill fortress. But Skobeleff 
excelled Lomakin in skill no less than in prowess and mag- 
netic influence. He proceeded to push his trenches towards 
the stronghold, so that on January 23, 1881, his men suc- 
ceeded in placing twenty-six hundred pounds of gunpowder 
under the south-eastern corner of the rampart. Early on 
the following day the Russians began the assault; and 
while cannon and rockets wrought death and dismay 
among the ill-armed defenders, the mighty shock of the 
explosion tore away fifty yards of their rampart. 

At once the Russian lines moved forward to end the 
work begun by gunpowder. With the blare of martial 
music and with ringing cheers, they charged at the still 
formidable walls. A young officer. Colonel Kuropatkin, 
who has since won notoriety in other lands, was ready with 
twelve companies to rush into the breach. Their leading 
files swarmed up it before the Tekkes fully recovered from 
the blow dealt by the hand of western science; but then 
the brave nomads closed in on foes with whom they could 
fight, and brought the storming party to a standstill. 



126 The European Nations 

Skobeleff was ready for the emergency. True to his 
Plevna tactics of ever feeding an attack at the crisis with 
new troops, he hurled forward two battalions of the line 
and companies of dismounted Cossacks. These pushed on 
the onset, hewed their way through all obstacles, and soon 
met the smaller storming parties which had penetrated at 
other points. By i p.m. the Russian standard waved in 
triumph from the central hill of the fortress, and thence- 
forth bands of Tekkes began to stream forth into the 
desert on the farther side. 

Now Skobeleff gave to his foes a sharp lesson, which, he 
claimed, was the most merciful in the end. He ordered his 
men, horse and foot alike, to pursue the fugitives and spare 
no one. Ruthlessly the order was obeyed. First, the dis- 
charge of grape-shot from the light guns, then the bayonet, 
and lastly the Cossack lance, strewed the plain with 
corpses of men, women, and children; darkness alone put 
an end to the butchery, and then the desert for eleven 
miles eastward of Denghil Tepe bore witness to the 
thoroughness of Muscovite methods of warfare. All the 
men within the fortress were put to the sword. Skobeleff 
himself estimated the number of the slain at twenty 
thousand.^ Booty to the value of six hundred thousand 
pounds fell to the lot of the victors. Since that awful day 
the once predatory tribes of Tekkes have given little 
trouble. Skobeleff sent his right-hand man, Kuropatkin, 
to occupy Askabad, and reconnoitre towards Merv, but 
these moves were checked by order of the Czar. 

A curious incident, told to Lord Curzon, illustrates the 
dread in which Russian troops have since been held. At 

» Siege and Assault of Denghil Tepe. By General Skobeleflf 
(translated). London, 1881 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 127 

the opening of the railway to Askabad, five years later, the 
Russian military bands began to play. At once the women 
and children there present raised cries and shrieks of dread, 
while the men threw themselves on the ground. They 
imagined that the music was a signal for another onslaught 
like that which preluded the capture of their former 
stronghold.^ 

This victory proved to be the last of Skobeleff 's career. 
The Government, having used their knight-errant, now put 
him on one side as too insubordinate and ambitious for his 
post. To his great disgust, he was recalled. He did not 
long survive. Owing to causes that are little known, 
among which a round of fast living is said to have played 
its part, he died suddenly from failure of the heart at his 
residence near Moscow (July 7, 1882). Some there were 
who whispered dark things as to his militant notions being 
out of favour with the new Czar, Alexander III. ; others 
pointed significantly to Bismarck. Others, again, prattled 
of Destiny; but the best comment on the death of Skobe- 
leff would seem to be that illuminating saying of Novalis — 
"Character is Destiny." Love of fame prompted in him 
the desire one day to measure swords with Lord Roberts 
in the Punjab; but the coarser strain in his nature dragged 
him to earth at the age of thirty-nine. 

The accession of Alexander IIL, after the murder of his 
father on March 13, 1881, promised for a short time to 
usher in a more peaceful policy; but, in truth, the last 
important diplomatic assurance of the reign of Alexander 
IL was that given by the minister, M. de Giers, to Lord 
Dufferin, as to Russia's resolve not to occupy Merv: " Not 

' Russia in Central Asia in i88g. By the Hon. G. N. Ctirzon 
(1889), p. 83. 



128 The European Nations 

only do we not want to go there, but, happily, there is 
nothing which can require us to go there." 

In spite of a similar assurance given on April 5th to the 
Russian Ambassador in London, both the need and the 
desire soon sprang into existence. Muscovite agents made 
their way to the fruitful oasis of Merv; and a daring 
soldier, Alikhanoff, in the guise of a merchant's clerk, pro- 
ceeded thither early in 1882, skilfully distributed money 
to work up a Russian party, and secretly sketched a plan 
of the fortress. Many chiefs and traders opposed Russia 
bitterly, for O'Donovan, a brilliant and adventurous Eng- 
lishman, while captive there, sought to open their eyes to 
the coming danger. But England's influence had fallen 
to zero since Skobeleff's victory and her own withdrawal 
from Candahar.^ 

■ In 1882, a Russian engineer officer, Lessar, in the guise 
of a scientific explorer, surveyed the route between Merv 
and Herat, and found that it presented far fewer difficulties 
than had been formerly reported to exist. 2 Finally, in 
1884, the Czar's Government sought to revenge itself for 
Britain's continued occupation of Egypt by fomenting 
trouble near the Afghan border. Alikhanoff then re- 
appeared, not in disguise, browbeat the hostile chieftains 
at Merv by threats of a Russian invasion, and finally in- 
duced them to take an oath of allegiance to Alexander III. 
(February 12, 1884).^ 

There was, however, some reason for Russia's violation 
of her repeated promises respecting Merv. In practical 

1 C. Marvin, Merv, the Queen of the World (1881); E. O'Donovan, 
The Merv Oasis, 2 vols. (1882-83), and Merv (1883). 

2 See his reports in Pari. Papers, Central Asia, No. i (1884), pp. 
26, 36, 39, 63, 96, 106. 

5 Ibid., p. 119. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 129 

politics the theory of compensation has long gained an as- 
sured footing; and, seeing that Britain had occupied Egypt 
partly as the mandatory of Europe, and now refused to 
evacuate that land, the Russian Government had a good 
excuse for retaliation. As has happened at every time of 
tension between the two Empires since 1855, the Czar 
chose to embarrass the Island Power by pushing on towards 
India. As a matter of fact, the greater the pressure that 
Russia brought to bear on the Afghan frontier, the greater 
became the determination of England not to withdraw 
from Egypt. Hence, in the years 1882-84, both Powers 
plunged more deeply into that "vicious circle," in which 
the policy of the Crimean War had enclosed them, and 
from which they have never freed themselves. 

The fact is deplorable. It has produced endless friction 
and has strained the resources of two great Empires; but 
the allegation of Russian perfidy in the Merv affair may be 
left to those who look at facts solely from the insular 
standpoint. In the eyes of patriotic Russians England 
was the offender: first, by opposing Muscovite policy tooth 
and nail in the Balkans; secondly, by seizing Egypt; and, 
thirdly, by refusing to withdraw from that commanding 
position. The important fact to notice is that after each 
of these provocations Russia sought her revenge on that 
flank of the British Empire to which she was guided by her 
own sure instincts and by the shrieks of insular Cassandras. 
By moving a few sotnias of Cossacks towards Herat she 
compelled her rival to spend a hundred-fold as much in 
military preparations in India. 

It is undeniable that Russia's persistent breach of her 
promises in Asiatic affairs exasperated public opinion, and 
brought the two Empires to the verge of war. Conduct of 

VOL. II. — 9. 



130 The European Nations 

that description baffles the resources of diplomacy, which 
are designed to arrange disputes. Unfortunately, British 
foreign affairs were in the hands of Lord Granville, whose 
gentle reproaches only awakened contempt at St. Peters- 
burg. The recent withdrawal of Lord Dufferin from St. 
Petersburg to Constantinople, on the plea of ill-health, was 
also a misfortune; but his appointment to the viceroyalty 
of India (September, 1884) placed at Calcutta a Governor- 
General superior to Lord Ripon in diplomatic experience. 

There was every need for the exercise of ability and 
firmness both at Westminster and Calcutta. The climax 
in Russia's policy of lance-pricks was reached in the follow- 
ing year; and it has been assumed, apparently on good 
authority, that the understanding arrived at by the three 
Emperors in their meeting at Skiernewice (September, 
1884) implied a tacit encouragement of Russia's designs in 
Central Asia, however much they were curbed in the 
Balkan Peninsula. This was certainly the aim of Bis- 
marck, and that he knew a good deal about Russian move- 
ments is clear from his words to Busch on November 24, 
1884: "Just keep a sharp lookout on the news from 
Afghanistan. Something will happen there soon." ^ 

This was clearly more than a surmise. At that time an 
Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission was appointed to 
settle the many vexed questions concerning the delimita- 
tion of the Russo-Afghan boundary. General Sir Peter 
Lumsden proceeded to Sarrakhs, expecting there to meet 
the Russian Commissioners by appointment in the middle 
of October, 1884. On various pretexts the work of the 
Commission was postponed in accordance with advices 

> Bismarck: Some Secret Pages in his History, iii., pp. 124, 133 
(Eng. edit.). 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 131 

sent from St. Petersburg. The aim of this dilatory poHcy 
soon became evident. That was the time when (as will 
appear in Chapter XVI.) the British expedition was slowly 
working its way towards Khartum in the effort to unravel 
the web of fate then closing in on the gallant Gordon. 
The news of his doom reached England on February 5, 
1885. Then it was that Russia unmasked her designs. 
They included the appropriation of the town and district 
of Panjdeh, which she herself had previously acknowledged 
to be in Afghan territory. In vain did Lord Granville 
protest; in vain did he put forward proposals which con- 
ceded very much to the Czar, but less than his minis- 
ters determined to have. All that he could obtain was 
a promise that the Russians would not advance farther 
during the negotiations. 

On March 13th, Mr. Gladstone officially announced that 
an agreement to this effect had been arrived at with Russia. 
The Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg, M. de Giers, on 
March i6th assured the British ambassador. Sir Edward 
Thornton, that that statement was correct. On March 26th, 
however, the light troops of General Komaroff advanced be- 
yond the line of demarcation previously agreed on, and 
on the following day pushed past the Afghan force holding 
positions in front of Panjdeh. The Afghans refused to be 
drawn into a fight, but held their ground; thereupon, on 
March 29th, Komaroff sent them an ultimatum ordering 
them to withdraw beyond Panjdeh. A British staff-officer 
requested him to reconsider and recall this demand, but 
he himself was waived aside. Finally, on March 30th, 
Komaroff attacked the Afghan position, and drove out the 
defenders with the loss of nine hundred men. The surviv- 
oij-s fell back on Herat, General Lumsden and his escort 



132 The European Nations 

retired in the same direction, and Russia took possession 
of the coveted prize. ^ 

The news of this outrage reached England on April 7th, 
and sent a thrill of indignation through the breasts of the 
most peaceful. Twenty days later Mr. Gladstone pro- 
posed to Parliament to vote the sum of ;^i 1,000,000 for 
war preparations. Of this sum all but ;,£4, 500,000 (needed 
for the Sudan) was devoted to military and naval prepara- 
tions against Russia; and we have the authority of Mr. 
John Morley for saying that this vote was supported by 
Liberals "with much more than a mechanical loyalty." ^ 
Russia had achieved the impossible: she had united 
Liberals of all shades of thought against her, and the joke 
about " Mervousness" was heard no more. 

Nevertheless the firmness of the Government resembled 
that of Bob Acres, — it soon oozed away. Ministers de- 
ferred to the Czar's angry declaration that he would allow 
no inquiry into the action of General Komaroff. This 
alone was a most mischievous precedent, as* it tended to 
inflate Russian officers with the belief that they could 
safely set at defiance the rules of international law. Still 
worse were the signs of favour showered on the violator of 
a truce by the sovereign who had gained the reputation of 
being the upholder of peace. From all that is known semi- 
officially with respect to the acute crisis of the spring of 
1885, it would appear that peace was due solely to the tact 
of Sir Robert Morier, the British ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg, and to the complaisance of the Gladstone Cabinet. 

Certainly this quality carried ministers very far on the 

' See Pari. Papers, Central Asia, No. i (1885), for General 
Lumsden's refutation of Komaroff's misstatements; also for the 
general accounts, ibid., No. 5 (1885), pp. 1-7. 

2 J. Morley, Life of Gladstone, iii., p. 184. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 133 

path of concession. When negotiations were resumed, the 
British Government behed its former promises of firmness in 
a matter that closely concerned their ally, and surrendered 
Panjdeh to Russia, but on the understanding that the Zul- 
fikar Pass should be retained by the Afghans. It should 
be stated, however, that Abdur Rahman had already 
assured Lord Dufferin, during interviews which they had 
at Rawal Pindi early in April, of his readiness to give up 
Panjdeh if he could retain that pass and its approaches. 
The Russian Government conceded this point; but their 
negotiators then set to work to secure possession of heights 
dominating the pass. It seemed that Lord Granville was 
open to conviction even on this point. 

Such was the state of affairs when, on June 9, 1885, Mr. 
Gladstone's Ministry resigned, owing to a defeat on a budget 
question. The accession of Lord Salisbury to power after 
a brief interval helped to clear up these disputes. The 
crisis in Bulgaria of September, 1885 (see Vol. I. Chapter 
X.), also served to distract the Russian Government, the 
Czar's chief pre-occupation now being to have his revenge 
on Prince Alexander of Battenberg. Consequently the two 
Powers came to a compromise about the Zulfikar Pass.^ 
There still remained several questions outstanding, and 
only after long and arduous surveys, not unmixed with 
disputes, was the present boundary agreed on in a protocol 
signed on July 22, 1887. We may here refer to a prophecy 
made by one of Bismarck's confidantes, Bucher, at the 
close of May, 1885: "I believe the [Afghan] matter will 
come up again in about five years, when the [Russian] 
railways are finished." 2 

» Pari. Papers, Central Asia, No. 4 (1885), pp. 41-72. 
2 Bismarck: Some Secret Pages, etc., iii., p. 135. 



134 The European Nations 

Thus it was that Russia secured her hold on districts 
dangerously near to Herat. Her methods at Panjdeh can 
only be described as a deliberate outrage on international 
law. It is clear that Alexander III. and his officials cared 
nothing for the public opinion of Europe, and that they 
pushed on their claims by means which appealed with over- 
powering force to the dominant motive of Orientals — fear. 
But their action was based on another consideration. Re- 
lying on Mr. Gladstone's well-known love of peace, they 
sought to degrade the British Government in the eyes of 
the Asiatic peoples. In some measure they succeeded. 
The prestige of Britain thenceforth paled before that of the 
Czar; and the ease and decisiveness of the Russian con- 
quests, contrasting with the fitful advances and speedy 
withdrawals of British troops, spread the feeling in Central 
Asia that the future belonged to Russia. 

Fortunately, this was not the light in which Abdur Rah- 
man viewed the incident. He was not the man to yield to 
intimidation. That "strange, strong creature," as Lord 
Dufferin called him, "showed less emotion than might have 
been expected," but his resentment against Russia was 
none the less keen.^ Her pressure only served to drive 
him to closer union with Great Britain. Clearly the 
Russians misunderstood Abdur Rahman. Their miscal- 
culation was equally great as regards the character of the 
Afghans and the conditions of life among those mountain 
clans. Russian officers and administrators, after pushing 
their way easily through the loose rubble of tribes that 
make up Turkestan, did not realise that they had to deal 
with very different men in Afghanistan. To ride rough- 

' In his Life (i., pp. 244-246) he also greatly blames British 
policy. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 135 

shod over tribes who hve in the desert and have no natural 
rallying-point may be very effective; but that poHcy is 
risky when appHed to tribes who cHng to their mountains. 

The analogy of Afghanistan to Switzerland may again 
serve to illustrate the difference between mountaineers and 
plain-dwellers. It was only when the Hapsburgs or the 
French threatened the Swiss that they formed any effective 
union for the defence of the Fatherland. Always at 
variance in time of peace, the cantons never united save 
under the stress of a common danger. The greater the 
pressure from without, the closer was the union. That 
truth has been illustrated several times, from the age of the 
legendary Tell down to the glorious efforts of 1798. In a 
word, the selfsame mountaineers who live disunited in time 
of peace, come together and act closely together in war, or 
under threat of war. 

Accordingly, the action of England in retiring from 
Candahar, contrasting as it did with Russia's action at 
Panjdeh, marked out the line of true policy for Abdur Rah- 
man. Thenceforth he and his tribesmen saw more clearly 
than ever that Russia was the foe; and it is noteworthy 
that under the shadow of the northern peril there has 
grown up among those turbulent clans a sense of unity 
never known before. Unconsciously Russia has been play- 
ing the part of a Napoleon I.; she has ground together 
some at least of the peoples of Central Asia with a thor- 
oughness which may lead to unexpected results if ever 
events favour a general rising against the conqueror. 

Amidst all his seeming vacillations of policy, Abdur 
Rahman was governed by the thought of- keeping Eng- 
land, and still more Russia, from his land. He absolutely 
refused to allow railways and telegraphs to enter his 



136 The European Nations 

territoiies, for, as he said: "Where Europeans build rail- 
ways, their armies quickly follow. My neighbours have 
all been swallowed up in this manner. I have no wish to 
suffer their fate." 

His judgment was sound. Skobeleff conquered the 
Tekkes by his railway; and the acquisition of Merv and 
Panjdeh was really the outcome of the new trans-Caspian 
line, which, as Lord Cufzon has pointed out, completely 
changed the problem of the defence of India. Formerly 
the natural line of advance for Russia was from Orenburg 
to Tashkend and the upper Oxus ; and even now that rail- 
way would enable her to make a powerful diversion against 
Northern Afghanistan.^ But the route from Krasnovodsk 
on the Caspian to Merv and Kushk presents a shorter and 
far easier route, leading, moreover, to the open side of 
Afghanistan, Herat, and Candahar. Recent experiments 
have shown that a division of troops can be sent in eight 
days from Moscow to Kushk, within a short distance of the 
Afghan frontier. In a word, Russia can operate against 
Afghanistan by a line (or rather by two lines) far shorter 
and easier than any which Great Britain can use for its 
defence.2 

It is therefore of the utmost importance to prevent her 
pushing on her railways into that country. This is the 
consideration which inspired Mr. Balfour's noteworthy 
declaration of May 11, 1905, in the House of Commons: 

" As transport is the great difficulty of an invading army, 
we must not allow anything to be done which would 
facilitate transport. It ought, in my opinion, to be con- 

> See Col. A. Durand's The Making of a Frontier (i8gg) ,ip-p. 41-43. 

2 Colquhoun, Russia against India, p. 170. Lord Curzon in 1894 
went over much of the ground between Sarrakhs and Candahar and 
found it quite easy for an army (except in food-supply). 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 137 

sidered as an act of direct aggression upon this country 
that any attempt should be made to build a railway, in 
connection with the Russian strategic railways, within the 
territory of Afghanistan." 

It is fairly certain that the present Ameer, Habibulla, 
who succeeded his father in 1901, holds those views. This 
doubtless was the reason why, early in 1905, he took the 
unprecedented step of inviting the Indian Government to 
send a Mission to Cabul. In view of the increase of Russia's 
railways in Central Asia there was more need than ever of 
coming to a secret understanding with a view to defence 
against that Power. 

Finally, we may note that Great Britain has done very 
much to make up for her natural defects of position. The 
Panjdeh affair having relegated the policy of "masterly 
inactivity" to the limbo of benevolent futilities, the 
materials for the Quetta railway, which had been in large 
part sent back to Bombay in the year 1881, were now 
brought back again; and an alternative route was made 
to Quetta. The urgent need of checkmating French in- 
trigues in Burmah led to the annexation of that land 
(November, 1885); and the Kurram valley, commanding 
Cabul, which the Gladstone Government had abandoned, 
was reoccupied. The Quetta district was annexed to 
India in 1887 under the title of British Baluchistan. The 
year 1891 saw an important work undertaken in advance 
of Quetta, the Khojak tunnel being then driven through a 
range close by the Afghan frontier, while an entrenched 
camp was contructed near by for the storage of arms and 
supplies. These positions, and the general hold which 
Britain keeps over the Baluchee clans, enable the de- 
fenders of India to threaten oh the flank any advance by 



138 The European Nations 

the otherwise practicable route from Candahar to the 
Indus. 

Certainly there is every need for careful preparations 
against any such enterprise. Lord Curzon, writing before 
Russia's strategic railways were complete, thought it 
feasible for Russia speedily to throw 150,000 men into 
Afghanistan, feed them there, and send on 90,000 of them 
against the Indus. 1 After the optimistic account of the 
problem of Indian defence given by Mr. Balfour in the 
speech above referred to, it is well to remember that, 
though Russia cannot invade India until she has con- 
quered Afghanistan, yet for that preliminary undertaking 
she has the advantages of time and position nearly en- 
tirely on her side. Further, the completion of her railways 
almost up to the Afghan frontier (the Tashkend railway is 
about to be pushed on to the north bank of the Oxus, near 
Balkh) minimises the difficulties of food-supply and trans- 
port in Afghanistan, on which the Prime Minister laid so 
much stress. 

It is, however, indisputable that the security of India 
has been greatly enhanced by the steady pushing on of 
that "forward policy," which all friends of peace used to 
decry. The Ameer, Abdur Rahman, irritated by the mak- 
ing of the Khojak tunnel, was soothed by Sir Mortimer 
Durand's Mission in 1 893 ; and in return for an increase of 
subsidy and other advantages, he agreed that the tribes of 
the debatable borderland — the Waziris, Afridis, and those 
of the Swat and Chitral valleys — should be under the con- 
trol of the Viceroy. Russia showed her annoyance at this 

1 Op. cit., p. 307. Other authorities differ as to practica-biUty of 
feeding so large a force even in the comparatively fertile districts of 
Herat and Candahar. 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 139 

Mission by seeking to seize an Afghan town, Murghab ; but 
the Ameer's troops beat them off. ^ Lord Lansdowne 
claimed that this right of permanently controlling very 
troublesome tribes would end the days of futile "punitive 
expeditions." In the main he was right. The peace and 
security of the frontier depend on the tact with which some 
few scores of officers carry on difficult work of which no one 
ever hears. 2 

In nearly all cases they have succeeded in their heroic 
toil. But the work of pacification was disturbed in the 
year 1895 ^7 ^ rising in the Chitral valley, which cut olT 
in Chitral fort a small force of Sikhs and loyal Kashmir 
troops with their British officers. Relieving columns from 
the Swat valley and Gilgit cut their way through swarms 
of hillmen and relieved the little garrison after a harassing 
leaguer of forty- five days.^ The annoyance evinced by 
Russian officers at the success of the expedition and the 
retention of the whole of the Chitral district (as large as 
Wales) prompts the conjecture that they had not been 
strangers to the original outbreak. In this year Russia 
and England delimited their boundaries in the Pamirs. 

The year 1897 saw all the hill tribes west and south of 
Peshawurrise against the British Raj. Moslem fanaticism, 
kindled by the Sultan's victories over the Greeks, is said to 
have brought about the explosion, though critics of the 
Calcutta Government ascribe it to official folly.* With 

> Life of Abdur Rahman, i., p. 287. 

2 For this work see The Life of Sir R. Sandeman; Sir R. Warbur- 
ton, Eighteen Years in the Khyher; Durand, op. cit.; Bruce, The 
Forward Policy and its Results; Sir James Willcock's Front Cabul to 
Kuntassi; S. S. Thorbum, The Punjab in Peace and War. 

' The Relief of Chitral, by Captains G. J. and F. E. Younghusband 

(1895)- 

* See The Punjab in Peace and War, by S. S. Thorburn, ad fin. 



HO The European Nations 

truly Roman solidity the British Government quelled the 
risings, the capture of the heights of Dargai by the "gay 
Gordons " showing the sturdy hillmen that they were no 
match for our best troops. Since then the "forward 
policy" has amply justified itself, thousands of fine troops 
being recruited from tribes which were recently daring 
marauders, ready for a dash into the plains of the Punjab at 
the bidding of any would-be disturber of the peace of India. 
In this case, then, Britain has transformed a troublesome 
border fringe into a protective girdle. 

Whether the Russian Government intends in the future 
to invade India is a question which time alone can answer. 
Viewing her Central Asian policy from the time of the 
Crimean War, the student must admit that it bears dis- 
tinct traces of such a design. Her advance has always 
been most conspicuous in the years succeeding any rebuff 
dealt by Great Britain, as happened after that war, and 
still more after the Berlin Congress. At first, the theory 
that a civilised Power must swallow up restless raiding 
neighbours could be cited in explanation of such progress; 
but such a defence utterly fails to account for the cynical 
aggression at Panjdeh and the favour shown by the Czar 
to the general who violated a truce. Equally does it fail 
to explain the pushing on of strategic railways since the 
time of the conclusion of the Anglo- Japanese Treaty of 
1902. Possibly Russia intends only to exert upon that 
Achilles heel of the British Empire the terrible but nomin- 
ally pacific pressure which she brings to bear on the open 
frontiers of Germany and Austria; and the constant dis- 
cussion by her officers of plans of invasion of India may be 
wholly unofficial. At the same time we must remember 



The Afghan and Turkoman Campaigns 141 

that the idea has long been a favourite one with the 
Russian bureaucracy, and the example of the years 1877-81 
shows that that class is ready and eager to wipe out by a 
campaign in Central Asia the memory of a war barren of 
fame and booty. But that again depends on more general 
questions, especially those of finance (now a very serious 
question for Russia, seeing that she has drained Paris and 
Berlin of all possible loans) and of alliance with some 
great Power, or Powers, anxious to efEect the overthrow 
of Great Britain. 

If Great Britain be not enervated by luxury; if she be 
not led astray from the paths of true policy by windy talk 
about "splendid isolation" ; if also she can retain the loyal 
support of the various peoples of India, she may face the 
contingency of such an invasion with firmness and equa- 
nimity. That it will come is the opinion of very maay 
authorities of high standing. A native gentleman of high 
official rank, who brings forward new evidence on the sub- 
ject, has recently declared it to be "inevitable." ^ Such, 
too, is the belief of the greatest authority on Indian war- 
fare. Lord Roberts closes his autobiography by affirming 
that an invasion is "inevitable in the end. We have done 
much, and may do still more to delay it; but when that 
struggle comes, it will be incumbent upon us, both for 
political and military reasons, to make use of all the 
troops and war material that the natives states can place 
at our disposal." 

POSTSCRIPT 

On May 22, 1905, the Times published particulars concerning the 
Anglo-Afghan Treaty recently signed at Cabul. It renewed the 

» See The Nineteenth Century and After for May, 1905. 



142 The European Nations 

compact made with the late Ameer, whereby he agreed to have 
no relations with any foreign Power except Great Britain, the latter 
agreeing to defend him against foreign aggression. The subsidy 
of ;,4^i 20,000 a year is to be continued, but the present Ameer 
HabibuUa, henceforth receives a title equivalent to "King" and 
is styled "His Majesty." 



CHAPTER IV 



BRITAIN IN EGYPT 



IT will be well to begin the story of the expansion of the 
nations of Europe in Africa by a brief statement of the 
events which brought Britain to her present position in 
Egypt. As we have seen, the French conquest of Tunis, 
occurring a year earlier, formed the first of the many ex- 
peditions which inaugurated "the partition of Africa" — 
a topic which, as regards the west, centre, and south of 
that continent, will engage our attention subsequently. In 
this chapter and the following it will be convenient to 
bring together the facts concerning the valley of the Nile, 
a district which up to a recent time has had only a slight 
connection with the other parts of that mighty continent. 
In his quaint account of that mysterious land, Herodotus 
always spoke of it as distinct from Libya; and this aloof- 
ness has characterised Lower Egypt almost down to the 
present age, when the events which we are about to con- 
sider brought it into close touch with the equatorial regions. 
The story of the infiltration of British influence into 
Egypt is one of the most curious in all history. To this 
day, despite the recent agreement with France (1904), the 
position of England in the valley of the lower Nile is 
irregular, in view of the undeniable fact that the Sultan is 
still the suzerain of that land. What is even stranger, it 
resiilts from the gradual control which the purse-holder 

143 



144 The European Nations 

has imposed on the borrower. The power that holds the 
purse-strings counts for much in the pohtical world, as 
also elsewhere. Both in national and domestic affairs it 
ensures, in the last instance, the control of the earning 
department over the spending department. It is the 
ultima ratio of parliaments and husbands. 

In order fully to understand the relations of Egypt to 
Turkey and to the purse-holders of the West, we must 
glance back at the salient events in her history for the past 
century. The first event that brought the land of the 
Pharaohs into the arena of European politics was the con- 
quest by Bonaparte in 1798. He meant to make Egypt a 
flourishing colony, to have the Suez Canal cut, and to use 
Alexandria and Suez as bases of action against the British 
possessions in India. This 'daring design was foiled by 
Nelson's victory at the Nile, and by the Abercrombie- 
Hutchinson expedition of 1801, which compelled the sur- 
render of the French army left by Bonaparte in Egypt. 
The three years of French occupation had no great political 
results except the awakening of British statesmanship to a 
sense of the value of Egypt for the safeguarding of India. 
They also served to weaken the power of the Mamelukes, 
a Circassian military caste which had reduced the Sultan's 
authority over Egypt to a mere shadow. The ruin of this 
warlike cavalry was gradually completed by an Albanian 
soldier of fortune named Mohammed Ali, who, first in the 
name of the Sultan, and later in defiance of his power, 
gradually won the allegiance of the different races of 
Egypt and made himself virtually ruler of the land. This 
powerful Pasha conquered the northern part of the Sudan, 
and founded Khartum as the southern bulwark of his 
realm (1823). He seems to have grasped the important 



Britain in Egypt 145 

fact that, as Egypt depends absolutely on the waters 
poured down by the Nile in its periodic floods, her rulers 
must control that river in its upper reaches — an idea also 
held by the ablest of the Pharaohs. To secure this control, 
what place could be so suitable as Khartum, at the junction 
of the White and Blue Niles ? 

Mohammed Ali was able to build up an army and navy, 
which in 1841 was on the point of overthrowing Turkish 
power in Syria, when Great Britain intervened, and by the 
capture of Acre compelled the ambitious Pasha to abandon 
his northern schemes' and own once more the suzerainty of 
the Porte. The Sultan, however, acknowledged that the 
Pashalic of Egypt should be hereditary in his famil5^ We 
may remark here that England and France had nearly 
come to blows over the Syrian question of that year; but, 
thanks to the firm demeanour of Lord Palrnerston, their 
rivalry ended, as in 1801, in the triumph of British in- 
fluence and the assertion of the nominal ascendency of the 
Sultan in Egypt. Mohammed was to pay his lord ^363,000 
a year. He died in 1849. 

No great event took place during the rule of the next 
Pashas, or Khedives, as they were now termed. Abbas I. 
(1849-54), and Said (1854-63), except that M. de Lesseps, 
a French engineer, gained the consent of Said in 1856 to 
the cutting of a ship-canal, the northern entrance to which 
bears the name of that Khedive. Owing to the rivalry of 
Britain and France over the canal it was not finished until 
1869, during the rule of Ismail (1863-79). We may note 
here that, as the concession was granted to the Suez Canal 
Company only for a hundred years, the canal will become 
, the property of the Egyptian Government in the year 1969. 

The opening of the canal placed Egypt once more on one 

VOL. II. 10. 



H^ The European Nations 

of the greatest highways of the world's commerce, and 
promised to bring endless wealth to her ports. That hope 
has not been fulfilled. The profits have gone almost en- 
tirely to the foreign investors, and a certain amount of 
trade has been withdrawn from the Egyptian railways. 
Sir John Stokes, speaking in 1887, said he found in Egypt 
a prevalent impression that the country had been injured 
by the canal. ^ 

Certainly Egypt was less prosperous after its opening, but 
probably owing to another and mightier event which oc- 
curred at the beginning of Ismail's rule. This was the 
American Civil War. The blockade of the Southern States 
by the Federal cruisers cut off from Lancashire and northern 
France the supplies of raw cotton which are the life-blood 
of their industries. Cotton went up in price until even the 
conservative fellahin of Egypt saw the desirability of grow- 
ing that strange new shrub — the first instance on record of 
a change in their tillage that came about without com- 
pulsion. So great were the profits reaped by intelligent 
growers that many fellahin bought Circassian and Abys- 
sinian wives, and established harems in which jewels, 
perfumes, silks, and mirrors were to be found. In a 
word, Egypt rioted in its new-found wealth. This may 
be imagined from the totals of exports, which in three 
years rose from ;£4, 500,000 to considerably more than 
£13,000,000.2 

But then came the end of the American Civil War. 
Cotton fell to its normal price, and ruin stared Egypt in the 
face. For not only merchants and fellahin, but also their 

> Quoted by D. A. Cameron, Egypt in the Nineteenth Century, 
p. 242. 

2 Egypt and the Egyptian Question, by Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace* 
(1883), pp. 318-320. 



Britain in Egypt i47 

ruler, had plunged into expenditure, and on the most lavish 
scale. Nay! Believing that the Suez Canal would bring 
boundless wealth to his land, Ismail persisted in his 
palace-building and other forms of Oriental extravagance, 
with the result that in the first twelve years of his reign, 
that isj by the year 1875, he had spent more than £100,- 
000,000 of public money, of which scarcely one-tenth had 
been applied to usefiil ends. The most noteworthy of 
these last were the barrage of the Nile in the upper part of 
the delta, an irrigation canal in Upper Egypt, the Ibra- 
himiyeh Canal, and the commencement of the Wady 
Haifa- Khartum railway. The grandeur of his views may 
be realised when it is remembered that he ordered this 
railway to be made of the same gauge as those of South 
Africa, because "it would save trouble in the end." 

As to the sudden fall in the price of cotton, his only ex- 
pedient for making good the loss was to grow sugar on a 
great scale, but this was done so unwisely as to increase the 
deficits. As a natural consequence, the Egyptian debt, 
which at his accession stood at ;£3,ooo,ooo, reached the 
extraordinary sum of ;£89,ooo,ooo in the year 1876, and 
that, too, despite the increase of the land tax by one-half. 
All the means which Oriental ingenuity has devised for the 
systematic plunder of a people were now put in force; so 
that Sir Alfred Milner (now Lord Milner) , after unequalled 
opportunities of studying the Egyptian Question, de- 
clared: "There is nothing in the financial history of any 
country, from the remotest ages to the present time, to 
equal this carnival of extravagance and oppression." ^ 

i England in Egypt, by Sir Alfred Milner (Lord Milner), 1892, 
pp. 216-219. (The Egyptian pound is equal to ;^i:o-6.) I give 
the figures as pounds sterling. 



148 The European Nations 

The Khedive himself had to make some sacrifices of a 
private nature, and one of these led to an event of inter- 
national importance. Towards the close of the year 1875 
he decided to sell the 177,000 shares which he held in the 
Suez Canal Company. In the first place he offered them 
secretly to the French Government for 100,000,000 francs; 
and the Foreign Minister, the Due Decazes, it seems, 
wished to buy them; but the Premier, M. Buffet, and other 
Ministers hesitated, perhaps in view of the threats of war 
from Germany, which had alarmed all responsible men. 
In any case, France lost her chance.^ Fortunately for 
Great Britain, news of the affair was sent to one of her 
ablest journalists, Mr. Frederick Greenwood, who at once 
begged Lord Derby, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
grant him an interview. The result was an urgent message 
from Lord Derby to Colonel Staunton, the British envoy 
in Egypt, to find out the truth from the Khedive himself. 
The tidings proved to be correct, and the Beaconsfield 
Cabinet at once sanctioned the purchase of the shares for 
the sum of close on ;^4,ooo,ooo. 

It is said that the French envoy to Egypt was playing 
billiards when he heard of the purchase, and in his rage he 
broke his cue in half. His anger was natural, quite apart 
from financial considerations. In that respect the pur- 
chase has been a brilliant success; for the shares are now 
worth more than ;£3o,ooo,ooo, and yield an annual return 
of about a million sterling; but this monetary gain is as 
nothing when compared with the influence which the 
United Kingdom has gained in the affairs of a great under- 
taking whereby M. de Lesseps hoped to assure the as- 
cendency of France in Egypt. 

» La Question d'Egypte, by C. de Freycinet (1905), p. 151. 



Britain in Egypt 149 

The facts of history, it should be noted, lent support to 
this contention of the "great Frenchman." The idea of 
the canal had originated with Napoleon I., and it was re- 
vived with much energy by the followers of the French 
philosopher, Saint-Simon, in the years 1833-37.^ The pro- 
ject, however, then encountered the opposition of British 
statesmen, as it did from the days of Pitt to those of 
Palmerston. This was not unnatural; for it promised to 
bring back to the ports of the Mediterranean the pre- 
ponderant share in the Eastern trade which they had 
enjoyed before the discovery of the route by the Cape of 
Good Hope. The political and commercial interests of 
England were bound up with the sea route, especially after 
the Cape was definitively assigned to her by the Peace of 
Paris of 18 14; but she could not see with indifference the 
control by France of a canal which would divert trade 
once more to the old overland route. That danger was 
now averted by the financial coup just noticed — -an affair 
which may prove to have been scarcely less important in 
a political sense than Nelson's victory at the Nile. 

In truth, the sea power has made up for her defects of 
position as regards Egypt by four great strokes: the 
triumph of her great admiral, the purchase of Ismail's 
canal shares, the repression of Arabi's revolt, and Lord 
Kitchener's victory at Omdurman. The present writer 
has not refrained from sharp criticism on British policy in 
the period 1 870-1900, and the Egyptian policy of the 
cabinets of Queen Victoria has been at times open to 
grave censure; but, on the whole, it has come out well, 
thanks to the ability of individuals to supply the qualities 
of foresight, initiative, and unswerving persistence, in 
1 La Question d'Egypte, by C. de Freycinet, p. 106. 



150 The European Nations 

which Ministers since the time of Chatham have rarely 
excelled. 

The sale of Ismail's canal shares only served to stave off 
the impending crash which would have formed the' natural 
sequel to this new "South Sea Bubble." All who took 
part in this carnival of folly ought to have suffered alike, 
Ismail and his beys along with the stock-jobbers and 
dividend-hunters of London and Paris. In an ordinary 
case these last would have lost their money, but in this 
instance the borrower was weak and dependent, while the 
lenders were in a position to stir up two powerful Govern- 
ments to action. Nearly the whole of the Egyptian loans 
was held in England and France; and in 1876, when Ismail 
was floating swiftly down stream to the abyss of bank- 
ruptcy, the British and French bondholders cast about 
them for means to secure their own safety. They organised 
themselves for the protection of their interests. The 
Khedive consented to hear the advice of their repre- 
sentatives, Messrs. Goschen and Joubert; but it was soon 
clear that he desired merely a comfortable liquidation and 
the continuance of his present expenditure. 

That year saw the institution of the " Caisse de la Dette," 
with power to receive the revenue set aside for the service 
of the debt, and to sanction or forbid new loans ; and in the 
month of November, 1876, the commission of bondholders 
took the form of the Dual Control. In 1878 a com- 
mission was appointed with power to examine the whole 
of the Egyptian administration. It met with the strongest 
opposition from the Khedive, until in the next year means 
were found to bring about his abdication by the act of the 
Sultan (June 26, 1879). His successor was his son Tewfik 
(1879-92). 



Britain in Egypt 151 

On their side the bondholders had to submit to a re- 
duction of rates of interest to a uniform rate of 4 per cent. 
on the unified debt. Even so, it was found in the year 
1 88 1 — a prosperous year — that about half of the Egyptian 
revenue, then ;;^9,2 29,ooo, had to be diverted to the pay- 
ment of that interest.! Again, one must remark that such 
a situation in an overtaxed country would naturally end 
in bankruptcy; but this was prevented by foreign control, 
which sought to cut down expediture in all directions. As 
a natural result, many industries sufiEered from the lack of 
due support; for even in the silt-beds formed by the Nile 
(and they are the real Egypt) there is need of capital to 
bring about due results. In brief, the popular discontent 
gave strength to a movement which aimed at ousting 
foreign influences of every kind, not only the usurers and 
stock-jobbers that sucked the life-blood of the land, but 
even the engineers and bankers who quickened its sluggish 
circulation. Thir movement was styled a national move- 
ment; and its abettors raised that cry of "Egypt for 
Egyptians," which has had its counterpart wherever selfish 
patriots seek to keep all the good things of the land to them- 
selves. The Egyptian troubles of the year 1882 originated 
partly in feelings of this narrow kind, and partly in the 
jealousies and strifes of military cliques. 

Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace, after carefully investigating 
the origin of the "Arabi movement," came to the con- 
clusion that it was to be found in the determination of the 
native Egyptian officers to force their way to the higher 
grades of that army, hitherto reserved for Turks or Cir- 

» England in Egypt, etc., p. 222. See there for details as to the 
Dual Control; also de Freycinet, op. cit., chap, ii., and The Ex- 
pansion of Egypt, by A. Silva White, chap. vi. 



152 The European Nations 

cassians. Said and Ismail had favoured the rise of the 
best soldiers of the fellahin class (that is, natives), and 
several of them, on becoming colonels, aimed at yet higher 
posts. This aroused bitter resentment in the dominant 
Turkish caste, which looked on the fellahin as born to pay 
taxes and bear burdens. Under the masterful Ismail these 
jealousies were hidden, but the young and inexperienced 
Tewfik, the nominee of the rival western powers, was un- 
able to bridle the restless spirits of the army, who looked 
around them for means to strengthen their position at the 
expense of their rivals. These jealousies were inflamed by 
the youthful caprice of Tewfik. At first he extended great 
favour to Ali Fehmi, an officer of fellahin descent, only to 
withdraw it owing to the intrigues of a Circassian rival. 
Ali Fehmi sought for revenge by forming a cabal with other 
fellahin colonels, among whom a popular leader soon came 
to the front. This was Arabi Bey. 

Arabi's frame embodied the fine animal qualities of the 
better class of fellahin, but to these he added mental gifts 
of no mean order. After imbibing the rather narrow edu- 
cation of a devout Moslem, he formed some acquaintance 
with Western thought, and from it his facile mind selected 
a stock of ideas which found ready expression in conver- 
sation. His soft, dreamy eyes and fluent speech rarely 
failed to captivate men of all classes.^ His popularity 
endowed the discontented camarilla with new vigour, en- 
abling it to focus all the discontented elements, and to 
become a movement of almost national import. Yet 
Arabi was its spokesman, or figurehead, rather than the 
actual propelling power. He seems to have been to a 
large extent the dupe of schemers who pushed him on for 
» Sir D. M. Wallace, Egypt and the Egyptian Question, p. 67. 



Britain in Egypt 153 

their own advantage. At any rate it is significant that 
after his fall he declared that British supremacy was the 
one thing needful for Egypt; and during his old age, 
passed in Ceylon, he often made similar statements. i 

The Khedive's Ministers, hearing of the intrigues of the 
discontented officers, resolved to arrest their chiefs; but 
on the secret leaking out, the offenders turned the tables on 
the authorities, and with soldiers at their back demanded 
the dismissal of the Minister of War and the redress of their 
chief grievance — the undue promotion of Turks and 
Circassians. 

The Khedive felt constrained to yield, and agreed to the 
appointment of a Minister of War who was a secret friend of 
the plotters. They next ventured on a military demon- 
stration in front of the Khedive's palace, with a view to 
extorting the dismissal of the able and energetic Prime 
Minister, Riaz Pasha. Again Tewfik yielded, and con- 
sented to the appointment of the weak and indolent Sherif 
Pasha. To consolidate their triumph the mutineers now 
proposed measures which would please the populace. 
Chief among them was a plan for instituting a consultative 
National Assembly. This would serve as a check on the 

' Mr. Morley says {Life of Gladstone, iii., p. 73) that Arabi's 
movement "was in truth national as well as military; it was anti- 
European, and above all, it was in its objects anti-Turk." In view 
of the evidence collected by Sir D. M. Wallace, and by Lord Milner 
{England in Egypt), I venture to question these statements. The 
movement clearly was military and anti-Turk in its beginning. 
Later on it sought support in the people, and became anti-European 
and to some extent national; but to that extent it ceased to be 
anti-Turk. Besides, why should the Sultan have encouraged it? 
How far it genuinely relied on the populace must for the present 
remain in doubt; but it may be noted that Sir Arthur Milner 
asserted that, "there are probably few countries in which patriotic 
sentiment counts for less than in Egypt." 



1 54 The European Nations 

Dual Control and on the young Khedive, whom it had 
placed in his present ambiguous position. 

A Chamber of Notables met in the closing days of 1881, 
and awakened great hopes, not only in Egypt, but among 
all who saw hope in the feeling of nationality and m a 
genuine wish for reform among a Moslem people. What 
would have happened had the Notables been free to work 
out the future of Egypt it is impossible to say. The fate 
of the young Turkish party and of Midhat's constitution 
of December, 1877, formed by no means a hopeful SLVLgury. 
In the abstract there is much to be said for the two chief 
demands of the Notables — that the Khedive's Ministers 
should be responsible to the people's representatives, and 
that the Dual Control of Great Britain and France should 
be limited to the control of the revenues set apart for the 
purposes of the Egyptian public debt. The petitioners, 
however, ignored the fact that democracy could scarcely 
be expected to work successfully in a land where not one 
man in a hundred had the least notion what it meant, and, 
further, that the Western Powers would not give up their 
coign of vantage at the bidding of Notables who really 
represented little more than the dominant military party. 
Besides, the acts of this party stamped it as Oriental even 
while it masqueraded in the garb of Western democracy. 
Having grasped the reins of government, the fellahin 
colonels proceeded to relegate their Turkish and Cir- 
cassian rivals to service at Khartum — an ingenious form 
of banishment. Against this and other despotic acts the 
representatives of Great Britain and France energetically 
protested, and, seeing that the Khedive was helpless, they 
brought up ships of war to make a demonstration against 
the de jacto governors of Egypt. 



Britain in Egypt 155 

It should be noted that these steps were taken by the 
Gladstone and Gambetta Cabinets, which were not likely to 
intervene against a genuinely democratic movement merely 
in the interests of British and French bondholders. On 
January 7, 1882, the two Cabinets sent a joint note to the 
Khedive assuring him of their support and of their desire 
to remove alb grievances, external and internal alike, that 
threatened the existing order.i 

While, however, the Western Powers sided with the 
Khedive, the other European States, including Turkey, 
began to show signs of impatience and annoyance at any 
intervention on their part. Russia saw the chance of re- 
venge on England for the events of 1878, and Bismarck 
sought to gain the favour of the Sultan. As for that 
potentate, his conduct was as tortuous as usual. From 
the outset he gave secret support to Arabi's party, probably 
with the view of undermining the Dual Control and the 
Khedive's dynasty alike. He doubtless saw that Turkish 
interests might ultimately be furthered even by the men 
who had imprisoned or disgraced Turkish officers and 
Ministers. 

Possibly the whole question might have been peaceably 
solved had Gambetta remained in power; for he was 
strongly in favour of a joint Anglo-French intervention in 
case the disorders continued. The Gladstone Government 
at that time demurred to such intervention, and claimed 
that it would come more legally from Turkey, or, if this 
were undesirable, from all the Powers; but this divergence 
of view did not prevent the two Governments from acting 
together on several matters. Gambetta, however, fell 

> For Gambetta's despatches see de Freycinet, op. cit., pp. 209 
et seq. 



156 The European Nations 

from power at the end of January, 1882, and his far weaker 
successor, de Freycinet, having to face a most complex 
parHamentary situation in France and the possible hos- 
tility of the other Powers, drew back from the leading 
position which Gambetta's bolder policy had accorded to 
France. The vacillations at Paris tended alike to weaken 
Anglo-French action and to encourage the Arabi party 
and the Sultan. As matters went from bad to worse in 
Egypt, the British Foreign Minister, Lord Granville, pro- 
posed on May 24th that the Powers should sanction an 
occupation of Egypt by Turkish troops. To this M. de 
Freycinet demurred, and, while declaring that France 
would not send an expedition, proposed that a European 
Conference should be held on the Egyptian Question. 

The Gladstone Cabinet at once agreed to this, and the 
Conference met for a short time at the close of June, but 
without the participation of Turkey.^ For the Sultan, 
hoping that the divisions of the Powers wpuld enable him 
to restore Turkish influence in Egypt, now set his emissaries 
to work to arouse there the Moslem fanaticism which he has 
so profitably exploited in all parts of his Empire. A Turk- 
ish commission had been sent to inquire into matters — 
with the sole result of enriching the chief commissioner. 
In brief, thanks to the perplexities and hesitations of the 
Western Powers and the ill-humour manifested by Ger- 
many and Russia, Europe was helpless, and the Arabi 
party felt that they had the game in their own hands. 
Bismarck said to his secretary, Busch, on June 8th: " They 
[the British] set about the affair in an awkward way, and 
have got on a wrong track by sending their ironclads to 
Alexandria, and now, finding that there is nothing to be 
» Morley, Life of Gladstone, iii., p. 79. 



Britain in Egypt 157 

done, they want the rest of Europe to help them out of 
their difficulty by means of a Conference." ^ 

Already, on May 27th, the Egyptian malcontents had 
ventured on a great military demonstration against the 
Khedive, which led to Arabi being appointed Minister of 
War. His followers also sought to inflame the hatred to 
foreigners for which the greed of Greek and Jewish usurers 
was so largely responsible. The results perhaps surpassed 
the hopes of the self-styled "Nationalists." Moslem fanati- 
cism suddenly flashed into flame. On the nth of June a 
street brawl between a Moslem and a Maltese led to a 
fierce rising. The "true believers" attacked the houses 
of the Europeans, secured a great quantity of loot, and 
killed about fifty of them, including men from the British 
squadron. The English party that always calls out for 
non-intervention made vigorous efforts at that time, and 
subsequently, to represent this riot and massacre as a 
mere passing event which did not seriously compromise 
the welfare of Egypt; but Sir Alfred Milner in his calm 
and judicial survey of the whole question states that the 
fears then entertained by Europeans in Egypt "so far 'from 
being exaggerated, .. . . perhaps even fell short of the 
danger which was actually impending." ^ 

The events at Alexandria and Tantah made armed inter- 
vention inevitable.' Nothing could be hoped for from 
Turkey. The Sultan's special envoy. Dervish Pasha, had 
arrived in Egypt only a few days before the outbreak ; and 
after that occurrence Abdul Hamid thought fit to send a 
decoration to Arabi, Encouraged by the support of Turkey 

• Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, iii., p. 51. 
2 England in Egypt, p. 16. For details of the massacre and its 
preconcerted character, see Pari, Papers, Egypt, No. 4 (1884). 



158 The European Nations 

and by the well-known jealousies of the Powers, the mili- 
tary party now openly prepared to defy Europe. They 
had some grounds for hope. Every one knew that France 
was in a very cautious mood, having enough on her hands 
in Tunis and Algeria, while her relations to England had 
rapidly cooled. 1 Germany, Russia, and Austria seemed 
to be acting together according to an understanding 
arrived at by the three Emperors after their meeting at 
Danzig in 1881; and Germany had begun that work of 
favouring the Sultan which enabled her to supplant 
British influence at Constantinople. Accordingly, few per- 
sons, least of all Arabi, believed that the Gladstone Cabinet 
would dare to act alone and strike a decisive blow. But 
they counted wrongly. Gladstone's toleration in regard 
to foreign affairs was large-hearted, but it had its limits. 
He now declared in Parliament that Arabi had thrown 
off the mask and was evidently working to depose the 
Khedive and oust all Europeans from Egypt; England 
would intervene to prevent this — if possible with the 
authority of Europe, with the support of France, and the 
co-operation of Turkey; but, if necessary, alone. 2 

Even this clear warning was lost on Arabi and his 
following. Believing that Britain was too weak, and her 
Ministry too vacillating, to make good these threats, they 
proceeded to arm the populace and strengthen the forts of 
Alexandria. Sir Beauchamp Seymour, now at the head of 

1 For the reasons of de Freyciiiet's caution, see his work, chap, 
iii., especially pp. 236 et seq. 

2 See, too, Gladstone's- speech of July 25, 1882, in which he 
asserted that there was not a shred of evidence to support Arabi 's 
claim to be the leader of a national party; also his letter of July 
14 to John Bright, quoted by Mr. Morley, Life of Gladstone, iii., 
pp. 84-85. 



Britain in Egypt 159 

a strong squadron, reported to London that these works 
were going on in a threatening manner, and on July 6th 
sent a demand to Arabi that the operations should cease at 
once. To this Arabi at once acceded. Nevertheless, the 
searchlight, when suddenly turned on, showed that work 
was going on at night. A report of an Egyptian officer was 
afterwards found in one of the forts, in which he complained 
of the use of the electric light by the English as distinctly 
discourteous. It may here be noted that M. de Freycinet, 
in his jaundiced survey of British action at this time, seeks 
to throw doubt, on the resumption of work by Arabi's men. 
But Admiral Seymour's reports leave no loop-hole for 
doubt. Finally, on July loth, the admiral demanded, not 
only the cessation of hostile preparations, but the surrender 
of some of the forts into British hands. The French fleet 
now left the harbour and steamed for Port Said. Most of 
the Europeans of Alexandria had withdrawn to ships pro- 
vided for them; and on the morrow, when the last of the 
twenty-four hours of grace brought no submission, the 
British fleet opened fire at 7 a.m. 

The ensuing action is of great interest as being one of the 
very few cases in modern warfare where ships have success- 
fully encountered modern forts. The seeming helplessness 
of the British unarmoured ships before Cronstadt during 
the Crimean War, their failure before the forts of Sevasto- 
pol, and the uselessness of the French navy during the war 
of 1870, had spread the notion that warships could not 
overpower modern fortifications. Probably this impres- 
sion lay at the root of Arabi's defiance. He had some 
grounds for confidence. The British fleet consisted of eight 
battleships (of which only the Inflexible and Alexandra 
were of great fighting power) along with five unarmoured 



i6o The European Nations 

vessels. The forts mounted ^;^ rifled muzzle-loading guns, 
3 rifled breach-loaders, and 120 old smooth-bores. The 
advantage in gun-power lay with the ships, especially 
as the sailors were by far the better marksmen. Yet 
so great is the superiority of forts over ships that the 
engagement lasted five hours or more (7 a.m. till noon) 
before most of the forts were silenced more or less com- 
pletely. Fort Pharos continued to fire till 4 p.m. On the 
whole, the Egyptian gunners stood manfully to their guns. 
Considering the weight of metal thrown against the forts, 
namely, 1741 heavy projectiles and 1457 light, the damage 
done to them was not great, only 27 cannon being silenced 
completely, and 5 temporarily. On the other hand, the 
ships were hit only 75 times and lost only 6 killed and 27 
wounded. The results show that the comparatively dis- 
tant cannonades of to-day, even with great guns, are far 
less deadly than the old sea-fights when ships were locked 
yard-arm to yard-arm. 

Had Admiral Seymour at once landed a force of marines 
and bluejackets, all the forts would probably have been 
surrendered at once. For some reason not fully known, 
this was not done. Spasmodic firing began again in the 
morning, but a truce was before long arranged, which 
proved to be only a device for enabling Arabi and his troops 
to escape. The city, meanwhile, was the scene of a furious 
outbreak against Europeans, in which some 400 or 500 
persons perished. Damage, afterwards assessed at;^7,ooo,- 
000, was done by fire and pillage. It was not till the 14th 
that the admiral, after receiving reinforcements, felt able 
to send troops into the city, when a few severe examples 
cowed the plunderers and restored order. The Khedive, 
who had shut himself up in his palace at Ramleh, now came 



1 62 The European Nations 

back to the seaport under the escort of a British force, and 
thenceforth remained virtually, though not in name, under 
British protection. 

The bombardment of Alexandria brought about the 
resignation of that sturdy Quaker and friend of peace, Mr. 
John Bright, from the Gladstone Ministry; but everything 
tends to show (as even M. de Freycinet admits) that the 
crisis took Ministers by surprise. Nothing was ready at 
home for an important campaign ; and it would seem that 
hostilities resulted, firstly, from the violence of Arabi 
supporters in Alexandria, and, secondly, from their per- 
istence in warlike preparations which might have en- 
dangered the safety of Admiral Seymour's fleet. The 
situation was becoming like that of 1807 at the Dar- 
danelles, when the Turks gave smooth promises to Admiral 
Duckworth, all the time strengthening their forts, with 
very disagreeable results. Probably the analogy of 1807, 
together with the proven perfidy of Arabi's men, brought 
on hostilities, which the British Ministers up to the end 
were anxious to avoid. 

In any case, the die was now cast, and England entered 
questioningly on a task, the magnitude and difficulty of 
which no one could then foresee. She entered on it alone, 
and that, too, though the Gladstone Ministry had made 
pressing overtures for the help of France, at any rate as 
regarded the protection of the Suez Canal. To this extent 
de Freycinet and his colleagues were prepared to lend their 
assistance; but, despite Gambetta's urgent appeal for 
common action with England at that point, the Chamber 
of Deputies still remained in a cautiously negative mood, 
and to that frame of mind M. Clemenceau added strength 
by a speech ending with a glorification of prudence. 



Britain in Egypt 163 

"Europe," he said, "is covered with soldiers; every one is 
in a state of expectation ; all the Powers are reserving their 
future liberty of action; do you reserve the liberty of 
action of France?" The restricted co-operation with Eng- 
land which the Cabinet recommended found favour with 
only seventy-five deputies; and, when face to face with a 
large hostile majority, de Freycinet and his colleagues re- 
signed (July 29, 1882).^ Prudence, fear of the newly 
formed Triple Alliance, or jealousy of England, drew 
France aside from the path to which her greatest captains, 
thinkers, and engineers had beckoned her in time past. 
Whatever the predominant motive may have been, it 
altered the course of history in the valley of the Nile. 

After the refusal of France to co-operate with England 
even to the smallest extent, the Conference of the Powers 
became a nullity, and its sessions ceased despite the lack of 
any formal adjournment.^ Here, as on so many other 
occasions, the Conference of the Powers displayed its weak- 
ness ; and there can be no doubt that the Sultan and Arabi 
counted on that weakness in playing the dangerous game 
which brought matters to the test of the sword. The 
jealousies of the Powers now stood fully revealed. Russia 
entered a vigorous protest against England's action at 
Alexandria; Italy evinced great annoyance, and at once 
repelled a British proposal for her co-operation; Germany 
also showed much resentment, and turned the situation to 
profitable account by substituting her influence for that of 
Britain in the counsels of the Porte. The Sultan, thwarted 
in the midst of his tortuous intrigues for a great Moslem 
revival, showed his spleen and his diplomatic skill by loftily 

1 De Freycinet, op cit., pp. 31 1-3 12. 

2 For its proceedings, see Pari. Papers, Egypt, 1882 (Conference 
on Egyptian Affairs). 



1 64 The European Nations 

protesting against Britain's violation of international law, 
and thereafter by refusing (August ist) to proclaim Arabi 
a rebel against the Khedive's authority. The essential 
timidity of Abdul Hamid's nature in presence of superior 
force was shown by a subsequent change of front. On 
hearing of British successes, he placed Arabi under the 
ban (September 8th). 

Meanwhile, the British expedition of some 10,000 men, 
despatched to Egypt under the command of Sir Garnet 
Wolseley made as though it would attack Arabi from 
Alexandria as a base. But on nearing that port at night- 
fall it steered about and occupied Port Said (August 15th). 
Kantara and Ismailia, on the canal, were speedily seized; 
and the Seaforth Highlanders by a rapid march occupied 
Chalouf and prevented the cutting of the fresh-water canal 
by the rebels. Thenceforth the little army had the ad- 
vantage of marching near fresh water, and by a route on 
which Arabi was not at first expecting them. Sir Garnet 
Wolseley's movements were of that quick and decisive 
order which counts for so much against Orientals. A 
sharp action at Tel-el-Mahuta obliged Arabi's forces, some 
10,000 strong, to abandon entrenchments thrown up at 
that point (August 24th). 

Four days later there was desperate fighting at Kas- 
sassin Lock on the fresh-water canal. There the Egyptians 
flung themselves in large numbers against a small force 
sent forward under General Graham to guard that impor- 
tant point. The assailants fought with the recklessness 
begotten by the proclamation of a holy war against in^ 
fidels, and for some time the issue remained in doubt. At 
length, about sundown, three squadrons of the Household 
Cavalry and the 7th Dragoon Guards, together with four 



Britain in Egypt 165 

light guns, were hastily sent forward from the main body in 
the rear to clinch the affair. General Drury Lowe wheeled 
this little force round the left flank of the enemy, and, com- 
ing up unperceived in the gathering darkness, charged with 
such fury as to scatter the hostile array in instant rout.i 
The enemy fell back on the entrenchments at Tel-el-Kebir, 
while the whole British force (including a division from 
India) concentrated at Kassassin, 17,400 strong, with 61 
guns and 6 Gatlings. 

The final action took place on September 13th, at Tel- 
el-Kebir. There Arabi had thrown up a double line of 
earthworks of some strength, covering about four miles, 
and lay with a force that has been estimated at 20,000 to 
25,000 regulars and 7000 irregulars. Had the assailants 
marched across the desert and attacked these works by 
day, they must have sustained heavy losses. Sir Garnet 
therefore determined to try the effect of a surprise at dawn, 
and moved his men forward after sunset of the 12th until 
they came within striking distance of the works. After a 
short rest they resumed their advance shortly before the 
time when the first streaks of dawn would appear on the 
eastern sky. At about 500 yards from the works, the ad- 
vance was dimly silhouetted against the paling orient. 
Shortly before five o'clock, an Egyptian rifle rang out a 
sharp warning, and forthwith the entrenchments spurted 
forth smoke and flame. At once the British answered by 
a cheer and a rush over the intervening ground, each 
regiment eager to be the first to ply the bayonet. The 
Highlanders, under the command of General Graham, were 
leading on the left, and therefore won in this race for 

' History of the Campaign in Egypt (War Office), by Col. J. F. 
Maurice, pp. 62-65. 



1 66 The European Nations 

glory; but on all sides the invaders poured almost simul^ 
taneously over the works. For several minutes there was 
sharp fighting on the parapet; but the British were not 
to be denied, and drove before them the defenders as a 
kind of living screen against the fire that came from the 
second entrenchments ; these they carried also, and thrust 
the whole mass out into the desert. i There hundreds of 
them fell under the sabres of the British cavalry which swept 
down from the northern end of the lines; but the pursuit 
was neither prolonged nor sanguinar5^ Sir Garnet Wolse- 
ley was satisfied with the feat of dissolving Arabi's army 
into an armed or unarmed rabble by a single sharp blow, 
and now kept horses and men for further eventualities. 

By one of those flashes of intuition that mark the born 
leader of men, the British commander perceived that the 
whole war might be ended if a force of cavalry pushed on 
to Cairo and demanded the surrender of its citadel at the 
moment when the news of the disaster at Tel-el-Kebir 
unmanned its defenders. The conception must rank as 
one of the most daring recorded in the annals of war. In 
the ancient capital of Egypt there were more than 300,000 
Moslems, lately aroused to dangerous heights of fanaticism 
by the proclamation of a "holy war" against infidels. Its 
great citadel, towering some 250 feet above the city, might 
seem to bid defiance to all the horsemen of the British army. 
Finally, Arabi had repaired thither in order to inspire 
vigour into a garrison numbering some 10,000 men. 
Nevertheless, Wolseley counted on the moral effect of his 
victory to level the ramparts of the citadel and to abase 
the mushroom growth of Arabi's pride. 

1 Life, Letters, and Diaries of General Sir Gerald Graham (1901), 
J. F. Maurice, op. cit., pp. 84-95. 



Britain in Egypt 167 

His surmise was more than justified by events. While 
his Indian contingent pushed on to occupy Zagazig, Sir 
Drury Lowe, with a force mustering fewer than 500 sabres, 
pressed towards Cairo by a desert road in order to summon 
it on the morrow. After halting at Belbeis the troopers 
gave rein to their steeds, and a ride of nearl}^ 40 miles 
brought them to the city about sundown. Rumour mag- 
nified their numbers, while the fatalism that used to nerve 
the Moslem in his great days now predisposed him to bow 
the knee and mutter Kismet at the advent of the seemingly 
predestined masters of Egypt. To this small, wearied, 
but lordly band Cairo surrendered, and Arabi himself 
handed over his sword. On the following day the in- 
fantry came up and made good this precarious conquest. 

In presence of this startling triumph the Press of the 
Continent sought to find grounds for the belief that Arabi, 
and Cairo as well, had been secretly bought over by British 
gold. It is somewhat surprising to find M. de Freycinet ^ 
repeating to-day this piece of spiteful silliness, which might 
with as much reason be used to explain away the victories 
of Clive and Coote, Outram and Havelock. The slanders 
of continental writers themselves stand in need of expla- 
nation. It is to be found in their annoyance at discovering 
that England had an army which could carry through a 
difficult campaign to a speedy and triumphant conclusion. 
Their typical attitude had been that of Bismarck, namely, 
of exultation at her difficulties and of hope of her discom- 
fiture. Now their tone changed to one of righteous in- 
dignation at the irregularity of her conduct in acting on 
behalf of Europe without any mandate from the Powers, 
and in using the Suez Canal as a base of operations. 

» Op. cit., p. 316. 



1 68 The European Nations 

In this latter respect Britain's conduct was certainly 
open to criticism. 1 On the other hand, it is doubtful 
whether Arabi would have provoked her to action had he 
not been tacitly encouraged by the other Powers, which, 
while professing their wish to see order restored in Egypt, 
in most cases secretly sought to increase her difficulties in 
undertaking that task. As for the Sultan, he had now 
trimmed his sails by declaring Arabi a rebel to the Khedive's 
authority, and in due course that officer was tried, found 
guilty, and exiled to Ceylon early in 1883. The conduct 
of France, Germany, and Russia, if we may judge by the 
tone of their officially inspired Press, was scarcely more 
straightforward, and was certainly less discreet. On all 
sides there were diatribes against Britain's high-handed 
and lawless behaviour, and some German papers affected 
to believe that Hamburg might next be chosen for bom- 
bardment by the British fleet. These outbursts, in the 
case of Germany, may have been due to Bismarck's desire 
to please Russia, and secondarily France, in all possible 
ways. It is doubtful whether he gained this end. Cer- 
tainly he and his underlings in the Press widened the gulf 
that now separated the two great Teutonic peoples. 

The annoyance of France was more natural. She had 
made the Suez Canal, and had participated in the Dual 
Control ; but her mistake in not sharing in the work of re- 
storing order was irreparable. Every one in Egypt saw 
that the control of that country must rest with the Power 
which had swept away Arabi's Government and re-estab- 
lished the fallen authority of the Khedive. A few persons 

' It is said, however, that Arabi had warned M. de Lesseps that 
"the defence of Egypt requires the temporary destruction of the 
Canal" (Traill, England, Egypt, and the Stidan, p 57). The status 
of the Canal was defined in 1885. Ibid., p. 59. 



Britain in Egypt 169 

in England, even including one member of the Gladstone 
Administration, Mr. Courtney, urged a speedy withdrawal ; 
but the Cabinet, which had been unwillingly but irresistibly 
drawn thus far by the force of circumstances, could not 
leave Egypt a prey to anarchy; and, clearly, the hand that 
repressed anarchy ruled the country for the time being. 
It is significant that on April 4, 1883, more than 2600 Euro- 
peans in Egypt presented a petition begging that the 
British occupation might be permanent. 1 

Mr. Gladstone, however, and others of his Cabinet, had 
declared that it would be only temporary, and would, in 
fact, last only so long as to enable order and prosperity to 
grow up under the shadow of new and better institutions. 
These pledges were given with all sincerity, and the Prime 
Minister and his colleagues evidently wished to be relieved 
from what was to them a disagreeable burden. The French 
in Egypt, of course, fastened on these promises, and one of 
their newspapers, the Journal Egyptien, printed them 
every day at the head of its front columns. ^ Mr. Glad- 
stone, who sought above all things for a friendly under- 
standing with France, keenly felt, even to the end of his 
career, that the continued occupation of Egypt hindered 
that most desirable consummation. He was undoubtedly 
right. The irregularity of England's action in Egypt 
hampered her international relations at many points ; and 
it may be assigned as one of the causes that brought 
France into alliance with Russia. 

What, then, hindered the fulfilment of Mr. Gladstone's 
pledges? In the first place, the dog-in-the-manger policy 
of French officials and publicists increased the difficulties of 

* Sir A. Milner, England in Egypt, p. 3 1 . 

' H. F. Wood, Egypt under the British, p. 59 (1896). 



170 The European Nations 

the British administrators who now, in the character of 
advisers of the Khedive, really guided him and controlled 
his Ministers. The scheme of administration adopted was 
in the main that advised by Lord Dufferin in his capacity 
of special envoy. The details, however, are too wide and 
complex to be set forth here. So, also, are those of the 
disputes between our officials and those of France. Suffice 
it to say that by shutting up the funds of the " Caisse de la 
Dette," the French administrators of that great "reserve 
fund hoped to make Britain's position untenable and 
hasten her evacuation. In point of fact, these and count- 
less other pin-pricks delayed Egypt's recovery and fur- 
nished a good reason why Britain should not withdraw. 1 

But above and beyond these administrative details there 
was one all-compelling cause, the war-cloud that now 
threatened the land of the Pharaohs from that home of 
savagery and fanaticism, the Sudan. 

' The reader should consult for full details Sir A. Milner, England 
in Egypt (1892); Sir D. M. Wallace, The Egyptian Qtiestion (1883), 
especially chaps, xi.-xiii. ; and A. Silva White, The Expansion of 
Egypt (1899), the best account of the Anglo-Egyptian administra- 
tion, with valuable Appendices on the "Caisse," etc. 



CHAPTER V 



GORDON AND THE SUDAN 



"What were my ideas in coming out? They were these: Agreed 
abandonment of Sudan, but extricate the garrisons; and these were 
the instructions of the Government." — Gordon's Journal, October 
8, 1885. 

IT is one of the peculiarities of the Moslem faith that any 
time of revival is apt to be accompanied by warlike 
fervour son:!(ewhat like that which enabled its early votaries 
to sweep over half of the known world in a single generation. 
This militant creed becomes dangerous when it personifies 
itself in a holy man who can make good his claim to be re- 
ceived as a successor of the Prophet. Such a man had 
recently appeared in the Sudan. It is doubtful whether 
Mohammed Ahmed was a genuine believer in his own ex- 
travagant claims, or whether he adopted them in order 
to wreak revenge on Rauf Pasha, the Egyptian Governor 
of the Sudan, for an insult inflicted by one of his under- 
lings. In May, 1881, while living near the island of Abba 
in the Nile, he put forward his claim to be the Messiah or 
Prophet, foretold by the founder of that creed. Retiring 
with some disciples to that island, he gained fame by his 
fervour and asceticism. His followers named him " El 
Mahdi," "the leader," but his claims were scouted by the 
Ulemas of Khartum, Cairo, and Constantinople, on the 
ground that the Messiah of the Moslems was to arise in 

171 



172 The European Nations 

the East. Nevertheless, while the British were crush- 
ing Arabi's movement, the Mahdi stirred the Sudan to 
its depths, and speedily shook the Egyptian rule to its 
base.^ 

There was every reason to fear a speedy collapse.- In 
the years 1874-76 the Province of the White Nile had 
known the benefits of just and tactful rule under that born 
leader of men, Colonel Gordon; and in the three following 
years, as Governor-General of the Sudan, he gained greater 
powers, which he felt to be needful for the suppression of 
the slave-trade and other evils. Ill-health and underhand 
opposition of various kinds caused him to resign his post 
in 1879. Then, to the disgust of all, the Khedive named 
as his successor Rauf Pasha, whom Gordon had recently 
dismissed for maladministration of the Province of Harrar, 
on the borders of Abyssinia.^ Thus the vSudan, after ex- 
periencing the benefits of a just and able government, 
reeled back into the bad old condition, at the time when the 
Mahdi was becoming a power in the land. No help was 
forthcoming from Egypt in the summer of 1882, and the 
Mahdi' s revolt rapidly made headway even despite several 
checks from the Egyptian troops. 

Possibly, if Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues had decided 
to crush it in that autumn, the task might have been easy. 
But, far from doing so, they sought to dissuade the Khedive 
from attempting to hold the most disturbed districts, those 
of Kordofan and Darfur, beyond Khartum. This might 

' See the Report of the Intelligence Department of the War 
Office, printed in The Journals of Major-General C. G. Gordon at 
Khartum, Appendix to Bk. iv. 

2 See Gordon's letter of April, 1880, quoted in the Introduction 
to The Journals of Major-General C. G. Gordon at Khartum (1885), 
p xvii. 



Gordon and the Sudan 173 

have been the best course, if the evacuation could have 
been followed at once and without risk of disaster at the 
hands of the fanatics. But Tewfik willed otherwise. 
Against the advice of Lord Dufferin, he sought to reconquer 
the Sudan, and that, too, by wholly insufficient forces. 
The result was a series of disasters, culminating in the 
extermination of Hicks Pasha's Egyptian force by the 
Mahdi's followers near El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan 
(November 5, 1883). 

The details of the disaster are not fully known. Hicks 
Pasha was appointed, on August 20, 1883, by the Khedive 
to command the expedition into that province. He set 
out from Omdurman on September 9th, with 10,000 men, 
4 Krupp guns, and 16 light guns, 500 horses and 5500, 
camels. His last despatch, dated October 3rd, showed that 
the force had been greatly weakened by want of water and 
provisions, and most of all by the spell cast on the troops 
by the Mahdi's claim to invincibility. Nevertheless, Hicks 
checked the rebels in two or three encounters, but, ac- 
cording to the tale of one of the few survivors, a camel- 
drivei , the force finally succumbed to a fierce charge on the 
Egyptian square at the close of an exhausting march, pro- 
longed by the treachery of native guides. Nearly the 
whole force was put to the sword. Hicks Pasha perished, 
along with five British and four German officers, and many 
Egyptians of note. The adventurous newspaper cor- 
respondents, O 'Donovan and Vizetelly, also met their 
doom (November 5, 1883).! 

• Gordon's Journals, pp. 347-351"; also Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 
12 (1884), pp. 85 and 127-131 for another account. See, too. Sir 
F. R. Wingate's Mahdism, chaps, i.-iii., for the rise of the Mahdi 
and his triumph over Hicks. 



174 The European Nations 

This catastrophe decided the history of the Sudan for 
many years. The British Government was in no respect 
responsible for the appointment of General Hicks to the 
Kordofan command. Lord Dufferin and Sir E. Malet had 
strongly urged the Khedive to abandon Kordofan and 
Darfur ; but it would seem that the desire of the governing 
class at Cairo to have a hand in the Sudan administration 
overbore these wise remonstrances, and hence the disaster 
near El Obeid with its long train of evil consequences. ^ It 
was speedily followed by another reverse at Tokar, not far 
from Suakim, where the slave-raiders and tribesmen of the 
Red Sea coast exterminated another force, under the com- 
mand of Captain Moncrieff. 

The Gladstone Ministry and the British advisers of the 
Khedive, among whom was Sir Evelyn Baring (the present 
Lord Cromer), again urged the entire evacuation of the 
Sudan, and the limitation of Egyptian authority to the 
strong position of the First Cataract at Assuan. This 
policy then received the entire approval of the man who 
was to be alike the hero and the martyr of that enterprise. -^ 
But how were the Egyptian garrisons to be withdrawn ? 
It was a point of honour not to let them be slaughtered or 
enslaved by the cruel fanatics of the Mahdi. Yet under 
the lead of Egyptian officers they would almost certainly 
suffer one of these fates. A way of escape was suggested 
- — by a London evening newspaper in the first instance. 
The name of Gordon was renowned for justice and hardi- 
hood all through the Sudan. Let this knight-errant be 
sent — so said this Mentor of the Press — and his strange 

• J. Morley, Life of Gladstone, iii., p. 146; Sir A. Lyall, Life of 
Lord Dufferin, ii., chap. ii. 

2 Morley, Life of Gladstone, iii., p. 147. 



Gordon and the Sudan 175 

power over men would accomplish the impossible. The 
proposal carried conviction everywhere, and Lord Gran- 
ville, who generally followed any strong lead, sent for the 
General. 

Charles George Gordon, born at Woolwich in 1833, was 
the scion of a staunch race of Scottish fighters. His great- 
grandfather served under Cope at Prestonpans ; his grand- 
father fought in Boscawen's expedition at Louisburg and 
under Wolfe at Quebec. His father attained the rank of 
Lieutenant-General. From his mother, too, he derived 
qualities of self-reliance and endurance of no mean order. 
Despite the fact that she had eleven children, and that three 
of her sons were out at the Crimea, she is said never to 
have quailed during that dark time. Of these sons, Charles 
George was serving in the Engineers; he showed at his 
first contact with war an d,ptitude and resource which won 
the admiration of all. "We used always to send him out 
to find what new move the Russians were making" — such 
was the testimony of one of his superior officers. Of his 
subsequent duties in delimiting the new Bessarabian 
frontier and his miraculous career in China we cannot 
speak in detail. By the consent of all, it was his soldierly 
spirit that helped to save that Empire from anarchy at the 
hands of the Taeping rebels, whose movement presented 
a strange medley of perverted Christianity, communism, 
and freebooting. There it was that his magnetic influence 
over men first had free play. Though he was only thirty 
years of age, his fine physique, dauntless daring, and the 
spirit of unquestionable authority that looked out from 
his kindly eyes, gained speedy control over the motley set 
of officers and the Chinese rank and file — half of them ex- 
rebels — that formed the nucleus of the "ever victorious 



176 The European Nations 

army." What wonder that he was thenceforth known as 
"Chinese Gordon"? 

In the years 1865-71, which he spent at Gravesend in 
supervising the construction of the new forts at the mouth 
of the river, the rehgious and philanthropic side of his 
character found free play. His biographer, Mr. Hake, 
tells of his interest in the poor and suffering, and, above all, 
in friendless boys, who came to idolise his manly yet 
sympathetic nature. Called thereafter by the Khedive to 
succeed Sir Samuel Baker in the Governorship of the 
Sudan, he grappled earnestly with the fearful difhculties 
that beset all who have attempted to put down the slave- 
trade in its chief seat of activity. Later on he expressed 
the belief that " the Sudan is a useless possession, ever was 
so, ever will be so." These words, and certain episodes in 
his official career in India and in Cape Colony, revealed the 
weak side of a singularly noble nature. Occasionally he 
was hasty and impulsive in his decisions, and the pride of 
his race would then flash forth. During his cadetship at 
Woolwich he was rebuked for incompetence, and told that 
he would never make an officer. At once he tore the 
epaulets from his shoulders and flung them at his superior's 
feet. A certain impatience of control characterised him 
throughout life. No man was ever more chivalrous, more 
conscientious, more devoted, or abler in the management 
of inferiors ; but his abilities lay rather in the direction of 
swift intuitions and prompt achievement than in sound 
judgment and plodding toil. In short, his qualities were 

r 

those of a knight-errant, not those of a statesman. The 
imperious calls of conscience and of instinct endowed him 
with powers uniquely fitted to attract and enthral simple, 
straightforward natures, and to sway Orientals at his will. 



Gordon and the Sudan 177 

But the empire of conscience, instinct, and will-power 
consorts but ill with those diplomatic gifts of effecting a 
timely compromise which go far to make for success in 
life. This was at once the strength and the weakness of 
Gordon's being. In the midst of a blase, sceptical age, his 
personality stood forth, God-fearing as that of a Covenanter, 
romantic as that of a Coeur de Lion, tender as that of a 
Florence Nightingale. In truth, it appealed to all that is 
most elemental in man. 

At that time Gordon was charged by the King of the 
Belgians to proceed to the Congo River to put down the 
slave-trade. Imagination will persist in wondering what 
might have been the result if he had carried out this much- 
needed duty. Possibly he might have acquired such an 
influence as to direct the "Congo Free State" to courses 
far other than those to which it has come. He himself 
discerned the greatness of the opportunity. In his letter 
of January 6, 1884, to H. M. Stanley, he stated that "no 
such efficacious means of cutting at root of slave-trade 
ever was presented as that which God has opened out to 
us through the kind disinterestedness of His Majesty." 

The die was now cast against the Congo and for the Nile. 
Gordon had a brief interview with four members of the 
Cabinet — Lords Granville, Hartington, Northbrooke, and 
Sir Charles Dilke, — Mr. Gladstone was absent at Hawar- 
den; and they forthwith decided that he should go to the 
upper Nile. What transpired in that most important 
meeting is known only from Gordon's account of it in a 
private letter : 

"At noon he, Wolseley, came to me and took me to the 
Ministers. He went in and talked to the Ministers, and 
came back and said: ' Her Majesty's Government wants you 

VOL. II. 12. 



178 The European Nations 

to undertake this. Government is determined to evacu- 
ate the Sudan, for they will not guarantee future govern- 
ment. Will you go and do it?' I said, 'Yes.' He said, 
' Go in.' I went in and saw them. They said, ' Did 
Wolseley tell you our orders?' I said, 'Yes.' I said, 
'You will not guarantee future government of the Sudan, 
and you wish me to go up to evacuate now?' They said, 
'Yes,' and it was over, and I left at 8 p.m. for Calais." 

Before seeing the Ministers, Gordon had a long inter- 
view with Lord Wolseley, who in the previous autumn had 
been named Baron Wolseley of Cairo. That conversation 
is also unknown to us, but obviously it must have in- 
fluenced Gordon's impressions as to the scope of the 
duties sketched for him by the Cabinet. We turn, then, 
to the "Instructions to General Gordon," drawn up by 
the Ministry on January 18, 1884. They directed him to 
"proceed at once to Egypt, to report to them on the 
military situation in the Sudan, and on the measures which 
it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian 
garrisons still holding positions in that country and for the 
safety of the European population in Khartum." He was 
also to report on the best mode of effecting the evacuation 
of the interior of the Sudan and' on measures that might be 
taken to counteract the consequent spread of the slave- 
trade. He was to be under the instructions of H.M.'s 
Consul-General at Cairo (Sir Evelyn Baring). There fol- 
lowed this sentence: " You will consider yourself authorised 
and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian 
Government may desire to entrust to you, and as may be 
communicated to you by Sir Evelyn Baring." ^ 

After receiving these instructions, Gordon started at 
» Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 2 (1884), p. 3. 



Gordon and the Sudan 179 

once for Egypt, accompanied by Colonel Stewart. At 
Cairo he had an interview with Sir Evelyn Baring, and was 
appointed by the Khedive Governor-General of the Sudan. 
The firman of January 26th contained these words: "We 
trust that you will carry out our good intentions for the 
establishment of justice and order, and that you will 
assure the peace and prosperity of the people of the Sudan 
by maintaining the security of the roads, etc." It con- 
tained not a word about the evacuation of the Sudan, nor 
did the Khedive's proclamation of the same date to the 
Sudanese. The only reference to evacuation was in his 
letter of the same date to Gordon, beginning thus: "You 
are aware that the object of your arrival here and of your 
mission to the Sudan is to carry into execution the evacua- 
tion of those territories and to withdraw our troops, civil 
officials, and such of the inhabitants, together with their 
belongings, as may wish to leave for Egypt. ..." After 
completing this task he was to "take the necessary steps 
for establishing an organised Government in the differ- 
ent provinces of the Sudan for the maintenance of order 
and the cessation of all disasters and incitement to re- 
volt."^ How Gordon, after sending away all the troops, 
was to pacify that enormous territory His Highness did not 
explain. 

There is almost as much ambiguity in the "further in- 
structions" which Sir Evelyn Baring drew up on January 
25th at Cairo. After stating that the British and Egyptian 
Governments had agreed on the necessity of " evacuating" 
the Sudan, he noted the fact that Gordon approved of it 
and thought it should on no account be changed; the 
despatch proceeds: 

1 Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 12 (1884), pp. 27, 28. 



i8o The European Nations 

' ' You consider that it may take a few months to carry 
it out with safety. You are further of opinion that ' the 
restoration of the country should be made to the different 
petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mohammed Ah's 
conquest, and whose families still exist'; and that an en- 
deavour should be made to form a confederation of those 
Sultans. In this view the Egyptian Government entirely 
concurs. It will of course be fully understood that the 
Egyptian troops are not to be kept in the Sudan merely 
with a view to consolidating the powers of the new rulers 
of the country. But the Egyptian Government has the 
fullest confidence in your judgment, your knowledge of the 
country, and your comprehension of the general line of 
policy to be pursued. You are therefore given full dis- 
cretionary power to retain the troops for such reasonable 
period as you may think necessary, in order that the 
abandonment of the country may be accomplished with 
the least possible risk to life and property. A credit of 
;£ 1 00,000 has been opened for you at the Finance De- 
partment. . . ."1 

In themselves these instructions were not wholly clear. 
An officer who is allowed to use troops for the settlement 
or pacification of a vast tract of country can hardly be the 
agent of a policy of mere "abandonment." Neither Gor- 
don nor Baring seems at that time to have felt the incon- 
gruity of the two sets of duties, but before long it flashed 
across Gordon's mind. At Abu Hammed, when nearing 
Khartum, he telegraphed to Baring: "I would most 
earnestly beg that evacuation but not abandonment be 
the programme to be followed." Or, as he phrased it, he 
wanted Egypt to recognise her ' ' moral control and suze- 
> Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 6 (1884), p. 3. 



Gordon and the Sudan i8i 

rainty " over the Sudan.^ This, of course, was an extension 
of the programme to which he gave his assent at Cairo ; it 
differed toto ccelo from the poHcy of abandonment laid 
down at London. 

Even now it is impossible to see why Ministers did not at 
once simplify the situation by a clear statement of their 
orders to Gordon, not, of course, as Governor-General of 
the Sudan, but as a British officer charged by them with a 
definite duty. At a later date they sought to limit him to 
the restricted sphere sketched out at London; but then it 
was too late to bend to their will a nature which, firm at 
all times, was hard as adamant when the voice of con- 
science spoke within. Already it had spoken, and against 
"abandonment." 

There were other confusing elements in the situation. 
Gordon believed that the "full discretionary power" 
granted to him by Sir E. Baring was a promise binding on 
the British Government; and, seeing that he was author- 
ised to perform such other duties as Sir Evelyn Baring 
would communicate to him, he was right. But Ministers 
do not seem to have understood that this implied an im- 
mense widening of the original programme. Further, Sir 
Evelyn Baring used the terms "evacuation", and "aban- 
donment" as if they were synonymous, while in Gordon's 
view they were very different. As we shall see, his nature, 
at once conscientious, vehement, and pertinacious, came 
to reject the idea of abandonment as cowardly and there- 
fore impossible. 

Lastly, we may note that Gordon was left free to an- 
nounce the forthcoming evacuation of the Sudan, or not, 
as he judged best.^ He decided to keep it secret. Had 

> Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 133. 2 Ibid., p. 27. 



I82 



The European Nations 



he kept it entirely so for the present, he would have done 
well, but he is said to have divulged it to one or two 
officials at Berber; if so, it was a very regrettable im- 
prudence, which compromised the defence of that town. 
But surely no man was ever charged with duties so com- 
plex and contradictory. The qualities of Nestor, Ulysses, 
and Achilles combined in one mortal could scarcely have 
availed to untie or sever that knot. 

The first sharp collision between Gordon and the Home 
Government resulted from his urgent request for the 
employment of Zebehr Pasha as the future ruler of the 
Sudan. A native of the Sudan, this man had risen to 
great wealth and power by his energy and ambition, and 
figured as a kind of king among the slave-raiders of the 
upper Nile, until, for some offence against the Egyptian 
Government, he was interned at Cairo. At that city 
Gordon had a conference with Zebehr in the presence of 
Sir E. Baring, Nubar Pasha, and others. It was long and 
stormy, and gave the impression of undying hatred felt 
by the slaver for the slave-liberator. This alone seemed 
to justify the Gladstone Ministry in refusing Gordon's 
request.! Had Zebehr gone with Gordon, he would cer- 
tainly have betrayed him — so thought Sir Evelyn Baring. 

Setting out from Cairo and travelling quickly up the 
Nile, Gordon reached Khartum on February i8th, and 
received an enthusiastic welcome from the discouraged 
populace. At once he publicly burned all instruments of 
torture and records of old debts; so that his popularity 
overshadowed that of the Mahdi. Again he urged the 
despatch of Zebehr as his "successor," after the with- 
drawal of troops and civilians from the Sudan. But, as 
' Egypt, pp- 38-41- 



Gordon and the Sudan 183 

Sir Evelyn Baring said in forwarding Gordon's request to 
Downing Street, it would be most dangerous to place them 
together at Khartum. It should further be noted that 
Gordon's telegrams showed his belief that the Mahdi's 
power was overrated, and that his advance in person on 
Khartum was most unlikely.^ It is not surprising, then, 
that Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir E. Baring on 
February 22nd that the public opinion of England "would 
not tolerate the appointment of Zebehr Pasha." 2 Already 
it had been offended by Gordon's proclamation at Khar- 
tum that the Government would not interfere with the 
buying and selling of slaves, though, as Sir Evelyn Baring 
pointed out, the re-establishment of slavery resulted quite 
naturally from the policy of evacuation; and he now 
strongly urged that Gordon should have "full liberty of 
action to complete the execution of his general plans." ^ 

Here it is desirable to remember that the Mahdist move- 
ment was then confined almost entirely to three chief dis- 
tricts — Kordofan, parts of the lands adjoining the Blue 
Nile, and the tribes dwelling west and south-west of Suakim. 
For the present these last were the most dangerous. Al- 
ready they had overpowered and slaughtered two Egyptian 
forces; and on February 22nd news reached Cairo of the 
fall of Tokar before the valiant swordsmen of Osman 
Digna, But this was far away from the Nile and did not 
endanger Gordon. British troops were landed at Suakim 
for the protection of that port, but this step implied no 
change of policy respecting the Sudan. The shght im- 
pression which two brilliant but costly victories, those of 
El Teb and Tamai, made on the warlike tribes at the back 
of Suakim certainly showed the need of caution in pushing 

' Egypt, pp. 74, 82, 88. 2 Ibid., p. 95. ^ Ibid., p. 94.. 



184 The European Nations 

a force into the Sudan when the fierce heats of summer 
were coming on.^ 

The first hint of any change of poHcy was made by 
Gordon in his despatch of February 26th, to Sir E. Baring. 
After stating his regret at the refusal of the British Govern- 
ment to allow the despatch of Zebehr as his successor, he 
used these remarkable words: 

"You must remember that when evacuation is carried 
out, Mahdi will come down here, and, by agents, will not 
let Egypt be quiet. Of course my duty is evacuation, and 
the best I can for establishing a quiet government. The 
first I hope to accomplish. The second is a more difficult 
task, and concerns Egypt more than me. If Egypt is to 
be quiet, Mahdi must be smashed up. Mahdi is most un- 
popular, and with care and time could be smashed. Re- 
member that once Khartum belongs to Mahdi, the task 
will be far more difficult; yet you will, for the safety of 
Egypt, execute it. If you decide on smashing Mahdi, 
then send up another ;£ioo,ooo and send up 200 Indian 
troops to Wady Haifa, and send officer up to Dongola under 
pretence to look out quarters for troops. Leave Suakim 
and Massowah alone. I repeat that evacuation is possible, 
but you will feel effect in Egypt, and will be forced to enter 
into a far more serious affair in order to guard Egypt. At 
present, it would be comparatively easy to destroy Mahdi." 2 

This statement arouses different opinions according to 
the point of view from which we regard it. As a declara- 
tion of general policy it is no less sound than prophetic; 
as a despatch from the Governor- General of the Sudan to 

» For details of these battles, see Sir F. Wingate's Mahdism, chap 
iii., and Life of Sir Gerald Graham (1901). 
* Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 115. 



Gordon and the Sudan 185 

the Egyptian Government, it claimed serious attention ; 
as a recommendation sent by a British officer to the Home 
Government, it was altogether beyond his powers. Gor- 
don was sent out for a distinct aim; he now proposed to 
subordinate that aim to another far vaster aim which 
lay beyond his province. Nevertheless, Sir E. Baring on 
February 28th, and on March 4th, urged the Gladstone 
Ministry even now to accede to Gordon's request for 
Zebehr Pasha as his successor, on the ground that some 
government must be left in the Sudan, and Zebehr was 
deemed at Cairo to be the only possible governor. Again 
the Home Government refused, and thereby laid them- 
selves under the moral obligation of suggesting an alter- 
nate course. The only course suggested was to allow the 
despatch of a British force up the Nile, if occasion seemed 
to demand HA 

In this connection it is well to remember that the ques- 
tion of Egypt and the Sudan was only one of many that 
distracted the attention of Ministers. The events outside 
Suakim alone might give them pause before they plunged 
into the Sudan ; for that was the time when Russia was 
moving on towards Afghanistan; and the agreement be- 
tween the three Emperors imposed the need of caution on 
a State as isolated and unpopular as England then was. 
In view of the designs of the German colonial party (see Vol. 
II., Chapter VI.) and the pressure of the Irish problem, the 
Gladstone Cabinet was surely justified in refusing to under- 
take any new responsibilities, except on the most urgent 
need. Vital interests were at stake in too many places to 
warrant a policy of Quixotic adventure up the Nile. 

Nevertheless, it is regrettable that Ministers took up^p 
> Egypt, p. If- 



1 86 The European Nations 

the Sudan problem a position that was logically sound but 
futile in the sphere of action. Gordon's mission, according 
to Earl Granville, was a peaceful one, and he inquired 
anxiously what progress had been made in the withdrawal 
of the Egyptian garrisons and civilians. This question he 
put, even in the teeth of Gordon's positive statement in a 
telegram of March 8th: 

"If you do not send Zebehr, you have no chance of 
getting the garrisons away; . . . Zebehr here would 
be far more powerful than the Mahdi, and he would make 
short work of the Mahdi." * 

A week earlier Gordon had closed a telegram with the 
despairing words: 

" I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but I 
feel conviction I shall be caught in Khartum." ^ 

It is not surprising that Ministers, were perplexed by 
Gordon's despatches, or that Baring telegraphed to Khar- 
tum that he found it very difficult to understand what the 
General wanted. All who now peruse his despatches must 
have the same feeling, mixed with one of regret that he 
ever weakened his case by the proposal to "smash the 
Mahdi." Thenceforth the British Government obviously 
felt some distrust of its envoy; and in this disturbing 
factor, and the duality of Gordon's duties, we may discern 
one cause at least of the final disaster. 

On March nth, the British Government refused either 
to allow the appointment of Zebehr or to send British or 
Indian troops from Suakim to Berber. Without wishing 
to force Gordon's hand prematurely, Earl Granville urged 
the need of evacuation at as early a date as might be prac- 
ticable. On March i6th, after hearing ominous news as 

» Egypt, p. 145. i Ibid., p 152. 



Gordon and the Sudan 187 

to the spread of the Mahdi's power near to Khartum and 
Berber, he advised the evacuation of the former city at the 
earhest possible date.i We may here note that the rebels 
began to close round it on March i8th. 

Earl Granville's advice directly conflicted with Gordon's 
sense of honour. As he stated, on or about March 20th, 
the fidehty of the people of Khartum, while treachery was 
rife all around, bound him not to leave them until he could 
do so " under a Government which would give them some 
hope of peace." Here again his duty as Governor of the 
Sudan, or his extreme conscientiousness as a man, held 
him to his post despite the express recommendations of the 
British Government. His decision is ever to be regretted; 
but it redounds to his honour as a Christian and a soldier. 
At bottom, the misunderstanding between him and the 
Cabinet rested on a divergent view of duty. Gordon 
summed up his scruples in his telegram to Baring: 

" You must see that you could not recall me, nor could 
I possibly obey, until- the Cairo employes get out from all 
the places. I have named men to different places, thus 
involving them with the Mahdi. How could I look the 
world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a 
gentleman, could you advise this course?" 

Earl Granville summed up his statement of the case in 
the words : 

"The Mission of General Gordon, as originally designed 
and decided upon, was of a pacific nature and in no way 
involved any movement of British forces. . . .He 
was, in addition, authorised and instructed to perform 
such other duties as the Egyptian Government might 
desire to entrust to him and as might be communicated by 
' Egypt, pp. 158, 162, 166. 



1 88 The European Nations 

you to him. . . . Her Majesty's Government, bearing 
in mind the exigencies of the occasion, concurred in these 
instructions [those of the Egyptian Government], which 
virtually altered General Gordon's Mission from one of 
advice to that of executing, or at least directing, the 
evacuation not only of Khartum but of the whole Sudan, 
and they were willing that General Gordon should receive 
the very extended powers conferred upon him by the 
Khedive to enable him to effect his difficult task. But they 
have throughout joined in your anxiety that he should not 
expose himself to unnecessary personal risk, or place him- 
self in a position from which retreat would be difficult. "^ 

He then states that it is clear that Khartum can hold out 
for at least six months, if it is attacked, and, seeing that the 
British occupation of Egypt was only " for a special and tem- 
porary purpose," any expedition into the Sudan would be 
highly undesirable on general as well as diplomatic grounds. 

Both of these views of duty are intelligible as well as 
creditable to those who held them. But the former view is 
that of a high-souled officer ; the latter, that of a responsi- 
ble and much-tried Minister and diplomatist. They were 
wholly divergent, and divergence there spelt disaster. 

On hearing of the siege of Khartum, General Stephenson, 
then commanding the British forces in Egypt, advised the 
immediate despatch of a brigade to Dongola — a step which 
would probably have produced the best results: but that 
advice was overruled at London for the reasons stated 
above. Ministers seem to have feared that Gordon might 
use the force for offensive purposes. An Egyptian battalion 
was sent up the Nile to Korosko in the middle of May, 

' Egypt, No. 13 (1884), pp. s, 6. Earl Granville made the same 
statement in his despatch of April 23. 



Gordon and the Sudan 189 

but the "moral effect" hoped for from that daring step 
vanished in face of a serious reverse. On May 19th the im- 
portant city of Berber was taken by the Mahdists.i 

Difficult as the removal of about 10,000 to 15,000 ^ 
Egyptians from Khartum had always been — and there were 
fifteen other garrisons to be rescued — it was now next to 
impossible, unless some blow were dealt at the rebels in that 
neighbourhood. The only effective blow would be that 
dealt by British or Indian troops, and this the Government 
refused, though Gordon again and again pointed out that a 
small well-equipped force would do far more than a large 
force. "A heavy, lumbering column, however strong, is 
nowhere in this land [so he wrote in his Journals on Sep- 
tember 24th]. ... It is' the country of the irregular, 
not of the regular." A month after the capture of Berber 
a small British force left Siut, on the Nile, for Assuan; 
but this move, which would have sent a thrill through the 
Sudan in March, had little effect at mid-summer. Even 
so, a prompt advance on Dongola and thence on Berber 
would probably have saved the situation at the eleventh 
hour. 

But first the battle of the routes had to be fought out by 
the military authorities. As early as April 25th, the 
Government ordered General Stephenson to report on the 
best means of relieving Gordon; after due consideration 
of this difficult problem he advised the despatch of 10,000 
men to Berber from Suakim in the month of September. 
Preparations were actually begun at Suakim; but in July 
experts began to favour the Nile route. In that month 

1 Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 25 (1884), pp. 129-131. 
' This is the number as estimated by Gordon in his Journals 
(September 10, 1S84), p. 6. 



igo The European Nations 

Lord Wolseley urged the immediate despatch of a force 
up that river, and he promised that it should be at Dongola 
by the middle of October. Even so, official hesitations 
hampered the enterprise, and it was not until July 29th 
that the decision seems to have been definitely formed in 
favour of the Nile route. Even on August 8th, Lord 
Hartington, then War Minister, stated that help would be 
sent to Gordon, if it proved to be necessary} On August 
26th, Lord Wolseley was appointed to the command of the 
relief expedition gathering on the Nile, but not until 
October 5th did he reach Wady Haifa, below the Second 
Cataract. 

Meanwhile the web of fate was closing in on Khartum. 
In vain did Gordon seek to keep communications open. 
All that he could do was to hold stoutly to that last bul- 
wark of civilisation. There were still some grounds for 
hope. The Mahdi remained in Kordofan, want of food 
preventing his march northwards in force. Against his 
half-armed fanatics the city opposed a strong barrier. 
"Crows' feet" scattered on the ground ended their mad 
rushes, and mines blew them into the air by hundreds. 
Khartum seemed to defy these sons of the desert. The 
fire of the steamers drove them from the banks and pul- 
verised their forts .2 The arsenal could turn out fifty 
thousand Remington cartridges a week. There was every 
reason, then, for holding the city; for, as Gordon jotted 
down in his Journal on September 17th, if the Mahdi took 
Khartum, it would need a great force to stay his propa- 
ganda. Here and there in those pathetic records of a life- 
and-death struggle we catch a glimpse of Gordon's hope 

> Morley, Life of Gladstone, iii., p. 164. 

2 For details, see Letters from Khartum, by Frank Power. 



Gordon and the Sudan 191 

of saving Khartum for civilisation. More than once he 
noted the ease of holding the Sudan from the Nile as base. 
With forts at the cataracts and armed steamers patrolling 
the clear reaches of the river, the defence of the Sudan, he 
believed, was by no means impossible.^ 

On September loth he succeeded in sending away down 
stream by steamer Colonel Stewart and Messrs. Power and 
Herbin; but unfortunately they were wrecked and mur- 
dered by Arabs near Korti. The advice and help of that 
gallant officer would have been of priceless service to the 
relieving force. On September loth, when the Journals 
begin, Gordon was still hopeful of success, though food was 
scarce. 

At this time the rescue expedition was mustering at 
Wady Haifa, a point which the narrowing gorge of the 
Nile marks out as one of the natural defences of its lower 
valley. There the British and Egyptian Governments 
were collecting a force that soon amounted to 2570 British 
troops and some Egyptians, who were to be used solely for 
transport and portage duties. A striking tribute to the 
solidarity of the Empire was the presence of 350 Canadians, 
mostly French, whose skill in working boats up rapids won 
admiration on all sides. The difficulties of the Nile route 
were soon found to be far greater than had been imagined. 
Indeed many persons still believe that the Suakim-Berber 
route would have been far preferable. The Nile was un- 
fortunately lower than usual, and many rapids, up which 
small steamers had been hauled when the waters ran deep 
and full, were impassable even for the whaleboats on 
which the expedition depended for its progress as far as 
Korti. Many a time all the boats had to be hauled up the 

> Journals, p. 35, etc. 



2".i Cataract/ 




N.B. The Timlway south cf Berber wss 
completed after the campaipiof" 1896- 



Miles o 2S 



lOO Miles Stanfbrds Geoj^ Estab^ LorudoTV. 

MAP OF THE NILE 

ig2 



Gordon and the Sudan 193 

banks and carried by Canadians or Egyptians to the next 
clear reaches. The letters written by Gordon in 1877 in a 
more favourable season were now found to be misleading, 
and in part led to the miscalculation of time which was 
to prove so disastrous. 

Another untoward fact was the refusal of the authorities 
to push on the construction of the railway above Sarras. 
It had been completed from Wady Haifa up to that point, 
and much work had been done on it for about fifteen miles 
farther. But, either from lack of the necessary funds, or 
because the line could not be completed in time, the con- 
struction was stopped by Lord Wolseley's orders early in 
October. Consequently much time was lost in dragging 
the boats and their stores up or around the difficult rapids 
above Semneh.^ 

Meanwhile a large quantity of stores had been collected 
at Dongola and Debbeh; numbers of boats were also there, 
so that a swift advance of a vanguard thence by the calmer 
reaches farther up the Nile seemed to offer many chances 
of success. It was in accord with Gordon's advice to act 
swiftly with small columns; but, for some reason, the plan 
was not acted on, though Colonel Kitchener, who had 
collected those stores, recommended it. Another argu- 
ment for speedy action was the arrival on November 14th 
of a letter from Gordon, dated ten days before, in which he 
stated that he could hold out for forty days, but would 
find it hard to do so any longer. 

The advance of the main body to Dongola was very 
slow, despite the heroic toil of all concerned. We now 

1 See Gordon's letters of the year 1877 quoted in the Appendix 
of A. Macdonald's Too Late for Gordon and Khartum (1887); also 
chap. vi. of that book. 

VOL. II. — 13. 



194 The European Nations 

know that up to the middle of September the Gladstone 
Ministry cherished the belief that the force need not ad- 
vance beyond Dongola. Their optimism was once again 
at fault. The Mahdists were pressing on the siege of 
Khartum, and had overpowered and slaughtered faithfiil 
tribes farther down the river. Such was the news sent by 
Gordon and received by Lord Wolseley on December 31st 
at Korti. The "secret and confidential" part of Gordon's 
message was to the effect that food was running short, and 
the rescuers must come quickly; they should come by 
Metammeh or Berber, and inform Gordon by the messenger 
when they had taken Berber. 

The last entries in Gordon's Journals, or in that part 
which has survived, contain the following statements: 

"December 13. . . . All that is absolutely neces- 
sary is for fifty of the expeditionary force to get on board 
a steamer and come up to Halfeyeh, and thus let their 
presence be felt; this is not asking much, but it must 
happen at once ; or it will (as usual) be too late. 

"December 14. [After stating that he would send down 
a steamer with the Journal towards the expeditionary 
force]. . . . Now mark this, if the expeditionary 
force, and I ask for no more than two hundred men, does 
not come in ten days the town may fall; and I have done 
my best for the honour of our country. Good bye." 

Owing to lack of transport, and other difficulties, the 
vanguard of the relieving force could not begin its march 
from the new Nile base, near Korti, until December 30th. 
Thence the gallant Sir Herbert Stewart led a picked 
column of men with eighteen hundred camels across the 
desert towards Metammeh. Lord Wolseley remained be- 
hind to guard the new base of operations. At Abu Klea 



Gordon and the Sudan 195 

wells, when nearing the Nile, the column was assailed by 
a great mass of Arabs. They advanced in five columns, 
each having a wedge-shaped head designed to pierce the 
British square. With a low murmuring cry or chant they 
rushed on in admirable order, disregarding the heavy losses 
caused by the steady fire of three faces of the square. 
Their leaders soon saw the weak place in the defence, 
namely, at one of the rear corners, where belated skir- 
mishers were still running in for shelter, where also one of 
the guns jammed at the critical moment. One of their 
Emirs, calmly reciting his prayers, rode in through the gap 
thus formed, and for ten minutes bayonet and spear plied 
their deadly thrusts at close quarters. Thanks to the 
firmness of the British infantry, every Arab that forced 
his way in perished; but in this melee there perished a 
stalwart soldier whom England could ill spare. Colonel 
Burnaby, hero of the ride to Khiva. Lord Charles JBeres- 
ford, of the Naval Brigade, had a narrow escape while 
striving to set right the defective cannon. In all Stewart 
lost sixty-five killed and sixty wounded, a proportion which 
tells its own tale as to the fighting.^ 

Two days later, while the force was beating ofif an attack 
of the Arabs near Metammeh, General Stewart received a 
wound which proved to be mortal. The command now 
devolved on Sir Charles Wilson, of the Royal Engineers. 
After repelling the attacks of other Mahdists and making 
good his position on the Nile, the new commander came 
into touch with Gordon's steamers, which arrived there on 
the 2ist, with 190 Sudanese. Again, however, the advance 

1 Sir C. W. Wilson, From Korti to Khartum, pp. 28-35; ^l^o see 
Hon. R. Talbot's article on "Abu Klea," in the Nineteenth Century 
for January, 1886. 



196 The European Nations 

of other Arabs from Omdurman caused a delay until a 
fortified camp, or zariba, could be formed. Wilson now 
had but 1322 unwounded men; and he saw that the 
Mahdists were in far greater force than Lord Wolseley or 
General Gordon had expected. Not until January 24th 
could the commander steam away southwards with twenty 
men of the Sussex regiment and the 190 Sudanese soldiers 
on the two largest of Gordon's boats — ^his " penny steamers" 
as he whimsically termed them. 

The sequel is well known. After overcoming many 
difficulties caused by rocks and saiidbanks, after running 
the gauntlet of the Mahdist fire, this forlorn hope neared 
Khartum on the 28th, only to find that the place had 
fallen. There was nothing for it but to put about and 
escape while it was possible. Sir Charles Wilson has 
described the scene: "The masses of the enemy with their 
fluttering banners near Khartum, the long rows of rifle- 
men in the shelter-trenches at Omdurman, the numerous 
groups of men on Tuti [Island], the bursting of shells, and 
the water torn up by hundreds of bullets, and occasionally 
heavier shot, made an impression never to be forgotten. 
Looking out over the stormy scene, it seemed almost im- 
possible that we should escape." ^ 

Weighed down by grief at the sad failure of all their 
strivings, the little band yet succeeded in escaping to 
Metammeh. They afterwards found out that they were 
two days too late. The final cause of the fall of Khartum is 
not fully known. The notion first current, that it was due 
to treachery, has been discredited. Certainly the defenders 
were weakened by privation and cowed by the Mahdist 
successes. The final attack was also given at a weak 
> Sir C. W. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 176-177. 



Gordon and the Sudan 197 

place in the long line of defence; but whether the de- 
fenders all did their best, or were anxious to make terms 
with the Mahdi, will probably never be known. The con- 
duct of the assailants in at once firing on the relieving force 
forbids the notion that they all along intended to get into 
Khartum by treachery just before the approach of the 
steamers. Had that been their aim, they would surely 
have added one crowning touch of guile, that of remaining 
quiet until Wilson and his men landed at Khartum. The 
capture of the town would therefore seem to be due to 
force, not to treachery. 

All these speculations are dwarfed by the overwhelming 
fact that Gordon perished. Various versions have been 
given of the manner of his death. One that rests on good 
authority is that he died fighting. Another account, 
which seems more consistent with his character, is that, 
on hearing of the enemy's rush into the town, he calmly 
remarked: " It is all finished; to-day Gordon will be killed." 
In a short time a chief of the Baggara Arabs with a few 
others burst in and ordered him to come to the Mahdi. 
Gordon refused. Thrice the Sheikh repeated the com- 
mand. Thrice Gordon calmly repeated his refusal. The 
Sheikh then drew his sword and slashed at his shoulder. 
Gordon still looked him steadily in the face. Thereupon 
the miscreant struck at his neck, cut off his head, and 
carried it to the Mahdi. ^ 

Whatever may be the truth as to details, it is certain" 
that no man ever looked death in the face so long and so 
serenely as Gordon. For him life was but duty — -duty to 

' A third account, given by Bordeini Bey, a merchant of Khar- 
tum, differs in many details. It is printed by Sir F. R. Wingate in 
his Mahdism, p. 171. 



198 The European Nations 

God and duty to man. We may fitly apply to him the 
noble lines which Tennyson offered to the memory of 
another steadfast soul: 

He that, ever following her commands, 

On with toil of heart and knees and hands. 

Thro' the long gorge to the far light has won 

His path upward, and prevail'd, 

Shall find the toppling crags of Duty scaled 

Are close upon the shining table-lands 

To which our God Himself is moon and sun. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE CONQUEST OF THE SUDAN 

"The Sudan, if once proper communication was estaWished, 
would not be difficult to govern. The only mode of improving the 
access to the Sudan, seeing the impoverished state of Egyptian 
finances, and the mode to do so without an outlay of more than 
;f 10,000, is by the Nile." — Gordon's Journals (Sept. 19, li 



IT may seem that an account of the fall of Khartum is out 
of place in a volume which deals only with formative 
events. But this is not so. The example of Gordon's 
heroism was of itself a great incentive to action for the 
cause of settled government in that land. For that cause 
he had given his life, and few Britons were altogether deaf 
to the mute appeal of that lonely struggle. Then, again, 
the immense increase to the Mahdi's power resulting from 
the capture of the arsenal of Khartum constituted (as 
Gordon had prophesied) a serious danger to Egypt. The 
continued presence of British troops at Wady Haifa, and 
that alone, saved the valley of the lower Nile from a 
desolating flood of savagery. This was a fact recognised 
by every one at Cairo, even by the ultra-Gallic party. 
Egypt alone has rarely been able to hold at bay any great 
downward movement of the tribes of Ethiopia and Nubia ; 
and the danger was never so great as in and after 1885. 
The Mahdi's proclamations to the faithful now swelled 
with inconceivable pride. To a wavering sheikh he sent 

199 



200 The European Nations 

the warning: "If you live long enough you will see the 
troops of the Mahdi spreading over Europe, Rome, and 
Constantinople, after which there will be nothing left for 
you but hell and damnation." The mistiness of the 
geography was hidden by the vigour of the theology, and 
all the sceptics of Nubia hastened to accept the new 
prophet. 

But his time of tyranny soon drew to a close. A woman 
of Khartum, who had been outraged by him or his followers, 
determined to wreak her vengeance. On June 14, 1885, 
she succeeded in giving him slow poison, which led him to 
his death amidst long-drawn agonies eight days later. 
This ought to have been the death of Mahdism as well, 
but superstitions die hard in that land of fanatics. The 
Mahdi's factotum, an able intriguer named Abdullah 
Taashi had previously gained from his master a written 
declaration that he was to be Khalifa after him; he now 
produced this document, and fortified its influence by de- 
scribing in great detail a vision in which the ghost of the 
Mahdi handed him a sacred hair of inestimable worth, and 
an oblong-shaped light which had come direct from the 
hands of the true Prophet, who had received it from the 
hands of the angel Gabriel, to whom it had' been entrusted 
by the Almighty. 

This silly story was eagerly believed by the many, the 
questioning few also finding it well to still their doubts in 
presence of death or torture. Piety and politics quickly 
worked hand in hand to found the impostor's authority. 
A mosque began to rise over the tomb of the Mahdi in his 
chosen capital, Omdurman, and his successor gained the 
support and the offerings of the thousands of pilgrims who 
came to visit that wonder-working shrine. Such was the 



The Conquest of the Sudan 201 

basis of the new rule, which spread over the valley of the 
Upper and Middle Nile, and carried terror nearly to the 
borders of Egypt. ^ 

There law and order slowly took root under the shadow 
of the British administration, but Egypt ceased to control 
the lands south of Wady Haifa. Mr. Gladstone announced 
that decision in the House of Commons on May ii, 1885; 
and those who discover traces of the perfidy of Albion, even 
in the vacillations of her policy, maintain that that declara- 
tion was made with a view to an eventual annexation of 
the Sudan by England. Their contention would be still 
more forcible if they would prove that the Gladstone 
Ministry deliberately sacrificed Gordon at Khartum in 
order to increase the Mahdi's power and leave Egypt open 
to his blows, thereby gaining one more excuse for delaying 
the long-promised evacuation of the Nile delta by the red- 
coats. This was the outcome of events; and those who 
argue backwards should have the courage of their con- 
victions and throw all the facts of the case into their 
syllogisms. 

All who have any knowledge of the trend of British 
st itesmanship in the eighties know perfectly well that the 
occupation of Egypt was looked on as a serious incubus. 
The Salisbury Cabinet sought to give effect to the promises 
of evacuation, and with that aim in view sent Sir Henry 
Drummond Wolff to Constantinople in the year 1887 for 
the settlement of details. The year 1890 was ultimately 
fixed, provided that no danger should accrue to Egypt 
from such action, and that Great Britain should "retain a 
treaty-right of intervening if at any time either the inter- 
nal peace or external security [of Egypt] should be seriously 
1 Wingate, Mahdism, pp. 238-233. 



202 The European Nations 

threatened." To this last stipulation the Sultan seemed 
prepared to agree. Austria, Germany, and Italy notified 
their complete agreement with it; but France and Russia 
refused to accept the British offer with this proviso added 
and even influenced the Sultan so that he, too, finally 
opposed it. Their unfriendly action can only be attributed 
to a desire of humiliating Great Britain, and of depriving 
her of any effective influence in the land which, at such 
loss of blood and treasure to herself, she had saved from 
anarchy. Their opposition wrecked the proposal, and the 
whole position therefore remained unchanged. British 
officials continued to administer Egypt in spite of oppo- 
sition from the French in all possible details connected 
with the vital question of finance. ^ 

Other incidents that occurred during the years inter- 
vening between the fall of Gordon and the despatch of Sir 
Herbert Kitchener's expedition need not detain us here. 2 
The causes which led to this new departure will be more 
fitly considered when we come to notice the Fashoda 
incident; but we may here remark that they probably 
arose out of the French and Belgian schemes for the par- 
tition of Central Africa. A desire to rescue the Sudan 
from a cruel and degrading tyranny and to offer a tardy 
reparation to the memory of Gordon doubtless had some 
weight with Ministers, as it undoubtedly had with the 
public. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the vox populi 
would have allowed the expedition but for these more 
sentimental considerations. But, in the view of the 
present writer, the Sudan expedition presents the best 

' England in Egypt, by Sir Alfred Milner, pp. 145-153. 
2 For the Sudan in this period see Wingate's Mahdism; Slatin's 
Fire and Sword in the Sudan, C. Neufeld's A Prisoner of the Khalifa. 



The Conquest of the Sudan 203 

instance of foresight, resolve, and able execution that is to 
be found in the recent annals of Britain. 

With the hoiir had come the man. During the dreary 
years of the "mark- time" policy Colonel Kitchener had 
gained renown as a determined fighter and able organiser. 
For some time he acted as governor of Suakim, and showed 
his powers of command by gaining over some of the neigh- 
bouring tribes and planning an attack on Osman Digna 
which came very near to success. Under him and many 
other British officers the Egyptians and Sudanese gradually 
learned confidence, and broke the spell of invincibility that 
so long had rested with the Dervish hordes. On all sides 
the power of the Khalifa was manifestly waning. The 
powerful Hadendowa tribe, near Suakim, which had given 
so much trouble in 1883-84, became neutral. On the Nile 
also the Dervishes lost ground. The Anglo- Egyptian 
troops wrested from them the post of Sarras, some thirty 
miles south of Wady Haifa ; and the efforts of the fanatics 
to capture the wells along desert routes far to the east of 
the river were bloodily repulsed. As long as Sarras, Wady 
Haifa, and those wells were firmly held, Egypt was safe. 

At Gedaref, not very far from Omdurman, the Khalifa 
sustained a severe check from the Italians (December, 
1893), who thereupon occupied the town of Kassala. It 
was not to be for any length of time. In all their enter- 
prises against the warlike Abyssinians they completely 
failed; and, after sustaining the disastrous defeat of 
Adowa (March i, 1896), the whole nation despaired of 
reaping any benefit from the Hinterland of their colony 
around Massowah. The new Cabinet at Rome resolved to 
withdraw from the districts around Kassala. On this 
news being communicated to the British Ministers, they 



204 The European Nations 

sent a request to Rome that the evacuation of Kassala 
might be delayed until Anglo-Egyptian troops could be 
despatched to occupy that important station. In this 
way the intended withdrawal of the Italians served to 
strengthen the resolve of the British Government to help 
the Khedive in effecting the recovery of the Sudan. i 

Preparations for the advance southwards went forward 
slowly and methodically through the summer and autumn 
of 1896. For the present the operations were limited to 
the recapture of Dongola. Sir Herbert Kitchener, then 
the Sirdar of the Egyptian army, was placed in command. 
Under him were men who had proved their worth in years 
of desultory fighting against the Khalifa — Broadwood, 
Hunter, Lewis, Macdonald, Maxwell, and many others. 
The training had been so long and severe as to weed out all 
weaklings ; and the Sirdar himself was the very incarnation 
of that stern but salutary law of nature which ordains the 
survival of the fittest. Scores of officers who failed to 
come up to his requirements were quietly removed; and 
the result was seen in a finely seasoned body of men, apt 
at all tasks, from staff duties to railway control. A com- 
parison of the Egyptian army that fought at Omdurman 
with that which thirteen years before ran away screaming 
from a tenth of its number of Dervishes affords the most 
impressive lesson of modern times of the triumph of mind 
over matter, of western fortitude over the weaker side of 
eastern fatalism. 

Such a building up of character as this implies could not 

1 See articles by Dr. E. J. Dillon and by Jules Simon in the Con- 
temporary Review for April and May, 1896. Kassala was handed 
over to an Egyptian force under Colonel Parsons in December. 
The Egyptian Sudan, by H. S. L. Alford and W. D. Sword (i! 



The Conquest of the Sudan 205 

take place in a month or two, for the mind of Egyptians 
and Sudanese was at first an utter blank as to the need of 
prompt obedience and still prompter action. An amusing 
case of their incredible slackness has been recorded. On 
the first parade of a new camel transport corps before Lord 
Kitchener, the leading driver stopped his animal, and 
therefore all that followed, immediately in front of the 
Sirdar, in order to light a cigarette. It is needless to say 
the cigarette was not lighted, but the would-be smoker 
had his first lesson as to the superiority of the claims of 
collectivism over the whims of the individual.^ 

As will be seen by reference to the map on page 192, the 
decision to limit the campaign to Dongola involved the 
choice of the Nile route. If the blow had been aimed 
straight at Khartum, the Suakim-Berber route, or even 
that by way of Kassala, would have had many advantages. 
Above all, the river route held out the prospect of effective 
help from gunboats in the final attacks on Berber, Om- 
durman, and Khartum. Seeing, however, that the greater 
part of the river's course between. Sarras and Dongola was 
broken up by rapids, the railway and the camel had at 
first to perform nearly the whole of the transport duties 
for which the Nile was there unsuited. The work of re- 
pairing the railway from Wady Haifa to Sarras, and thence- 
forth of constructing it through rocky wastes, amidst 
constant risk of Dervish raids, called into play every 
faculty of ingenuity, patience, and hardihood. But little 
by little the line crept on; the locomotives carried the 
piles of food, stores, and ammunition further and further 
south, until on June 6, 1897, the first blow was dealt by 
the surprise and destruction of the Dervish force at Ferket. 
> Sudan Campaign, 1896-97, by "An Officer," p. 20. 



2o6 The European Nations 

There a halt was called ; for news came in that an unpre- 
cedented rain storm further north had washed away the 
railway embankments from some of the gulleys. To make 
good the damage would take thirty days, it was said. 
The Sirdar declared that the line must be ready in twelve 
days; he went back to push on the work; in twelve days 
the line was ready. As an example of the varied difficul- 
ties that were met and overcome, we may mention one. 
The work of putting together a steamer, which had been 
brought up in sections, was stopped because an all-im- 
portant nut had been lost in transit. At once the Sirdar 
ordered horsemen to patrol the railway line — and the nut 
was found. At last the vessel was ready; but on her trial 
trip she burst a cylinder and had to be left behind.^ Three 
small steamers and four gunboats were, however, available 
for service in the middle of September, when the expedition 
moved on. 

By this time the effective force numbered about 12,000 
men. The Dervishes had little heart for fighting to the 
north of Dongola; and even at that town, they made 
but a poor stand, cowed as they were by the shells of 
the steamers and perplexed by the enveloping moves 
which the Sirdar ordered; seven hundred were taken in 
Dongola, and the best three hundred of these were in- 
corporated in the Sirdar's Sudanese regiments (September 
23, 1896). 

Thus ended the first part of the expedition. Events 
had justified Gordon's statement that a small well-equipped 
expedition could speedily overthrow the Mahdi — that is, 
in the days of his comparative weakness before the cap- 
ture of Khartum. The ease with which Dongola had been 

' Sudan Campaign, p. 54. 



The Conquest of the Sudan 207 

taken and the comparative cheapness of the expedition 
predisposed the Egyptian Government and the EngHsh 
pubUc to view its extension southwards with less of 
disfavour. 

Again the new stride forward had to be prepared for by 
careful preparations at the base. The question of route 
also caused delay. It proved to be desirable to begin a 
new railway from Wady Haifa across the desert to Abu 
Hamed, at the northern tip of the deep bend which the 
Nile makes below Berber. To drive a line into a desert 
in order to attack an enemy holding a good position beyond 
seemed a piece of foolhardiness. Nevertheless it was done, 
and at the average rate of about one and a quarter miles a 
day. In due course General Hunter pushed on and cap- 
tured Abu Hamed, the inhabitants of which showed little 
fight, being thoroughly weary of Dervish tyranny (August 
6, 1897). 

The arrival of gimboats after a long struggle with the 
rapids below Abu Hamed gave Hunter's little force a 
much-needed support; and before he could advance fur- 
ther, news reached him that the Dervishes had abandoned 
Berber. This step caused general surprise, and it has 
never been fully explained. Some have averred that a 
panic seized the wives of the Dervish garrison at Berber, 
and that when they rushed out of the town southwards 
their hubsands followed them.^ Certain it is that family 
feelings, which the Dervishes so readily outraged in others, 
played a leading part in many of their movements. What- 
ever the cause may have been, the abandonment of Berber 
greatly facilitated the work of Sir Herbert Kitchener. A 
strong force soon mustered at that town, and the route to 

1 The Downfall of the Dervishes, by E. N. Bennett, M.A., p. 23. 



2o8 The European Nations 

the Red Sea was reopened by a friendly arrangement with 
the local sheikhs. 

The next important barrier to the advance was the 
river Atbara. Here the Dervishes had a force some 
eighteen thousand strong; but before long the Sirdar re- 
ceived timely reinforcements of a British brigade, con- 
sisting of the Cameron and Seaforth Highlanders and the 
Lincolnshire and Warwickshire regiments, under General 
Gatacre. Various considerations led the Sirdar to wait 
until he could strike a telling blow. What was most to be 
dreaded was the adoption of Parthian tactics by the 
enemy. Fortunately they had constructed a zariba (a 
camp surrounded by thorn-bushes) on the north bank of 
the Atbara at a point twenty miles above its confluence 
with the Nile. At last, on April 7, 1898, after trying to 
tempt the enemy to a battle in the open, the Sirdar moved 
forward his 14,000 men in the hope of rushing the position 
soon after dawn of the following day, Good Friday. 

Before the first streaks of sunrise tinged the east, the 
assailants moved forward to a ridge overlooking the Der- 
vish position; but very few heads were seen above the 
thorny rampart in the hollow opposite. It was judged to 
be too risky at once to charge a superior force that clung 
to so strong a shelter, and for an hour and a half the British 
and Egyptian guns plied the zariba in the hope of bringing 
the fanatics out to fight. Still they kept quiet; and their 
fortitude during this time of carnage bore witness to their 
bravery and discipline.^ 

At 7.45 the Sirdar ordered the advance. The British 
brigade held the left wing, the Camerons leading in line 

> The Egyptian Sudan: its Loss and Recovery, by H. S. L. Alford 
and W. D. Sword, ch. iv. 



The Conquest of the Sudan 209 

formation, while behind them in columns were ranged the 
Warwicks, Seaforths, and Lincolns, to add weight to the 
onset. Macdonald's and Maxwell's Egyptian and Sudan- 
ese brigades, drawn up in lines, formed the centre and 
right. Squadrons of Egyptian horse and a battery of 
Maxims confronted the Dervish horsemen ranged along 
the front of a dense scrub to the left of the zariba. 
As the converging lines advanced, they were met by a 
terrific discharge; fortunately it was aimed too high, or 
the loss would have been fearful. Then the Highlanders 
and Sudanese rushed in, tore apart the thorn bushes, and 
began a fierce fight at close quarters. From their shelter 
trenches, pits, and huts the Dervishes poured in spas- 
modic volleys, or rushed at their assailants with spear or 
bayonet. Even at this the fanatics of the desert were no 
match for the seasoned troops of the Sirdar; and soon 
the beaten remnant streamed out through the scrub or 
over the dry bed of the Atbara. About 2500 were killed, 
and 2000, including Mahmud, the commander, were taken 
prisoners. Those who attempted to reach the fertile coun- 
try round Kassala were there hunted down or captured 
by the Egyptian garrison that lately had arrived there. 

As on previous occasions, the Sirdar now waited some 
time until the railway could be brought up to the points 
lately conquered. More gunboats were also constructed 
for the final stage of the expedition. The dash at Om- 
durman and Khartum promised to tax to the uttermost 
the strength of the army; but another brigade of British 
troops, commanded by Colonel Lyttelton, soon joined the 
expedition, bringing its effective strength up to 23,000 
men. General Gatacre received the command of the 
British division. Ten gunboats, five transport steamers, 

VOL. II. — 14. 



2IO The European Nations 

and eight barges promised to secure complete command of 
the river banks and to provide means for transporting 
the army and all needful stores to the western bank of the 
Nile wherever the Sirdar judged it to be advisable. The 
mid-summer rains in the equatorial districts now made 
their influence felt, and in the middle of August the Nile 
covered the sandbanks and rocks that made navigation 
dangerous at the time of "low Nile." In the last week of 
that month all was ready for the long and carefully pre- 
pared advance. The infantry travelled in steamers or 
barges as far as the foot of the Shabluka, or Sixth Cataract, 
and this method of advance left the Dervishes in some 
doubt by which bank the final advance would be made. 

By an unexpected piece of good fortune the Dervishes 
had evacuated the rocky heights of the Shabluka gorge. 
This was matter for rejoicing. There the Nile, which 
above and below is a mile wide, narrows to a channel of 
little more than a hundred yards in width. It is the 
natural defence of Khartum on the north. The strategy 
of the Khalifa was here again inexplicable, as also was his 
abandonment of the ridge at Kerreri, some seven miles 
north of Omdurman. Mr. Bennett Burleigh in his account 
of the campaign states that the Khalifa had repaired 
thither once a year to give thanks for the triumph about 
to be gained there. 

At last, on September ist, on topping the Kerreri ridge, 
the invaders caught their first glimpse of Omdurman. 
Already the gunboats were steaming up to the Mahdist 
capital to throw in their first shells. They speedily dis- 
mounted several guns, and one of the shells tore away a 
large portion of the gaudy cupola that covered the Mahdi's 
tomb. Apart from this portent, nothing of moment was 



The Conquest of the Sudan 211 

done on that day; but it seems probable that the bom- 
bardment led the Khalifa to hazard an attack on the in- 
vaders in the desert on the side away from the Nile. 
Nearer to the Sirdar's main force the skirmishing of the 
2ist Lancers, new to war but eager to "win their spurs," 
was answered by angry but impotent charges of the 
Khalifa's horse and foot, until at sunset both sides retired 
for the night's rest. 

The Anglo- Egyptian force made a zariba around the 
village of el-Gennuaia on the river bank; and there, in full 
expectation of a night attack, they sought what slumber 
was to be had. What with a panic rush of Sudanese 
servants and the stampede of an angry camel, the night 
wore away uneasily; but there was no charge of Dervishes 
such as might have carried death to the heart of that small 
zariba. It is said that the Sirdar had passed the hint to 
some trusty spies to pretend to be deserters and warn the 
enemy that he was going to attack them by night. If this 
be so, spies have never done better service. 

When the first glimmer of dawn came on September 2nd, 
every man felt instinctively that the Khalifa had thrown 
away his last chance. Yet few were prepared for the 
crowning act of madness. Every one feared that he 
would hold fast to Omdurman and fight the new crusaders 
from house to house. Possibly the seeming weakness of 
the zariba tempted him to a concentric attack from the 
Kerreri Hills and the ridge which stretches on both sides of 
the steep slopes of the hill Gebel Surgham. A glance at 
the plan on page 213 will show that the position waf 
such as to tempt a confident enemy. The Sirdar also 
manoeuvred so as to bring on an attack. He sent out the 
Egyptian cavalry and camel corps soon after dawn to the 



212 The European Nations 

plain lying between Gebel Surgham and Omdurman to 
lure on the Khalifa's men. 

The device was completely successful. Believing that 
they could catch the horsemen in the rocky ridge alongside 
of Gebel Surgham, the Dervishes came forth from their 
capital in swarms, pressed them hard, and inflicted some 
losses. Retiring in good order, the cavalry drew on the 
eager hordes, imtil about 6.30 a.m. the white glint of their 
gibbehs, or tunics, showed thickly above the tawny slopes 
on either side of Gebel Surgham. On they came in un- 
numbered throngs, until, pressing northwards along the 
sky-line, their lines also topped the Kerreri Hills to the 
north of the zariba. Their aim was obvious: they in- 
tended to surround the invaders, pen them up in their 
zariba, and slaughter them there. To all who did not 
know the value of the central position in war and the power 
of modem weapons, the attack seemed to promise com- 
plete success. The invaders were 1300 miles away from 
Cairo and defeat would mean destruction. 

Religious zeal lent strength to the onset. From the 
converging crescent of the Mahdists a sound as of a dim 
murmur was wafted to the zariba. Little by little it 
deepened to a hoarse roar, as the host surged on, chanting 
the pious invocations that so often had struck terror into 
the Egyptians. Now they heard the threatening din with 
hearts unmoved; nay, with spirits longing for revenge for 
untold wrongs and insults. Thus for some minutes in 
that vast amphitheatre the discipline and calm confidence 
of the West stood quietly facing the fanatic fury of the 
East. Two worlds were there embattled: the world of 
Mohammedanism and the world of Christian civilisation; 
the empire of untutored force and the empire of mind. 



THE FIRST ATTACK OF THE DERVISHES. 



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RESERVE,,^ 



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THE DERVISH ATTACK ON MACDONALB. 



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**<^::;;^ ENEMY 



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A/ -"^ KHALIFA ^->^ 



ENEMYS 

RIGHT ATTACK 



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StomJTords Oeogf- Estai>^,Londort, 
BATTLE OF OMDURMAN 
213 



214 The European Nations 

At last, after some minutes of tense expectancy, the 
cannon opened fire, and speedily gaps were seen in the 
white masses. Yet the crescent never slackened its ad- 
vance, except when groups halted to fire their muskets at 
impossible ranges. Waving their flags and intoning their 
prayers, the Dervishes charged on in utter scorn of death; 
but when their ranks came within range of the musketry 
fire, they went down like swathes of grass under the 
scythe. Then was seen a marvellous sight. When the 
dead were falling their fastest, a band of about 150 Dervish 
horsemen formed near the Khalifa's dark-green standard 
in the centre and rushed across the fire zone, determined 
to snatch at triumph or gain the sensuous joys of the 
Moslem paradise. None of them rode far. 

Only on the north, where the camel corps fell into an 
awkward plight among the rocks of the Kerreri slope, had 
the attack any chance of success; and there the shells of 
one of the six protecting gunboats helped to check the 
assailants. On this side, too, Colonel Broadwood and his 
Egyptian cavalry did excellent service by leading no small 
part of the Dervish left away from the attack on the 
zariba. At the middle of the fiery crescent the assailants 
did some execution by firing from a dip in the ground 
some four hundred yards away; but their attempts to 
rush the intervening space all ended in mere slaughter. 
Not long after eight o'clock the Khalifa, seeing the hope- 
lessness of attempting to cross the zone of fire around 
el-Gennuaia, now thickly strewn with his dead, drew oflF 
the survivors beyond the ridge of Gebel Surgham; and 
those who had followed Broadwood's horse also gave up 
their futile pursuit, and began to muster on the Kerreri 
ridge. 



The Conquest of the Sudan 215 

The Sirdar now sought to force on a fight in the open ; 
and with this aim in view commanded a general advance on 
Omdurman. In order, as it would seem, to keep a fighting 
formation that would impose respect on the bands of 
Dervishes on the Kerreri Hills, he adopted the formation 
known as echelon of brigades from the left. Macdonald's 
Sudanese brigade, which held the northern face of the 
zariba, was therefore compelled to swing round and march 
diagonally towards Gebel Surgham; and, having a longer 
space to cover than the other brigades, it soon fell behind 
them. 

For the present, however, the brunt of the danger fell, 
not on Macdonald, but on the vanguard. The 21st 
Lancers had been sent forward over the ridge between 
Gebel Surgham and the Nile with orders to reconnoitre, 
and, if possible, to head the Dervishes away from their 
city. Throwing out scouts, they rode over the ridge, but 
soon afterwards came upon a steep and therefore concealed 
khor or gulley whence a large body of concealed Dervishes 
poured a sharp fire.^ At once Colonel Martin ordered his 
men to dash at the enemy. Eagerly the troopers obeyed 
the order and jumped their horses down the slope into the 
mass of furious fanatics below; these slashed to pieces 
every one that fell, and viciously sought to hamstring 
the horses from behind. Pushing through the mass, the 
lancers scrambled up the further bank, re-formed, and 
rushed at the groups beyond; after thrusting these aside, 
they betook themselves to less dramatic but more effective 
methods. Dismounting, they opened a rapid and very 
effective fire from their carbines on the throngs that still 

' Some accounts state that the Lancers had no scouts, but "An 
Officer" denies this {Sudan Campaign, 1896-99, p. 198). 



2i6 The European Nations 

clustered in or near the gulley. The charge, though a fine 
display of British pluck, cost the horsemen dear: out of a 
total of 320 men 60 were killed and wounded; 119 horses 
were killed or made useless.^ 

Meanwhile, Macdonald's brigade, consisting of one 
Egyptian and three Sudanese battalions, stood on the 
brink of disaster. The bands from the Kerreri Hills were 
secretly preparing to charge its rear, while masses of the 
Khalifa's main following turned back, rounded the western 
spurs of Gebel Surgham, and threatened to envelop its 
right flank. The Sirdar, on seeing the danger, ordered 
Wauchope's brigade to turn back to the help of Macdonald, 
while Maxwell's Sudanese, swarming up the eastern slopes 
of Gebel Surgham, poured deadly volleys on the Khalifa's 
following. Collinson's division and the camel corps were 
ordered to advance from the neighbourhood of the zariba 
and support Macdonald on that side. Before these dis- 
positions were complete, that sturdy Scotsman and his 
Sudanese felt the full weight of the Khalifa's onset. Ex- 
cited beyond measure, Macdonald's men broke into spas- 
modic firing as the enemy came on; the deployment into 
line was thereby disordered, and it needed all Macdonald's 
power of command to make good the line. His steadiness 
stiffened the defence, and before the potent charm of 
Western discipline the Khalifa's onset died away. 

But now the storm cloud gathering in the rear burst with 
unexpected fury. Masses of men led by the Khalifa's son, 
the Sheikh ed Din, rushed down the Kerreri slopes and 
threatened to overwhelm the brigade. Again there was 

• The general opinion of the army was that the charge of the 
Lancers "was magnificent, but was not war." See G. W. Steevens's 
With Kitchener to Khartum, ch. xxxii. 



The Conquest of the Sudan 21 y 

seen a proof of the ascendency of mind over brute force. 
At once Macdonald ordered the left part of his hne to 
wheel round, keeping the right as pivot, so that the whole 
speedily formed two fronts resembling a capital letter V, 
pointing outwards to the two hostile forces. Those who 
saw the movement v/ondered alike at the masterly resolve, 
the steadiness of execution, and the fanatical bravery 
which threatened to make it all of no avail. On came the 
white swarms of Arabs from the north, until the Sudanese 
firing once more became' wild and ineffective; but, as the 
ammunition of the blacks ran low and they prepared to 
trust to the bayonet, the nearest unit of the British 
division, the Lincolns, doubled up, prolonged Macdonald's 
line to the right, and poured volley upon volley obliquely 
into the surging flood. It slackened, stood still, and 
then slowly ebbed. Macdonald's coolness and the timely 
arrival of the Lincolns undoubtedly averted a serious 
disaster.! 

Meanwhile, the Khalifa's main force had been held in 
check and decimated by the artillery now planted on Gebel 
Surgham and by the fire of the brigades on or near its 
slopes; so that about eleven o'clock the Sirdar's lines 
could everywhere advance. After beating off a desperate 
charge of Baggara horsemen from the west, Macdonald 
unbent his brigade and drove back the sullen hordes of 
ed Din to the western spurs of the Kerreri Hills, where 
they were harassed by Broadwood's horse. All was now 
ended, except at the centre of the Khalifa's force, where a 
faithful band clustered about the dark-green standard of 
their leader and chanted defiance to the infidels till one by 

» See Mr. Winston Churchill's The River War, ii., pp. 160-163, for 
the help given by the Lincolns. 




'SUuifor'<i^ Geocj'r i^^ta2>ULoruU-n.. 



PLAN OF KHARTUM 
2X§ 



The Conquest of the Sudan 219 

one they fell. The chief himself, unworthy object of this 
devotion, fled away on a swift dromedary some time before 
the last group of stalwarts bit the sand. 

Despite the terrible heat and the thirst of his men, 
the Sirdar allowed only a brief rest before he resumed the 
march on Omdurman. Leaving no time for the bulk of the 
Der\'ish survivors to reach their capital, he pushed on at 
the head of Maxwell's brigade, while once more the shells 
of the gunboats spread terror in the city. The news 
brought by a few runaways and the sight of the Khalifa's 
standard carried behind the Egyptian ensign dispelled all 
hopes of resisting the disciplined Sudanese battalions; 
and, in order to clinch matters, the Sirdar with splendid 
courage rode at the head of the brigade to summon the 
city to surrender. Through the clusters of hovels on the 
outskirts he rode on despite the protests of his staff against 
any needless exposure of his life. He rightly counted on 
the effect which such boldness on the part of the chief 
must have on an undecided populace. Fanatics here and 
there fired on the conquerors, but the news of the Khalifa's 
cowardly flight from the city soon decided the wavering 
mass to bow before the inscrutable decrees of Fate, and ask 
for backsheesh from the victors. 

Thus was Omdurman taken. Neufeld, an Austrian tra- 
der, and some Greeks and nuns who had been in captivity 
for several years, were at once set free. It was afterwards 
estimated that- about ten thousand DerA^ishes perished in 
the battle ; very many died of their wounds upon the field 
or were bayoneted owing to their persistence in firing on 
the victors. This episode formed the darkest side of the 
triumph; but it was malignantly magnified by some 
Continental journals into a wholesale slaughter. This is 



2 20 The European Nations 

false. Omdurman will bear comparison with Skobeleff' s 
victory at Denghil Tepe at all points. 

Two days after his triumph the Sirdar ordered a parade 
opposite the ruins of the palace in Khartum where Gordon 
had met his doom. The funeral service held there in 
memory of the dead hero was, perhaps, the most affecting 
scene that this generation has witnessed. Detachments 
of most of the regiments of the rescue force formed a semi- 
circle round the Sirdar; and by his side stood a group of 
war-worn officers, who with him had toiled for years in 
order to see this day. The funeral service was intoned; 
the solemn assembly sang Gordon's favourite hymn, Abide 
with Me, and the Scottish pipes wailed their lament for the 
lost chieftain. Few eyes were un dimmed by tears at the 
close of this service, a slight but affecting reparation for 
the delays and blunders of fourteen years before. Then 
the Union Jack and the Egyptian Crescent flag were 
hoisted and received a salute of twenty-one guns. 

The recovery of the Sudan by Egypt and Great Britain 
was not to pass unchallenged. All along France had 
viewed the reconquest of the valley of the upper Nile with 
ill-concealed jealousy, and some persons have maintained 
that the French Government was not a stranger to designs 
hatched in France for helping the Khalifa.^ Now that 
these questions have been happily buried by the Anglo- 
French agreement of the year 1904, it would be foolish to 
recount all that was said amidst the excitements of the 
year 1898. Some reference must, however, be made to the 
Fashoda incident, which for a short space threatened to 
bring Great Britain and France to an open rupture. 

I See an unsigned article in the Contemporary Review for Decem- 
ber, 1897. 



The Conquest of the Sudan 221 

On September 5th, a steamer, flying the white flag, 
reached Omdurman. The ex-Dervish captain brought the 
news that at Fashoda he had been fired upon by white men 
bearing a strange flag. The Sirdar divined the truth, 
namely, that a French expedition under Major (now 
Colonel) Marchand must have made its way from the 
Congo to the White Nile at Fashoda with the aim of an- 
nexing that district for France. 

Now that the dust of controversy has cleared away, we 
can see facts in their true proportions, especially as the 
work recently pubHshed by M. de Freycinet and the reve- 
lations of Colonel Marchand have thrown more light on the 
affair. Briefly stated, the French case is as follows. Mr. 
Gladstone on May 11, 1885, declared officially that Egypt 
limited her sway to a line drawn through Wady Haifa. 
The authority of the Khedive over the Sudan therefore 
ceased, though this did not imply the cessation of the 
Sultan's suzerainty in those regions. Further, England 
had acted as if the Sudan were no man's land by appro- 
priating the southernmost part in accordance with the 
Anglo-German agreement of July i, 1890; and Uganda 
became a British Protectorate in August, 1894. The 
French protested against this extension of British in- 
fluence over the upper Nile; and we must admit that, in 
regard to international law, they were right. The power 
to will away that district lay with the Sultan, the Khedive's 
claims having practically lapsed. Germany, it is true 
agreed not to contest the annexation of Uganda, but 
France did contest it. 

The Republic also entered a protest against the Anglo- 
Congolese Convention of May 12, 1894, whereby, in return 
for the acquisition of the right bank of the upper Nile, 



22 2 The European Nations 

England ceded to the Congo Free State the left bank.i 
That compact was accordingly withdrawn, and on August 
14, 1894, France secured from the Free State. the recogni- 
tion of her claims to the left bank of the Nile with the ex- 
ception of the Lado district below the Albert Nyanza. 
This action on the part of France implied a desire on her 
part to appropriate these lands, and to contest the British 
claim to the right bank. In regard to law, she was justi- 
fied in so doing; and had she, acting as the mandatory of 
the Sultan, sent an expedition from the Congo to the upper 
Nile, her conduct in proclaiming a Turco-Frankish condo- 
minium would have been unexceptionable. That of Britain 
was open to question, seeing that the English practically 
ignored the Sultan 2 and acted (so far as is known) on their 
own initiative in reversing the policy of abandonment 
officially announced in May, 1885. From the standpoint 
of equity, however, the Khedive had the first claim to the 
territories then given up under stress of circumstances; 
and the Power that helped him to regain the heritage of 
his sires obviously had a strong claim to consideration so 
long as it acted with the full consent of that potentate. 

The British Cabinet, that of Lord Rosebery, frankly pro- 
claimed its determination to champion the claims of the 
Khedive against all comers. Sir Edward Grey declaring 
officially in the debate of March 28, 1895, that the despatch 
of a French expedition to the upper Nile would be "an un- 
friendly act." ^ It is known now, through the revelations 
made by Colonel Marchand in the Matin of June 20, 1905, 
that in June, 1895, he had pressed the French Government 

1 Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 2 (1898), pp. 13-14- 

2 The Earl of Kimberley's reply of August 14, 1894, to M. Hano- 
taux, is very weak on this topic. Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 2 
(1898), pp. 14-15. ' Ibtd., p. 18. 



The Conquest of the Sudan 223 

to intervene in that quarter; but it did little, relying (so 
M. de Freycinet states) on the compact of August 14, 1894, 
and not, apparently, on any mandate from the Sultan. 
If so, it had less right to intervene than the British Govern- 
ment had in virtue of its close connection with the Khedive. 
As a matter of fact, both Powers lacked an authoritative 
mandate and acted in accordance with their own interests. 
It is therefore futile to appeal to law, as M. de Freycinet 
has done. 

It remained to see which of the two would act the more 
efficiently. M. Marchand states that his plan of action was 
approved by the French Minister for the Colonies, M. Ber- 
thelot, on November 16, 1895; t>ut little came of it until 
the news of the preparations for the Anglo- Egyptian ex- 
pedition reached Paris. It would be interesting to hear 
what Lord Rosebery and Sir Edward Grey would say to 
this. For the present we may affirm with some confidence 
that the tidings of the Franco-Congolese compact of August, 
1894, and of expeditions sent under Monteil and Liotard 
towards the Nile basin must have furnished the real motive 
for the despatch of the Sirdar's army on the expedition to 
Dongola. That event in its turn aroused angry feelings at 
Paris, and M. Berthelot went so far as to inform Lord 
Salisbury that he would not hold himself responsible for 
events that might occur if the expedition .p the Nile were 
persisted in. After giving this brusque but useful warning 
of the importance which France attached to the upper 
Nile, M. Berthelot quitted office, and M. Bourgeois, the 
Prime Minister, took the portfolio for foreign affairs. He 
pushed on the Marchand expedition; so also did his suc- 
cessor, M. Hanotaux, in the Meline Cabinet which speedily 
supervened. 



224 The European Nations 

Marchand left Marseilles on June 25, 1896, to join his 
expeditionary force, then being prepared in the French 
Congo. It is needless to detail the struggles of the gallant 
band. After battling for two years with the rapids, 
swamps, forests, and mountains of Eastern Congoland and 
the Bahr-el-Ghazal, he brought his flotilla down to the 
White Nile, thence up its course to Fashoda, where he 
hoisted the tricolour (July 12, 1898). His men strengthened 
the old Egyptian fort, and beat ofE an attack of the 
Dervishes. 

Nevertheless they had only half succeeded, for they relisd 
on the approach of a French mission from the east by way 
of Abyssinia. A prince of the House of Orleans had been 
working 'hard to this end, but owing to the hostility of the 
natives of Southern Abyssinia that expedition had to fall 
back on Kukong. A Russian officer. Colonel Artomoroff, 
had struggled on down the river Sobat, but he and his band 
also had to retire.^ The purport of these Franco-Russian 
designs is not yet known; but even so, we can see that the 
situation was one of great peril. Had the French and 
Russian officers from Abyssinia joined hands with Mar- 
chand at Fashoda, their Governments might have made 
it a point of honour to remain, and to claim for France a 
belt of territory extending from the confines of the French 
Congo eastwards to Obock on the Red Sea. 

As it was, Marchand and his heroic little band were in 

much danger from the Dervishes when the Sirdar and his 

force steamed up to Fashoda. The interview between the 

two chiefs at that place was of historic interest. Sir Her- 

» Marchand I'Africain, by C. Castellani, pp. 279-280. The au- 
thor reveals his malice by the statement (p. 293) that the Sirdar, 
after the battle of Omdurman, ordered 14,000 Dervish wounded to 
be eventres. 



The Conquest of the Sudan 225 

bert Kitchener congratulated the Major on his triumph- of 
exploration, but claimed that he must plant the flag of the 
Khedive at Fashoda. M. Marchand declared that he 
would hoist it over the village himself "Over the fort, 
Major," replied the Sirdar. "I cannot permit it," ex- 
claimed the Major, " as the French flag is there." A refer- 
ence by the Sirdar to his superiority of force produced no 
effect, the French commander stating that if it were used 
he and his men would die at their posts. He, however, 
requested the Sirdar to let the matter be referred to the 
Government at Paris, to which Sir Herbert assented. 
After exchanging courteous gifts they parted, the Sirdar 
leaving an Egyptian force in the village, and lodging a 
written protest against the presence of the French force. i 
He then proceeded up stream to the Sobat tributary, on 
the banks of which at Nassar he left half of a Sudanese 
battalion to bar the road on that side to geographical ex- 
plorers provided with flags. He then returned to Khartum. 
The sequel is well known. Lord Salisbury's Govern- 
ment behaved with unexpected firmness, asserting that 
the overthrow of the Mahdi brought again under the 
Egyptian flag all the lands which that leader had for a 
time occupied. The claim was not wholly convincing in 
the sphere of logic; but the victory of Omdurman gave it 
force. Clearly, then, whether Major Marchand was an 
emissary of civilisation or a pioneer of French rule, he had 
no locus standi on the Nile. The French Government 
before long gave way and recalled Major Marchand, who 
returned to France by way of Cairo. This tame end to 
what was a heroic struggle to extend French influence 
greatly incensed the Major; and at Cairo he made a speech, 
« Pari. Papers, Egypt, No. 2 (1898), p. 9; No. 3 (1898). pp. 3-4. 

VOL. II. — 15. 



226 The European Nations 

declaring that for the present France was worsted in the 
valley of the Nile, but the day might come when she would 
be supreme. 

It is generally believed that France gave way at this 
juncture partly because her navy was known to be un- 
equal to a conflict with that of Great Britain, but also be- 
cause Franco-German relations were none of the best. 
Or, in the language of the Parisian boulevards: "How do 
we know that while we are fighting the British for the 
Nile valley, Germany will not invade Lorraine?" As to 
the influences emanating from St. Petersburg contra- 
dictory statements have been made. Rumour asserted 
that the Czar sought to moderate the irritation in France 
and to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute; 
and this story won general acceptance. The astonishment 
was therefore great when, in the early part of the Russo- 
Japanese war, the Paris Figaro published documents which 
seemed to prove that he had assured the French Govern- 
ment of his determination to fulfll the terms of the alliance 
if matters came to the sword. 

There we must leave the affair, merely noting that the 
Anglo-French agreement of March, 1899, peaceably ended 
the dispute and placed the whole of the Egyptian Sudan, 
together with the Bahr-el-Ghazal district and the greater 
part of the Libyan Desert, west of Egypt, under the Anglo- 
Egyptian sphere of influence. (See map at the end of 
this volume.) 

The battle of Omdurman therefore ranks with the most 
decisive in modern history, not only in a military sense, but 
also because it extended British influence up the Nile' 
valley as far as Uganda. Had French statesmen and M. 
Marchand achieved their aims, there is little doubt that a 



The Conquest of the Sudan 227 

solid wedge would have been driven through north-central 
Africa from west to east, from the Ubangi province of 
French Congoland to the mouth of the Red Sea. The 
Sirdar's triumph came just in time to thwart this design 
and to place in the hands that administered Egypt the 
control of the waters whence that land draws its life. 
Without crediting the stories that were put forth in the 
French press as to the possibility of France damming up 
the Nile at Fashoda and diverting its floods into the 
Bahr-el-Ghazal district, we may recognise that the control 
of that river by Egypt is a vital necessity, and that the 
nation which helped the Khedive to regain that control 
thereby established one more claim to a close partnership 
in the administration at Cairo. The reasonableness of 
that claim was finally admitted by France in the Anglo- 
French agreement of the year 1904. 

That treaty set the seal, apparently, on a series of efforts 
of a strangely mixed character. The control of bond- 
holders, the ill-advised strivings of Arabi, the armed inter- 
vention undertaken by Sir Beauchamp Seymour and Sir 
Garnet Wolseley, the forlorn hope of Gordon's Mission to 
Khartum, the fanaticism of the Mahdists, the diplomatic 
skill of Lord Cromer, the covert opposition of France and 
the Sultan, and the organising genius of Lord Kitchener — 
such is the medley of influences, ranging from the basest 
up to the noblest of which human nature is capable, that 
served to draw the Government of Great Britain deeper 
and deeper into the meshes of the Egyptian question, until 
the heroism, skill, and stubbornness of a few of her sons 
brought about results which would now astonish those 
who early in the eighties tardily put forth the first timid 
efforts at intervention. 



CHAPTER VII 



THE PARTITION OF AFRICA 



IN the opening up of new lands by European peoples the 
order of events is generally somewhat as follows: 
First come explorers, pioneers, or missionaries. These 
having thrown some light on the character of a land or of 
its people, traders follow in their wake; and in due course 
factories are formed and settlements arise. The ideas of 
the new-comers as to the rights of property and land- 
holding differ so widely from those of the natives, that 
quarrels and strifes frequently ensue. Warships and 
soldiers then appear on the scene; and the end of the old 
order of things is marked by the hoisting of the Union 
Jack, or the French or German tricolour. In the case of 
the expansion of Russia as we have seen, the procedure is 
far otherwise. But Africa has been for the most part ex- 
plored, exploited, and annexed by agencies working from 
the sea and proceeding in the way just outlined. 

The period since the year 1870 has for the most part, 
witnessed the operation of the last and the least romantic 
of these so-called civilising efEorts. The great age of 
African exploration was then drawing to a close. In the 
year 1870 that devoted missionary explorer, David Living- 
stone, was lost to sight for many months owing to his 
earnest longing peacefully to solve the great problem of 
the waterways of Central Africa, and thus open up an easy 
- 228 



The Partition of Africa 229 

path for the suppression of the slave-trade. But when, in 
187 1, Mr. H. M. Stanley, the enterprising correspondent of 
the New York Herald, at -the head of a rescue expedition, met 
the grizzled, fever-stricken veteran near Ujiji and greeted 
him with the words — "Mr. Livingstone, I presume" — the 
age of mystery and picturesqueness vanished away. 

A change in the spirit and methods of exploration 
naturally comes about when the efforts of single indi- 
viduals give place to collective enterprise,^ and that change 
was now rapidly to come over the whole field of African 
exploration. The day of the Mungo Parks and Living- 
stones was passing away, and the day of associations and 
companies was at hand. In 1876, Leopold II., King of 
the Belgians, summoned to Brussels several of the leading 
explorers and geographers in order to confer on the best 
methods of opening up Africa. The specific results of this 
important Conference will be considered in the next 
chapter; but we may here note that, under the auspices 
of the "International Association for the Exploration and 
Civilisation of Africa" then founded, much pioneer work 
was carried out in districts remote from the river Congo. 
The vast continent also yielded up its secrets to travellers 
working their way in from the south and the north, so that 
in the late seventies the white races opened up to view 
vast and populous districts which imaginative charto- 
graphers in other ages had diversified with the Mountains 
of the Moon or with signs of the Zodiac and monstrosities 
of the animal creation. 

1 In saying this I do not underrate the achievements of explorers 
like Stanley, Thomson, Cameron, Schweinfurth, Pogge, Nachti- 
gall, Pinto, de Brazza, Johnston, Wissmann, Holub, Lugard, and 
others ; but apart from the first two, none of them made discoveries 
that can be called epoch-marking. 



2 30 The European Nations 

The last epoch-marking work carried through by an 
individual was accomplished by a Scottish explorer, whose 
achievements almost rivalled those of Livingstone. Joseph 
Thomson, a native of Dumfriesshire, succeeded in 1879 to 
the command of an exploring party which sought to open 
up the country around the lakes of Nyassa and Tangan- 
yika. Four years later on behalf of the Royal Geographi- 
cal Society, he undertook to examine the country behind 
Mombasa which was little better known than when Vasco 
da Gama first touched there. In this journey Thomson 
discovered two snow-capped mountains, Kilimanjaro and 
Kenia, and made known the resources of the country as 
far inland as the Victoria Nyanza. Considering the small 
resources he had at hand, and the cruel and warlike char- 
acter of the Masai people through whom he journeyed, 
this journey was by far the most remarkable and important 
in the annals of exploration during the eighties. Thom- 
son afterwards undertook to open a way from the Benue, 
the great eastern affluent of the Niger, to lake Chad on the 
White Nile. Here again he succeeded beyond all ex- 
pectation, while his tactful management of the natives led 
to political results of the highest importance, as will 
shortly appear. 

These explorations and those of French, German, and 
Portuguese travellers served to bring nearly the whole of 
Africa within the ken of the civilised world, and revealed 
the fact that nearly all parts of tropical Africa had a dis- 
tinct commercial value. 

This discovery, we may point out, is the necessary pre- 
liminary to any great and sustained work of colonisation 
and annexation. Three conditions may be looked on as 
essential to such an effort. First, that new lands should 



The Partition of Africa 231 

be known to be worth the labour of exploitation or settle- 
ment; second, that the older nations should possess 
enough vitality to pour settlers and treasure into them; 
and thirdly, that mechanical appliances should be available 
for the overcoming of natural obstacles. 

Now, a brief glance at the great eras of exploring and 
colonising activity will show that in all these three direc- 
tions the last thirty years have presented advantages 
which are unique in the history of the world. A few words 
will suffice to make good this assertion. The wars which 
constantly devastated the ancient world, and the feeble 
resources in regard to navigation wielded by adventurous 
captains, such as Hanno the Carthaginian, grievously ham- 
pered all the efforts of explorers by sea, while mechanical 
appliances were so weak as to cripple man's efforts at pene- 
trating the interior. The same is true of the mediaeval 
voyagers and travellers. Only the very princes among 
men, Columbus, Magellan, Vasco da Gama, Cabot, Cabral, 
Gilbert, and Raleigh, could have done what they did with 
ships that were mere playthings. Science had to do her 
work of long and patient research before man could hope- 
fully face the mighty forces and malignant influences of 
the tropics. Nor was the advance of knowledge and in- 
vention sufficient by itself to equip man for successful war 
against the ocean, the desert, the forest, and the swamp. 
The political and social development of the older countries 
was equally necessary. In order that thousands of settlers 
should be able and ready to press in where the one great 
leader had shown the way, Europe had to gain something 
like peace and stability. Only thus, when the natural 
surplus of the white races could devote itself to the task 
of peacefully subduing the earth rather than to the hideous 



232 The European Nations 

work of mutual slaughter, could the life-blood of Europe 
be poured forth in fertilising streams into the waste places 
of the other continents. 

The latter half of the eighteenth century promised for a 
brief space to inaugurate such a period of expansive life. 
The close of the Seven Years' War seemed to be the start- 
ing point for a peaceful campaign against the unknown; 
but the efforts of Cook, d'Entrecasteaux, and others then 
had little practical result, owing to the American War of 
Independence, and the great cycle of the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars. These in their turn left Europe 
too exhausted to accomplish much in the way of colonial 
expansion until the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Even then, when the steamship and the locomotive were 
at hand to multiply man's powers, there was, as yet, no 
general wish, except on the part of the more fortunate 
English-speaking peoples, to enter into man's new heritage. 
The problems of Europe had to be settled before the age 
of expansive activity could dawn in its full radiance. As 
has been previously shown, Europe was in an introspective 
mood up to the years 1870-1878. 

Our foregoing studies have shown that the years following 
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, brought about a state 
of political equilibrium which made for peace and stagna- 
tion in Europe; and the natural forces of the Continent, 
cramped by the opposition of equal and powerful forces, 
took the line of least resistance — away from Europe. For 
Russia, the line of least resistance was in Central Asia. 
For all other European States it was the sea, and the new 
lands beyond. 

Furthermore, in that momentous decade the steamship 
and locomotive were constantly gaining in efficiency; 



The Partition of Africa 233 

electricity was entering the arena as a new and mighty 
force ; by this time medical science had so far advanced as 
to screen man from many of the ills of which the tropics 
are profuse; and the repeating rifle multiplied the power 
of the white man in his conflicts with savage peoples. 
When all the advantages of the present generation are 
weighed in the balance against the meagre equipment of 
the earlier discoverers, the nineteenth century has scant 
claim for boasting over the fifteenth. In truth, its great 
achievements in this sphere have been practical and 
political. It has only fulfilled the rich promise of the age 
of the great navigators. Where they could but wonder- 
ingly skirt the fringes of a new world, the moderns have 
won their way to the heart of things and found many an 
Eldorado potentially richer than that which tempted the 
cupidity of Cortes and Pizarro. 

In one respect the European statesmen of the recent 
past tower above their predecessors of the centuries before. 
In the eighteenth century the "'mercantilist" craze for seiz- 
ing new markets and shutting out all possible rivals brought 
about most of the wars that desolated Europe. In the 
years 1 880-1 8go the great Powers put forth sustained and 
successful efforts to avert the like calamity, and to cloak 
with the mantle of diplomacy the eager scrambles for the 
unclaimed lands of the world. 

For various reasons the attention of statesmen turned 
almost solely on Africa. Central and South America were 
divided among States that were nominally civilised and 
enjoyed the protection of the Monroe Doctrine put forward 
by the United States. Australia was wholly British. In 
Asia the weakness of China was but dimly surmised; and 
Siam and Cochin China alone offered any field for settle- 



234 The European Nations 

ment or conquest by European peoples from the sea. In 
Polynesia several groups of islands were still unclaimed; 
but these could not appease the land-hunger of Europe. 
Africa alone provided void spaces proportionate to the 
needs and ambitions of the white man. The opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869 served to bring the east coast of 
that continent within easy reach of Europe; and the dis- 
coveries on the upper Nile, Congo, and Niger opened a 
way into other large parts. Thus, by the year 1880, every- 
thing favoured the "partition of Africa." 

Rumour, in the guise of hints given by communicative 
young attaches or "well-informed" correspondents, as- 
cribes the first beginnings of the plans for the partition of 
Africa to the informal conversations of statesmen at the 
time of the Congress of Berlin (1878). Just as an architect 
safeguards his creation by providing a lightning-con- 
ductor, so the builder of the German Empire sought to 
divert from that fabric the revengeful storms that might 
be expected from the south-west. Other statesmen were 
no less anxious than Bismarck to draw away the attention 
of rivals from their own political preserves by pointing the 
way to more desirable waste domains. In short, the 
statesmen of Europe sought to plant in Africa the light- 
ning-conductors that would safeguard the new arrange- 
ments in Europe, including that of Cyprus. The German 
and British Governments are known then to have passed 
on hints to that of France as to the desirability of her ap- 
propriating Tunis. The Republic entered into the schemes, 
with results which have already been considered (Vol. II., 
Chapter I.); and, as a sequel to the occupation of Tunis, 
plans were set on foot for the eventual conquest of the 
whole of the north-west of Africa (except Morocco and a 



The Partition of Africa 235 

few British, Spanish, and Portuguese settlements) from 
Cape Bon to Cape Verde and thence nearly to the mouth 
of the river Niger. We may also note that in and after 
1883 France matured her schemes for the conquest of part, 
and ultimately the whole, of Madagascar, a project which 
reached completion in the year 1885.1 

The military occupation of Egypt by Great Britain in 
1882 also served to quicken the interest of European 
Powers in Africa. It has been surmised that British 
acquiescence in French supremacy in Tunis, West Africa, 
and Madagascar had some connection with the events that 
transpired in Egypt, and that the perpetuation of British 
supremacy in the valley of the Nile was virtually bought 
by the surrender of most of the English political and trad- 
ing interests in these lands, the lapse of which under the 
French "protective" regime caused much heart-burning in 
commercial circles. 

Last among the special causes that concentrated at- 
tention on Africa was the activity of King Leopold's As- 
sociation at Brussels in opening up the Congo district in 
the years 187 9- 1882. Everything therefore tended to 
make the ownership of tropical Africa the most complex 
question of the early part of the eighties. 

For various reasons Germany was a little -later than 
France and England in entering the field. The hostility 
of France on the west, and, after 1878, that of Russia on 
the east, made it inadvisable for the new Empire to give 
hostages to Fortune, in the shape of colonies, until by 
alliances it secured its position at home and possessed a 
fleet strong enough to defend distant possessions. In some 

• For the French treaty of December 17, 1885, with Madagascar 
see Pari. Papers, Africa, No. 2 (i< 



236 The European Nations 

measure the German Government had to curb the eager- 
ness of its "colonial party." The present writer was in 
Germany in the year 1879, when the colonial propaganda 
was being pushed forward, and noted the eagerness in 
some quarters, and the distrust in others, with which pam- 
phlets like that of Herr Fabri, Bedarf Deutschland Colonien? 
were received. Bismarck himself at first checked the 
"colonials," until he felt sure of the European situation. 
That, however, was cleared up to some extent by the in- 
clusion of Italy in the compact which thus became the 
Triple Alliance (May, 1882), and by the advent to office 
of the pacific Chancellor de Giers at St. Petersburg a little 
later. There was therefore the less need officially to curb the 
colonising instinct of the Teutonic people. The formation 
of the German Colonial Society at Frankfurt in Decem- 
ber, 1882, and the immense success attending its propa- 
ganda, spurred on the statesmen of Berlin to take action. 
They looked longingly (as they still do) towards Brazil, 
in whose southern districts their people had settled in 
large numbers ; but over all that land the Monroe Doctrine 
spread its sheltering wings. A war with the United States 
would have been madness, and Germany therefore turned 
to Polynesia and Africa. We may note here that in 
1885 she endeavoured to secure the Caroline Islands from 
Spain, whose title to them seemed to have lapsed; but 
Spanish pride flared up at the insult, and after a short 
space Bismarck soothed ruffled feelings at Madrid by ac- 
cepting the mediation of the Pope, who awarded them 
to Spain, Germany, however, gaining the right to occupy 
an islet of the group as a coaling station. 

Africa, however, absorbed nearly all the energy of the 
German colonial party. The forward wing of that party 



The Partition of Africa 237 

early in the year 1884 inaugurated an anti-British cam- 
paign in the Press, which probably had the support of the 
Government. As has been stated in Vol. II., Chapter I., 
that was the time when the Three Emperors' League showed 
signs of renewed vitality; and Bismarck, after signing the 
secret treaty of March 24, 1884 (later on ratified at Skier- 
nevice), felt safe in pressing on colonial designs against 
England in Africa, especially as Russia was known to be 
planning equally threatening moves against the Queen's 
Empire in Asia. We do not know enough of what then 
went on between the German and Russian Chancellors to 
assert that they formed a definite agreement to harry 
British interests in those continents; but, judging from 
the general drift of Bismarck's diplomacy and from the 
"nagging" to which England was thenceforth subjected for 
two years, it seems highly probable that the policy ratified 
at Skiernevice aimj.ed at marking time in European affairs 
and striding onwards in other continents at the expense 
of the Island Power. 

The Anglophobes of the German press at once fell foul 
of everything British ; and that well-known paper the Kol- 
nische ZeiUing, in an article of April 22, 1884, used the 
following words: "Africa is a large pudding which the 
Englisli have prepared for themselves at other people's 
expense, and the crust of which is already fit for eating. 
Let us hope that our sailors will put a few pepper-corns 
into it on the Gmnea coast, so that our friends on the 
Thames may not digest it too rapidly." The sequel will 
show whether the simile correctly describes either the 
state of John Bull's appetite or the easy aloofness of the 
Teutonic onlooker. 

It will be convenient to treat this great and complex 



238 The European Nations 

subject on a topographical basis, and to begin with a 
survey of the affairs of East Africa, especially the districts 
on the mainland north and south of the island of Zanzibar. 
At that important trade centre, the natural starting-point 
then for the vast district of the Great Lakes, the influence 
of British and Indian traders had been paramount; and 
for many years the Sultan of Zanzibar had been "under 
the direct influence of the United Kingdom and of the 
Government of India." ^ Nevertheless, in and after 1880 
German merchants, especially those of Hamburg, pressed 
in with great energy and formed plans for annexing the 
neighbouring territories on the mainland. 

Their energy was in strange contrast to the lethargy 
shown by the British Government in the protection of 
Anglo-Indian trade interests. In the year 1878 the Sultan 
of Zanzibar, who held a large territory on the mainland, 
had offered the control of all the commerce of his dominions 
to Sir W. Mackinnon, Chairman of the British-India Steam 
Navigation Company; but, for some unexplained reason, 
the Eeaconsfield Cabinet declined to be a party to this 
arrangement, which, therefore, fell through. 2 L Despite the 
fact that England and France had in 1862 agreed to recog- 
nise the independence of the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Ger- 
mans deemed the field to be clear, and early in November, 
1884, Dr. Karl Peters and two other enthusiasts of the 
colonial party landed at Zanzibar, disguised as mechanics, 
with the aim of winning new lands for their Fatherland. 
They had with them several blank treaty forms, the hidden 
potency of which was soon to be felt by dusky potentates 
on the mainland. Before long they succeeded in per- 

i Pari. Papers, Africa, No. i (1886), p. 2. 

2 The Partition of Africa, by J. Scott Keltic (1893), pp. 157, 225. 



The Partition of Africa 239 

suading some of these novices in diplomacy to set their 
marks to these documents, an act which converted them 
into subjects of the Kaiser, and speedily secured sixty 
thousand square miles for the German tricolour. It is 
said that the Government of Berlin either had no know- 
ledge of, or disapproved of, these proceedings; and, when 
Earl Granville ventured on some representations respect- 
ing them, he received the reply, dated November 28, 
1884, that the Imperial Government had no design of ob- 
taining a protectorate over Zanzibar. 1 It is difhcult to 
reconcile these statements with the undoubted fact that 
on February 17, 1885, the German Emperor gave his sanc- 
tion to the proceedings of Dr. Peters by extending his 
suzerainty over the signatory chiefs. 2 This event caused 
soreness among British explorers and Indian traders who 
had been the first to open up the country to civilisation. 
Nevertheless, the Gladstone Ministry took no effective 
steps to safeguard their interests. 

In defence of their academic treatment "of this matter 
some considerations of a general nature may be urged. 

The need of colonies felt by Germany was so natural, so 
imperious, that it could not be met by the high and dry 
legal argument as to the priority of Great Britain's com- 
mercial interests. Such an attitude would have involved 
war with Germany about East Africa and war with France 
about West Africa, at the very time when the English 
were on the brink of hostilities with Russia about Merv, 
and were actually fighting the Mahdists behind Suakim. 
The "weary Titan" — to use Matthew Arnold's picturesque 
phrase — was then overburdened. The motto " Live and 
let live " was for the time the most reasonable, provided 

1 Pari. Papers, Africa, No. i (1886), p. i. 2 Ihid., pp. 12-20. 



240 The European Nations 

that it was not interpreted in a weak and maudlin way on 
essential points. 

Many critics, however, maintain that Mr. Gladstone's 
and Lord Granville's diplomatic dealings with Germany 
in the years 1884 and 1885 displayed most lamentable 
weakness, even when Dr. Peters and others were known to 
be working hard at the back of Zanzibar, with the results 
that have been noted. In April, 1885, the Cabinet ordered 
Sir John Kirk, British representative at Zanzibar, and 
founder of the hitherto unchallenged supremacy of his 
nation along that coast, forthwith to undo the work of a 
lifetime by "maintaining friendly relations" with the Ger- 
man authorities at that port. This, of course, implied 
a tacit acknowledgment by Britain of what amounted 
to a German protectorate over the mainland possessions 
of the Sultan. It is not often that a government, in its 
zeal for "live and let live," imposes so humiliating a task 
on a British representative. The Sultan did not take the 
serene and philosophic view of the situation that was held 
at Downing Street, and the advent of a German squadron 
was necessary in order to procure his consent to these 
arrangements (August-December, 1885).! 

The Blue Book dealing with Zanzibar (Africa, No. i, 
1886) by no means solves the riddle of the negotiations 
which went on between London and Berlin early in the 
year 1885. From other sources we know that the most 
ardent of the German colonials were far from satisfied 
with their triumph. Curious details have appeared show- 
ing that their schemes included the laying of a trap for the 
Sultan of Zanzibar, which failed owing to clumsy baiting 
and the loquacity of the would-be captor. Lord Rose- 
» J. Scott Keltie, The Partition of Africa, ch. xv. 



The Partition of Africa 241 

bery also managed, according to German accounts, to get the 
better of Count Herbert Bismarck in respect of St. Lucia 
Bay (see map end Vol. II.), and districts on the Benue 
River; so that this may perhaps be placed over against the 
losses sustained by Britain on the coast opposite Zanzibar. 
Even there, as we have seen, results did not fully correspond 
to the high hopes entertained by the German Chauvinists. ^ 

In the meantime (June, 1885) the Salisbury Cabinet 
came into office for a short time, but the evil effects of the 
slackness of British diplomacy were not yet at an end. 
At this time British merchants, especially those of Man- 
chester, were endeavouring to develop the mountainous 
country around the giant cone of Mt. Kilimanjaro, where 
Mr. (now Sir) Harry Johnston had, in September, 1884, 
secured some trading and other rights with certain chiefs. 
A company had been formed in order to further British 
interests, and this soon became the Imperial British East 
Africa Company, which aspired to territorial control in 
the parts north of those claimed by Dr. Peters's Company. 
A struggle took place between the two companies, the 
German East jVfrica Company laying claim to the Kili- 
manjaro district. Again it proved that the Germans had 
the more effective backing, and, despite objections urged 
by the English Foreign Minister, Lord Rosebery, against 
the proceedings of German agents in that tract, the question 
of ownership was referred to the decision of an Anglo- 
German boundary commission. 

Lord Iddesleigh assumed control of the Foreign Office in 
August, but the advent of the Conservatives to power in no 

' Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, iii., pp. 135, 144-145. 
Pari. Papers, Africa, No. i (1886), pp. 39-45, 61 et seq.; also No. 3 
(1886), pp. 4, 15- 



242 The European Nations 

way helped on the British case. By an agreement between 
the two Powers, dated November i, 1886, the Kihmanjaro 
district was assigned to Germany. From the northern 
spurs of that mountain the dividing hne ran in a north- 
westerly direction towards the Victoria Nyanza. The 
same agreement recognised the authority of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar as extending over the island of that name, those 
of Pemba and Mafia, and over a strip of coastline ten 
nautical miles in width"; but the ownership of the district 
of Vitu north of Mombasa was left open.i (See map end 
Vol. II.) 

On the whole, the skill which dispossessed a sovereign of 
most of his rights, under a plea of diplomatic rearrange- 
ments and the advancement of civilisation, must be pro- 
nounced unrivalled; and Britain cut a sorry figure as the 
weak and unwilling accessory to this act. The only satis- 
factory feature in the whole proceeding was Britain's 
success in leasing from the Sultg-n of Zanzibar administra- 
tive rights over the coast region around Mombasa. The 
gain of that part secured unimpeded access from the coast 
to the northern half of Lake Victoria Nyanza. The Ger- 
man Company secured similar rights over the coastline of 
their district, and in 1890 bought it outright. By an 
agreement of December, 1896, the river Rovuma was 
recognised by Germany and Portugal as the boundary of 
their East African possessions. 

The lofty hopes once entertained by the Germans as to 
the productiveness of their part of East Africa have been 
but partially realised. ^ Harsh treatment of the natives 

1 Banning, op. cit., pp. 45-50; Pari. Papers, Africa, No. 3 (1887), 
pp. 46, 59. 

2 See the Report on German East Africa for 1900, in the EngHsh 
Diplomatic and Consular Reports. 



The Partition of Africa 243 

brought about a formidable revolt in 1888-89. The need 
of British co-operation in the crushing of this revolt served 
to bring Germany to a more friendly attitude towards 
England. Probably the resignation, or rather the dis- 
missal of Bismarck by the present Emperor, in March, 
1890, also tended to lessen the friction between England 
and Germany. The Prince while in retirement expressed 
strong disapproval of the East African policy of his suc- 
cessor, Count Caprivi. 

A more conciliatory spirit found expression in the 
Anglo -German agreement of July i, 1890, which delim- 
ited the districts claimed by the two nations around the 
Victoria Nyanza in a sense favourable to Great Britain 
and disappointing to that indefatigable treaty-maker Dr. 
Peters. It acknowledged British claims to the northern 
half of the shores and waters of that great lake and to the 
valley of the upper Nile, as also to the coast of the Indian 
Ocean about Vitu and thence northwards to Kismayu. 

On the other hand, Germany acquired the land north of 
Lake Nyassa, where British interests had been paramount. 
The same agreement applied both to the British and Ger- 
man lands in question the principle of free or unrestricted 
transit of goods, as also between the Great Lakes. Germany 
further recognised a British Protectorate over the islands 
held by the Sultan of Zanzibar, reserving certain rights for 
German commerce in the case of the Island of Mafia. 
Finally, Great Britain ceded to Germany the Island of 
Heligoland in the North Sea. On both sides of the North 
Sea the compact aroused a storm of hostile comment, 
which perhaps served to emphasise its fairness. ^ Bis- 
marck's opinion deserves quotation: 

iParl. Papers, Africa, No. 6 (1890). 



244 The European Nations 

"Zanzibar ought not to have been left to the English. 
It would have been better to maintain the old arrange- 
ment. We could then have had it at some later time when 
England required our good offices against France or Russia. 
In the meantime our merchants, who are cleverer, and, 
like the Jews, are satisfied with smaller profits, would have 
kept the upper hand in business. To regard Heligoland as 
an equivalent shows more imagination than sound calcula- 
tion. In the event of war it would be better for us that it 
should be in the hands of a neutral Power. It is difficult 
and most expensive to fortify." i 

The passage is instructive as showing the aim of Bis- 
marck's colonial policy, namely, to wait until England's 
difficulties were acute (or perhaps to augment those diffi- 
culties, as he certainly did by furthering Russian schemes 
against Afghanistan in 1884-852), and then to apply re- 
morseless pressure at all points where the colonial or com- 
mercial interests of the two countries clashed. 

The more his policy is known, the more dangerous to 
England it is seen to have been, especially in the years 
1884-86. In fact, those persons who declaim against 
German colonial ambitions of to-day may be asked to re- 
member that the extra- European questions recently at 
issue between Great Britain and Germany are trivial when 
compared with the momentous problems that were peace- 
fully solved by the agreement of the year 1890. Of what 
importance are Samoa, Kiao-chow, and the problem of 
Morocco, compared with the questions of access to the 
great lakes of Africa and the control of the lower Niger? 

'Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, iii., p. 353. See, 
too, S. Whitman, Personal Reminiscences of Prince Bismarck, p. 122. 

^Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, iii., pp. 124, 133; 
also see pp. 192 of this work. 



The Partition of Africa 245 

It would be unfair to Wilhelm II., as also to the Salisbury- 
Cabinet, not to recognise the statesmanlike qualities which 
led to the agreement of July i, i8g,o — one of the most solid 
gains peacefully achieved for the cause of civilisation 
throughout the nineteenth century^ 

Among its many benefits may be reckoned the virtual 
settlement of long and tangled disputes for supremacy in 
Uganda. We have no space in which to detail the rivalries 
of French and British missionaries and agents at the Court 
of King M'tesa and his successor M'wanga, or the futile 
attempt of Dr. Peters to thrust in German influence. 
Even the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 did not end 
the perplexities of the situation; for, though the British 
East Africa Company (to which a charter had been granted 
in 1888) thenceforth had the chief influence on the northern 
shores of Victoria Nyanza, the British Government de- 
clined to assume any direct responsibility for so inaccessible 
a district. Thanks, however, to the activity and tact of 
Captain Lugard, difficulties were cleared away, with the 
result that the large and fertile territory of Uganda (for- 
merly included in the Khedive's dominions) became a 
British Protectorate in August, 1894 (see Chapter VI.). 

The significance of the events just described will be 
apparent when it is remembered that British East Africa, 
inclusive of Uganda and the upper Nile basin, comprises 
altogether 670,000 square miles, to a large extent fertile, 
and capable of settlement by white men in the more ele- 
vated tracts of the interior. German East Africa contains 
385,000 square miles, and is also destined to have a future 
that will dwarf that of many of the secondary States of 
to-day. 

The prosperity of British East Africa was greatly en- 



246 The European Nations 

hanced by the opening of a railway, 580 miles long, from 
Mombasa to Victoria Nyanza in 1902. Among other bene- 
fits, it has cut the ground from under the slave-trade, which 
used to depend on the human beast of burden for the 
carriage of all heavy loads. ^ 

The Anglo-German agreement of 1890 also cleared up 
certain questions between Britain and Germany relating 
to South-West Africa which had made bad blood between 
the two countries. In and after 'the year 1882 the atten- 
tion of the colonial party in Germany was turned to the 
district north of the Orange River, and in the spring of the 
year 1883 Herr Liideritz founded a factory and hoisted 
the German flag at Angra Pequefia. There are grounds for 
thinking that that district was coveted, not so much for its 
intrinsic value, which is slight, as because it premised to 
open up communications with the Boer Republics. Lord 
Granville ventured to express his doubts on that subject 
to Count Herbert Bismarck, whom the Chancellor had 
sent to London in the summer of 1884 in order to take 
matters out of the hands of the too Anglophobe ambassador, 
Count Miinster. Anxious to show his mettle, young Bis- 
marck fired up, and informed Lord Granville that his 
question was one of mere curiosity; later on he informed 
him that it was a matter which did not concern him. 2 

It must be admitted, however, that the British Govern- 
ment had acted in a dilatory and ineffective manner. Sir 
Donald Currie had introduced a deputation to Lord Derby, 

I For the progress and prospects of this important colony, see 
Sir G. Portal, The British Mission to Uganda in iSpj; Sir Charles 
Elliot, British East Africa (1905); also Lugard, Our East African 
Empire; Sir H. Johnston. The Uganda Protectorate. 

^ Bismarck: Some Secre. '''ages o^ his History, iii., p. 120. 



The Partition of Africa 247 

Colonial Minister in the Gladstone Cabinet, which warned 
him seriously as to German aims on the coast of Damara- 
land; in reply to which that phlegmatic Minister stated 
that Germany was not a colonising Power, and that the 
annexation of those districts would be resented by Great 
Britain as an "unfriendly act." ^ In November, 1883, 
the German amibassador inquired whether British pro- 
tection would be accorded to a few German settlers on the 
coast of Damaraland. No decisive answer was given, 
though the existence of British interests there was affirmed. 
Then, when Germany claimed the right to annex it, a 
counter-claim was urged from Whitehall (probably at the 
instigation of the Cape Government) that the land in 
question was a subject of close interest to England, as it 
might be annexed in the future. It was against this belated 
and illogical plea that Count Bismarck was sent to lodge a 
protest; and in August, 1884, Germany clinched the matter 
by declaring Angra Pequefia and' surrounding districts to 
be German territory. (See note at the end of the chapter.) 
In this connection we may remark that Angra Pequena 
had recently figured as a British settlement on German 
maps, including that of Stieler of the year 1882. Walfisch 
Bay, farther to the north, was left to the Union Jack, that 
flag having been hoisted there by official sanction in 1878 
owing to the urgent representations of Sir Bartle Frere, 
the Governor of Cape Colony. The rest of the coast was 
left to Germany ; the Gladstone Government informed that 
of Berlin that no objection would be taken to her occupa- 
tion of that territory. Great annoyance was felt at the 

> See Sir D. Currie's paper on South Africa to the members of 
the Royal Colonial Institute, April 10, 1888 {Proceedings, xix., p. 
240). 



248 The European Nations 

Cape at what was looked on as an uncalled-for surrender 
of British claims, especially when the Home Government 
failed to secure just treatment for the British settlers. 
Sir Charles Dilke states in his Problems of Greater Britain 
that only the constant protests of the Cape Ministry pre- 
vented the authorities at Whitehall from complying with 
German unceasing requests for the cession of Walfisch Bay, 
doubtless as an item for exchange during the negotiations 
of 1889-90.1 

We may add here that in 1886 Germany defined the 
northern limits of "South- West Africa" — such was the 
name of the new colony — by an agreement with Portugal ; 
and in 1890 an article of the Anglo-German agreement 
above referred to gave an eastward extension of that 
northern border which brought it to the banks of the river 
Zambesi. 

The British Government took a firmer stand in a matter 
that closely concerned the welfare of Natal and the rela- 
tions of the Transvaal Republic to Germany. In 1884 
some German prospectors sought to gain a footing in St. 
Lucia Bay in Zululand and to hoist the German flag. The 
full truth on this interesting matter is not yet known; it 
formed a pendant to the larger question of Delagoa Bay, 
which must be briefly noticed here. 

Friction had arisen between Great Britain and Portugal 
over conflicting claims respecting Delagoa Bay and its ad- 
joining lands; and in this connection it may be of interest 
to note that the Disraeli Ministry had earlier missed an 
opportunity of buying out Portuguese claims. The late 
Lord Carnarvon stated that, when he took the portfolio for 
colonial affairs in that Ministry, he believed the purchase 
' Op. cit., i., p. 502. 



The Partition of Africa 249 

might have been effected for a comparatively small sum. 
Probably the authorities at Lisbon were aroused to a sense 
of the potential value of their Laurenjo Marquez domain 
by the scramble for Africa which began early in the eighties ; 
and it must be regretted that the British Government, with 
the lack of foresight which has so often characterised it, 
let slip the opportunity of securing Delagoa Bay until its 
value was greatly enhanced. It then agreed to refer the 
questions in dispute to the arbitration of General Mac- 
Mahon, President of the French Republic (1875). As has 
generally happened when foreign potentates have adjudi- 
cated on British interests, his verdict was wholly hostile 
to England. It even assigned to Portugal a large district 
to the south of Delagoa Bay which the Portuguese had 
never thought of claiming from its native inhabitants, the 
Tongas.^ In fact, a narrative of all the gains which have 
accrued to Portugal in Delagoa Bay, and thereafter to the 
people who controlled its railway to Pretoria, would throw 
a sinister light on the connection that has too often sub- 
sisted between the noble theory of arbitration and the 
profitable practice of peacefully willing away, or appro- 
priating, the rights and possessions of others. Portugal 
soon proved to be unable to avail herself of the oppor- 
tunities opened up by the gift unexpectedly awarded her 
by MacMahon. She was unable to control either the 
Tongas or the Boers. 

England having been ruled out, there was the chance for 
some other Power to step in and acquire St. Lucia Bay, one 
of the natural outlets of the southern part of the Transvaal 
Republic. It is an open secret that the forerunners of the 
"colonial party" in Germany had already sought to open 
» Sir C. Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain, i., pp. 553-556. 



250 The European Nations 

up closer relations with the Boer Republics. In 1876 the 
President of the Transvaal, accompanied by a Dutch mem- 
ber of the Cape Parliament, visited Berlin, probably with 
the view of reciprocating those advances. They had an 
interview with Bismarck, the details of which are not fully 
known. Nothing however, came of it at the time, owing 
to Bismarck's preoccupation in European affairs. Early 
in the eighties, the German colonial party, then begin- 
ning its campaign, called attention repeatedly to the ad- 
vantages of gaining a foothold in or near Delagoa Bay; 
but the rise of colonial feeling in Germany led to a similar 
development in the public sentiment of Portugal, and in- 
deed of all lands; so that, by the time that Bismarck was 
won over to the cause of Teutonic expansion, the Portu- 
guese refused to barter away any of their ancient posses- 
sions. This probably accounts for the concentration of 
German energies on other parts of the South African coast, 
which, though less valuable in themselves, might serve as 
points d'appui for German political agents and merchants 
in their future dealings with the Boers, who were then 
striving to gain control over Bechuanaland. The points 
selected by the Germans for their action were on the coast 
of Damaraland, as already stated, and St. Lucia Bay in 
Zululand, a position which President Burgers had striven 
to secure for the Transvaal in 1878. 

In reference to St. Lucia Bay our narrative must be 
shadowy in outline owing to the almost complete secrecy 
with which the German Government wisely shrouds a 
failure. The officials and newspaper writers of Germany 
have not yet contracted the English habit of proclaiming 
their intentions beforehand and of parading before the 
world their recriminations in case of a fiasco. All that can 



The Partition of Africa 251 

be said, then, with certainty is that in the autumn of 1884 
a German trader named Einwold attempted to gain a 
footing in St. Lucia Bay and to prepare the way for the 
recognition of German claims if all went well. In fact, he 
could either be greeted as a Mehrer des Reichs, or be dis- 
owned as an unauthorised busybody. 

We may here cite passages from the Diary of Dr. Busch, 
Bismarck's secretary, which prove that the State took a 
livel}/ interest in Einwold's adventure. On February 25, 
1885, Busch had a conversation with Herr Andrae, in the 
course of which they "rejoiced at England's difficulties in 
the Sudan, and I expressed the hope that Wolseley's head 
would soon arrive in Cairo, nicely pickled and packed." 
Busch then referred to British friction with Russia in 
Afghanistan and with France in Burmah, and then put the 
question to Andrae, " 'Have we given up South Africa; or 
is the Lucia Bay affair still open?' He said that the 
matter was still under consideration." ^ 

It has since transpired that the British Government . 
might have yielded to pressure from Berlin, had not greater 
pressure been exercised from Natal and from British mer- 
chants and shipowners interested in the South African 
trade. Sir Donald Currie, in the paper already referred to, 
stated that he could easily have given particulars of the 
means which had to be used in order to spur on the British 
Government to decisive action. Unfortunately he was 
discreetly reticent, and merely stated that, not only St. 
Lucia Bay, but the whole of the coast between Natal and 
the Delagoa Bay district was then in question, and that 
the Gladstone Ministry was finally induced to telegraph 
instructions to Cape Town for the despatch of a cruiser to 
1 Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, iii., p. 132. 



252 The European Nations 

assert British claims to St., Lucia Bay. H. M. S. Goshawk 
at once steamed thither, and hoisted the British flag, by 
virtue of a treaty made with a Zulu chief in 1842. Then 
ensued the usual interchange of angry notes between Berlin 
and London; Bismarck and Count Herbert sought to win 
over, or browbeat, Lord Rosebery, then Colonial Minister. 
In this, however, Bismarck failed; and the explanation of 
the failure given to Busch was that Lord Rosebery was too 
clever for him and "quite mesmerised him." On May 7, 
1885, Germany gave up her claims to that important posi- 
tion, in consideration of gaining at the expense of England 
in the Cameroons.^ Here again a passage from Busch 's 
record deserves quotation. In a conversation which he had 
with Bismarck on January 5, 1886, he put the question: 

" 'Why have we not been able to secure the Santa Lucia 
Bay?' I asked. 'Ah!' he replied, 'it is not so valuable as 
it seemed to be at first. People who were pursuing their 
own interests on the spot represented it to be of greater 
importance than it really was. And then the Boers were 
not disposed to take any proper action in the matter. 
The bay would have been valuable to us if the distance 
from the Transvaal were not so great. And the English 
attached so much importance to it that they declared it 
was impossible for them to give it up, and they ultimately 
conceded a great deal to us in New Guinea and Zanzibar. 
In colonial matters we must not take too much in hand at 
a time, and we already have enough for a beginning. We 
must now hold rather with the English, while, as you 
know, we were formerly more on the French side.'^ But, 

1 Pari. Papers, Africa, No. 6 (1885), p. 2. 

2 He here referred to the Franco-German agreement of Decem- 
ber 24, 1885, whereby the two Powers amicably settled the bound- 
aries of their west African lands, and Germany agreed not to 



The Partition of Africa 253 

as the last elections in France show, every one of any im- 
portance there had to make a show of hostility to us.' " 

This passage explains, in part at least, why Bismarck 
gave up the nagging tactics latterly employed towards 
Great Britain. Evidently he had hoped to turn the current 
of thought in France from the Alsace-Lorraine question to 
the lands over the seas, and his henchmen in the Press did 
all in their power to persuade people, both in Germany and 
France, that England was the enemy. The Anglophobe 
agitation was fierce while it lasted; but its artificiality is 
revealed by the passage just quoted. 

We may go further, and say that the more recent out- 
break of Anglophobia in Germany may probably be as- 
cribed to the same official stimulus; and it, too, may be 
expected to cease when the politicians of Berlin see that 
it no longer pays to twist the British lion's tail. That 
sport ceased in and after 1886, because France was found 
still to be the enemy. Frenchmen did not speak much 
about Alsace-Lorraine. They followed Gambetta's ad- 
vice: " Never speak about it, but always think of it." The 
recent French elections revealed that fact to Bismarck 
and, lo! the campaign of calumny against England at once 
slackened. 

We may add that two German traders settled on the 
coast of Pondoland, south of Natal; and in August, 1885, 
the statesman of Berlin put forth feelers to Whitehall with 
a view to a German Protectorate of that coast. They met 
with a decisive repulse. 1 

thwart French designs on Tahiti, the Society Isles, the New Heb- 
rides, etc. See Banning, Le Portage poUtiqtie de I'Afrique, pp. 22-26. 
1 Cape Colony, Papers on Pondoland, 1887, pp. i, 41. For the 
progress of German South- West Africa and East Africa, see Pari. 
Papers, Germany, Nos. 474, 528, 2790. 



2 54 The European Nations 

Meanwhile, the dead-set made by Germany, France, and 
Russia against British interests in the years 1883-85 had 
borne fruit in a way little expected by those Powers, but 
fully consonant with previous experience. It awakened 
British statesmen from their apathy, and led them to 
adopt measures of unwonted vigour. The year 1885 saw 
French plans in Indo-China checked by the annexation of 
Burmah. German designs in South Africa undoubtedly 
quickened the resolve of the Gladstone Ministry to save 
Bechuanaland for the British Empire. 

It is impossible here to launch upon the troublous sea of 
Boer politics, especially as the conflict naturally resulting 
from two irreconcilable sets of ideas outlasted the century 
with which this work is concerned. We can therefore only 
state that filibustering bands of Boers had raided parts 
of Bechuanaland, and seemed about to close the trade- 
route northwards to the Zambesi. This alone would have 
been a serious bar to the prosperity of Cape Colony; but 
the loyalists had lost their confidence in the British Govern- 
ment since the events of 1880, while a large party in the 
Cape Ministry, including at that time Mr. Cecil Rhodes, 
seemed willing to abet the Boers in all their proceedings. 
A Boer deputation went to England in the autumn of 1883, 
and succeeded in cajoling Lord Derby into a very remark- 
able surrender. Among other things, he conceded to them 
an important strip of land west of the Harts River. ^ 

Far from satisfying them, this act encouraged some of 
their more restless spirits to set up two republics named 
Stellaland and Goshen. There, however, they met a tough 
antagonist, John Mackenzie. That devoted missionary, 

' For the negotiations and the Convention of February 27, 1884, 
^e Papers relating to the South African Republic, 1887. 



The Partition of Africa 255 

after long acquaintance with Boers and Bechuanas, saw 
how serious would be the loss to the native tribes and to 
the cause of civilisation if the raiders were allowed to hold 
the routes to the interior. By degrees he aroused the 
sympathy of leading men in the Press, who thereupon 
began to whip up the laggards of Whitehall and Downing 
Street. Consequently, Mackenzie, on his return to South 
Africa, was commissioned to act as British Resident in 
Bechuanaland, and in that capacity he declared that 
country to be under British protection (May, 1884). At 
once the Dutch throughout South Africa raised a hue and 
cry against him, in which Mr. Rhodes joined, with the 
result that he was recalled on July 30th. 

His place was taken by a statesman whose exploits 
raised him to a high place among builders of the Empire. 
However much Cecil Rhodes differed from Mackenzie on 
the native question and other affairs., he came to see the 
urgent need of saving for the Empire the central districts 
which, as an old Boer said, formed "the key to Africa." 
Never were the loyalists more dispirited at the lack of 
energy shown by the Home Government; and never was 
there greater need of firmness. In a sense, however, the 
action of the Germans on the coast of Damaraland (August- 
October, 1884) helped to save the situation. The imperi- 
ous need of keeping open the route to the interior, which 
would be closed to trade if ever the Boers and Germans 
joined hands, spurred on the Gladstone Ministry to sup- 
port the measures proposed by Mr. Rhodes and the loyalists 
of Cape Colony. When the whole truth on that period 
comes to be known, it will probably be found that British 
rule was, in very grave danger in the latter half of the year 
1884, 



256 The European Nations 

Certainly no small expedition ever accomplished so much 
for the Empire, at so trifling a cost and without the effusion 
of blood, as that which was now sent out. It was en- 
trusted to Sir Charles Warren. He recruited his force 
mainly from the loyalists of South Africa, though a body 
named Methuen's horse went out from England. In 
all it numbered nearly five thousand men. Moving 
quickly from the Orange River through Griqualand West, 
he reached the banks of the Vaal at Barkly Camp, by 
January 22, 1885, that is, only six weeks after his arrival 
at Cape Town. At the same time three thousand troops 
took their station in the north of Natal in readiness to 
attack the Transvaal Boers, should they fall upon Warren. 
It soon transpired, however, that the more respectable 
Boers had little sympathy with the raiders in Bechuanaland. 
These again were so far taken aback by the speed of War- 
ren's movements and the thoroughness of his organisation 
as to manifest little desire to attack a force which seemed 
ever ready at all points and spied on them from balloons. 
The behaviour of the commander was as tactful as his dis- 
positions were effective ; and, as a result of these favouring 
circumstances (which the superficial may ascribe to luck), he 
was able speedily to clear Bechuanaland of those intruders. 

On September 30th it became what it has since re- 
mained — a British possession, safeguarding the route into 
the interior and holding apart the Transvaal Boers from 
the contact with the Germans of Damaraland which could 
hardly fail to produce an explosion. The importance of 

> See Sir Charles Warren's short account of the expedition, in the 
Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute for x8S§-86, pp. 5-45; 
also Mackenzie's Austral Africa, ii., ad init., and John Mackenzie, 
by W. D. Mackenzie (1902). 



The Partition of Africa 257 

the latter fact has already been made clear. The signifi- 
cance of the former will be apparent when we remember 
that Mr. Rhodes, in his later and better-known character 
of Empire-builder, was able from Bechuanaland as a base 
to extend the domain of his chartered Company up to the 
southern end of Lake Tanganyika in the year 1889. 

It is well known that Rhodes hoped to extend the domain 
of his Company as far north as the southern limit of the 
British East Africa Company. Here, however, the Ger- 
mans forestalled him by their energy in Central Africa. 
Finally, the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 assigned to 
Germany all the hinterland of Zanzibar as far west as the 
frontier of the Congo Free State, thus sterilising the idea 
of an all- British route from the Cape to Cairo, which 
possessed for some minds an alliterative and all-compelling 
charm. 

As for the future of the vast territory which came to be 
known popularly as Rhodesia, we may note that the part 
bordering on Lake Nyassa was severed from the South 
Africa Company in 1894, and was styled the British Central 
Africa Protectorate. In 1895 the south of Bechuanaland 
was annexed to Cape Colony, a step greatly regretted by 
many well-wishers of the natives. The intelligent chief, 
Khama, visited England in that year, mainly in order to 
protest against the annexation of his lands by Cape Colony 
and by the South Africa Company. In this he was suc- 
cessful; he and other chiefs are directly under the pro- 
tection of the Crown, but parts of the north and east of 
Bechuanaland are administered by the British South 
Africa Company. The tracts between the rivers Limpopo 
and Zambesi, and thence north to the Tanganyika, form 
a territory vaster and more populous than any which has 

VOL. II. 17. 



258 The European Nations 

in recent years been administered by a company; and its 
rule leaves much to be desired. 

It is time now to turn to the expansion of German and 
British spheres of influence in the Bight of Guinea and 
along the course of the rivers Niger and Benue. In the 
innermost part of the Bight of Guinea, British commercial 
interests had been paramount up to about 1880; but about 
that time German factories were founded in increasing 
numbers, and, owing to the dilatory action of British 
firms, gained increasing hold on the trade of several dis- 
tricts. The respect felt by native chiefs for British law 
was evinced by a request of five of the "Kings" of the 
Cameroons that they might have it introduced into their 
lands (1879). Authorities at Downing Street and White- 
hall were deaf to the request. In striking contrast to this 
was the action of the German Government, which early in 
the year 1884 sent Dr. Nachtigall to explore those dis- 
tricts. The German ambassador in London informed 
Earl Granville on April 19, 1884, that the object of his 
mission was " to complete the information now in possession 
of the Foreign Office at Berlin on the state of German com- 
merce on that coast." He therefore requested that the 
British authorities there should be furnished with suitable 
recommendations for his reception.^ This was accordingly 
done, and, after receiving hospitality at various consulates, 
he made treaties with native chiefs, and hoisted the Ger- 
man flag at several points previously considered to be 
under British influence. This was especially the case on 
the coast to the east of the river Niger. 

The British Government was incensed at this procedure, 

» Pari. Papers, Africa, No. i (1885), p. 14. 



The Partition of Africa 259 

and all the more so as plans were then on foot for consoli- 
dating British influence in the Cameroons. On that river 
there were six British and two German firms, and the 
natives had petitioned for the protection of England; but 
H.M.S. Flirt, on steaming into that river on July 20th, 
found that the German flag had been hoisted by the 
officers of the German warship Mowe. Nachtigall had 
signed a treaty with "King Bell" on July 12th, whereby 
native habits were to remain unchanged and no customs 
dues levied, but the whole district was placed under German 
suzerainty. 1 The same had happened at neighbouring 
districts. Thereupon Consul Hewitt, in accordance with 
instructions from London, established British supremacy 
at the Oil rivers, Old and New Calabar, and several other 
points adjoining the Niger delta as far west as Lagos. 

For some time there was much friction between London 
and Berlin on these questions, but on May 7, 1885, an 
agreement was finally arrived at, a line drawn between 
the Rio del Rey and the Old Calabar River being fixed on 
as the boundary of the spheres of influence of the two 
Powers, while Germany further recognised the sovereignty 
of Britain over St. Lucia Bay in Zululand, and promised 
not to annex any land between Natal and Delagoa Bay.^ 
Many censures were lavished on this agreement, which 
certainly sacrificed important British interests in the 
Cameroons in consideration of the abandonment of German 
claims on the Zulu coast which were legally untenable. 
Thus, by pressing on various points formerly regarded as 
under British influence, Bismarck secured at least one 
considerable district — one moreover that is the healthiest 

> Pari. Papers, p. 24. 

2 Pari. Papers, Africa, No. 6 (1885), p. 2. 



26o The European Nations 

on the West African coast. Subsequent expansion made 
of the Cameroons a colony containing some 140,000 square 
miles with more than 1,100,000 inhabitants. 

It is an open secret that Germany was working hard in 
1884-85 to get a foothold on the Lower Niger and its great 
affluent, the Benue. Two important colonial societies 
combined to send out Herr Flegel in the spring of 1885 to 
secure possession of districts on those rivers where British 
interests had hitherto been paramount. Fortunately for 
the cause of Free Trade (which Germany had definitely 
abandoned in 1880) private individuals had had enough 
foresight and determination to step in with effect, and to 
repair the harm which otherwise must have come from the 
absorption of Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues in home 
affairs. 

In the present case, British merchants were able to save 
the situation, because in the year 1879 the firms having 
important business dealings with the river Niger com- 
bined to form the National African Company in order t3 
withstand the threatening pressure of the French advance 
soon to be described. In 1882 the Company's powers 
were extended, largely owing to Sir George Taubman 
Goldie, and it took the name of the National African Com- 
pany. Extending its operations up the river Niger, it 
gradually cut the ground from under the French companies 
which had been formed for the exploitation and ultimate 
acquisition of those districts, so that after a time the French 
shareholders agreed to merge themselves in the British 
enterprise. 

This important step was taken, just in time to forestall 
German action from the side of the Cameroons, which 
threatened to shut out British trade from the banks of the 



The Partition of Africa 261 

river Benue and the shores of Lake Chad. Forewarned 
of this danger, Sir George Goldie and his directors urged 
that bold and successful explorer, Mr. Joseph Thomson, 
to safeguard the nation's interests along the Benue and 
north thereof. Thomson had scarcely recovered from the 
hardships of his epoch-marking journey through Masailand; 
but he now threw himself into the breach, quickly travelled 
from England to the Niger, and by his unrivalled experi- 
ence alike of the means of travel and of native ways 
managed to frame treaties with the Sultans of Sokoto and 
Gando, before the German envoy reached his destination 
(1885). The energy of the National African Company and 
the promptitude and tact of Mr. Thomson secured for his 
countrymen undisputed access to Lake Chad and the great 
country peopled by the warlike Haussas.^ 

Seeing that both France and Germany seek to restrict 
foreign trade in their colonies, while Great Britain gives 
free access to all merchants on equal terms, we may regard 
this brilliant success as a gain, not only for the United 
Kingdom, but for the commerce of th'e world. The an- 
noyance expressed in influential circles in Germany at the 
failure of the plans for capturing the trade of the Benue 
district served to show the magnitude of the interests 
which had there been looked upon as prospectively and 
exclusively German. The delimitation of the new British 
territory with the Cameroon territory and its north-eastern 
extension to Lake Chad was effected by an Anglo-German 
agreement of 1886, Germany gaining part of the upper 
Benue and the southern shore of Lake Chad. In all, the 

> This greatest among recent explorers of Africa died in 1895. 
He never received any appropriate reward from the Court for his 
great services to science and to the nation at large. 



262 The European Nations 

territories controlled by the British Company comprised 
about 500,000 square miles (more than four times the size 
of the United Kingdom). 

It is somewhat characteristic of British colonial pro- 
cedure in that period that many difficulties were raised as 
to the grant of a charter to the company which had carried 
through this work of national importance; but on July 10, 
1886, it gained that charter with the title of the Royal 
Niger Company. The chief difficulties since that date 
have arisen from French aggressions on the west, which 
will be noticed presently. 

In 1897 the Royal Niger Company overthrew the power 
of the turbulent and slave-raiding Sultan of Nupe, near 
the Niger, but, as has so often happened, the very success 
of the Company doomed it to absorption by the nation. 
On January i, 1900, its governing powers were handed over 
to the Crown; the Union Jack replaced the private flag; 
and Sir Frederick Lugard added to the services which he 
had rendered to the Empire in Uganda by undertaking the 
organisation of this great and fertile colony. In an inter- 
esting paper, read before the Royal Geographical Society 
in November, 1903, he thus characterised his administra- 
tive methods: "to rule through the native chiefs, and, 
while checking the extortionate levies of the past, fairly to 
assess and enforce the ancient tribute. By this means a 
fair revenue will be assured to the emirs, in lieu of their 
former source of wealth, which consisted in slaves and 
slave-raiding, and in extortionate taxes on trade. . . 
Organised slave-raiding has become a thing of the past ill 
the country where it lately existed in its worst form." He 
further stated that the new colony had made satisfactory 
progress; but light railways were much needed to connect 



The Partition of Africa 263 

Lake Chad with the upper Nile and with the Gulf of 
Guinea. The area of Nigeria (apart from the Niger Coast 
Protectorate) is about 500,000 square miles. ^ 

The result, then, of the activity of French and Germans 
in West Africa has, on the whole, not been adverse to 
British interests. The efforts leading to these noteworthy- 
results above would scarcely have been made but for some 
external stimulus. -As happened in the days of Dupleix 
and Montcalm, and again at the time of the little-known 
efforts of Napoleon I. to appropriate the middle of Aus- 
tralia, the spur of foreign competition furthered not only 
the cause of exploration but also the expansion of the 
British Empire. 

The expansion of French influence in Africa has been 
far greater than that of Germany; and, while arousing less 
attention on political grounds, it has probably achieved 
more solid results — a fact all the more remarkable when 
we bear in mind the exhaustion of France in 187 1, and the 
very slow growth of her population at home. From 1872 
to 1 90 1 the number of her inhabitants rose from 36,103,000 
to 38,962,000; while in the same time the figures for the 
German Empire showed an increase from 41,230,000 to 
56,862,000. To some extent, then, the colonial growth 
of France is artificial; at least it is not based on the im- 
perious need which drives forth the surplus population 
of Great Britain and Germany. Nevertheless, so far as 
governmental energy and organising skill can make colo- 
nies successful, the French possessions in West Africa, 
Indo-China, Madagascar, and the Pacific have certainly 
justified their existence. 1 No longer do we hear the old 

> The Geographical Journal, January i, 1904, pp. 5, 18, 27. 



264 The European Nations 

joke that a French colonial settlement consists of a dozen 
officials, a restaurateur, and a hair-dresser. ^ 

In the seventies the French Republic took up once niore 
the work of colonial expansion in West Africa, in which the 
Emperor Napoleon III. had taken great interest. The 
Governor of Senegal, M. Faidherbe, pushed on expeditions 
from that colony to the head waters of the Niger in the 
years 1879-81. There the French came into collision with 
a powerful slave-raiding chief, Samory, whom they worsted 
in a series of campaigns in the five years following. Events 
therefore promised to fulfil the desires of Gambetta, who 
during his brief term of office in 1881 initiated plans for 
the construction of a trans-Saharan railway (never com- 
pleted) and the establishment of two powerful French 
companies on the upper Niger. French energy secured 
for the Republic the very lands which the great traveller 
Mungo Park first revealed to the gaze of civilised peoples. 
It is worthy of note that in the year 1865 the House of 
Commons, when urged to promote British trade and in- 
fluence on that mighty river, passed a resolution declaring 
that any extension of Britisl) rule in that quarter was inex- 
pedient. So rapid, however, was the progress of the French 
arms on the Niger, and in the country behind British 
Gold Coast settlements, that private individuals in London 
and Liverpool began to take action. Already in 1878 the 

' See La Colonisation chez les Peuples modernes, by Paul Leroy- 
Beaulieu; Discours et Opinions, by Jules Ferry; La France coloniale 
(6th edit., 1893), by Alfred Rambaud; La Colonisation de I'lndo- 
Chine (1902), by Chailley-Bert ; L'Indo-Chine frangaise (1905), by 
Paul Doumer (describing its progress under his administration) ; 
Notre Epopee coloniale (190 1), by P. Legendre; La Mise en Valeur 
de notre Domaine coloniale (1903), by C. Guy; Un Siecle d' Expan- 
sion coloniale (1900), by M. Dubois and A. Terrier; Le Partage de 
VAfrique (1898), by V. Deville. 



The Partition of Africa 265 

British firms trading with the lower Niger had formed the 
United African Company, with the results noted above. 
A British Protectorate was also established in the year 
1884 over the coast districts around Lagos, "with the view 
of guarding their interests against the advance of the 
French and Germans." ^ 

Meanwhile the French were making rapid progress under 
the lead of Gallieni and Archinard. In 1890 the latter 
conquered Segu-Sikoro, and a year later Bissandugu. A 
far greater prize fell to the tricolour at the close of 1893. 
Boiteux and Bonnier succeeded in leading a flotilla and a 
column to the mysterious city of Timbuctu; but a little 
later a French force sustained a serious check from the 
neighbouring tribes. The affair only spurred on the Re- 
public to still greater efforts, which led finally to the rout 
of Samory's forces and his capture in the year 1898. That 
redoubtable chief, who had defied France for fifteen years, 
was sent as a prisoner to Gaboon. 

These campaigns and other more peaceful "missions" 
added to the French possessions a vast territory of some 
800,000 square kilometres in the basin of the Niger. Mean- 
while disputes had occurred with the King of Dahomey, 
which led to the utter overthrow of his power by Colonel 
Dodds in a brilHant Httle campaign in 1892. The crowned 
slave-raider was captured and sent to Martinique. 

These rapid conquests, especially those on the Niger, 

brought France and England more than once to the verge 

of war. In the autumn of the year 1897, the aggressions 

> For its progress see Colonial Reports, Niger Coast Protectorate, 
for 1898-99. For the Franco-German agreement of December 24, 
1885, delimiting their West African lands, see Banning, Le Portage 
politique de I'Afrique, pp. 22-26. For the Anglo-French agreement 
of August 10, 1889, see Pari. Papers, Africa, No. 3, (1890). 



266 The European Nations 

of the French at and near Busa, on the right bank of the 
lower Niger, led to a most serious situation. Despite its 
inclusion in the domains of the Royal Niger Company, that 
town was occupied by French troops. At the Guildhall 
banquet (November 9th), Lord Salisbury made the firm 
but really prudent declaration that the Government would 
brook no interference with the treaty rights of a British 
company. The pronouncement was timely; for French 
action at Busa, taken in conjunction with the Marchand 
expedition from the Niger basin to the upper Nile at 
Fashoda (see Vol. II., Chapter VI.), seemed to betoken a 
deliberate defiance of the United Kingdom. Ultimately, 
however, the tricolour was withdrawn from situations 
that were legally untenable. These questions were settled 
by the Anglo-French agreement of i8g8, which, we may 
add, cleared the ground for the still more important com- 
pact of 1904. 

The limits of this chapter having already been passed, it 
is impossible to advert to the parts played by Italy and 
Portugal in the partition of Africa. At best they have 
been subsidiary; the colonial efforts of Italy in the Red 
Sea and in Somaliland have as yet produced little else than 
disaster and disappointment. But for the part played by 
Serpa Pinto in the Zambesi basin, the role of Portugal has 
been one of quiescence. Some authorities, as will appear 
in the following chapter, would describe it by a less euphon 
ious term; it is now known that slave-hunting goes on in 
the upper part of the Zambesi basin owned by them. The 
French settlement at Obock, opposite Perim, and the par- 
tition of Somaliland between England and Italy, can also 
only be named. 



The Partition of Africa 



267 



The general results of the partition of Africa may best be 
realised by studying the map at the close of this volume, 
and by the following statistics as presented by Mr. Scott 
Keltic in the Encydopcedia Britannica: 



French territories in Africa (inclusive of 
the Sahara) . . . . . 

British (inclusive of the Transvaal and 
Orange River Colonies, but exclusive 
of the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan — 610,- 
000 square miles) 

German 

Congo Free State 

Portuguese 

Italian 



SQUARE MILES. 



3,804,974 



2,713.910 
933.380 
900,000 
790,124 
188,500 



These results correspond in the main to the foresight and 
energy displayed by the several States, and to the initial 
advantages which they enjoyed on the coast of Africa. 
The methods employed by France and Germany present a 
happy union of individual initiative with intelligent and 
persistent direction by the State ; for it must be remembered 
that up to the year 1880 the former possessed few good 
bases of operation, and the latter none whatever. The 
natural portals of Africa were in the hands of Great Britain 
and Portugal. It is difficult to say what would have been 
the present state of Africa if everything had depended on 
the officials at Downing Street and Whitehall. Certainly 
the expansion of British influence in that continent (apart 
from the Nile valley) would have been insignificant but for 
the exertions of private individuals. Among them the 
names of Joseph Thomson, Sir William Mackinnon, Sir 
John Kirk, Sir Harry Johnston, Sir George Goldie, Sir 



268 The European Nations 

Frederick Lugard, John Mackenzie, and Cecil Rhodes will 
be remembered as those of veritable empire-builders. 

Viewing the matter from the European standpoint, the 
partition of Africa may be regarded as a triumph for the 
cause of peace. In the years 1880-1900, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium came into 
possession of new lands far larger than those for which 
French and British fleets and armies had fought so desper- 
ately in the eighteenth century. If we go further back 
and think of the wars waged for the possession of the 
barrier towns of Flanders, the contrast between the fruit- 
less strifes of that age and the peaceful settlement of the 
affairs of a mighty continent will appear still more striking. 
It is true, of course, that the cutting up of the lands of 
natives by white men is as indefensible morally as it is 
inevitable in the eager expansiveness of the present age. 
Further, it may be admitted that the methods adopted 
towards the aborigines have sometimes been disgraceful. 
But even so, the events of the years 1 880-1 900, black as 
some of them are, compare favourably with those of the 
long ages when the term "African trade" was merely a 
euphemism for slave-hunting. 



Note. — The Parliamentary Papers on Angra Pequena (li 
show that the dispute with Germany was largely due to the desire 
of Lord Derby to see whether the Government of Cape Colony 
would bear the cost of administration of that whole coast, if it 
were annexed. Owing to a change of Ministry at Cape Town early 
in 1884, the affirmative reply was very long in coming; and mean* 
while Germany took decisive action, as described on p. 249. 



CHAPTER VIII 



THE CONGO FREE STATE 



"^. "The object which unites us here to-day is one of those which 
deserve in the highest degree to occupy the friends of humanity. 
To open to civilisation the only part of our globe where it has not 
yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness which envelops entire popu- 
lations, is, I venture to say, a crusade worthy of this century of 
progress." — King Leopold II., Speech to the Geographical Con- 
gress of 1 8 yd at Brusselsr'^^ 

THE Congo Free State owes its origin, first, to the 
self-denying pioneer- work of Livingstone; second, 
to the energy of the late Sir H. M. Stanley in clearing up 
the problems of African exploration which that devoted 
missionary had not fully solved, and third, to the interest 
which His Majesty, Leopold II., King of the Belgians, has 
always taken in the opening up of that continent. It will 
be well briefly to note the chief facts which helped to 
fasten the gaze of Europe on the Congo basin; for these 
events had a practical issue; they served to bring King 
Leopold and Mr. Stanley into close touch with a view to 
the establishment of a settled government in the heart of 
Africa. 

In 1874 Mr. H. M. Stanley (he was not knighted until the 
year 1899) received a commission from the proprietors of 
the Daily Telegraph to proceed to Central Africa in order 
to complete the geographical discoveries which had been 
cut short by the lamented death of Livingstone near Lake 

26q 



270 The European Nations 

Bangweolo. That prince of explorers had not fully solved 
the riddle of the waterways of Central Africa. He had 
found what were really the head waters of the Congo at 
and near Lake Moero; and had even struck the mighty 
river itself as far down as Nyangwe; but he could not 
prove that these great streams formed the upper waters 
of the Congo. 

Stanley's journey in 187 4- 1877 led to many important 
discoveries. He first made clear the shape and extent of 
"Victoria Nyanza; he tracked the chief feeder of that vast 
reservoir; and he proved that Lake Tanganyika drained 
into the river Congo Voyaging down its course to the 
mouth, he found great and fertile territories, thus proving 
what Livingstone could only surmise, that here was the 
natural waterway into the heart of "the Dark Continent." 

Up to the year 1877 nearly all the pioneer work in the 
interior of the Congo basin was the outcome of Anglo- 
American enterprise. Therefore, so far as priority of dis- 
covery confers a claim to possession, that claim belonged 
to the English-speaking peoples. King Leopold recog- 
nised the fact and allowed a certain space of time for 
British merchants to enter on the possession of what was 
potentially their natural "sphere of influence." Stanley, 
however, failed to convince his countrymen of the feasi- 
bility of opening up that vast district to peaceful com- 
merce. At that time they were suffering from severe 
depression in trade and agriculture, and from the disputes 
resulting from the Eastern Question both in the near East 
and in Afghanistan. For the time "the weary Titan" was 
preoccupied and could not turn his thoughts to commer- 
cial expansion, which would speedily have cured his evils. 
Consequently, in November, 1878, Stanley proceeded to 



The Congo Free State 271 

Brussels in order to present to King Leopold the opportu- 
nity which England let slip. 

Already the King of the Belgians had succeeded in 
arousing widespread interest in the exploration of Africa. 
In the autumn of 1876 he convened a meeting of leading 
explorers and geographers of the six Great Powers and of 
Belgium for the discussion of questions connected with the 
opening up of that continent ; but at that time, and until 
the results of Stanley's journey were made known, the 
King and his coadjutors turned their gaze almost exclu- 
sively on East Africa. It is therefore scarcely appropriate 
for one of the Belgian panegyrists of the King to proclaim 
that when Central Africa celebrates its Day of Thanks- 
giving for the countless blessings of civilisation conferred 
by that monarch, it will look back on the day of meeting 
of that Conference (September 12, 1876) as the dawn of 
the new era of goodwill and prosperity. 1 King Leopold, 
in opening the Conference, made use of the inspiring words 
quoted at the head of this chapter, and asked the delegates 
to discuss the means to be adopted for "planting definitely 
the standard of civilisation on the soil of Central Africa." 

As a result of the Conference, "The International Asso- 
ciation for the Exploration and CiviHsation of Africa" was 
founded. It had committees in most of the capitals of 
Europe, but the energy of King Leopold, and the simis 
which he and his people advanced for the pioneer work of 
the Association, early gave to that of Brussels a priority, 
of which good use was made in the sequel. 2 The Great 
Powers were at this time distracted by the Russo-Turkish 

> UAfrique nouvelle. Par E. Descamps, Brussels, Paris, 1903, 
p. 8. 

2 For details see J. de C. Macdonell, King Leopold II , p. 113. 



2 72 The European Nations 

war and by the acute international crisis that supervened. 
Thus the jealousies and weakness of the Great Powers left 
the field free for Belgian activities, which, owing to the 
energy of a British explorer, were definitely concentrated 
upon the exploitation of the Congo. 

On November 25, 1878, a separate committee of the 
International Association was formed at Brussels with the 
name of "Comit^ d'Etudes du Haut Congo." In the year 
1879 it took the title of the "International Association of 
the Congo," and for all practical purposes superseded its 
progenitor. Outwardly, however, the Association was still 
international. Stanley became its chief agent on the river 
Congo, and in the years 1879-1880 made numerous treaties 
with local chiefs. In February, 1880, he founded the first 
station of the Association at Vivi, and within four years 
established twenty-four stations on the main river and 
its chief tributaries. The cost of these explorations was 
largely borne by King Leopold. 

The King also commissioned Lieutenant von Wissmann 
to complete his former work of discovery in the great dis- 
trict watered by the river Kasai and its affluents ; and in 
and after 1886 he and his coadjutor. Dr. Wolf, greatly ex- 
tended the knowledge of the southern and central parts of 
the Congo basin. 1 In the meantime the British mission- 
aries. Rev. W. H. Bentley and Rev. G. Grenfell, carried on 
explorations, especially on the Ubangi River, and in the 
lands between it and the Congo. The part which mission- 
aries have taken in the work of discovery and pacification 
entitles them to a high place in the records of equatorial 
exploration; and their influence has often been exerted 

> H. von Wissmann, My Second Journey through Equatorial 
Africa, 1 89 1. Rev. W. H. Bentley, Pioneering on the Congo, 2 vols. 



The Congo Free State 273 

beneficially on behalf of the natives. We may add here 
that M. de Brazza did good work for the French tricolour 
in exploring the land north of the Congo and Ubangi rivers ; 
he founded several stations, which were to develop into the 
great French Congo colony. 

Meanwhile events had transpired in Europe which served 
to give stability to these undertakings. The energy thrown 
into the exploration of the Congo basin soon awakened the 
jealousy of the Power which had long ago discovered 
the mouth of the great river and its adjacent coasts. In 
the years 1883, 1884, Portugal put forward a claim to the 
over-lordship of those districts on the ground of priority 
of discovery and settlement. On all sides that claim was 
felt to be unreasonable. The occupation of that territory 
by the Portuguese had been short-lived, and nearly all 
traces of it had disappeared, except at Kabinda and one 
or two points on the coast. The fact that Diogo Cam and 
others had discovered the mouth of the Congo in the 
fifteenth century was a poor argument for closing to other 
peoples, three centuries later, the whole of the vast territory 
between that river and the mouth of the Zambesi. These 
claims raised the problem of the hinterland, that is, the 
ownership of the whole range of territory behind a coast 
line. Furthermore, the Portuguese officials were notori- 
ously inefficient and generally corrupt; while the customs 
system of that State was such as to fetter the activities of 
trade with shackles of a truly mediaeval type. 

Over against these musty claims of Portugal there stood 
the offers of "The International Association of the Congo" 
to bring the blessings of free trade and civilisation to down- 
trodden millions of negroes, if only access were granted 
from the sea. The contrast between the dull obscurantism 



VOL. II. li 



2 74 The European Nations 

of Lisbon and the benevolent intentions of Brussels struck 
the popular imagination. At that time the eye of faith 
discerned in the King of the Belgians the ideal godfather 
of a noble undertaking, and great was the indignation 
when Portugal interfered with freedom of access to the 
sea at the mouth of the Congo. Various matters were also 
in dispute between Portugal and Great Britain respecting 
trading rights at that important outlet ; and they were by 
no means settled by an Anglo-Portuguese Convention of 
February 26th (1884), in which Lord Granville, Foreign 
Minister in the Gladstone Cabinet, was thought to display 
too much deference to questionable claims. Protests were 
urged against this Convention, by the United States, France, 
and Germany, with the result that the Lisbon Govern- 
ment proposed to refer all these matters to a Conference 
of the Powers; and arrangements were soon made for the 
summoning of their representatives to Berlin, under the 
presidency of Prince Bismarck. 

Before the Conference met, the United States took the 
decisive step of recognising the rights of the Association to 
the government of that river-basin (April 10, 1884) — a pro- 
ceeding which ought to have secured to the United States 
an abiding influence on the affairs of the State which they 
did so much to create. The example set by the United 
States was soon followed by the other Powers. In that 
same month France withdrew the objections which she 
had raised to the work of the Association, and came to 
terms with it in a treaty whereby she gained priority in 
the right of purchase of its claims and possessions. The 
way having been thus cleared, the Berlin Conference met 
on November 15, 1884. Prince Bismarck suggested that 
the three chief topics for consideration were (i) the free- 



The Congo Free State 275 

dom of navigation and of trade in the Congo area; (2) free- 
dom of navigation on the river Niger; (3) the formalities 
to be thenceforth observed in lawful and valid annexations 
of territories in Africa. The British plenipotentiary, Sir 
Edward Malet, however, pointed out that, while his 
Government wished to preserve freedom of navigation and 
of trade upon the Niger, it would object to the formation 
of any international commission for those purposes, seeing 
that Great Britain was the sole proprietary Power on the 
lower Niger (see Vol. II., Chapter VII. ).i This firm declar- 
ation possibly prevented the intrusion of claims which 
might have led to the whittling down of British rights on 
that great river. An Anglo-French Commission was after- 
ward appointed to supervise the navigation of the Niger. 

The main question being thus concentrated on the Congo. 
Portugal was obliged to defer to the practically unanimous 
refusal of the Powers to recognise her claims over the lower 
parts of that river; and on November 19th she conceded 
the principle of freedom of trade on those waters. Next, 
it was decided that the Congo Association should acquire 
and hold governing rights over nearly the whole of the vast 
expanse drained by the Congo, with some reservations in 
favour of France on the north and Portugal on the south. 
The extension of the principle of freedom of trade nearly 
to the Indian Ocean was likewise affirmed; and the estab- 
lishment of monopolies or privileges "of any kind" was 
distinctly forbidden within the Congo area. 

An effort strictly to control the sale of intoxicating 

Hquors to natives lapsed owing to the strong opposition 

of Germany and Holland, though a weaker motion on 

the same all-important matter found acceptance (December 

I See Protocols, Pari, Papers, Africa, No. 4 (1885), pp. 119 et seq. 



276 The European Nations 

22d). On January 7, 1885, the Conference passed a 
stringent declaration against the slave-trade: "... these 
regions shall not be used as markets or routes of transit for 
the trade in slaves, no matter of what race. Each of these 
Powers binds itself to use all the means at its disposal to 
put an end to this trade, and to punish those engaged 
in it." 

The month of February saw the settlement of the 
boundary claims with France and Portugal, on bases nearly 
the same as those still existing. The Congo Association 
gained the northern bank of the river at its mouth, but 
ceded to Portugal a small strip of coast line a little farther 
north around Kabinda. These arrangements were, on the 
whole, satisfactory to the three parties. France now 
definitively gained by treaty right her vast Congo territory 
of some 257,000 square miles in area, while Portugal re- 
tained on the south of the river a coast nearly 1000 miles 
in length and a dominion estimated at 351,000 square 
miles. The Association, though handing over to these 
Powers respectively 60,000 and 45,000 square miles of land 
which its pioneers hoped to obtain, nevertheless secured 
for itself an immense territory of some 870,000 square 
miles. 

The General Act of the Berlin Conference was signed on 
February 26, 1885. Its terms and those of the Protocols 
prove conclusively that the governing powers assigned to 
the Congo Association were assigned to a neutral and inter- 
national State, responsible to the Powers which gave it 
its existence. In particular, Articles IV. and V. of the 
General Act ran as follows: 

"Merchandise imported into these regions shall remain 
free from import and transit dues. The Powers reserve to 



The Congo Free State 277 

themselves to determine, after the lapse of twenty years, 
whether this freedom of import shall be retained or not. 

" No Power which exercises, or shall exercise, sovereign 
rights in the above mentioned regions shall be allowed to 
grant therein a monopoly or favour of any kind in matters 
of trade. Foreigners, without distinction, shall enjoy pro- 
tection of their persons and property, as well as the right 
of acquiring and transferring movable and immovable 
possessions, and national rights and treatment in the 
exercise of their professions." 

Before describing the growth of the Congo State, it is 
needful to refer to two preliminary considerations. First, 
it should be noted that the Berlin Conference committed 
the mistake of failing to devise any means for securing the 
observance of the principles there laid down. Its work, 
considered in the abstract, was excellent. The mere fact 
that representatives of the Powers could meet amicably 
to discuss and settle the administration of a great territory 
which in other ages would have provoked them to deadly 
strifes, was in itself a most hopeful augury, and possibly 
the success of the Conference inspired a too confident 
belief in the efifective watchfulness of the Powers over the 
welfare of the young State to which they then stood as 
godfathers. In any case it must be confessed that they 
have since interpreted their duties in the easy way to which 
godfathers are all too prone. As in the case of the Treaty 
of Berlin of 1878, so in that of the Conference of Berlin of 
1885, the fault lay not in the promise but in the failure of 
the executors to carry out the terms of the promise. 

Another matter remains to be noted. It resulted from 
the demands urged by Portugal in 1883-84. By way of 
retort, the plenipotentiaries now declared any occupation 



278 The European Nations 

of territory to be valid only when it had effectively taken 
place and had been notified to all the Powers represented 
at the Conference. It also defined a "sphere of influence" 
as the area within which one Power is recognised as possess- 
ing priority of claims over other States. The doctrine was 
to prove convenient for expansive States in the future. 

The first important event in the life of the new State was 
the assumption by King Leopold II. of sovereign powers. 
All nations, and Belgium not the least, were startled by his 
announcement to his Ministers, on April 16, 1885, that he 
desired the assent of the Belgian Parliament to this pro- 
ceeding. He stated that the union between Belgium and 
the Congo State would be merely personal, and that the 
latter would enjoy, like the former, the benefits of neutral- 
ity. The Parliament on April 28th gave its assent, with 
but one dissentient voice, on the understanding stated 
above. The Powers also signified their approval. On 
August ist. King Leopold informed them of the facts just 
stated, and announced that the new State took the title 
of the Congo Free State (L'Etat Independant du Congo) A 

Questions soon arose concerning the delimitation of the 
boundary with the French Congo territory; and these led 
to the signing of a protocol at Brussels on April 29, 1887, 
whereby the Congo Free State gave up certain cf its claims 
in the northern part of the Congo region (the right bank 
of the Ubangi River), but exacted in return the addition 
of a statement "that the right of pre-emption accorded to 
France could not be claimed as against Belgium, of which 
King Leopold is sovereign." 2 

1 The Story of the Congo Free State, by H. W. Wack (New York, 
1905), p. loi. Wauters, L'Etat Independant du Congo, pp. 36-37, 

2 The Congo State, by D. C. Boulger (London, 1896), p. 62. 



The Congo Free State 279 

There seems, however, to be some question whether this 
clause is Hkely to have any practical effect. The clause is 
obviously inoperative if Belgium ultimately declines to 
take over the Congo territory, and there is at least the 
chance that this will happen. If it does happen, King 
Leopold and the Belgian Parliament recognise the prior 
claim of France to all the Congolese territory. The King 
and the Congo Ministers seem to have made use of this 
circumstance so as to strengthen the financial relations of 
France to their new State in several ways, notably in the 
formation of monopolist groups for the exploitation of 
Congoland. For the present we may remark that by a 
clause of the Franco-Belgian Treaty of February 5, 1895, 
the Government of Brussels declared that it "recognises 
the right of preference possessed by France over its Congo- 
lese possessions, in case of their compulsory alienation, in 
whole or in part." 1 

Meanwhile King Leopold proceeded as if he were the 
absolute ruler of the new State. He bestowed on it a con- 
stitution on the most autocratic basis. M. Cattier, in 
his account of that constitution sums it up by stating 
that 

"The sovereign is the direct source of legislative, ex- 
ecutive, and judiciary powers. He can, if he chooses, 
delegate their exercise to certain functionaries, but this 
delegation has no other source than his will. . . . He 
can issue rules, on which, so long as they last, is based the 
vaHdity of certain acts by himself or by his delegates. 
But he can cancel these rules whenever they appear to him 
troublesome, useless, or dangerous. The organisation of 

1 Cattier, Droit et Administration de I'Etat Independent du Congo, 
p. 82. 



28o The European Nations 

justice, the composition of the army, financial systems, 
and industrial and commercial institutions — all are estab- 
lished solely by him in accordance with his just or faulty 
conceptions as to their usefulness or efificiency." ^ 

A natural outcome of such a line of policy was the 
gradual elimination of non-Belgian officials. In July, 
1886, Sir Francis de Winton, Stanley's successor in the 
administration of the Congo area, gave place to a Belgian 
"Governor-General," M. Janssen; and similar changes 
were made in all grades of the service. 

Meanwhile other events were occurring which enabled 
the officials of the Congo State greatly to modify the pro- 
visions laid down at the Berlin Conference. These events 
were as follows : For many years the Arab slave-traders 
had been extending their raids in easterly and south-easterly 
directions, until they began to desolate the parts of the 
Congo State nearest to the great lakes and the Bahr-el- 
Ghazal. 

Their activity may be ascribed to the following causes. 
The slave trade has for generations been pursued in Africa. 
The negro tribes themselves have long practised it ; and the 
Arabs, in their gradual conquest of many districts of 
Central Africa, found it to be by far the most profitable of 
all pursuits. The market was almost boundless; for since 
the Congress of Vienna (18 15) and the Congress of Verona 
(1822) the Christian Powers had forbidden their subjects 
any longer to pursue that nefarious calling. It is true that 
kidnapping of negroes went on secretly, despite all the 
efforts of British cruisers to capture the slavers. It is said 
that the last seizure of a Portuguese schooner illicitly trad- 
ing in human flesh was made off the Congo coast as late as 
» Cattier, op. nt., pp. 134-135. 



The Congo Free State 281 

the year 1868. i But the cessation of the trans-Atlantic 
slave-trade only served to stimulate the Arab man-hunters 
of Eastern Africa to greater efforts ; and the rise of Mahdism 
quickened the demand for slaves in an unprecedented, 
manner. Thus, the hateful trade went on apace, threaten- 
ing to devastate the continent which explorers, missionaries, 
and traders were opening up. 

The civilising and the devastating processes were certain 
soon to clash; and, as Stanley had foreseen, the conflict 
broke out on the upper Congo. There the slave-raiders, 
subsidised or led by Arabs of Zanzibar, were specially 
active. Working from Ujiji and other 'bases, they at- 
tacked some of the expeditions sent by the Congo Free 
State. Chief among the raiders was a half-caste Arab 
negro nick-named Tipu Tib ("the gatherer of wealth"), 
who by his energy and cunning had become practically the 
master of a great district between the Congo and Lake 
Tanganyika. At first (188 7-1 888) the Congo Free State 
adopted Stanley's suggestion of appointing Tipu Tib to be 
its governor of the Stanley Falls district, at a salary of 
thirty pounds a month. 2 So artificial an arrangement 
soon broke down, and war broke out early in 1892. The 
forces of the Congo Free State, led by Commandants 
Dhanis and Lothaire, and by Captain S. L. Hinde, finally 
worsted the Arabs after two long and wearisome cam- 
paigns waged on the upper Congo. Into the details of the 
war it is impossible to enter. The accounts of all the 
operations, including that of Captain Hinde,^ are written 

• A. J. Wauters, L'Etat Independani dii Congo, p. 52. 

2 Stanley, In Darkest Africa, i., pp. 60-70. 

3 The Fall of the Congo Arabs, by Capt. S. L. Hinde (London, 
1897). 



282 The European Nations 

with a certain reserve ; and the impression that the writers 
were working on behalf of civihsation and humanity is 
somewhat blurred by the startling admissions made by 
Captain Hinde in a paper read by him before the Royal 
Geographical Society in London, on March ii, 1895. He 
there stated that the Arabs, "despite their slave-raiding 
propensities," had "converted the Manyema and Malela 
country into one of the most prosperous in Central Africa." 
He also confessed that during the fighting the two flourish- 
ing towns, Nyangwe and Kasongo, had been wholly swept 
away. In view of these statements the results of the cam- 
paign cannot be "regarded with unmixed satisfaction. 

Such, however, was not the view taken at the time. Not 
long before, the Continent had rung with the sermons and 
speeches of Cardinal Lavigerie, Bishop of Algiers, who, like 
a second Peter the Hermit, called all Christians to unite in 
a great crusade for the extirpation of slavery. The out- 
come of it all was the meeting of an Anti-Slavery Conference 
at Brussels, at the close of 1889, in which the Powers that 
had framed the Berlin Act again took part. The second 
article passed at Brussels asserted among other things the 
duties of the Powers "in giving aid to commercial enter- 
prises to watch over their legality, controlling especially 
the contracts for service entered into with natives." The 
abuses in the trade in firearms were to be carefully checked 
and controlled. 

Towards the close of the Conference a proposal was 
brought forward (May 10, 1890) to the effect that, as the 
suppression of the slave trade and the work of upraising 
the natives would entail great expense, it was desirable to 
annul the clause in the Berlin Act prohibiting the imposi- 
tion of import duties for, at least, twenty years from that 



The Congo Free State 283 

date (that is, up to the year 1905). The proposal seemed 
so plausible as to disarm the opposition of all the Powers, 
except Holland, which strongly protested against the 
change. Lord Salisbury's Government neglected to safe- 
guard British interests in this matter; and, despite the 
unremitting opposition of the Dutch Government, the ob- 
noxious change was finally registered on January 2, 1892, 
it being understood that the duties were not to exceed 
10 per cent, ad valorem except in the case of spirituous 
liquors, and that no differential treatment would be ac- 
corded to the imports of any nation or nations. 

Thus the European Powers, yielding to the specious plea 
that they must grant the Congo Free State the power of 
levying customs dues in order to further its philanthropic 
aims, gave up one of the fundamentals agreed on at the 
Berlin Conference. The raison d'etre of the Congo Free 
State was, that it stood for freedom of trade in that great 
area; and to sign away one of the birthrights of modern 
civilisation, owing to the plea of a temporary want of cash 
in Congoland, can only be described as the act of a political 
Esau. The General Act of the Brussels Conference re- 
ceived a provisional sanction (the clause respecting cus- 
toms dues not yet being definitely settled) on July 2, 1890.1 

On the next day the Congo Free State entered into a 
financial arrangement with the Belgian Government which 
marked one more step in the reversal of the policy agreed on 
at Berlin five years previousl5r. In this connection we 
must note that King Leopold by his will, dated August 2, 



1 On August I, 1890, the Sultan of Zanzibar declared that no 
sale of slaves should thenceforth take place in his dominions. He 
also granted to slaves the right of appeal to him in case they were 
cruelly treated. See Pari. Papers, Africa, No. i (1890-91). 



284 The European Nations 

1889, bequeathed to Belgium after his death all his sovereign 
rights over that State,, "together with all the benefits, 
rights and advantages appertaining to that sovereignty." 
Apparently, the occasion that called forth the will was the 
urgent need of a loan of ten million francs which the Congo 
State pressed the Belgian Government to make on behalf 
of the Congo railway. Thus, on the very eve of the sum- 
moning of the European Conference at Brussels, the Congo 
Government (that is. King Leopold) had appealed, not 
to the Great Powers, but to the Belgian Government, and 
had sought to facilitate the grant of the desired loan by the 
prospect of the ultimate transfer of his sovereign rights to 
Belgium. 

Unquestionably the King had acted very generously in 
the past toward the Congo Association and State. It has 
even been affirmed that his loans often amounted to the 
sum of forty million francs a year; but, even so, that did 
not confer the right to will away to any one state the re- 
sults of an international enterprise. As a matter of fact, 
however, the Congo State was at that time nearly bank- 
rupt;- and in this circumstance, doubtless, may be found 
an explanation of the apathy of the Powers in presence of 
an infraction of the terms of the Berlin Act of 1885. 

We are now in a position to understand more clearly the 
meaning of the Convention of July 3, 1890, between the 
Congo Free State and the Belgian Government. By its 
terms the latter pledged itself to advance a loan of twenty- 
five million francs to the Congo State in the course of ten 
years, without interest, on condition that at the close of 
six months after the expiration of that time Belgium 
should have the right of annexing the Free State with all 
its possessions and liabilities. 



The Congo Free State 285 

Into the heated discussions which took place in the 
Belgian Parliament in the spring and summer of 1901 re- 
specting the Convention of July 3, 1890, we cannot enter. 
The King interfered so as to prevent the acceptance of a 
reasonable compromise proposed by the Belgian Prime 
Minister, M. Beernaert; and ultimately matters were ar- 
ranged by a decree of August 7, 1901, which will probably 
lead to the transference of King Leopold's sovereign rights 
to Belgium at his death. In the meantime, the entire 
executive and legislative control is vested in him, and in a 
colonial Minister and council of four members, who are 
responsible solely to him, though the Minister has a seat 
in the Belgian Parliament. ^ To King Leopold, therefore, 
belongs the ultimate responsibility for all that is done in 
the Congo Free State. As M. Cattier phrased it in the 
year 1898: 'Belgium has no more right to intervene in 
the internal affairs of the Congo than the Congo State has 
to intervene in Belgian affairs. As regards the Congo 
Government, Belgium has no right either of intervention, 
direction, or control." 2 

Very many Belgians object strongly to the building up of 
an iwiperium in imperio in their land; and the wealth 
which the ivory and rubber of the Congo brings into their 
midst (not to speak of the stock-jobbing and company- 
promoting which go on at Brussels and Antwerp), does not 
blind them to the moral responsibility which the Belgian 
people has indirectly incurred. It is true that Belgium 
has no legal responsibility, but the State which has lent 
a large sum to the Congo Government, besides providing 
the great majority of the officials and exploiters of that 

i H. R. Fox-Bourne. Civilisation in Congoland, p. 277. 
2 M. Cattier, op. cit.. p. 88. 



286 The European Nations 

territory, cannot escape some amount of responsibility. M. 
Vandervelde, leader of the Labour Party in Belgium, has 
boldly and persistently asserted the right of the Belgian 
people to a share in the control of its eventual inheritance, 
but hitherto all the efforts of his colleagues have failed 
before the groups of capitalists who have acquired great 
monopolist rights in Congoland. 

Having now traced the steps by which the Congolese 
Government reached its present anomalous position, we 
will proceed to give a short account of its material progress 
and administration. 

No one can deny that much has been done in the way 

of engineering. A light railway has been constructed from 

near Vivi on the lower Congo to Stanley Pool, another 

from Boma into the districts north of that important river 

port. Others have been planned, or are already being 

constructed, between Stanley Falls and the northern end 

of Lake Tanganyika, with a branch to the Albert Nyanza. 

Another line will connect the upper part of the Congo River 

with the westernmost affluent of the Kasai River, thus 

taking the base of the arc instead of the immense curve of 

the main stream. By the year 1903, 480 kilometres of 

railway were open for traffic, while 1600 more were in 

course of construction or were being planned. It seems 

that the first 400 kilometres, in the hilly region near the 

seaboard, cost 75,000,000 francs in place of the 25,000,000 

francs first estimated. 1 Road-making has also been pushed 

on in many directions. A fiotilia of steamers plies on the 

great river and its chief affluents. In 1885 there were but 

five; the number now exceeds a hundred. As many as 

' L'Afrique nouvelle, by E. Descamps (1903), chap. xv. Much 
of the credit of the early railway-making was due to Colone] Thys. 



The Congo Free State 287 

1532 kilometres of telegraphs are now open. The exports 
advanced from 1,980,441 francs in 1885-86 to 50,488,394 
francs in 1901-02, mainly owing to the immense trade in 
rubber, of which more anon; the imports from 9,175,103 
francs in 1893 to 23,102,064 in igoi-02.1 

Far more important is the moral gain which has resulted 
from the suppression of the slave trade over a large part 
of the State. On this point we may quote the testimony 
of Mr. Roger Casement, British Consul at Boma, in an offi- 
cial report founded on observations taken during a long 
tour up the Congo. He writes: "The open selling of 
slaves, and the canoe convoys which once navigated the 
upper Congo, have everywhere disappeared. No act of 
the Congo State Government has perhaps produced more 
laudable results than the vigorous suppression of this wide- 
spread evil." 2 

King Leopold has also striven hard to extend the bounds 
of the Congo State. Not satisfied with his compact with 
France of April, 1887, which fixed the Ubangi River and 
its tributaries as the boundary of their possessions, he 
pushed ahead to the north-east of those confines, and early 
in the nineties established posts at Lado on the White Nile 
and in Bahr-el-Ghazal basin. Clearly his aim was to con- 
quer the districts which Egypt for the tim.e had given up 
to the Mahdi. These efforts brought about sharp friction 
between the Congolese authorities and France and Great 
Britain. After long discussions the Cabinet of London 
agreed to the convention of May 12, 1894, whereby the 
Congo State gained the Bahr-el-Ghazal basin and the left 
bank of the upper Nile, together with a port on the Albert 

* L'Afnqiie nouvelle, pp. 589-590. 

» Pari Papers, Africa, No. i (1904), p. 26. 



288 The European Nations 

Nyanza. On his side, King Leopold recognised the claims 
of England to the right bank of the Nile and to a strip of 
land between the Albert Nyanza and Lake Tanganyika. 
Owing to the strong protests of France and Germany this 
agreement was rescinded, and the Cabinet of Paris finally 
compelled King Leopold to give up all claims to the Bahr- 
el-Ghazal, though he acquired the right to lease the Lado 
district below the Albert Nyanza. The importance of 
these questions in the development of British policy in the 
Nile basin has been pointed out in Chapter VL 

The ostensible aim, however, of the founders of the 
Congo Free State was, not the exploitation of the upper 
Nile district, the making of railways and the exportation 
of great quantities of ivory and rubber from Congoland, 
but the civilising and uplifting of Central Africa. The 
General Act of the Berlin Conference begins with an in- 
vocation to Almighty God; and the Brussels Conference 
imitated its predecessor in this particular. It is, there- 
fore, as a civilising and moralising agency that the Congo 
Government will always be judged at the bar of posterity. 

The first essential of success in dealing with backward 
races is sympathy with their most cherished notions. Yet 
from the very outset one of these was violated. On July 
I, 1885, a decree of the Congo Free State asserted that all 
vacant lands were the property of the Government, that is, 
virtually of the King himself. Further, on June 30, 1887, 
an ordinance was decreed, claiming the right to let or sell 
domains, and to grant mining or wood-cutting rights on 
any land, "the ownership of which is not recognised as 
appertaining to any one." These decrees, we may remark, 
were for some time kept secret, until their effects became 
obvious. 



The Congo Free State 289 

All who know anything of the land systems of primitive 
peoples will see that they contravened the customs which 
the savage holds dear. The plots actually held and tilled 
by the natives are infinitesimally small when compared 
with the vast tracts over which their tribes claim hunting, 
pasturage, and other rights. The land system of the 
savage is everywhere communal. Individual ownership 
in the European sense is a comparatively late develop- 
ment. The Congolese authorities must have known this; 
for nearly all troubles with native races have arisen from 
the profound differences in the ideas of the European and 
the savage on the subject of land-holding. 

Yet, in face of the experience of former times, the Congo 
State put forward a claim which has led, or will lead, to 
the confiscation of all tribal or communal land-rights in 
that huge area. Such confiscation may, perhaps, be de- 
fended in the case of the United States, where the new- 
comers enormously outnumbered the Red Indians, and 
tilled land that previously lay waste. It is indefensible in 
the tropics, where the white settlers will always remain the 
units as compared with the millions whom they elevate or 
exploit.! The savage holds strongly to certain rudi- 
mentary ideas of justice, especially to the right, which he 
and his tribe have always claimed and exercised, of using 
the tribal land for the primary needs of life. When he is 
denied the right of hunting, cutting timber, or pasturage, 
he feels "cribbed, cabined, and confined." This, doubt- 
less, is the chief source of the quarrels between the new 

> The number of whites in Congoland is about 1700, of whom 
1060 are Belgians; the blacks number about 29,000,000, accord- 
ing to Stanley ; the Belgian Governor -General, Wahis, thinks this 
below the truth. See Wauters, L'Etat ittde pendant du Congo, pp. 
261, 432. 

VOL. II. — ig. 



290 The European Nations 

State and its proteges, also of the depression of spirits 
which Mr. Casement found so prevalent. The best French 
authorities on colonial development now admit that it is 
madness to interfere with the native land tenures in 
tropical Africa. 

The method used in the enlisting of men for public works 
and for the army has also caused many troubles. This 
question is admittedly one of great difficulty. Hard work 
must be done, and, in the tropics, the white man can only 
direct it. Besides, where life is fairly easy, men will not 
readily come forward to labour. Either the inducement 
offered must be adequate, or some form of compulsory enlist- 
ment must be adopted. The Belgian officials, in the plen- 
tiful lack of funds that has always clogged their State, 
have tried compulsion, generally through the native chiefs. 
These are induced, by the offer of cotton cloth or bright- 
coloured handkerchiefs, to supply men from the tribe. If 
the labourers are not forthcoming, the chief is punished, 
his village being sometimes burned. By means, then, of 
gaudy handkerchiefs, or firebrands, the labourers are ob- 
tained. They figure as "apprentices," under the law of 
November 8, 1888, which accorded "special protection to 
the blacks." 

The British Consul, Mr. Casement, in his report oir the 
administration of the Congo, stated that the majority of 
the government workmen at Leopoldville were under 
some form of compulsion, but were, on the whole, well 
cared for.^ 

According to a German resident in Congoland, the lot 
of the apprentices differs Httle from that of slaves. Their 
position, as contrasted with that of their former relation 
' Pari. Papers, Africa, No. i (1904), p. 27. 



The Congo Free State 291 

to the chief, is humorously defined by the term Uteres.'^ 
The hardships of the labourers on the State railways were 
such that the British Government refused to allow them to 
be recruited from Sierra Leone or other British possessions. 

However, now that a British Cabinet has allowed a great 
colony to make use of indentured yellow labour in its 
mines. Great Britain cannot, without glaring inconsistency, 
lodge any protest against the infringement, in Congoland, 
of the Act of the Berlin Conference in the matter of the 
treatment of hired labourers. If the lot of the Congolese 
apprentices is to be bettered, the initiative must be taken 
at some capital other than London. 

Another subject which nearly concerns the welfare of the 
Congo State is the recruiting and use of native troops. 
These are often raised from the most barbarous tribes of the 
far interior; their pay is very small; and too often the main 
inducement to serve under the blue banner with the golden 
star, is the facility for feasting and plunder at the ex- 
pense of other natives who have not satisfied the author- 
ities. As one of them naively said to Mr. Casement, he 
preferred to be with the hunters rather than with the hunted. 

It seems that grave abuses first crept in during the course 
of the campaign for the extirpation of slavery and slave- 
raiding in the Stanley Falls region. The Arab slave- 
raiders were rich, not only in slaves, but in ivory — prizes 
which tempted the cupidity of the native troops, and even, 
it is said, of their European officers. In any case, it is 
certain that the liberating forces, hastily raised and im- 
perfectly controlled, perpetrated shocking outrages on the 

1 A. Boshart, Zehn Jahre Afrikanischen Lebens (1898), quoted by 
Fox-Bourne, op. cit., p. 77. For futher details see the article by 
Mr. Glave, once an official of the Congo Free State, in the Century 
Magazine, liii ; also his work, Six Years in the Congo (1892). 



292 The European Nations 

tribes for whose sake they were waging war. The late Mr. 
Glave, in the article in the Century Magazine referred 
to above, found reason for doubting whether the crusade 
did not work almost as much harm as the evils it was sent 
to cure. His words were these: "The black soldiers are 
bent on fighting and raiding; they want no peaceful settle- 
ment. They have good rifles and ammunition, realise 
their superiority over the natives with their bows and 
arrows, and they want to shoot and kill and rob. Black 
delights to kill black, whether the victim be man, woman, 
or child, and no matter how defenceless." This deep- 
seated habit of mind is hard to eradicate; and among 
certain of the less reputable of the Belgian officers it has 
occasionally been used in order to terrorise into obedience 
tribes that kicked against the decrees of the Congo State. 

Undoubtedly there is great difficulty in avoiding friction 
with native tribes. All governments have at certain 
times and places behaved more or less culpably towards 
them. British annals have been fouled by many a mis- 
deed on the part of harsh officials and grasping pioneers, 
while recent revelations as to the treatment of natives in 
Western Australia show the need of close supervision of 
officials even in a popularly governed colony. The record 
of German East Africa and the French Congo is also very 
far from clean. Still, in the opinion of all who have 
watched over the welfare of the aborigines — among whom 
we may name Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Fox-Bourne — the 
treatment of the natives in a large part of the Congo Free 
State has been worse than in the districts named above. ^ 
There is also the further- damning fact that the very State 

> Sir Charles Dilke stated this very forcibly in a speech delivered 
at the Holborn Town Hall on June 7, 1Q05. 



The Congo Free State 293 

which claimed to be a great philanthropic agency has, 
until very recently, refused to institute any full inquiry 
into the alleged defects of its administration. 

Some of these defects may be traced to the bad system 
of payment of officials. Not only are they underpaid, but 
they have no pension such as is given by the British, 
French, and Dutch governments to their employees. The 
result is that the Congolese officer looks on his term of 
service in that unhealthy climate as a time when he must 
enrich himself for life. Students of Roman history know 
that, when this feeling becomes a tradition, it is apt to 
lead to grave abuses, the recital of which adds an undying 
interest to the speech of Cicero against Verres. In the 
case of the Congolese administrators the State provided 
(doubtless unwittingly) an incentive to harshness. It 
frequently supplemented its inadequate stipends by 
"gratifications," which are thus described and criticised 
by M. Cattier: "The custom was introduced of paying to 
officials prizes proportioned to the amount of produce of 
the ' private domain ' of the State, and of the taxes paid by 
the natives. That amounted to the inciting, by the spur 
of personal interest, of officials to severity and to rigour 
in the application of laws and regulations." Truly, a 
more pernicious application of the plan of "payment by 
results" cannot be conceived; and M. Cattier affirms that, 
though nominally abolished, it existed in reality down to 
the year 1898. 

Added to this are defects arising from the uncertainty 
of employment. An official may be discharged at once by 
the Governor-General on the ground of unfitness for 
service in Africa; and the man, when discharged, has 
no means of gaining redress. The natural result is the 



294 The European Nations 

growth of a habit of almost slavish obedience to the au- 
thorities, not only in regard to the written law, but also to 
private and semi-official intimations. i 

Another blot on the record of the Congo Free State is 
the exclusive character of the trading corporation to which 
it has granted concessions. Despite the promises made 
to private firms that early sought to open up business 
in its land, the government itself has become a great trad- 
ing corporation, with monopolist rights which close great 
regions to private traders and subject the natives to vex- 
atious burdens. This system took definite form in Sep- 
tember, 1 89 1, when the government claimed exclusive 
rights in trade in the extreme north and north-east. At 
the close of that year Captain Baert, the administrator of 
these districts, also enjoined the collection of rubber and 
other products by the natives for the benefit of the State. 

The next step was to forbid to private traders in that 
quarter the right of buying these products from natives. 
In May, 1892, the State monopoly in rubber, etc., was ex- 
tended to the "Equator" district, natives not being al- 
lowed to sell them to any one but a State official. Many 
of the merchants protested, but in vain. The chief result 
of their protest was the establishment of privileged com- 
panies, the "Societe Anversoise" and the "Anglo-Bel- 
gian," and the reservation to the State of large areas 
under the title of Domaines prives (October, 1892). 2 The 
apologetic skill of the partisans of the Congo State is very 
great; but it will hardly be equal to the task of proving 
that this new departure is not a direct violation of Article 

i Ca,i\AQV, Droit et Administration . . . du Congo, -pp. 2i^^-245. 
2 For a map of the domains now appropriated by these and other 
privileged "Trusts," see Morel, op. cit., p. 466. 



The Congo Free State 295 

V. of the General Act of the Berhn Conference of 1885, 
quoted above. 

A strange commentary on the latter part of that article, 
according full protection to all foreigners, was furnished 
by the executioa of the ex-missionary, Stokes, at the 
hands of Belgian officials in 1895 — a matter for which the 
Congo government finally made grudging and incomplete 
reparation. 1 Another case was as bad. In 1901 an 
Austrian trader, Rabinek, was arrested and imprisoned 
for "illegal" trading in rubber in the "Katanga Trust" 
country. Treated unfeelingly during his removal down 
the country, he succumbed to fever. His effects were 
seized and have not been restored to his heirs. 2 

When such treatment is meted out to white men who 
pursued their trade in reliance on the original constitution 
of the State, the natives may be expected to fare badly. 
Their misfortunes thickened when the government, on the 
plea that natives must contribute towards the expenses of 
the state, began to require them to collect and hand in a 
certain amount of rubber. The evidence of Mr. Casement 
clearly shows that the natives could not understand 
why this should suddenly be imposed on them; that the 
amount claimed was often excessive; and that the pun- 
ishment meted out for failure to comply with the official 
demands led to many barbarous actions on the part of 
officials and their native troops. Thus, at Bolobo, he 
found large numbers of industrious workers in iron who 
had fled from the Domaine de la Couronne (King Leo- 
pold's private domain) because "they had endured such 
ill-treatment at the hands of the government officials 

1 See the evidence in Pari. Papers, Africa, No. 8 (1896). 

2 Morel, op. cit., chaps, xxiii.-xxv. 



296 The European Nations 

and government soldiers in their own country that life 
had become intolerable, that nothing had remained for 
them at home but to be killed for failure to bring in a 
certain amount of rubber, or to die of starvation or ex- 
posure in their attempts to satisfy the demands made 
upon them." ^ 

On the north side of Lake Mantumba Mr. Casement 
found that the population had diminished by 60 or 70 
per cent, since the imposition of the rubber tax in 1893 — a 
fact, however, which may be partly assigned to the sleep- 
ing sickness. The tax led to constant fighting, until at 
last the officials gave up the effort and imposed a requisi- 
tion of food or gum-copal ; the change seems to have been 
satisfactory there and in other parts where it has been 
tried. In the former time the native soldiers punished 
delinquents with mutilation: proofs on this subject here 
and in several other places were indisputable. On the 
River Lulongo, Mr. Casement found that the amount of 
rubber collected from the natives generally proved to be 
in proportion to the number of guns used by the collecting 
force. 2 In some few cases natives were shot, even by 
white officers, on account of their failure to bring in the 
due amount of rubber.^ A comparatively venial form of 
punishment was the capture and detention of wives until 

1 Pari. Papers, Africa, No. i (1904), pp. 29, 60. A missionary 
Rev. J. Whitehead, wrote in July, 1903: "During the past seven 
years this dontaine prive of King Leopold has been a veritable 
' hell on earth.'" Ibid., p. 64. 

2 Ibid., pp. 34, 43. 44. 49. 76, etc. 

3 Ibid., p. 70. The effort made by the Chevalier de Cuvelier to 
rebut Mr. Casement's charges consists mainly of an ineffective tit 
quoque. To compare the rubber tax of the Congo State with the 
hut-tax of Sierra Leone begs the whole question. Mr. Casement 
proves (p. 27) that the natives do not object to reasonable taxa- 



The Congo Free State 297 

their husbands made up the tale. Is it surprising that 
thousands of the natives of the north have fled into French 
Congoland, itself by no means free from the grip of mono- 
polist companies, but not terrorised as are most of the 
tribes of the " Free State"? 

Livingstone, in his day, regarded ivory as the chief cause 
of the slave trade in Central and Eastern Africa; but it is 
questionable whether even ivory (now a vanishing pro- 
duct) brought more woe to millions of negroes than the 
viscous fluid which enables the pleasure-seekers of Paris, 
London, and New York to rush luxuriously through space. 
The swift Juggernaut of the present age is accountable for 
as much misery as ever sugar or ivory was in the old slave 
days. But it seems that, so long as the motor-car in- 
dustry prospers, the dumb woes of the millions of Africa 
will count for little in the Courts of Europe. During the 
session of 1904 Lord Lansdowne made praise-worthy 
efforts to call their attention to the misgovernment of the 
Congo State; but he met with no response except from 
the United States, Italy, and Turkey (!) A more signcil 
proof of the weakness and cynical selfishness now prevalent 

tion which comes regularly. They do object to demands for rubber 
which are excessive and often involve great privations. Above 
all the punishments utterly cow them and cause them to flee 
to the forests. 

The efforts of Mr. Macdonnell in K'ng Leopold II (London, 1905) 
to refute Mr. Casement also seem to me weak and inconclusive. 
The reply of the Congo Free State is printed by Mr. H. W. Wack 
in the Appendix of his Story of the Congo Free State (New York, 
1905). It convicts Mr. Casement of inaccuracy on a few details. 
Despite all that has been written by various apologists, it may be 
affirmed that the Congo Free State has yet made no adequate 
defence. Possibly it will appear in the report which, it is hoped, 
will be published in full by the official commission of inquiry now 
sitting. 



298 The European Nations 

in high quarters has never been given than in this aban- 
donment of a plain and bounden duty. 

A shght amount of pubhc spirit on the part of the 
signatories of the BerHn Act would have sufficed to prevent 
Congolese affairs drifting into the present highly anomalous 
situation. That land is not Belgian, and it is not inter- 
national — except in a strictly legal sense. It is difficult to 
say what it is if it be not the private domain of King 
Leopold and of several monopolist - controlHng trusts. 
Probably the only way out of the present slough of despond 
is the definite assumption of sole responsibility by the 
Belgian people; for it should be remembered that a very 
large number of patriotic Belgians urgently long to re- 
dress evils for which they feel themselves to be indirectly, 
and to a limited extent, chargeable. At present, those who 
carefully study the evidence relating to the BerHn Con- 
ference of 1885, and the facts, so far as they are ascertain- 
able to-day, must pronounce the Congo experiment to be 
a terrible failure. 



CHAPTER IX 



RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 



' ' This war,, waged . . . for the command of the waters of the 
Pacific Ocean, so urgently necessary for the peaceful prosperity, 
not only of our own, but of other nations." — The Czar's Proclama- 
tion of March 3, 1905. 

OF all the collisions of racial interests that have made 
recent history, none has turned the thoughts of the 
world to regions so remote, and events so dramatic in their 
intensity and momentous in their results, as that which 
has come about in Manchuria. The Far Eastern Question 
is the outcome of the expansion of two vigorous races, that 
of Russia and Japan, at the expense of the almost torpid 
poHty of China. The struggle has taken place in the de- 
batable lands north and west of Korea, where Tartars and 
Chinese formerly warred for supremacy, and where geo- 
graphical and commercial considerations enhance the value 
of the most northerly of the ice-free ports of the continent 
of Asia. 

In order to understand the significance of this great 
struggle, we must look back to the earlier stages of the ex- 
tension of Russian influence. Up to a very recent period 
the eastward growth of Russia affords an instance of swift 
and natural expansion. Picture on the one side a young 
and vigorous community, dowered with patriotic pride 
by the long and eventually triumphant conflict with the 

299 



300 The European Nations 

Tartar hordes, and dwelling in dreary plains where Nature 
now and again drives men forth on the quest for a suffi- 
ciency of food. On the other hand, behold a vast territory, 
well watered, with no natural barrier between the Urals 
and the Pacific, sparsely inhabited by tribes of nomads 
having Httle in common. The one active community will 
absorb the ill-organised units as inevitably as the rising 
tide overflows the neighbouring mud-flats when once the 
intervening barrier is overtopped. In the case of Russia 
and Siberia the only barrier is that of the Ural mountains ; 
and their gradual slopes form a slighter barrier than is any- 
where else figured on the map of the world in so con- 
spicuous a chain. The Urals once crossed, the slopes and 
waterways invite the traveller eastward. 

The French revolutionists of 1793 used to say, "With 
bread and iron one can get to China." Russian pioneers 
had made good that boast nearly two centuries before it 
was uttered in Paris. The impelling force which set in 
motion the Muscovite tide originated with a man whose 
name is rarely heard outside Russia. Yet, if the fame of 
men were proportionate to the effect of their exploits, few 
names would be more widely known than that of Jermak. 
This man had been a hauler of boats up the banks of the 
Volga, until his strength, hardihood, and love of adventure 
impelled him to a freebooting life, wherein his powers of 
command and the fierce thoroughness of his methods 
speedily earned him the name of Jermak, "the millstone." 
In the year 1580, the wealthy family of the Stroganoffs, 
tempted by stories of the wealth to be gained from the 
fur-bearing animals of Siberia, turned their thoughts to 
Jermak and his robber band as the readiest tools for the 
conquest of those plains. The enterprise appealed to 



Russia in the Far East 301 

Jermak and the hardy Cossacks with whom he had to do. 
He and his men were no less skilled in river craft than in 
fighting; and the roving Cossack spirit kindled at the 
thought of new lands to harry. Proceeding by boat from 
Perm, they worked their way into the spurs of the Urals, 
and then by no very long portage crossed one of its lower 
passes and found themselves on one of the tributaries of 
the Obi. 

Thenceforth their course was easy. Jermak and his 
small band of picked fighters were more than a match for 
the wretchedly armed and craven-spirited Tartars, who 
fled at the sound of firearms. In 1581 the settlement, 
called Sibir, fell to the invaders; and, though they soon 
abandoned this rude encampment for a new foundation, 
the town of Tobolsk, yet the name Siberia recalls their 
pride at the conquest of the enemy's capital. The tra- 
ditional skill of the Cossacks in the handling of boats 
greatly aided their advance, and despite the death of Jer- 
mak in battle, his men pressed on and conquered nearly 
the half of Siberia within a decade. What Drake and 
the sea-dogs of Devon were then doing for England on the 
Western main, was being accomplished for Russia by the 
ex-pirate and his band from the Volga. The two expan- 
sive movements were destined finally to meet on the shores 
of the Pacific in the northern creeks of what is now British 
Columbia. 

The later stages in Russian expansion need not detain 
us here. The excellence of the Cossack methods in foray- 
ing, pioneer- work, and the forming of military settlements, 
consolidated the Muscovite conquests. The Tartars were 
fain to submit to the Czar, or to flee to the nomad tribes 
of Central Asia or Northern China. The invaders reached 



302 The European Nations 

the river Lena in the year 1630; and some of their ad- 
venturers voyaged down the Amur, and breasted the waves 
of the Pacific in 1636. Cossack bands conquered Kam- 
chatka in 1699-1700.^ 

Meanwhile the first collision between the white and 
the yellow races took place on the river Amur, which 
the Chinese claimed as their own. At first the Russians 
easily prevailed; but in the year 1689 they suffered a 
check. New vigour was then manifested in the councils 
of Pekin, and the young Czar, Peter the Great, in his long- 
ing for triumphs over Swedes and Turks, thought lightly 
of gains at the expense of the "celestials." He therefore 
gave to Russian energies that trend westwards and south- 
wards which after him marked the reigns of Catharine 
II., Alexander I., and, in part, of Nicholas I. The sur- 
render of the Amur valley to China in 1689 ended all 
efforts of Russia in that direction for a century and a half. 
Many Russians believe that the earlier impulse was sounder 
and more fruitful in results for Russia than her meddling 
in the wars of the French Revolution and Empire. 

Not till 1846 did Russia resume her march down the 
valley of the Amur ; and then the new movement was • 
partly due to British action. At that time the hostility 
of Russia and Britain was becoming acute on Asiatic and 
Turkish questions. Further, the first Anglo-Chinese War 
(1840-42) led to the cession of Hong-Kong to the distant 
islanders, who also had five Chinese ports opened to their 
trade. This enabled Russia to pose as the protector of 
China, and to claim points of vantage whence her covering 
wings might be extended over that Empire. The states- 
men of Pekin had little belief in the genuineness of these 
' Vladimir, Russia on the Pacific. 



Russia in the Far East 303 

offers, especially in view of the thorough exploration of the 
Amur region and the Gulf of Okhotsk which speedily 
ensued. 

The Czar, in fact, now inaugurated a forward Asiatic 
policy, and confided it to an able governor, Muravieff 
(1847). The new departure was marked by the issue of 
an imperial ukase (1851) ordering the Russian settlers be- 
yond Lake Baikal to conform to the Cossack system; that 
is, to become liable to military duties in return for the 
holding of land in the more exposed positions. Three 
years later Muravieff ordered six thousand Cossacks to 
migrate from these trans-Baikal settlements to the land 
newly acquired from China on the borders of Manchuria.^ 
In the same year the Russians established a station at the 
mouth of the Amur, and in 1853 gained control over part 
of the Island of Saghalien. 

For the present, then, everything seemed to favour 
Russia's forward policy. The tribes on the Amur were 
passive; an attack of an Anglo-French squadron on 
Petropaulovsk, a port in Kamchatka, failed (August, 
1854) ; and the Russians hoped to be able to harry British 
commerce from this and other naval bases in the Pacific. 
Finally, the rupture with England and France, and the 
beginning of the Taeping rebellion in China, induced the 
Court of Peking to agree to Russia's demands for the Amur 
boundary, and for a subsequent arrangement respecting 
the ownership of the districts between the mouth of that 
river and the bay on which now stands the port of 
Vladivostok (May 15, 1858). The latter concession left 
the door open for Muravieff to push on Russia's claims 
to this important wedge of territory. His action was 
1 Popowski, The Rival Poivers in Central Asia, p. 13. 



304 The European Nations 

characteristic. He settled Cossacks along the Ussuri River, 
a southern tributary of the Amur, and, by pressing cease- 
lessly on the celestials (then distracted by a war with Eng- 
land and France), he finally brought them to agree to the 
cession of the district around the new settlement, which 
was soon to receive the name ' of Vladivostok (" Lord 
of the East"). He also acquired for the Czar the Man- 
churian coast down to the bounds of Korea (November 2, 
i860). Russia thus threw her arms around the great 
province which had provided China with her dynasty and 
her warrior caste, and was still one of the wealthiest and 
most cherished lands of that Empire. Having secured 
these points of vantage in Northern China, the Muscovites 
could await with confidence further developments in the 
decay of that once formidable organism. 

Such, in brief, is the story of Russian expansion from the 
Urals to the Sea of Japan. Probably no conquest of such 
magnitude was ever made with so little expenditure of 
blood and money. In one sense this is its justification, 
that is, if we view the course of events, not by the lime- 
light of abstract right, but by the ordinary daylight of 
expediency. Conquests which strain the resources of the 
victors and leave the vanquished longing for revenge, 
carry their own condemnation. On the other hand, the 
triumph of Russia over the ill-organised tribes of Siberia 
and Northern Manchuria reminds one of the easy and un- 
alterable methods of nature, which compels a lower type 
of life to yield up its puny force for the benefit of a higher. 
It resembles the victory of man over quadrupeds, of order 
over disorder, of well-regulated strength over weakness 
and stupidity. 



Russia in the Far East 305 

Muravieff deserves to rank among the makers of modern 
Russia. He waited his time, used his Cossack pawns as an 
effective screen to each new opening of the game, and 
pushed his foes hardest when they were at their weakest. 
Moreover, like Bismarck, he knew when to stop. He saw 
the limit that separated the practicable from the im- 
practicable. He brought' the Russian coast near to the 
latitudes where harbours are free from ice; but he fore- 
bore to encroach on Korea — a step which would have 
brought Japan on to the field of action. The Muscovite 
race, it was clear, had swallowed enough to busy its 
digestive powers for many a year ; and it was partly on his 
advice that Russian North America was sold to the United 
States. 

Still, Russia's advance southwards towards ice-free 
ports was only checked, not stopped. In 1861 a Russian 
man-of-war took possession of the Tshushima Isles between 
Korea and Japan, but withdrew on the protest of the 
British admiral. Six years later the Muscovites strength- 
ened their grip on Saghalien, and thereafter exercised with 
Japan joint sovereignty over that island. The natural 
result followed. In 1875 Russia found means to eject her 
partner, the Japanese receiving as compensation undis- 
puted claim to the barren Kuriles, which they already 
possessed. 1 

Even before this further proof of Russia's expansive- 
ness, Japan had seen the need of adapting herself to the 
new conditions consequent on the advent of the Great Pow- 
ers in the Far East. This is not the place for a descrip- 
tion of the remarkable revolution of the years 1867-71. 

1 The Russo-Japanese Conflict, by K. Asakawa (1904), p. 67; 
Europe and the Far East, by Sir R. K. Douglas (1904), p. 191. 

VOL. II. — 20. 



3o6 The European Nations 

Suffice it to say that the events recounted above un- 
doubtedly helped on the centralising of the powers in the 
hands of the Mikado, and the Europeanising of the insti- 
tutions and armed forces of Japan. In face of aggressions 
by Russia and quarrels with the maritime • Powers, a 
vigorous seafaring people felt the need of systems of 
organisation and self-defence other than those provided 
by the rule of feudal lords, and levies drilled with bows and 
arrows. The subsequent history of the Far East may be 
summed up in the statement that Japan faced the new 
situation with the brisk adaptability of a maritime people, 
while China plodded along on her old tracks with a patience 
and stubbornness eminently bovine. 

The events which finally brought Russia and Japan into 
collision arose out of the obvious need for the construction 
of a railway from St. Peterburg to the Pacific having its 
terminus on an ice-free port. Only so could Russia de- 
velop the resources of Siberia and the Amur Province. In 
the sixties and seventies trans-continental railways were 
being planned and successfully laid in North America. But 
there is this difference; in the New World the iron horse 
has been the friend of peace ; in the Far East of Asia it has 
hurried on the advent of war; and for this reason, that 
Russia, having no ice-free harbour at the end of her great 
Siberian line, was tempted to grasp at one which the 
yellow races looked on as altogether theirs. 

The miscalculation was natural. The rapid extension 
of trade in the Pacific Ocean seamed to invite Russia to 
claim her full share in a development that had already 
enriched England, the United States, and, later, Ger- 
many and France; and events placed within the Mus- 
covite grasp positions which fulfilled all the conditions 



Russia in the Far East 307 

requisite for commercial prosperity and military and naval 
domination. 

For many years past vague projects of a trans-Siberian 
railway had been in the air. In 1857 an English engineer 
offered to construct a horse tramway from Perm, across the 
Urals, and to the Pacific. An American also proposed to 
make a railway for locomotives from Irkutsk to the head 
waters of the Amur. In 1875 the Russian Government 
decided to construct a line from Perm as far as a western 
affluent of the river Obi ; but owing to want of funds the line 
was carried no farther than Tiumen on the River Tobol (1880). 

The financial difficulty was finally overcome by the 
generosity of the French, who, as we have already seen 
(Vol. II., Chapter I.), late in the eighties began to subscribe 
to all the Russian loans placed on the Paris Bourse. The 
scheme now became practicable, and in March, 1891, an 
imperial ukase appeared sanctioning the mighty under- 
taking. It was made known at Vladivostok by the Czare- 
vitch (now Nicholas II.) in the course of a lengthy tour in 
the Far East; and he is known then to have gained that 
deep interest in those regions which has moulded Russian 
policy throughout his reign. Quiet, unostentatious, and 
even apathetic on most subjects, he then, as we may judge 
from subsequent events, determined to give to Russian 
energies a decided trend towards the Pacific. As Czar, he 
has placed that aim in the forefront of his policy. With 
him the Near East has always been second to the Far 
East; and in the critical years 1896-97, when the suffer- 
ings of Christians in Turkey became acute, he turned a 
deaf ear to the cries of myriads who had rarely sent their 
prayers northwards in vain. The most reasonable explan- 
ation of this callousness is that Nicholas II. at that time 



3o8 The European Nations 

had no ears save for the call of the Pacific Ocean. This 
was certainly the policy of his Ministers, Prince Lobanoff, 
Count MuraviefE, and Count Lamsdorff . It was oceanic. 

The necessary prelude to Russia's new policy was the 
completion of the trans-Siberian railway, certainly one of 
the greatest engineering feats ever attempted by man. 
While a large part of the route offers no more difficulty 
than the conquest of limitless levels, there are portions 
that have taxed to the utmost the skill and patience of the 
engineer. The deep trough of Lake Baikal has now (June, 
1905) been circumvented by the construction of a railway 
(here laid with double tracks) which follows the rocky 
southern shore. This part of the line, 244 versts (162 
miles) long, has involved enormous expense. In fifty-six 
miles there are thirty-nine tunnels, and thirteen galleries 
for protection against rock-slides. This short section is 
said to have cost ;^i,i7o,ooo. The energy with which the 
Government pushed on this stupendous work during the 
Russo-Japanese war yields one more proof of their deter- 
mination to secure at all costs the aims which they set in 
view in and after the year 1 891.1 

Other parts of the track have also presented great diffi- 
culties. East of Lake Baikal the line gradually winds its 
way up to a plateau some three thousand feet higher than 
the lake, and then descends to treacherous marsh lands. 
The district of the Amur bristles with obstacles, not the 
least being the terrible floods that now and again (as in 
1897) turn the whole valley into a trough of swirling 
waters. 2 

1 See an article by Mr. J. M. Price in The Fortnightly Review for 
May, 1905. 

2 Russia on the Pacific, by "Vladimir"; The Awakening of the 
East, by P. Leroy-Beaulieu, chaps, ix., x. 



Russia in the Far East 309 

All these difficulties have been overcome in course of 
time; but there remained the question of the terminus. 
Up to the year 1894 the objective had been Vladivostok; 
but the outbreak of the Chino-Japanese War at that time 
opened up vast possibilities. Russia could either side 
with the islanders and share with them the spoils of 
Northern China, or, posing as the patron of the celestials, 
claim some profitable douceurs as her reward. 

She chose the latter alternative, and, in the opinion of 
some of her own writers, wrongly. The war proved the 
daring, the patriotism, and the organising skill of the 
Japanese to be as signal as the sloth and corruptibility of 
their foes. Then, for the first time, the world saw the 
utter weakness of China — a fact which several observers 
(including Lord Curzon) had vainly striven to make clear. 
Even so, when Chinese generals and armies took to their 
heels at the slightest provocation; when their battle-ships 
were worsted by Japanese armoured cruisers; when their 
great stronghold. Port Arthur, was stormed with a loss of 
about four hundred killed, the moral of it all was hidden 
from the wise men of the West. Patronising things were 
said of the Japanese as conquerers — of the Chinese; but 
few persons realised that a new Power had arisen. It 
seemed the easiest of undertakings to despoil the " venomous 
dwarfs" of the fruits of their triumph over China. ^ 

The chief conditions of the Chino-Japanese Treaty of 
Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) were the handing over to 
Japan the Island of Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula. 
The latter was very valuable, inasmuch as it contained 

' See the evidence adduced by V. Chirol, The Far Eastern Ques- 
tion, chap, xi., as to the ultimately aggressive designs of China on 
Japan. 



3IO The European Nations 

good ice-free harbours which dominated the Yellow Sea 
and the Gulf of Pechili; and herein must be sought the 
reason for the action of Russia at this crisis. Li Hung 
Chang, the Chinese negotiator, had already been bought 
over by Russia in an important matter,^ and he early dis- 
closed the secret of the terms of peace with Japan. Russia 
was thus forewarned; and, before the treaty was ratified 
at Pekin, her Government, acting in concert with those of 
France and Germany, intervened with a menacing declara- 
tion that the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula would give 
to Japan a dangerous predominance in the affairs of China 
and disturb the whole balance of power in the Far East. 
The Russian note addressed to Japan further stated 
that such a step would "be a perpetual obstacle to the 
permanent peace of the Far East." Had Russia alone 
been concerned, possibly the Japanese would have re- 
ferred matters to the sword; but, when face to face with a 
combination of three Powers, they decided on May 4th 
to give way, and to restore the Liaotung Peninsula to 
China. ^ 

The reasons for the conduct of France and Germany in 
this matter are not fully known. We may safely con- 
jecture that the Republic acted conjointly with the Czar 
in order to clinch the new Franco-Russian alliance, not 
from any special regard for China, a Power with which she 
had frequently come into collision respecting Tonquin. 
As for Germany, she was then entering on new colonial 
undertakings; and she doubtless saw in the joint inter- 
vention of 1895 a means of sterilising the Franco- Russian 
alliance, so far as she herself was concerned, and possibly 

1 Manchu and Muscovite, by B. L. Putnam Weale, p. 60. 

2 Asakawa, op. ci*., p. 76. 



Russia in the Far East 311 

of gaining Russia's assent to the future German expansion 
in the Far East. 

Here, of course, we are reduced to conjecture, but the 
conjecture is consonant with later developments. In any 
case, the new Triple Alliance was a temporary and artificial 
union, which prompt and united action on the part of 
Great Britain and the United States would have speedily 
dissolved. Unfortunately these Powers were engrossed 
in other concerns, and took no action to redress the balance 
which the self-constituted champions of political stability 
were upsetting to their own advantage. 

The effects of their action were diverse, and for the most 
part unforeseen. In the first place, Japan, far from being 
discouraged by this rebuff, set to work to perfect her army 
and navy, and with a thoroughness which Roon and 
Moltke would have envied. Organisation, weapons, drill, 
marksmanship (the last a weak point in the war with 
China) were improved; heavy ironclads were ordered, 
chiefly in British yards, and, when procured, were handled 
with wonderful efficiency. Few, if any, of those "dis- 
asters" which are so common in the British navy in time 
of peace, occurred in the new Japanese navy— a fact which 
redounds equally to the credit of the British instructors and 
to the pupils themselves. 

The surprising developments of the Far Eastern Ques- 
tion were soon to bring the new armaments to a terrible 
test. Japan and the whole world believed that the Liao- 
tung Peninsula was made over to China in perpetuity. It 
soon appeared that the Czar and his Ministers had other 
views, and that, having used France and Germany for the 
purpose of warning off Japan, they were preparing schemes 
for the subjection of Manchuria to Russian influence. Or 



312 The European Nations 

rather, it is probable that Li Hung Chang had already- 
arranged the following terms with Russia as the price of 
her intervention on behalf of China. The needs of the 
Court of Pekin and the itching palms of its officials proved 
to be singularly helpful in the carrying out of the bargain. 
China being unequal to the task of paying the Japanese 
war indemnity, Russia undertook to raise a four per cent, 
loan of 400,000,000 francs — of course mainly at Paris — in 
order to cover the half of that debt. In return for this 
favour, the Muscovites required the establishment of a 
Russo-Chinese Bank having widespread powers, compris- 
ing the receipt of taxes, the management of local finan- 
ces, and the construction of such railway and telegraph 
lines as might be conceded by the Chinese authorities. 

This in itself was excellent "brokerage" on the French 
money, of which China was assumed to stand in need. At 
one stroke Russia ended the commercial supremacy of 
England in China, the result of a generation of commercial 
enterprise conducted on the ordinary lines, and substituted 
her own control, with powers almost equal to those of a 
Viceroy. They enabled her to displace Englishmen from 
various posts in Northern China and to clog the efforts of 
their merchants at every turn. The British Government, 
we may add, showed a singular equanimity in face of this 
procedure. 

But this was not all. At the close of March, 1896, it 
appeared that the gratitude felt by the Chinese Andromeda 
to the Russian Perseus had ripened into a definite union. 
The two Powers framed a secret treaty of alliance which 
accorded to the northern state the right to make use of 
any harbour in China, and to levy Chinese troops in case 
of a conflict with an Asiatic State. In particular, the 



Russia in the Far East 313 

Court of Pekin granted to its ally the free use of Port 
Arthur in time of peace, or, if the other Powers should 
object, of Kiao-chau. Manchuria was thrown open to 
Russian officers for purposes of survey, etc., and it was 
agreed that on the completion of the trans-Siberian rail- 
way, a line should be constructed southwards to Talienwan 
or some other place, under the joint control of the two 
Powers. 1 

The treaty marks the end of the first stage in the Russi- 
fication of Manchuria. Another stage was soon covered, 
and, as it seems, by the adroitness of Count Cassini, Russian 
Minister at Pekin. The details, and even the existence, 
of the Cassini Convention of September 30, 1896, have 
been disputed; but there are good grounds for accepting 
the following account as correct: Russia received per- 
mission to construct her line to Vladivostok across Man- 
churia, thereby saving the northern detour down the 
difficult valley of the Amur; also to build her own Hne to 
Mukden, if China found herself unable to do so; and the 
hne southwards to Talienwan, and Port Arthur was to be 
made on Russian plans. Further, all these new lines 
built by Russia might be guarded by her troops, pre- 
sumably to protect them from natives who objected to the 
inventions of the "foreign devils." As regards naval 
affairs, the Czar's Government gained the right to "lease" 
from China the harbour of Kiao-chau for fifteen years , and, 
in case of war, to make use of Port Arthur. The last 
clauses granted to Russian subjects the right to acquire 
mining rights in Manchuria, and to the Czar's officers to 
drill the levies of that province in the European style, 
should China desire to reorganise them. 2 

» Asakawa, pp. 85-87. 2 Ibid., chap. ii. 



314 The European Nations 

But the protector had not reaped the full reward of his 
timely intervention in the spring of 1895. He had not yet 
gained complete control of an ice-free harbour. In fact, 
the prize of Kiao-chau, nearly within reach, now seemed 
to be snatched from his grasp by Kaiser Wilhelm. The 
details are well known. Two German subjects who were 
Roman Catholic missionaries in the Shan-tung province 
were barbarously murdered by Chinese ruffians on Novem- 
ber I, 1897. The outrage was of a flagrant kind, but in 
ordinary times would have been condoned by the punish- 
ment of the offenders and a fine payable by the district. 
But the occasion was far from ordinary. A German 
squadron therefore steamed into Kiao-chau and occupied 
that important harbour. 

There is reason to think that Germany had long been 
desirous of gaining a foothold in that rich province. The 
present writer has been assured by a geological expert, Pro- 
fessor Skertchley, who made the first map of the district 
for the Chinese authorities, that that map was urgently 
demanded by the German envoy at Pekin about this time. 
In any case, the mineral wealth of the district undoubtedly 
influenced the course of events. In accordance with a 
revised version of the old Christian saying, "The blood of 
the martyrs is the seed of — the Empire," the Emperor 
William despatched his brother, Prince Henry — the 
"mailed fist" of Germany— with a squadron to strengthen 
the imperial grip on Kiao-chau. The Prince did so with- 
out opposition either from China or Russia. Finally, on 
March 5, 1898, the Court of Pekin confirmed to Germany 
the lease of that port and of the neighbouring parts of the 
province of Shan-tung. 

The whole affair caused a great stir, because it seemed to 



Russia in the Far East 3^5 

prelude a partition of China, and that, too, in spite of the 
well-meaning declarations of the Salisbury Cabinet in 
favour, first, of the integrity of that Empire, and, when that 
was untenable, of the policy of the "open door" for traders 
of all nations. Most significant of all was the conduct of 
Russia. As far as is known, she made no protest against 
the action of Germany in a district to which she herself had 
laid claim. It is reasonable, on more grounds than one, 
to suppose that the two Powers had come to some tmder- 
standing, Russia conceding Kiao-chau to the Kaiser, pro- 
vided that she herself gained Port Arthur and its peninsula. 
Obviously she could not have faced the ill-will of Japan, 
Great Britain, Germany, and the United States — all more 
or less concerned at her rapid strides southward ; and it is 
at least highly probable that she bought off Germany by 
waiving her own claims to Kiao-chau, provided that she 
gained an ideal terminus for her Siberian line, and a great 
naval and miUtary stronghold. It is also worth noting 
that the first German troops were landed at Kiao-chau on 
November 17, 1897, while three Russian warships steamed 
into Port Arthur on December 1 8th ; and that the German 
"lease" was signed at Pekin on March 5, 1898; while that 
accorded to Russia bears date March 2'jth.A 

If we accept the naive suggestion of the Russian author, 
"Vladimir," the occupation of Kiao-chau by Germany 
"forced" Russia "to claim some equivalent compensa- 
tion." Or possibly the cession of Port Arthur was another 
of the items in Li Hung Chang's bargain with Russia. In 
any case, the Russian warships entered Port Arthur, at 
first as if for a temporary stay ; when two British warships 
repaired thither the Czar's Government requested them to 
> Asakawa, p. no, note. 



3 '6 The European Nations 

leave — a request with which the SaHsbury Cabinet com- 
phed in an inexplicably craven manner (January, 1898). 
Rather more pressure was needed on the somnolent man- 
darins of Pekin ; but, under the threat of war with Russia 
if the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula were not granted by 
March 27th, it was signed on that day. She thereby 
gained control of that peninsula for twenty-five years, a 
period which might be extended "by mutual agreement." 
The control of all the land forces was vested in a Russian 
official ; and China undertook not to quarter troops to the 
north without the consent of the Czar. Port Arthur was 
reserved to the use of Russian and Chinese ships of war; 
and Russia gained the right to erect fortifications. 

The British Government, which had hitherto sought to 
uphold the integrity of China, thereupon sought to "save 
its face" by leasing Wei-hai-wei (July ist). An excuse 
for the weakness of the Cabinet in Chinese affairs has been 
put forward, namely, that the issue of the Sudan campaign 
was still in doubt, and that the efforts of French and Rus- 
sians to reach the upper Nile from the French Congo and 
Southern Abyssinia compelled Ministers to concentrate 
their attention on that great enterprise. But this excuse 
will not bear examination. Strength at any one point of 
an Empire is not increased by discreditable surrenders at 
other points. No great statesman would have proceeded 
on such an assumption. 

Obviously the balance of gain in these shabby trans- 
actions in the north of China was enormously in favour of 
Russia. She now pushed on her railway southwards with 
all possible energy. It soon appeared that Port Arthur 
could not remain an open port, and it was closed to mer- 
chant ships. Then Talienwan was named in place of it, 



Russia in the Far East 317 

but under restrictions which made the place of Httle value 
to foreign merchants. Thereafter the new port of Dalny 
was set apart for purposes of commerce, but the efficacy of 
the arrangements there has never been tested. In the in- 
tentions of the Czar, Port Arthur was to become the 
Gibraltar of the Far East, while Dalny, as the commercial 
terminus of the trans-Siberian line, figured as the Cadiz of 
the new age of exploration and commerce opening out to 
the gaze of Russia. 

That motives of genuine philanthropy played their part 
in the Far Eastern policy of the Czar may readily be 
granted; but the enthusiasts who acclaimed him as the 
world's peacemaker at The Hague Congress (May, 1899) 
were somewhat troubled by the thought that he had 
compelled China to cede to his enormous Empire the very 
peninsula the acquisition of which by little Japan had been 
declared to be an unwarrantable disturbance of the bal- 
ance of power in the Far East. 

These events caused a considerable sensation in Greal 
Britain, even in a generation which had become inured to 
"graceful concessions." In truth, the part played by her 
in the Far East has been a sorry one ; and if there be eager 
partisans who still maintain that British Imperialism is an 
unscrupulously aggressive force, ever on the search for new 
enemies to fight and new lands to annex, a course of study 
in the Blue Books dealing with Chinese affairs in 1897-99 
may with some confidence be prescribed as a sedative and 
lowering diet. It seems probable that the weakness of 
British diplomacy induced the belief , at St. Petersburg 
that no opposition of any account would be forthcoming. 
With France acting as the complaisant treasurer, and 
Germany acquiescent, the Czar and his advisers might well 



3i8 The European Nations 

believe that they had reached the goal of their efforts, "the 
domination of the Pacific." 

With the Boxer movement of the years 1 899-1 900 we 
have here no concern. Considered pathologically, it was 
only the spasmodic protest of a body which the dissectors 
believed to be ready for operation. To assign it solely to 
dislike of European missionaries argues sheer inability to 
grasp the laws of evidence. Missionaries had been working 
in China for several decades, and were no more disliked 
than other "foreign devils." The rising was clearly due 
to indignation at the rapacity of the European Powers. 
We may note that it gave the Russian governor of the 
town of Blagovestchensk an opportunity of cowing the 
Chinese of Northern Manchuria by slaying and drowning 
some forty-five hundred persons at that place (July, 1900). 
Thereafter Russia invaded Manchuria and claimed the un- 
limited rights due to actual conquest. On April 8, 1902, 
she promised to withdraw; but her persistent neglect to 
fulfil that promise (cemented by treaty with China) led to 
the outbreak of hostilities with Japan. 1 

We can now see that Russia, since the accession of 
Nicholas II., has committed two great faults in the Far 
East. She has overreached herself; and she has over- 
looked one very important factor in the problem — Japan. 
The subjects of the Mikado quivered with rage at the in- 
sult implied by the seizure of Port Arthur; but, with the 
instinct of a people at once proud and practical, they 
thrust down the flames of resentment and turned them 
into a mighty motive force. Their preparations for 
war, steady and methodical before, now gained redoubled 

• Asakawa, chap. vii. ; and for the Korean Question, chaps, xvi., 
xvii. 



Russia in the Far East 319 

energy; and the whole nation thrilled secretly but irre- 
sistibly to one cherished aim, the recovery of Port Arthur. 
How great is the power of chivalry and patriotism the 
world has now seen ; but it is apt to forget that love of life 
and fear of death are feelings alike primal and inalienable 
among the Japanese as among other peoples. The in- 
spiring force which nerved some forty thousand men gladly 
to lay down their lives on the hills around Port Arthur was 
the feeling that they were helping to hurl back in the face 
of Russia the gauntlet which she had there so insolently 
flung down as to an inferior race. 



CHAPTER X 

THE NEW GROUPING OF THE GREAT POWERS* 
(1900- I 907) 

WHEN I penned the words at the end of Chapter IX., 
it seemed probable that the mad race in armaments 
must lead either to war or to revolution. In these three 
supplementary chapters, I seek to trace very briefly the 
causes that have led to war, in other words, to the ascend- 
ancy (perhaps temporary) of the national principle over the 
social and international tendencies of the age. 

The collapse of the international and pacifist movement 
may be ascribed to various causes. The Franco-German 
and Russo-Turkish Wars left behind rankling hatreds which 
rendered it very difficult for nations to disarm; and, after the 
decline of those resentments, there arose others as the out- 
come of the Greco-Turkish War and the Boer War. Further, 
the conflict between Japan and Russia so far weakened the 
latter as to leave Germany and Austria almost supreme 
in Europe; and, while in France and the United Kingdom 
the social movement has made considerable progress, Ger- 
many and Austria have remained in what may be termed 
the national stage of development, which offers many 
advantages over the international for purposes of war. 
Then again in the Central Empires parliamentary institu- 

' Written in May-July, 1915. 

320 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 321 

tions have not been successful, tending on the whole to 
accentuate the disputes between the dominant and the sub- 
ject races. The same is partially true of Russia, and far 
more so of the Balkan States. Consequently, in Central 
and Eastern Europe the national idea has become militant 
and aggressive; while Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
to some extent France, have sought as far as possible to 
concentrate their efforts upon social legislation, arming only 
in self-defence. In this contrast lay one of the dangers of 
the situation. 

Nationality caused the movements and wars of 1848-77. 
Thereafter, that principle seemed to wane. But it revived 
in redoubled force among the Balkan peoples owing partly to 
the brutal oppressions of the Sublime Porte ; and the cognate 
idea, aiming, however, not at liberty but conquest, became 
increasingly popular with the German people after the 
accession of Kaiser William II. The sequel is only too 
well known. Civilisation has been overwhelmed by a 
recrudescence of nationalism, and the wealthiest age which 
the world has seen is a victim to the perfection and potency 
of its machinery. A recovery of the old belief in the soli- 
darity of mankind and a conviction of the futility of all 
efforts for domination by any one people, are the first 
requisites towards the recovery of conditions that make for 
peace and good-will. 

Meanwhile, recent history has had to concern itself 
largely with groupings or alliances, which have in the main 
resulted from ambition, distrust, or fear. As has already 
been shown, the Partition of Africa was arranged without a 
resort to arms; but after that appropriation of the lands of 
the dark races, the white peoples in the south came into 
collision late in 1899. 



322 The European Nations 

Much has been written as to the causes of the Boer War; 
but the secret encouragements which those brave farmers 
received from Germany are still only partly known. Even 
in 1894 Mr. Merriman warned Sir Edward Grey of the 
danger arising from "the steady way in which Kriiger 
was Teutonising the Transvaal." Germany undoubtedly 
stiffened the neck of Kriiger and the reactionary Boers in 
resisting the much-needed reforms. It is significant that 
the Kaiser's telegram to Kriiger after the defeat of Jameson's 
raiders, was sent only a few days before his declaration, 
January 18, 1896, that Germany must now pursue a World- 
Policy, as she did by browbeating Japan in the Far East. 
These developments had been rendered possible by the 
opening of the Kiel-North Sea Canal in 1895, an achieve- 
ment which doubled the naval power of Germany. Thence- 
forth she pushed on construction, especially by the Navy 
Bill of 1898. Reliance on her largely accounts for the 
obstinate resistance of the Boers to the just demands of 
England and the Outlanders in 1899. A German historian, 
Count Reventlow, has said that "a British South Africa 
could not but thwart all German interests"; and the anti- 
British fury prevalent in Germany in and after 1 899 augured 
ill for the preservation of peace in the twentieth century 
so soon as her new fleet was ready. ^ 

The results of the Boer War were as follows: For the 
time Great Britain lost very seriously on prestige and 
in material resources. Amidst the successes gained by the 
Boers, the intervention of one or more European States in 
their favour seemed highly probable ; and it is almost certain 

' E. Lewin, The Germans and Africa, p. xvii. and chaps, v.-xiii.; J. H. 
Rose, The Origins of the War, Lectures I.-III.; Reventlow, Deutschlands 
auswdrtige Politik, p. 71. 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 323 

that Kriiger relied on such an event. He paid visits to some 
of the chief European capitals, and was received by the 
French President (November, 1900), but not by Kaiser 
William. The personality and aims of the Kaiser will 
concern us later; but we may notice here that in that year 
he had special reasons for avoiding a rupture with the 
United Kingdom. The Franco-Russian Alliance gave him 
pause, especially since June, 1898, when a resolute man, 
Delcasse, became Foreign Minister at Paris and showed less 
complaisance to Germany than had of late been the case.'^ 
Besides, in 1898, the Kaiser had concluded, with Great 
Britain a secret arrangement on African affairs, and early in 
1900 acquired sole control of Samoa instead of the joint 
Anglo-American-German protectorate, which had produced 
friction. Finally, in the summer of 1900, the Boxer Rising 
in China opened up grave problems which demanded the 
co-operation of Germany and the United Kingdom. 

It has often been stated that the Kaiser desired to form a 
Coalition against Great Britain during the Boer War ; and it 
is fairly certain that he sounded Russia and France with a 
view to joint diplomatic efforts to stop the war oh the plea 
of humanity, and that, after the failure of this device, he 
secretly informed the British Government of the danger 
which he claimed to have averted.^ His actions reflected 
the impulsiveness and impetuosity which have often puzzled 
his subjects and alarmed his neighbours ; but it seems likely 
that his aims were limited either to squeezing the British 
at the time of their difficulties, or to finding means of break- 
ing up the Franco-Russian Alliance. His energetic fishing 
in troubled waters caused much alarm ; but it is improbable 

' Delcasse was Foreign Minister in five Administrations until 1905. 
* Sir V. Chirol, Quarterly Review, Oct., 19 14. 



3^4 The European Nations 

that he desired war with Great Britain until his new navy 
was ready for sea. The German Chancellor, Prince von 
Billow, has since written as follows: "We gave England no 
cause to thwart us in the building of our fleet ... we 
never came into actual conflict with the Dual Alliance, 
which would have hindered us in the gradual acquisition 
of a navy. "^ This, doubtless, was the governing motive in 
German policy, to refrain from any action that would in- 
volve war, to seize every opportunity for pushing forward 
German claims, and, above all, to utilise the prevalent 
irritation at the helplessness of Germany at sea as a means 
of overcoming the still formidable opposition of German 
Liberals to the ever-increasing naval expenditure. 

In order to discourage the futile anti-British diatribes in 
the German Press, Bulow declared in the Reichstag that 
in no quarter was there an intention to intervene against 
England. There are grounds for questioning the sincerity 
of this utterance; for the Russian statesman, Muraviev, 
certainly desired to intervene, as did influential groups at 
Petrograd, Berlin, and Paris. In any case, the danger to 
Great Britain was acute enough to evoke help from all parts 
of the Empire, and implant the conviction of the need of 
closer union and of maintaining naval supremacy. The 
risks of the years 1 899-1 902 also revealed the very grave 
danger of what had been termed "splendid isolation," and 
aroused a desire for a friendly understanding with one or 
more Powers as occasion might offer. 

The war produced similar impressions on the German 

' Biilow, Imperial Germany, pp. 98-9 (Eng. transl.) ; Rachfahl, Kaiser 
uni Reich (p. 163) states that, as in 1900-1, the German fleet, even along 
with those of France and Russia, was no match for the British fleet, 
Germany necessarily remained neutral. See, too, Hurd and Castle, 
German Sea Power, chap. v. 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 325 

people. Dislike of England, always acute in Prussia, 
especially in reactionary circles, now spread to all parts 
and all classes of the nation; and the Kaiser, as we have 
seen, made skilful use of it to further his naval policy. His 
speech at Hamburg in October i8, 1899, on the need of a 
great navy, marked the beginning of a new era, destined 
to end in war with Great Britain. Admiral von Tirpitz, in 
introducing the Amending Bill of February, 1960, demanded 
the doubling of the navy in a scheme working automatically 
until 1920. The Socialist leader, Bebel, opposed it as 
certain to strain relations with England, a war with whom 
would be the greatest possible misfortune for the German 
people. On the other hand, the Chancellor, Prince Hohen- 
lohe, voiced the opinions of the governing class and the 
German Navy League when he declared that the demand 
for a great navy originated in the ambition of the German 
nation to become a World-Power.^ The Bill passed; and 
thenceforth the United Kingdom and Germany became 
declared rivals at sea. Fortunately for the islanders, the 
new German Navy could not be ready for action before the 
year 1904; otherwise, a very dangerous situation would have 
arisen. Even as it was, British statesmen were induced to 
secure an ally and to end the Boer War as quickly as 
possible. 

During that conflict the tension between England and the 
Dual Alliance (France and Russia), was at times so acute 
as to render it doubtful whether we should not gravitate 
towards the rival Triple Alliance. The problem was the 
most important that had confronted British statesmen 
during a century. Kinship and tradition seemed to beckon 
us towards Germany and Austria. On the other hand, 

' Prince Hohenlohe, Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 480. 



326 The European Nations 

democracy and social intercourse told in favour of the 
French connection. Further, now that Russia was retiring 
more and more from her Balkan and Central Asian projects 
in order to concentrate on the Far East, she ceased to 
threaten India and the Levant. Moreover, the personality 
of the Tsar, Nicholas II., was reassuring, while that of 
Kaiser William II. aroused distrust and alarm. 

In truth, the inordinate vanity, restless energy, and flam- 
boyant Chauvinism of the Kaiser placed great difficulties in 
the way of an Anglo-German Entente. An article believed 
to have been inspired by Bismarck contained the following 
reference to the Kaiser's megalomania: "It causes the 
deepest anxiety in Germany, because it is feared that it may 
lead to some irreparable piece of want of tact, and thence 
to war. For it is argued that, vanit}'- being at the bottom 
of it all, and the Emperor finding he is unable to gain the 
premature immortality he thirsts for by peaceful prodigies, 
his restless nervous iiritability may degenerate into reck- 
lessness, and then his megalomania may blind him to the 
dangers he, and above all, poor blood-soaken Germany may 
encounter on the warpath."^ Kaiser William possesses 
more power of self-restraint than this passage indicates; for 
though he has spread a warlike enthusiasm through his 
people, he has also lestrained it until there arrived a fit 
opportunity for its exercise. It arrived when Germany and 
her Allies were far better prepared, both by land and sea, 
than the Powers whom she expected to meet in aims. 

His attitude towards Great Britain has varied surprisingly. 
During several years he figured as her friend. But it is 
difficult to believe that a man of his keen intellect did not 
discern ahead the collision which his policy must involve. 

f Contemporary Review, April, i8g2. 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 327 

His many claims to acquire maritime supremacy and a 
World-Empire were either mere bluff or a portentous 
challenge. Only the good-natured, easy going British race 
could so long have clung to the former explanation, thereby 
leaving the most diffuse, vulnerable, and ill-armed Empire 
that has ever existed face to face with an Empire that is 
compact, well-fortified and armed to the teeth. In this 
contrast lies one of the main causes of the present war. 

Moreover, the internal difficulties of France and the pre- 
occupation of Russia in the Far East gave to Kaiser William 
a disquietingly easy victory in the affairs of the Near East. 
His visit to Constantinople and Palestine in 1898 inaugu- 
rated a Levantine policy destined to have momentous re- 
sults. On the Bosphorus he scrupled not to clasp the hand 
of Sultan Abdul Hamid H., still reeking with the blood of 
the Christians of Armenia and Macedonia. At Jerusalem 
he figured as the Christian knight-errant but at Damascus, 
as the champion of the Moslem creed. After laying a 
wreath on the tomb of Saladin, he made a speech which re- 
vealed his plan of utilising the fighting power of Islam. He 
said: "The three hundred million Mohammedans who live 
scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the 
German Empeior will be their friend at all times. " Taken 
in conjunction with his pro-Turkish policy, this implied 
that the Triple Alliance was to be buttressed by the most 
terrible fighting force in the East.^ 

During the tour he did profitable business with the Sub- 
lime Porte by gaining a promise for the construction of a 
( 

'See Hurgronje, The Holy War; made in Germany, pp. 27-39, 68-78; 
also G. E. Holt, Morocco the Piquant (1914), who says (chap, xiv.): 
"Islam is waiting for war in Europe. ... A war between any two 
European Powers, in my opinion, would mean the uprising of Islam. " 



328 The European Nations 

railway to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, under German 
auspices. The scheme took practical form in 1902-3, when 
the Sultan granted a firman for the construction of that line 
together with very extensive proprietary rights along its 
course. Russian opposition had been bought off in 1900 by 
the adoption of a more southerly course than was originally 
designed; and the Kaiser now sought to get the financial 
support of England to the enterprise. British public 
opinion, however, was invincibly sceptical, and with justice, 
for the scheme would have ruined our valuable trade on the 
River Tigris and the Persian Gulf; while the proposed 
prolongation of the line to Koweit on the gulf would enable 
Germany, Austria, and Turkey to threaten India. 

For by the year 1903 Austria was so far mistress of the 
Balkans as to render it possible for her and Germany in the 
near future to send troops through Constantinople and Asia 
Minor by the railways which they controlled. Accordingly, 
affairs in the Near East became increasingly strained; and, 
when Russia was involved in the Japanese War, no Great 
Power could effectively oppose Austro-German policy in 
that quarter. The influence of France and Britain, formerly 
paramount both politically and commercially in the Turkish 
Empire, declined, while that of Germany became supreme. 
Every consideration of prudence therefore prompted the 
Governments of London and Paris to come to a close under- 
standing, in order to make headway against the aggressive 
designs of the two Kaisers in the Balkans and Asia Minor. 
Looking forward, we may note that the military collapse 
of Russia in 1904-5 enabled the Central Powers to push 
on in the Levant. Germany fastened her grip on the Turk- 
ish Government, exploited the resources of Asia Minor, and 
posed as the champion of the Moslem creed. Early in the 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 329 

twentieth century that creed became aggressive, mainly 
under the impulse of Sultan Abdul Hamid II., who varied 
his propagandism by massacre with appeals to the faithful 
to look to him as their one hope in this world. Constanti- 
nople and Cairo were the centres of this Pan-Islamic move- 
ment, which, aiming at the closer union of all Moslems in 
Asia, Europe, and Africa around the Sultan, threatened 
to embarrass Great Britain, France, and Russia. The 
Kaiser, seeing in this revival of Islam an effective force, took 
steps to encourage the "true believers" and strengthen the 
Sultan by the construction of a branch line of the Bagdad 
system running southwards through Aleppo and the district 
east of the Dead Sea towards Mecca. Purporting to be a 
means for lessening the hardships of pilgrims, it really en- 
abled the Sultan to threaten the Suez Canal and Egypt. 

The aggressive character of these schemes explains why 
France, Great Britain, and Russia began to draw together 
for mutual support. The three Powers felt the threat 
implied in an organisation of the Moslem world under the 
aegis of the Kaiser. He, a diligent student of Napoleon's 
career, was evidently seeking to dominate the Near East, 
and to enrol on his side the force of Moslem enthusiasm 
which the Corsican had forfeited by his attack on Egypt in 
1798. The construction of German railways in the Levant 
and the domination of the Balkan Peninsula by Austria 
would place in the hands of the Germanic Powers the keys 
of the Orient, which have always been the keys to World- 
Empire. 

Closely connected with these far-reaching schemes was 
the swift growth of the Pan-German movement. It sought 
to group the Germanic and cognate peoples in some form of 
political union — a programme which threatened to absorb 



330 The European Nations 

Holland, Belgium, the greater part of Switzerland, the Baltic 
Provinces of Russia, the Western portions of the Hapsburg 
dominions, and, possibly, the Scandinavian peoples. The 
resulting State or Federation of States would thus extend . 
from Ostend to Reval, from Amsterdam (or Bergen) to 
Trieste. 

Even those Germans who did not espouse these ambitious 
schemes became deeply imbued with the expansively patri- 
otic ideas championed by the Kaiser. So far back as 1890 
he ordered their enforcement in the universities and 
schools.^ Thenceforth professors and teachers vied in their 
eagerness to extol the greatness of Germany and the civilis- 
ing mission of the Hohenzollerns, whose exploits in the future 
were to eclipse all the achievements of Frederick the Great 
and William I. Moreover, the new German Navy was 
acclaimed as a necessary means to the triumph of German 
Kultur throughout the world. Other nations were depicted 
as slothful, selfish, decadent; and the decline in the prestige 
of Great Britain, France, and Russia to some extent justified 
these pretensions. The Tsar, by turning away from the 
Balkans towards Korea, deadened Slav aspirations. For 
the time Pan-Slavism seemed moribund. Pan-Germanism 
became a far more threatening force. 

Summing up, and including one topic that will soon be 
dealt with, we may conclude as follows: Germany showed 
that she did not want England's friendship, save in so far 
as it would help her to oppose the Monroe Doctrine or sup- 
ply her with money to finish the Bagdad Railway. For 
reasons that have been explained, she and Austria were 
likely to undermine British interests in the Near East ; while, 

'Latterly, the catchword, England ist der Feind ("England is the 
enemy"), has been taught in very many schools. 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 331 

on the other hand, the diversion of Russia's activities from 
Central Asia and the Balkans to the Far East, lessened the 
Muscovite menace which had so long determined the 
trend of British policy. Moreover, Russia's ally, France, 
showed a conciliatory spirit. Forgetting the . rebuff at 
Fashoda (see ante, pp. 220-226), she aimed at expansion in 
Morocco. Now, Korea and Morocco did not vitally con- 
cern us. The Bagdad Railway and the Kaiser's court to 
Pan-Islamism were definite threats to our existence as an 
Empire. Finally, the development of the German Navy 
and the growth of a furiously anti-British propaganda 
threatened the long and vulnerable East Coast of Great 
Britain. 

A temporary understanding with Germany could have 
been attained if we had acquiesced in her claim for maritime 
equality and in the oriental and colonial enterprises which 
formed its sequel. But that course, by yielding to her 
undisputed ascendancy in all parts of the world, would have 
led to a policy of partition. Now, since 1688, British states- 
men have consistently opposed, often by force of arms, a 
policy of partition at the expense of civilised nations. Their 
aim has been to support the weaker European States against 
the stronger and more aggressive, thus assuring a Balance of 
Power which in general has proved to be the chief safeguard 
of peace. In seeking an Entente with France, and subse- 
quently with Russia , British policy has followed the course 
consistent with the counsels of moderation and the teachings 
of experience. We may note here that the German histo- 
rian. Count Reventlow, has pointed out that the Berlin 
Government could not frame any lasting agreement with 
the British; for, sooner or later, they would certainly de- 
mand the limitation of Germany's colonial aims and of her 



332 The European Nations 

naval development, to neither of which could she consent 
The explanation is highly significant.^ 

Nevertheless, at first Great Britain sought to come to a 
friendly understanding with Germany in the Far East, 
probably with a view to preventing the schemes of partition 
of China which in 1900 assumed a menacing guise. At that 
time Russia seemed likely to take the lead in those designs. 
But opposite to the Russian stronghold of Port Arthur was 
the German province of Kiao-chau, in which the Kaiser 
took a deep interest. His resolve to play a leading part in 
Chinese affairs appeared in his speech to the German troops 
sent out in 1900 to assist in quelling the Boxer Rising. He 
ordered them to adopt methods of terrorism like those of 
Attila's Huns, so that "no Chinaman will ever again dare to 
look askance at a German. " The orders were ruthlessly 
obeyed. After the capture of Pekin by the Allies (Septem- 
ber, 1900) there ensued a time of wary balancing. Russia 
and Germany were both suspected of designs to cut up 
China; but they were opposed by Great Britain and Japan. 
This obscure situation was somewhat cleared by the states- 
men of London and Berlin agreeing to maintain the territori- 
al integrity of China and freedom of trade (October, 1900). 
But in March, 1901, the German Chancellor, Prince von 
Billow, nullified the agreement by officially announcing 
that it did not apply to, or limit, the expansion of Russia 
in Manchuria. What caused this volte face is not known; 
but it implied a renunciation of the British policy of the 
status quo in the Far East and an official encouragement to 
Russia to push forward to the Pacific Ocean, where she was 
certain to come into conflict with Japan. Such a collison 

'Reventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik, pp. 178-9; Mr. Chamber' 
Iain's Speeches, vol. ii., p. 68. 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 333 

would enfeeble those two Powers; while Germany, as 
tertius gaudens, would be free to work her will both in 
Europe and Asia.^ 

On the other hand, Eckardstein, the German ambassador 
in London, is said to have made proposals of an Anglo-Ger- 
man-Japanese Alliance in March-April, 1901. If we may 
trust the work entitled Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 
(Japanese ambassador in London) these proposals were 
dangled for some weeks, why, he could never understand. 
Probably Germany was playing a double game; for Hayashi 
believed that she had a secret understanding with Russia 
on these questions. He found that the Salisbury Cabinet 
welcomed her adhesion to the principles of maintaining the 
territorial integrity of China and of freedom of commerce 
in the Far- East. ^ 

In October, 1901, Germany proposed to the United 
Kingdom that each Power should guarantee the possessions 
of the other in every Continent except Asia. Why Asia 
was excepted is not clear, unless Germany wished to give 
Russia a free hand in that Continent. The Berlin Govern- 
ment laid stress on the need of our support in North and 
South America, where its aim of undermining the Monroe 
Doctrine was notorious. The proposed guarantee would 
also have compelled us to assist Germany in any dispute 

'In September, 1895, the Tsar thanked Prince Hohenlohe for sup- 
porting his Far East policy, and said he was weary of Armenia and dis- 
trustful of England; so, too, in September, 1896, when Russo-German 
relations were also excellent (Hohenlohe, Memoirs, Eng. edit., ii., pp. 

463, 470). 

^Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi (New York, 1915), pp. 103-136. 
There are suspicious features about this book. I refer to it, with all 
reserve. Reventlow {Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik, p. 178) thinks 
Eckardstein may have been playing his own game — an improbable 
suggestion. 



334 The European Nations 

that might arise between her and France about Alsace-Lor- 
raine or colonial questions. The aim was obvious, to gain 
the support of the British fleet either against the United 
States or France. A British diplomatist of high repute, 
who visited Berlin, has declared that the German Foreign 
Office made use of garbled and misleading documents 
to win him over to these views.' It was in vain. The 
British Government was not to be hoodwinked ; and, as soon 
as it declined these compromising proposals, a storm of abuse 
swept through the German Press at the barbarities of Brit- 
ish troops in South Africa. That incident ended all chance 
of an understanding, either between the two Governments 
or the two peoples. 

The inclusion of Germany in the Anglo-Japanese compact 
proving to be impossible, the two Island Powers signed a 
treaty of alliance at London on January 30, 1902. It 
guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo in the Far 
East, and offered armed assistance by either signatory in the 
event of its ally being attacked by more than one Power. ^ 
The alliance ended the isolation of the British race, and 
marked the entry of Japan into the circle of the World- 
Powers. The chief objections to the new departure were its 
novelty, and the likelihood of its embroiling us finally with 
Russia and France or Russia and Germany. These fears 
were groundless; for France and even Russia (!) expressed 
their satisfaction at the treaty. Lord Langdowne's diplo- 
matic coup not only ended the isolation of two Island States, 

' Quarterly Review, Oct., 1914, pp. 426-9. 
■ ' £. g., if the Russians alone attacked Japan we were not bound to help 
her: but if the French also attacked Japan we must help her. The aim 
clearly was to prevent Japan being overborne as in 1895 (see p. 310). 
It was signed for five years, but was renewed on August 12, 1905, and 
in July 191 1. 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 335 

which had been severally threatened by powerful rivals; it 
also safeguarded China; and finally, by raising the prestige 
of Great Britain, it helped to hasten the end of the Boer 
War. During the discussion of their future policy by the 
Boer delegates at Vereeniging on May 30, General Botha 
admitted that he no longer had any hope of intervention 
from the Continent of Europe; for their deputation thither 
had failed. All the leaders except De Wet agreed, and they 
came to terms with Lords Kitchener and Milner at Pretoria 
on May 31. That the Anglo-Japanese compact ended the 
last hopes of the Boers for intervention can scarcely be 
doubted. 

Still more significant was the new alliance as a warning to 
Russia not to push too far her enterprises in the Far East. 
On April 12, 1902, she agreed with China to evacuate Man- 
churia; but (as has appeared in Chapter IX.) she finally 
pressed on, not only in Manchuria, but also in Korea, in 
which the Anglo-Japanese treaty recognised that Japan 
had predominant interest. For this forward policy Russia 
had the general support of the Kaiser whose aims in the Near 
East were obviously served by the transference thence of 
Russia's activities to the Far East. It is, indeed, probable 
that he and his agents desired to embroil Russia and Japan. 
Certain it is that the Russian people regarded the Russo- 
Japanese War, which began in February, 1904, as "The 
War of the Grand Dukes." The Russian troops fought 
an uphill fight loyally and doggedly, but with none of the 
enthusiasm so conspicuous in the present truly national 
struggle. In Manchuria the mistakes and incapacity of 
their leaders led to an almost unbroken series of defeats, 
ending with the protracted and gigantic contests around 
Mukden (March i-io, 1905). The almost complete 



336 The European Nations 

destruction of the Russian Baltic fleet by Admiral Togo 
at the Battle of Tsushima (May 27-28) ended the last 
hopes of the Tsar and his ministers; and, fearful of the 
rising discontent in Russia, they accepted the friendly offers 
of the United States for mediation. By the Treaty of 
Portsmouth (Sept. 5, 1905) they ceded to Japan the south- 
em half of.Saghalien and the Peninsula on which stands 
Port Arthur: they also agreed to evacuate South Man- 
churia and to recognise Korea as within Japan's sphere of 
influence. No war indemnity was paid. Indeed it could 
not be exacted, as Japan occupied no Russian territory 
which she did not intend to annex. To Russia the material 
results of the war were the loss of some 350,000 men, 
killed, wounded, and prisoners; of two fleets; and of the 
valuable provinces and ice-free harbours for the acquisition 
of which she had constructed the Trans-Siberian Railv/ay. 
So heavy a blow had not been dealt to a Great Power since 
the fall of Napoleon III.; and worse, perhaps, than the 
material loss was that of prestige in accepting defeat at the 
hands of an Island State, whose people fifty years before 
fought with bows and arrows. 

Japan emerged from the war triumphant, but financially 
exhausted. Accordingly, she was not loath to conclude 
with Russia, on July 30, 1907, a convention which adjusted 
outstanding questions in a friendly manner.^ The truth 
about this Russo-Japanese rapprochement is, of course, not 
known; but it may reasonably be ascribed in part to the 
good services of England (then about to frame an entente 
with Russia) ; and in part, to the suspicion of the statesmen 

* Hayashi, op. cit., ch. viii. and Appendix D. On June 10, 1907, 
Japan concluded with France an agreement, for which see Hayashi, 
ch. vi. and Appendix C. 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 337 

of Petrograd and Tokio that German influences had secretly 
incited Russia to the poHcy of reckless exploitation in Korea 
which led to war and disaster. 

The chief results of the Russo-Japanese War were to 
paralyse Russia, thereby emasculating the Dual Alliance 
and leaving France as much exposed to German threats as 
she was before its conclusion; also to exalt the Triple Alli- 
ance and enable its members (Germany, Austria, and Italy) 
successively to adopt the forward policy which marked the 
years 1905, 1908, 191 1, and 1914. The Russo-Japanese 
War therefore inaugurated a new era in European History. 
Up to that time the Triple Alliance had been a defensive 
league, except when the exuberant impulses of Kaiser 
William forced it into provocative courses; and then the 
provocations generally stopped at telegrams and orations. 
But in and after 1905 the Triple Alliance forsook the 
watchwords of Bismarck, Andrassy, and Crispi. Expansion 
at the cost of rivals became the dominant aim. 

We must now return to affairs in France which predis- 
posed her to come to friendly terms, first with Italy, then 
with Great Britain. Her internal history in the years 1895- 
1906 turns largely on the Dreyfus affair. In 1895, he, a 
Jewish officer in the French army, was accused and con- 
victed of selling military secrets to Germany. But suspi- 
cions were aroused that he was the victim of anti-Semites or 
the scapegoat of the real offenders; and finally, thanks to 
the championship of Zola, his condemnation was proved 
to have been due to a forgery (July, 1906). Meanwhile 
society had been rent in twain, and confidence in the army 
and in the administration of justice was seriously impaired. 
A furious anti-militarist agitation began, which had impor- 
tant consequences. Already in May, 1900, the Premier, 



338 The European Nations 

Waldeck-Rousseau, appointed as Minister of War General 
Andre, who sympathised with these views and dangerously 
relaxed discipline. The Combes Ministry, which succeeded 
in June, 1902, embittered the strife between the clerical and 
anti-clerical sections by measures such as the separation of 
Church and State and the expulsion of the Religious Orders. 
In consequence France was almost helpless in the first years 
of the century, a fact which explains her readiness to clasp 
the hand of England in 1904 and, in 1905, after the military 
collapse of Russia in the Far East, to give way before the 
threats of Geimany.^ 

The weakness of France predisposed Italy to forget the 
wrong done by French statesmen in seizing Tunis twenty 
years before. That wrong (as we saw on p. 15) drove 
Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria. But now 
Crispi and other pro-German authors of the Triple Alli- 
ance had passed away; and that compact, founded on 
passing passion against France rather than community of 
interest or sentiment with the Central Empires, had sensibly 
weakened. Time after time Italian Ministers complained 
of disregard of their interests by the men of Berlin and 
Vienna,^ whereas in 1898 France accorded to Italy a favour- 
able commercial treaty. Victor Emmanuel III. paid his 
first state visit to Petrograd, not to Berlin. In December, 
1900, France and Italy came to an understanding respecting 
Tripoli and Morocco; and in May, 1902, the able French 
Minister, Delcasse, then intent on his Morocco enterprise, 

' Even in 1908 reckless strikes occurred, and there were no fewer than 
1 1 ,223 cases of insubordination in the army. Professor Gustave Herv6 
left the University in order to direct a paper, La Guerre sociale, which 
advocated a war of classes. 

» Crispi, Memoirs (Eng. edit.) vol. ii., pp. 166, 169, 472; vol. iii., pp. 
330. 347- 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 339 

prepared the way for it by a convention with Italy, which 
provided that France and Italy should thenceforth peace- 
ably adjust their differences, mainly arising out of Mediter- 
ranean questions. Seeing that Italy and Austria were at 
variance respecting Albania, the Franco-Italian Entente 
weakened the Triple Alliance; and the old hatred of Austria 
appeared in the shouts of "Viva Trento," "Viva Trieste," 
often raised in front of the Aiistrian embassy at Rorne. 
Despite the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1907 and 191 2, 
the adhesion of Italy was open to question, unless the Allies 
became the object of indisputable aggression. 

Still more important was the Anglo-French Entente of 
1904. That the Anglophobe outbursts of the Parisian Press 
and populace in 1902 should so speedily give way to a 
friendly understanding was the work, partly of the friends 
of peace in both lands, parti}'- of the personal tact and 
charm of Edward VII. as manifested during his visit to Paris 
in May, 1903, but mainly of the French and British Govern- 
ments. In October, 1903, they agreed by treaty to refer to 
arbitration before the Hague Tribunal disputes that might 
arise between them. This agreement (one of the greatest 
triumphs of the principle of arbitration') naturally led to 
more cordial relations. During the visit of President 
Loubet and M. Declasse to London in July, 1903, the 
latter discussed with Lord Lansdowne the questions that 
hindered a settlement, namely, our occupation of Egypt 
(a rankling sore in France ever since 1882); French claims 
to dominate Morocco both commercially and politically, 

^Sir Thomas Barclay, Anglo-French Reminiscences (1876-1906), ch. 
xviii.-xxii. ; M. Hanotaux {La Politique de I'equilibre, p. 415) claims that 
Mr. Chamberlain was chiefly instrumental in starting the negotiations 
leading to the Entente with France. 



340 The European Nations 

"the French shore" of Newfoundland, the New Hebrides, 
the French convict -station in New Caledonia, as also the 
• territorial integrity of Siam, championed by England, 
threatened by France. A more complex set of problems 
never confronted statesmen. Yet a solution was found 
simply because both of them were anxious for a solution. 
Their anxiety is intelligible in view of the German activities 
just noticed, and of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese 
War in February, 1904. True, France was allied to Russia 
only for European affairs; and our alliance with Japan 
referred mainly to the Far East. Still, there was danger 
of a collision, which both Paris and London wished to avert. 
It was averted by the skill and tact of Lord Lansdowne 
and M. Delcasse, whose conversations of July, 1903, pointed 
the way to the definitive compact of April 8, 1904. 

Stated briefly, France gave way on most of the questions 
named above, except one, that is, Morocco. There she 
attained her end, the recognition by us of her paramount 
claims. For this she conceded most of the points in dispute 
between the two countries in Egypt, though she maintains 
her Law School, hospitals, mission schools, and a few other 
institutions. Thenceforth England had opposed to her in 
that land only German influence and the Egyptian nation- 
alists and Pan-Islam fanatics whom it sought to encourage. 
France also renounced some of her fishing rights in New- 
foundland in return for gains of territory on the River 
Gambia and near Lake Chad. In return for these con- 
cessions she secured from us the recognition of her claim to 
watch over the tranquillity of Morocco, together with an 
offer of assistance for all "the administrative, economic, 
financial, and military reforms which it needs." True, 
she promised not to change the political condition of Mo- 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 341 

rocco, as also to maintain equality of commercial privileges. 
Great Britain gave a similar undertaking for Egypt. ^ 

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 is the most important 
event of modern diplomacy. Together with the preceding 
treaty of arbitration, it removed all likelihood of war be- 
tween two nations which used to be "natural enemies " ; and 
the fact that it in no respect menaced Germany appeared in 
the communication of its terms to the German ambassador 
in Paris shortly before its signature. On April 12 Biilow 
declared to the Reichstag his approval of the compact as 
likely to end disputes in several quarters, besides assuring 
peace and order in Morocco, where Germany's interests 
were purely commercial. Two days later, in reply to the 
Pan-German leader. Count Reventlow, he said he would 
not embark Germany on any enterprise in Morocco. These 
statements were reasonable and just. The Entente less- 
ened the friction between Great Britain and Russia during 
untoward incidents of the Russo-Japanese War. After the 
conclusion of the Entente the Russian ambassador in Paris 
publicly stated the approval of his Government, and, quot- 
ing the proverb, "The friends of our friends are our 
friends, " added with a truly prophetic touch — "Who knows 
whether that will not be true ? ' ' The agreement also served 
to strengthen the position of France at a time when her 
internal crisis and the first Russian defeats in the Far East 
threatened to place her almost at the mercy of Germany. 
A dangerous situation would have arisen if France had 

^A. Tardieu, Questions diplomatiques de Vannee IQ04, Appendix II. 
England in 1914 annulled the promise respecting Egypt because of the 
declaration of war by Turkey and the assistance afforded her by the 
Khedive, Abbas II. (see Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt and Abbas II.). 
On February 15, 1904, France settled by treaty with Siam frontier dis- 
putes of long standing. 



342 The European Nations 

not recently gained the friendship both of England and 
Italy. 

Finally, the Anglo-French Entente induced Italy to recon- 
sider her position. Her dependence on us for coal and iron, 
together with the vulnerability of her numerous coast-towns, 
rendered a breach with the two Powers of the Entente highly 
undesirable, while on sentimental grounds she could scarcely 
take up the gauntlet for her former oppressor, Austria, 
against two nations which had assisted in her liberation. 
As we shall see, she declared at the Conference of Algeciras 
her complete solidarity with Great Britain. 

Even so, Germany held a commanding position owing to 
the completion of the first part of her naval programme, 
which placed her far ahead of France at sea. For reasons 
that have been set forth, the military and naval weakness 
of France was so marked as greatly to encourage German 
Chauvinists: but the Entente made them pause, especially 
when France agreed to concentrate her chief naval strength 
in the Mediterranean, while that of Great Britain was 
concentrated in the English Channel and the North Sea. 
It is certain that the Entente with France never amounted 
to an alliance; that was made perfectly clear; but it was 
unlikely that the British Government would tolerate an 
unprovoked attack upon the Republic, or look idly on while 
the Pan-Germans refashioned Europe and the other Con- 
tinents. Besides, Great Britain was strong at sea. In 
1905 she possessed thirty-five battleships mounting 12-in. 
guns; while the eighteen German battleships carried only 
ii-in. and 9.4-in. guns. Further, in 1905-7 we began and 
finished the first Dreadnought; and the adoption of that 
type for the battle-fleet of the near future lessened the value 
of the Kiel-North Sea Canal, which was too small to receive 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 343 

Dreadnoughts. In these considerations may perhaps be 
found the reason for the caution of Germany at a time which 
was otherwise very favourable for aggressive action. 

Meanwhile Kaiser William, pressed on by the colonials, 
had intervened in a highly sensational manner in the Morocco 
Affair, thus emphasising his earlier assertion that nothing im- 
portant must take place in any part of the world without the 
participation of Germany. Her commerce in Morocco was 
unimportant compared with that of France and Great Brit- 
ain; but the position of that land, commanding the routes to 
the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic, was such as to in- 
terest all naval Powers, while the State that gained a foothold 
in Morocco would have a share in the Moslem questions then 
arising to prime importance. As we have seen, the Kaiser 
had in 1898 declared his resolve to befriend all Moslem peo- 
ples ; and his Chancellor, Biilow, has asserted that Germany's 
pro-Islam policy compelled her to intervene in the Moroccan 
Question. The German ambassador at Constantinople, 
Baron von Marschall, said that, if after that promise Ger- 
many sacrificed Morocco, she would at once lose her position 
in Turkey, and therefore all the advantages and prospects 
that she had painfully acquired by the labour of many years. ^ 

On the other hand, the feuds of the Moorish tribes vitally 
concerned France because they led to many raids into her Al- 
gerian lands which she could not merely repel. In 1901 she 
adopted a more active policy, that of "pacific penetration," 
and, by successive compacts with Italy, Great Britain, and 
Spain, secured a kind of guardianship over Moroccan affairs.* 

' Biilow, Imperial Germany, p. 83. 

"Tardieu, Questions diplomatiques de IQ04, pp. 56-102; Rachfahl, 
Kaiser und Reich, pp. 230-241 ; E. D. Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy, 
chaps, i.-xii. 



344 The European Nations 

This policy, however, aroused deep resentment at Berlin. 
Though Germany was pacifically penetrating Turkey and 
Asia Minor, she grudged France her success in Morocco, 
not for commercial reasons but for others, closely con- 
nected with high diplomacy and World-Policy. As the 
German historian, Rachfahl, declared, Morocco was to be 
a test of strength. 

In one respect Germany had cause for complaint. On 
October 6, 1904, France signed a Convention with Spain in 
terms that were suspiciously vague. They were interpreted 
by secret articles which defined the spheres of French and 
Spanish influence in case the rule of the Sultan of Morocco 
ceased. It does not appear that Germany was aware of 
these secret articles at the time of her intervention.^ But 
their existence, even perhaps their general tenor, was sur- 
mised. The effective causes of her intervention were, 
firstly, her resolve to be consulted in every matter of impor- 
tance, and, secondly, the disaster that befell the Russians at 
Mukden early in March, 1905. At the end of the month, the 
Kaiser landed at Tangier and announced in strident terms 
that he came to visit the Sultan as an independent sovereign. 
This challenge to French claims produced an acute crisis. 
Delcasse desired to persevere with pacific penetration; but 
in the debate of April 19 the deficiencies of the French 
military system were admitted with startling frankness; 
and a threat from Berlin revealed the intention of humiliat- 
ing France, and, if possible, of severing the Anglo-French 
Entente. Here, indeed, is the inner significance of the crisis. 
Germany had lately declared her indifference to all but 
commercial questions in Morocco. But she now made use 
of the collapse of Russia to seek to end the Anglo-French 

' Rachfahl, pp. 235, 238. For details, see Morel, chap. ii. 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 345 

connection which she had recently declared to be harmless. 
The aim obviously was to sow discord between those two 
Powers. In this she failed. Lord Lansdowne and Delcasse 
lent each other firm support, so much so that the Paris 
Temps accused us of pushing France on in a dangerous affair 
which did not vitally concern her. The charge was not only 
unjust but ungenerous; for Germany had worked so as to 
induce England to throw over France or make France throw 
over England. The two Governments discerned the snare, 
and evaded it by holding firmly together. ^ 

The chief difficulty of the situation was that it committed 
France to two gigantic'tasks, that of pacifying Morocco and 
also of standing up to the Kaiser in Europe. In this respect 
the ground for the conflict was all in his favour ; and both he 
and she knew it. Consequently, a compromise was desir- 
able; and the Kaiser himself, in insisting on the holding of a 
Conference, built a golden bridge over which France might 
draw back, certainly with honour, probably with success; 
for in the diplomatic sphere she was at least as strong as he. 
When, therefore, Delcasse objected to the Conference, his 
colleagues accepted his resignation (June 6). His fall was 
hailed at Berlin as a humiliation for France. Nevertheless, 
her complaisance earned general sympathy, while the bully- 
ing tone of German diplomacy, continued during the Confer- 
ence held at Algeciras, hardened the opposition of nearly all 

' In an interview with M. Tardieu at Baden-Baden on October 4, 1905, 
Bulow said that Germany intervened in Morocco because of her interests 
there, and also to protest against this new attempt to isolate her (Tar- 
dieu, Questions actuelles de politique etrangere, p. 87). If so, her conduct 
increased that isolation. Probably the second Anglo- Japanese Treaty of 
August 12, 1905 (published on September 27th), was due to fear of 
German aggression. France and Germany came to a preliminary 
agreement as to Morocco on September 28th. 



346 The European Nations 

the Powers, including the United States. Especially note- 
worthy was the declaration of Italy that her interests were 
identical with those of England. German proposals were 
supported by Austria alone, who therefore gained from the 
Kaiser the doubtful compliment of having played the part of 
"a brilliant second" to Germany. 

It is needless to describe at length the Act of Algeciras 
(April 7, 1906). It established a police and a State Bank in 
Morocco, suppressed smuggling and the illicit trade in arms, 
reformed the taxes, and set on foot public works. Of course, 
little resulted from all this; but the position of France was 
tacitly regularised, and she was left free to proceed with pa- 
cific penetration. "We are neither victors nor vanquished," 
said Bulow in reviewing the Act; and M. Rouvier echoed 
the statement for France. In reality, Germany had suffered 
a check. Her chief aim was to sever the Anglo-French 
Entente, and she failed. She sought to rally Italy to her 
side, and she failed; for Italy now proclaimed her accord 
with France on Mediterranean questions. Finally the 
North German Gazette paid a tribute to the loyal and peace- 
able aims of French policy; while other less official German 
papers deplored the mistakes of their Government, which 
had emphasised the isolation of Germany. ^ This is indeed 
the outstanding result of the Conference. The threatening 
tone of Berlin had disgusted everybody. Above all it 
brought to more cordial relations the former rivals. Great 
Britain and Russia. 

As has already appeared, the friction between Great 
Britain and Russia quickly disappeared after the Japanese 
War. During the Congress of Algeciras the former rivals 
worked cordially together to check the expansive policy of 

' Tardieu, La Conference d' Algeciras, pp. 410-20. 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 347 

Germany, in which now lay the chief cause of poHtical un- 
rest. In fact, the Kaiser's Turcophile poHcy acquired a new 
significance owing to the spread of a Pan-Islamic propaganda 
which sent thrills of fanaticism through North-West Africa, 
Egypt, and Central Asia. At St. Helena Napoleon often 
declared Islam to be vastly superior to Christianity as a 
fighting creed; and his imitator now seemed about to mar- 
shal it against France, Russia, and Great Britain. Natu- 
rally, the three Powers drew together for mutual support. 
Further, Germany by herself was very powerful, the por- 
tentous growth of her manufactures and commerce endowing 
her with wealth which she spent lavishly on her army and 
navy. In May, 1906, the Reichstag agreed to a new Navy 
Bill for further construction which was estimated to raise 
the total annual expenditure on the navy from £11,671,000 
in 1905 to £16,492,000 in 1917; this too though Bebel had 
warned the House that the agitation of the German Navy 
League had for its object a war with England. 

In 1906 and 1907 Edward VII. paid visits to William II., 
who returned the compliment in November 1907. But this 
interchange of courtesies could not end the distrust caused 
by Germany's increase of armaments. The peace-loving 
Administration of Campbell-Bannerman, installed in power 
by the General Election of 1906, sought to come to an under- 
standing with Berlin, especially at the second Hague Con- 
ference of 1907, with respect to a limitation of armaments. 
But Germany rejected all such proposals.^ The hopeless- 
ness of framing a friendly arrangement with her threw us 
into the arms of Russia; and on August 31, 1907, Anglo- 

' See the cynical section in Reventlow, op. cit. (pp. 280-8), entitled 
"Utopien und Intrigen im Haag. " For Austria's efforts to prevent the 
Anglo-Russian Entente, see W. Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 230, 



348 The European Nations 

Russian Conventions were signed defining in a friendly way 
the interests of the two Powers in Persia, Afghanistan, and 
Thibet. True, the interests of Persian reformers were 
sacrificed by this bargain ; but it must be viewed, firstly, in 
the light of the Bagdad Railway scheme, which threatened 
soon to bring Germany to the gates of Persia and endanger 
the position of both Powers in that land^; secondly, in that 
of the general situation, in which Germany and Austria were 
rapidly forcing their way to a complete military ascendancy 
and refused to consider any limitation of armaments. The 
detailed reasons which prompted the Anglo-Russian En- 
tente are of course unknown. But the fact that the most 
democratic of all British Administrations should come to 
terms with the Russian autocracy is the most convincing 
proof of the very real danger which both States discerned 
in the aggressive conduct of the Central Powers. The 
Triple Alliance, designed by Bismarck solely to safeguard 
peace, became, in the hands of William II., a menace to his 
neighbours, and led them to form tentative and conditional 
arrangements for defence in case of attack. This is all that 
was meant by the Triple Entente. It formed a loose 
pendant to the Dual Alliance between France and Russia, 
which was binding and solid. With those Powers the 
United Kingdom formed separate agreements; but they 
were not alliances; they were friendly understandings on 
certain specific objects, and in no respect threatened the 
Triple Alliance so long as it remained non-aggressive.^ 
One question remains. When was it that the friction 

'Rachfahl (p. 307) admits this, but accuses England of covert 
opposition everywhere, even at the Hague Conference. 

' On December 24, 1908, the Russian Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, 
assured the Duma that "no open or secret agreements directed against 
German interests existed between Russia and England." 



New Grouping of the Great Powers 349 

between Great Britain and Germany first became acute? 
Some have dated it from the Morocco Affair of 1905-6. The 
assertion is inconsistent with the facts of the case. Long 
before that crisis the poHcy of the Kaiser tended increasingly 
towards a colHsion. His patronage of the Boers early in 
1896 was a threatening sign; still more so was his World- 
Policy, proclaimed repeatedly in the following years, when 
the appointments of Tirpitz and Biilow showed that the 
threats of capturing the trident, and so forth, were not mere 
bravado. The outbreak of the Boer War in 1899, followed 
quickly by the Kaiser's speech at Hamburg, and the adop- 
tion of accelerated naval construction in 1900, brought about 
serious tension, which was not relaxed by British complai- 
sance respecting Samoa. The coquetting with the Sultan, 
the definite initiation of the Bagdad scheme (1902-3), and 
the completion of the first part of Germany's new naval pro- 
gramme in 1904 account for the Anglo-French Entente of 
that year. The chief significance of the Morocco Affair of 
1905-6 lay in the Kaiser's design of severing that Entente. 
His failure, which was still further emphasised during the 
Algeciras Conference, proved that a policy which relies on 
menace and ever-increasing armaments arouses increasing 
distrust and leads the menaced States to form defensive ar- 
rangements. That is also the outstanding lesson of the career 
of Napoleon I. Nevertheless, the Kaiser, like the Corsican, 
persisted in forceful procedure, until Army Bills, Navy Bills, 
and the rejection of pacific proposals at The Hague, led to 
their natural result, the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. 
This event should have made him question the wisdom of 
relying on armed force and threatening procedure. The 
Entente between the Tsar and the Campbell-Bannerman 
Administration formed a tacit but decisive censure of the 



350 The European Nations 

policy of Potsdam; for it realised the fears which had 
haunted Bismarck like a nightmare. ' Its efifect on William II. 
was to induce him to increase his military and naval prepa- 
rations, to reject all proposals for the substitution of arbi- 
tration in place of the reign of force, and thereby to enclose 
the policy of the Great Powers in a vicious circle from which 
the only escape was a general reduction of armaments for 
war. 

^Bismarck, his Reflections and Recollections, vol. ii., pp. 252, 289. 
There are grounds for thinking that William II. has been pushed on to a 
bellicose policy by the Navy, Colonial, and Pan-German Leagues. In 
1908 he seems to have sought to pause ; but powerful influences (as also at 
the time of the crises of July, 191 1, and 1914) propelled him. See an 
article in the Revue de Paris of April 15, 1 9 13, "Guillaume II et les pan- 
germanistes. " In my narrative I speak of the Kaiser as equivalent to 
the German Government; for he is absolute and his Ministers are 
responsible solely to him. 



CHAPTER XI 
TEUTON versus slav (1908-13) 

" To tell the truth, the Slav seems to us a born slave." — Treitschke, 
June, 1876. 

ON October 7, 1908, Austria-Hungary exploded a poli- 
tical bomb shell by declaring her resolve to annex 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, she 
had provisionally occupied and administered those provinces 
as mandatory *of Europe (see Vol. I., p. 283). But now, 
without consulting Europe, she appropriated her charge. 
On the other hand, she consented to withdraw from the 
Sanjak of Novi-Bazar which she had occupied by virtue 
of a secret agreement with Russia of July, 1878. Even so, 
her annexation of a great province caused a sharp crisis for 
the following reasons: (i) It violated the international law 
of Europe without any excuse whatevei . (2) It exasperated 
Servia, which hoped ultimately to possess Bosnia, a land 
peopled by her kindred and necessary to her expansion 
seawards. (3) It no less deeply offended the Young Turks, 
who were resolved to revivif}^ the Turkish people and assert 
their authority over all parts of the Ottoman dominions. 
(4) It came at the same time as the assumption by Prince 
Ferdinand of Bulgaria of the title of Tsar of the Bulgarians. 
This change of title, which implied a prospect of sovereignty 
over the Bulgars of Macedonia, had been arranged during a 

351 



352 The European Nations 

recent visit to Buda-Pest, and foreshadowed the supremacy 
of Austrian influence not only in the new kingdom of Bulga- 
ria but eventually in the Bulgar districts of Macedonia.' 

Thus, Austria's action constituted a serious challenge to 
the Powers in general, especially to Russia, Servia, and to 
regenerated Turkey. ^ So daring a coup had not been dealt 
by Austria since 1848, when Francis Joseph ascended the 
throne; it is believed that he desired to have the prov- 
inces as a jubilee gift, a set-off to the loss of Lombardy 
and Venetia in 1859 and 1866. Certainly Austria had 
carried out great improvements in Bosnia; but an occupier 
who improves a farm does not gain the right to possess it 
except by agreement with others who have joint claims. 
Moreover, the Young Turks, in power since July, 1908, 
boasted their ability to civilise Bosnia and all parts of their 
Empire. Servia also longed to include it in the large Servo- 
Croat kingdom of the future. 

The Bosnian Question sprang out of a conflict of racial 
claims, which two masterful men, the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, 
were resolved to decide in favour of Austria. The Arch- 
duke disliked, and was disliked by, the Germans and Mag- 
yars on account of his pro-Slav tendencies. In 1900 he 
contracted with a Slav lady, the Countess Chotek, a mor- 
ganatic marriage, which brought him into strained relations 
with the Emperor and Court. A silent, resolute man, he 
determined to lessen German and Magyar influence in the 
Empire by favouring the law for universal suffrage (1906), 

'W. Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, pp. 52, 214. 

^ The constitutional regime which the Young Turks imposed on the 
reactionary Abdul Hamid II., in July, 1908, was hailed as a victory for 
British influence. The change in April, 1909, favoured German influence. 
I have no space for an account of these complex events. 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 353 

and by the appointment as Foreign Minister of Aehrenthal, 
who harboured ambitiously expansive schemes. The 
Archduke also furthered a policy known as Trialism, that of 
federalising the Dual Monarchy by constituting the Slav 
provinces as the third of its component groups. The an- 
nexation of Bosnia would serve to advance this programme 
by depressing the hitherto dominant races, the Germans 
and Magyars, besides rescuing the monarchy from the posi- 
tion of "brilliant second" to Germany. Kaiser William 
was taken aback b}^ this bold stroke, especially as it wounded 
Turkey ; but he soon saw the advantage of having a vigorous 
rather than a passive Ally; and, in a visit which he paid to 
the Archduke in November, 1908, their intercourse, which 
had hitherto been coldly courteous, ripened into friendship, 
which became enthusiastic admiration when the Archduke 
advocated the building of Austrian Dreadnoughts. 

The annexation of Bosnia was a defiance to Europe, 
because, at the Conference of the Powers held at London in 
1871, they all (Austria included) solemnly agreed not to 
depart from their treaty engagements without a previous 
understanding with the co-signatories. Austria's conduct 
in 1908, therefore, dealt a severe blow to the regime of 
international law. But it was especially resented by the 
Russians, because for ages they had lavished blood and 
treasure in effecting the liberation of the Balkan peoples. 
Besides, in 1897, the Tsar had framed an agreement with the 
Court of Vienna for the purpose of exercising conjointly some 
measure of control over Balkan affairs; and he then vetoed 
Austria's suggestion for the acquisition of Bosnia. In 
1903, when the two Empires drew up the "February" and 
"Miirzsteg" Programmes for more effectually dealing with 
the racial disputes in Macedonia, the Hapsburg Court did 
23 



354 The European Nations 

not renew the suggestion about Bosnia, yet in 1908 Austria 
annexed that province. Obviously, she would not have 
thus defied the public law of Europe and Russian, Servian, 
and Turkish interests, but for the recent humiliation of 
Russia in the Far East, which explains both the dramatic 
intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier against Russia's ally, 
France, and the sudden apparition of Austria as an aggres- 
sive Power. In his speech to the Austro-Hungarian Dele- 
gations Aehrenthal declared that he intended to continue 
"an active foreign policy," which would enable Austria- 
Hungary to "occupy to the full her place in the world." 
She had to act because otherwise " affairs might have de- 
veloped against her." 

Thus the Eastern Question once more became a matter 
of acute controversy. The Austro-Russian agreements of 
1897 and 1903 had huddled up and cloaked over those racial 
and religious disputes, so that there was little chance of a 
general war arising out of them. But since 1908 the Eastern 
Question has threatened to produce a general conflict unless 
Austria moderated her pretensions. She did not do so; for, 
as we have seen, Germany favoured them in order to assure 
uninterrupted communications between Central Europe and 
her Bagdad Railway. Already Hapsburg influence was 
supreme at Bukharest, Sofia, and in Macedonia affairs. If 
it could dominate Servia (anti-Austrian since the accession 
of King Peter in 1903) the whole of the Peninsula would be 
subject to Austro-German control. True, the influence of 
Germany at Constantinople at first suffered a shock from 
the Young Turk Revolution of July, 1908; and those eager 
nationalists deeply resented the annexation of Bosnia, which 
they ascribed to the Austro-German alliance. The men of 
Berlin, however, so far from furthering that act, disapproved 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 355 

of it as endangering their control of Turkey and exploitation 
of its resources. In fact, Germany's task in inducing her 
prospective vassals, the Turks, to submit to spoliation at 
the hands of her ally, Austria, was exceedingly difHcult; and' 
in the tension thus created, the third partner of the Triple 
Alliance, Italy, very nearly parted company from disgust 
at Austrian encroachments in a quarter where she cherished 
aspirations. As we have seen, Victor Emmanuel III., 
early in his reign, favoured friendly relations with Russia; 
and these ripened quickly during the "Annexation Crisis" 
of 1908-9, as both Powers desired to maintain the status quo 
against Austria.^ On December 24, 1908, the Russian 
Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, declared that, with that aim in 
view, he was acting in close concert with France, Great 
Britain, and Italy. He urged Bulgaria, Servia, and Monte- 
negro to hold closely together for the defence of their 
common interests: "Our aim must be to bring them to- 
gether and to combine them with Turkey in a common ideal 
of defence of their national and economic development." 
A. cordial union between the Slav States and Turkey now 
seems a fantastic notion; but it was possible then, under 
pressure of the Austro-German menace, which the Young 
Turks were actively resisting. 

During the early part of 1909 a general war seemed im- 
minent ; for Slavonic feeling was violently excited in Russia 
and Servia. But, hostilities being impossible in winter, 
passions had time to cool. It soon became evident that 
those States could not make head against Austria and 

■ Tittoni, Italy's Foreign and, Colonial Policy (English translation, p. 
128). Tittoni denied that the Triple Alliance empowered Italy to 
demand "compensation" if Austria expanded in the Balkans. But the 
Triple Alliance Treaty, as renewed in 1912, included such a clause, No. 
VII. 



35^ The European Nations 

Germany. Moreover, the Franco-Russian alliance did not 
bind France to act with Russia unless the latter were defi- 
nitely attacked; and France was weakened by the wide- 
spread strikes of 1907-8 and the vehement anti-militarist 
agitation already described. Further, Italy was distracted 
by the earthquake at Messina, and armed intervention was 
not to be expected from the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry. 
Bulgaria and Roumania were pro-Austrian. Turkey alone 
could not hope to reconquer Bosnia, and a Turco-Serb- 
Russian league was beyond the range of practical politics. 
These material considerations decided the issue of events. 
Towards the close of March, Kaiser William, the hitherto 
silent backer of Austria, ended the crisis by sending to his 
ambassador at Petrograd an autograph letter, the effect of 
which upon the Tsar was decisive. Russia gave way, and 
dissociated herself fiom France, England, and Italy. In 
consideration of an indemnity of £2,200,000 from Austria, 
Turkey recognised the annexation. Consequently no Con- 
ference of the Powers met even to register the fait accompli 
in Bosnia. The Germanic Empires had coerced Russia 
and Servia, despoiled Turkey, and imposed their will on 
Europe. Kaiser William characteristically asserted that it 
was his apparition "in shining armour" by the side of 
Austria which decided the issue of events. Equally decisive, 
perhaps, was Germany's formidable shipbuilding in 1908-9, 
namely, four Dreadnoughts to England's two, a fact which 
explains this statement of Biilow : "When at last, during the 
Bosnian crisis, the sky of international politics cleared, when 
German power on the Continent burst its encompassing 
bonds, we had already got beyond the stage of preparation 
in the construction of our fleet."* 
» Biilow, Imperial Germany, p. 99. 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 357 

The crisis of 1908-9 revealed in a startling manner the 
weakness of international law in a case where the stronger 
States were determined to have their way. It therefore 
tended to discourage the peace propaganda and the social 
movement in Great Britain and France. The increased 
speed of German naval construction alarmed the British peo- 
ple, who demanded precautionary measures. ^ France and 
Russia also improved their armaments, for it was clear that 
Austria, as well as Germany, intended to pursue an active 
foreign policy which would inflict other rebuffs on neigh- 
bours who were unprepared. Further, the Triple Entente 
had proved far too weak for the occasion. True, France 
and England loyally supported Russia in a matter which 
chiefly concerned her and Servia, and her sudden retreat 
before the Kaiser's menace left them in the lurch. Conse- 
quently, the relations between the Western Powers and 
Russia were decidedly cool during the years 1909-10, 
especially in and after November, 1910, when the Tsar met 
Kaiser William at Potsdam, and framed an agreement, both 
as to their general relations and the railways then under con- 
struction towards Persia. On the other hand, the rapid 
advance of Germany and Austria alarmed Italy, who, in 
order to safeguard her interests in the' Balkans (especially 
Albania), came to an understanding with Russia for the 
support of their claims. The details are not known, neither 
are the agreements of Austria with Bulgaria and Roumania, 
though it seems probable that they were framed with the 
two kings rather than with the Governments of Sofia and 

'Annoyance had been caused by the Kaiser's letter of Feb. 18, 1908, 
to Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty, advising (though 
in friendly terms) the cessation of suspicion towards Germany's naval 
construction. It was held to be an attempt to put us off our guard. 



358 The European Nations 

Bukharest. Those sovereigns were German princes, and 
the events of 1908-9 naturally attracted them towards 
the Central Powers. 

In 1909-10 France and England also lost ground in Tur- 
key. There the Young Turks, who seized power in July, 
1908, were overthrown in April, 1909, when Abdul Hamid 
II. was deposed. He was succeeded by his weakly com- 
plaisant brother, Mohammed V. This change, however, 
did not promote the cause of reform. The Turkish Parlia- 
ment became a bear-garden, and the reformers the tools of 
reaction. In the four years 1908-12 there were seven 
Ministries and countless ministerial crises, and the Young 
Turks, copying the forms and killing the spirit of English 
Liberalism, soon became the most intolerant oppressors of 
their non-Moslem subjects. In administrative matters they 
acted on the old Turkish proverb — "The Sultan's treasure is 
a sea, and he who does not draw from it is a pig." Ger- 
many found means to satisfy these dominating and acquisi- 
tive instincts, and thus regained power at the Sublime 
Porte. The Ottoman Empire therefore remained the de- 
spair of patriotic reformers, a hunting-ground for Teutonic 
concessionaires, a Hell for its Christian subjects, and the 
chief storm-centre of Europe. ^ 

The death of King Edward VII. on May 6, 1910, was a 

' Lack of space precludes an account of the Cretan Question, also 
of the Agram and Friedjung trials which threw lurid Hght on Austria's 
treatment of her South-Slav subjects, for which see Seton-Watson, 
Corruption and Reform in Hungary. Rohrbach, D-er deutsche Gedanke 
in der Welt (1912), p. 172, explains the success of German efforts at the 
Porte by the belief of the Young Turks that Germany was the only 
Power that wished them well — -Germany who helped Austria to secure 
Bosnia; Germany, whose Bagdad Railway scheme mercilessly exploited 
Turkish resources! (See D. Fraser, The Short Cut to India, chs. iii., 
iv.). 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 359 

misfortune for the cause of peace. His tact and discernment 
had on several occasions allayed animosity and paved the 
way for friendly understandings. True, the German Press 
sought to represent those efforts as directed towards the 
"encircling" (Einkreisung) of Germany. But here we may 
note that (i) King Edward never transgressed the con- 
stitutional usage, which prescribed that no important 
agreement be arrived at apart from the responsible Ministers 
of the Crown. ^ (2) The agreements with Spain, Italy, 
France, Germany, and Portugal (in 1903-4) were for the 
purposes of arbitration. (3) The alliance with Japan and 
the Ententes with France and Russia were designed to end 
the perilous state of isolation which existed at the time of 
his accession. (4) At that time Germany was allied to 
Austria, Italy, and (probably) Roumania, not to speak of 
her secret arrangements with Turkey. She had no right to 
complain of the ending of our isolation. (5) The marriage 
of King Alfonso of Spain with Princess Ena of Battenberg 
(May, 1906), was a lovcrmatch, and was not the result of 
King Edward's efforts to detach Spain from Germany. It 
had no political significance. (6) The Kaiser's sister was 
Crown Princess (now Queen) of Greece; the King of 
Roumania was a Hohenzollern ; and the King of Bul- 
garia and the Prince Consort of Holland were German 
Princes. (7) On several occasions King Edward testified 
his friendship with Germany, notably during his visit 
to Berlin in February, 1909, which Germans admit to 
have helped on the friendly Franco-German agreement 
of that month on Morocco; also in his letter of January, 
1910, on the occasion of the Kaiser's birthday, when he 
expressed the hope that the United Kingdom and Ger- 
» I have been assured of this on high authority. 



36o The European Nations 

many might always work together for the maintenance 
of peace. ^ 

The chief danger to public tranquillity arises from the 
vigorous expansion of some peoples and the decay of others. 
Nearly all the great nations of Europe are expansive ; but on 
their fringe lie other peoples, notably the Turks, Persians, 
Koreans, and the peoples of North Africa, who are in a state 
of decline or semi-anarchy. In such a state of things 
friction is inevitable and war difficult to avoid, unless in 
the councils of the nations good-will and generosity prevail 
over the suspicion and greed which are too often the domi- 
nant motives. Scarcely was the Bosnian-Turkish crisis over 
before Morocco once more became a danger to the peace of 
the world. 

There the anarchy continued, with results that strained 
the relations between France and Germany. Nevertheless, 
on February 8, 1909 (probably owing to the friendly offices 
of Great Britain^), the two rivals came to an agreement 
that France should respect the independence of Morocco 
and not oppose German trade in that quarter, while Ger- 
many declared that her sole interests there were commercial, 
and that she would not oppose "the special political interests 
of France in that country."^ But, as trade depended on 
the maintenance of order, this vague compact involved 
difficulties. Clearly, if disorders continued, the task of 

' Viscount Esher, The Influence of King Edward : and Other Essays, 
p. 56. The "encircling" myth is worked up by Rachfahl, Kaiser und 
Reich, p. 228; Reventlow, op. cit., pp. 254, 279, 298, etc.; and by Rohr- 
bach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (ch. vi.), where he says that 
King Edward's chief idea from the outset was to cripple Germany. He 
therefore won over Japan, France, Spain, and Russia, his aim being to 
secure all Africa from the Cape to Cairo, and all Asia from the Sinaitic 
Peninsula to Burmah! 

'Rachfahl, p. 310. J Morel, Appendix XIV. 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 361 

France would be onerous and relatively unprofitable, for 
she would be working largely for the benefit of British and 
German traders. Indeed, the new Chancellor, Bethmann- 
Hollweg, admitted to the French ambassador, Jules Cam- 
bon, that thenceforth Morocco was a fruit destined to fall 
into the lap of France ; only she must humour public opinion 
in Germany. Unfortunately, the "Consortium," for joint 
commercial enterprises of French and Germans in Morocco 
and the French Congo broke down on points of detail; 
and this produced a very sore feeling in Germany in the 
spring of 191 1 . Further, as the Moorish rebels pushed their 
raids up to the very gates of Fez, French troops in those 
same months proceeded to march to that capital (April, 
191 1). The Kaiser saw in that move, and a corresponding 
advance of Spanish troops in the North, a design to partition 
Morocco. Failing to secure what he considered satisfactory 
assurances, he decided to send to Agadir a corvette, the 
Panther (July i, 191 1) replaced by a cruiser, the Berlin. 

Behind him were ambitious parties which sought to com- 
pass world-predominance for Germany. The Pan-German, 
Colonial, and Navy Leagues had gained enormous influence 
since 1905, when they induced the Kaiser to visit Tangier; 
and early in 191 1 they issued pamphlets urging the annex- 
ation of part of Morocco. The chief, termed West-Mar okke 
Deutsch, was inspired by the Under-Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, Kiderlen-Wachter, who thereafter urged officially 
that the Government must take into account public opinion 
— which he himself had manipulated. 

Soon again, as at Tangier in 1905, Germany's procedure 
was needlessly provocative if, as the agreement of 1909 
declared, her interests in Morocco were solely commerical. 
If this were so, why send a war-ship, when diplomatic insist- 



362 The European Nations 

ence on the terms of 1909 would have met the needs of the . 
case, especially as German trade with Morocco was less than 
half that of French firms and less than one-third that of 
British firms? Obviously, Germany was bent on something 
more than the maintenance of her trade (which, indeed, the 
French were furthering by suppressing anarchy); other- 
wise she would not have risked the chance of a collision 
which might at any time result from the presence of a Ger- 
man cruiser alongside French war-ships in a small harbour. 
It is almost certain that the colonial and war parties at 
Berlin sought to drive on the Kaiser to hostilities. The 
occasion was favourable. In the spring of 191 1 France was 
a prey to formidable riots of vine-growers. On June 28th 
occurred an embarrassing change of Ministry. Besides, 
the French army and navy had not yet recovered from the 
Socialist regime of previous years. The remodelling of the 
Russian army was also very far from complete. Moreover^ 
the Tsar and Kaiser had come to a friendly understanding 
at Potsdam in November, 191 o, respecting Persia and their 
attitude towards other questions, so that it was doubtful 
whether Russia would assist France if French action in 
Morocco could be made to appear irregular. As for Great 
Britain, her ability to afford sufficiently large and timely 
succour to the French was open to question. In the throes 
of a sharp constitutional crisis, and beset by acute Labour 
troubles, she was ill-fitted to defend herself. By the close 
of 191 1 the Navy would include only fourteen first-class 
ships as against Germany's nine; while Austria was also 
becoming a Naval Power. The weakness of France and 
England had appeared in the spring when they gave way 
before Germany's claims in Asia Minor. On March 18, 
191 1, by a convention with Turkey she acquired the right 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 363 

to construct from the Bagdad Railway a branch line to 
Alexandretta, together with large privileges over that port 
which made it practically German, and the natural outlet for 
Mesopotamia and North Syria, heretofore in the sphere of 
Great Britain and France. True, she waived conditionally 
her claim to push the Bagdad line to the Persian Gulf; but 
her recent bargain with the Tsar at Potsdam gave her the 
lion's share of the trade of Western Persia. 

After taking these strides in the Levant, Germany ought 
not to have shown jealousy of French progress in Morocco, 
where her commerce was small. As in 1905, she was clearly 
using the occasion to test the validity of the Anglo-French 
Entente and the effectiveness of British support to France. 
Probably, too, she desired either a territorial acquisition in 
South Morocco, for which the colonial party and most of the 
Press were clamouring; or she intended, in lieu of it, to 
acquire the French Congo. At present it is not clear at 
which of these objects she aimed. Kiderlen-Wachter de- 
clared privately that Germany must have the Agadir district 
and would never merely accept in exchange Congolese 
territory. ^ 

Whatever were the real aims of the Kaiser, they ran 
counter to French and British interests. Moreover, the 
warning of Sir Edward Grey, on July 4, that we must be 
consulted as to any new developments, was completely 

'The following facts are significant. In November 9, 191 1, the 
Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, assured the Reichstag that Germany- 
had never intended to annex Moroccan territory, an assertion con- 
firmed by Kiderlen-Wachter on Nov. 17th. But during the libel action 
brought against the Berlin Post it was postively afl&rmed that the 
Government and Kiderlen-Wachter had intended to annex South-West 
Morocco. A high official, Dr. Heilbronn, telephoned so to the Posl, 
urging it to demand that step. 



364 The European Nations 

ignored; and even on July 21st the German ambassador in 
London could give no assurance as to the policy of his 
Government. Consequently, on that evening Mr. Lloyd 
George, during a rpeech at the Mansion House, apprised 
Germany that any attempt to treat us as a negligible factor 
in the Cabinet of Nations "would be a humiliation intoler- 
able for a great country like ours to endure. " The tension 
must have been far more severe than appeared in the pub- 
lished documents to induce so peace-loving a minister to 
speak in those terms. They aroused a storm of passion in 
the German Press; and, somewhat later, a German admiral, 
Stiege, declared that they would have justified an immedi- 
ate declaration of war by Germany. ' Certainly they were 
more menacing than is usual in diplomatic parlance ; but our 
cavalier treatment by Germany (possibly due to Bethmann- 
Hollweg's belief in blunt Bismarckian ways) justified a 
protest, which, after all, was less questionable than Ger- 
many's despatching a cruiser to Agadir, owing to the reserve 
of the French Foreign Office. Up to July 27th the crisis 
remained acute; but on that day the German ambassador 
gave assurances as to a probable agreement with France. 

What caused the change of front at Berlin ? Probably it 
was due to a sharp financial crisis (an unexpected result of 
the political crisis), which would have produced a general 
crash in German finance, then in an insecure position; and 
prudence may have counselled the adoption of the less 
ambitious course, namely a friendly negotiation with the 
French for territorial expansion in their Congo territory 
in return for the recognition of their protectorate of Morocco. 
Such a compromise (which, as we shall see, was finally 
arrived at) involved no loss for Germany. On the con- 

' Rear- Admiral Stiege in Uberall for March, 19 12. 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 365 

trary, she gained fertile districts in the tropics and left the 
French committed to the Morocco venture, VN^hich, at great 
cost to them, would tend finally to benefit commerce in 
general, and therefore that of Germany. 

Also, before the end of these discussions there occurred 
two events which might well dispose the Kaiser to a com- 
promise with France. Firstly, as a result of his negotiations 
with Russia (then beset by severe dearth) he secured larger 
railway and trading concessions in Persia, the compact of 
August 19th opening the door for further German enterprises 
in the Levant. Secondly, on September 29th, Italy 
declared war on Turkey, partly (it is said) because recent 
German activity in Tripoli menaced the ascendancy which 
she was resolved to acquire in that land. This event greatly 
deranged the Kaiser's schemes. He had hoped to keep the 
Triple Alliance intact, and yet add to it the immense po- 
tential fighting force of Turkey and the Moslem world. 
Now, however he might "hedge," he could hardly avoid 
offending either Rome or Constantinople; and even if he 
succeeded, his friends would exhaust each other and be 
useless for the near future. Consequently, the Italo- 
Turkish War (with its sequel, the Balkan War of 191 2) dealt 
him a severe blow. The Triple Alliance was at once strained 
nearly to breaking point by Austria forbidding Italy to 
undertake naval operations in the Adriatic (probably also in 
the .^gean). Equally serious was the hostility of Moslems 
to Europeans in general which compromised the Kaiser's 
schemes for utilising Islam. Accordingly, for the present, 
his policy assumed a more peaceful guise. 

Here, doubtless, are the decisive reasons for the Franco- 
German accord of November 4, 191 1, whereby the Berlin 
Government recognised a French protectorate over Morocco 



366 The European Nations 

and agreed not to interfere in the Franco-Spanish negoti- 
ation still pending. France opened certain "closed" ports 
(among them Agadir), and guaranteed equality of trading 
rights to all nations. She also ceded to Germany about 
100,000 square miles of fertile land in the north-west of her 
Congo territory, which afforded access to the rivers Congo 
and Ubangi. The explosion of Teutonic wrath produced 
by these far from unfavourable conditions revealed the 
magnitude of the designs that prompted the coup of Agadir. 
The Colonial Minister at once resigned ; and scornful laugh- 
ter greeted the Chancellor when he announced to the 
Reichstag that the Berlin would be withdrawn from that 
port, the protection of German subjects being no longer 
necessary. He added that Germany would neither fight for 
Southern Morocco nor dissipate her strength in distant 
expeditions. In fact, he would "avoid any war which was 
not required by German honour." Far different was the 
tone of the Conservative leader, Herr Heydebrand, who 
declared Mr. Lloyd George's "challenge" to be one which 
the German people would not tolerate; England had sought 
to involve them in a war with France; but they now saw 
"where the real enemy was to be found." The Crown 
Prince, who was present, loudly applauded these Anglo- 
phobe outbursts. The German Press showed no less 
bitterness. Besides criticising the Chancellor's blustering 
beginning and huckstering conclusion, they manifested a re- 
solve that Germany should always and everywhere succeed . 
The Berlin journal, the Post, went so far as to call the Kaiser 
ce poltron miserable for giving up South Morocco ; and it was 
clear that a large section of the German people ardently 
desired war with the Western Powers. 

Many Frenchmen and Belgians credited the German 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 367 

colonial party with the design of acquiring the whole of the 
French Congo, as a first step towards annexing the Belgian 
Congo. ^ Belgium became alarmed, and in 1913 greatly 
extended the principle of compulsory military service. On 
the other hand, the German Chauvinists certainly desired 
the acquisition of a naval base in Morocco which would help 
to link up their naval stations and facilitate the conquest of 
a World Empire. This was the policy set forth by Bernhardi 
in the closing parts of his work, Germany and the next War, 
where he protested against the Chancellor's surrender of 
Morocco as degrading to the nation and damaging to its 
future. Following the lead of Treitschke, he depreciated 
colonies rich merely in products; for Germany needed homes 
for her children in future generations, and she must fight for 
them with all her might at the first favourable opportunity. 
This is the burden of Bernhardi's message which bristles 
with rage at the loss of Morocco. He regarded that land 
as more important than the Congo; for, in addition to the 
strategic value of its coasts, it offered a fulcrum in the West, 
whereby to raise the Moslems against the Triple Entente. 
In the Epilogue he writes: "Our relations with Islam have 
changedforthe worse by the abandonment of Morocco. . . . 
We have lost prestige in the whole Mohammedan world, 
which is a matter of the first importance for us. " 

The logical conclusion of Bernhardi's thesis was that 
Germany and Austria should boldly side with the Moors 
and Turks against France and Italy, summoning Islam 
to arms, if need be, against Christendom. Perhaps if 
Turkey had possessed the i ,500,000 troops whom her War 
Minister, Chevket Pacha, was hopefully striving to raise, 
this might have been the outcome of events. As it was, 

' Hanotaux, La Politique de V Equilibre, p. 417. 



368 The European Nations 

Realpolitik counselled prudence, and the observance of the 
forms of Christianity. 

Certainly there was no sufficient pretext for war. France 
and Russia had humoured Germany. As to "the real 
enemy, " light was thrown on her attitude during the debate 
of November 27, 191 1, at Westminster. Sir Edward Grey 
then stated that we had consistently helped on, and not 
impeded, the Franco-German negotiations. Never had we 
played the dog-in-the-manger to Germany. In fact, the 
Berlin Government would greatly have eased the tension 
if she had declared earlier that she did not intend to take 
part of Morocco. Further, the Entente with France (made 
public on November 24th), contained no secret articles; nor 
were there any in any compact made by the British Gov- 
ernment. On December 6th, Mr. Asquith declared that we 
had no secret engagement with any Power obliging us to take 
up arms. "We do not desire to stand in the light of any 
Power which wants to find its place in the sun. The first 
of British interests is, as it always has been, the peace of the 
world; and to its attainment British diplomacy and policy 
will be directed. " The German Chancellor, Bethmann- 
Hollweg, also said in the Reichstag, "We also, sirs, sincerely 
desire to live in peace and friendship with England" — an 
announcement received with complete silence. Some 
applause greeted his statement that he would welcome 
any definite proof that England desired friendlier relations 
with Germany. 

Thus ended the year 191 1. Frenchmen were sore at 
discovering that the Entente entailed no obligation on our 
part to help them by force of arms' ; and Germans, far from 
rejoicing at their easy acquisition of a new colony, harboured 

' Hanotaux, La Politique de V Equilibre, p. 419. 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 369 

resentment against both the Western Powers. Britons had 
been aroused from party strifes and Labour quarrels by 
finding new proofs of the savage enmity with which Junkers, 
Colonials, and Pan-Germans regarded them; and the pro- 
blem was — Should England seek to regain Germany's friend- 
ship, meanwhile remaining aloof from close connections 
with France and Russia; or should she recognise that her 
uncertain attitude possessed all the disadvantages and few 
of the advantages of a definite alliance? 

Early in 191 2 light was thrown on the situation, and the 
Berlin Government thenceforth could not plead ignorance 
as to our intentions; for efforts, both public and private, 
were made to improve Anglo-German relations. Mr. 
Churchill advocated a friendly understanding in naval 
affairs. Lord Haldane also visited Berlin, probably on an 
ofiicial invitation. He declared to that Government that 
"we would in no circumstances be a party to any sort of 
aggression upon Germany." But we must oppose a vio- 
lation of the neutrality of Belgium, and, if the naval com- 
petition continued, we should lay down two keels to 
Germany's one. As a sequel to these discussions the two 
Governments discussed the basis of an Entente. It soon 
appeared that Germany sought to bind us almost un- 
conditionally to neutrality in all cases. To this the 
British Cabinet demurred, but suggested the following 
formula : 

" The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and 
friendship between them, England declares that she will neither 
make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggres- 
sion upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any 
treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a 
party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an 
object." 

24 



370 The European Nations 

Further than this it refused to go ; and Mr. Asquith in his 
speech 6f October 2, 1914, at Cardiff thus explained the 
reason : 

"They [the Germans] wanted us to go further. They asked us to 
pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany 
being engaged in war, and this, mark you, at a time when Germany 
was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive resources, 
and especially upon the sea. They asked us (to put it quite plainl}'', 
for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the 
opportunity to overbear, to dominate, the European world. To such 
a demand, but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we 
gave."' 

Thus, efforts for a good understanding with Germany- 
broke down owing to the exacting demands of German diplo- 
macy for our neutrality in all circumstances (including, 
of course, a German invasion of Belgium). Thereupon 
she proceeded with a new Navy Act (the fifth in fourteen 
years) for a large inciease in construction.^ 

Perhaps Germany would have been more conciliatory if 
she had foreseen the events of the following autumn. As has 
already appeared, Italy's attack upon the Turks (coinciding 
with difficulties which their rigour raised up) furnished the 
opportunity — for which the Balkan States had been longing 
— to shake off the Turkish yoke. On March 13, 191 2, 
Servia and Bulgaria framed a secret treaty of alliance 
against Turkey, which contained conditions as to joint 
action against Austria or Roumania, if they attacked, and a 
general understanding as to the partition of Macedonia. 

' See Times of October 3, 1914, and Julj' 20, 1915 (with quotations from 
the North German Gazette). Bethmann-Hollweg declared to the Reichstag 
on August 19, 1915, that Asquith's statement was false; but in a letter 
published on August 26th, and an official statement of September 1,1915, 
Sir E. Grey convincingly refuted him. 

"Casile and Hurd, German Naval Power, pp. 142-52. 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 371 

Greece came into the agreement later. ^ No time was 
fixed for action against Turkey ; but in view of her obstinacy 
and intolerance action was inevitable. She precipitated 
matters by massacring Christians in and on the borders of 
Macedonia. Thereupon the three States and Montenegro 
demanded the enforcement of the reforms and toleration 
guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin (see Vol. I, p. 287). The 
Turks having as usual temporised (though they were still at 
war with Italy ^), the four States demanded complete auton- 
omy and the reconstruction of frontiers according to racial 
needs. Both sides rejected the joint offers of Austria and 
Russia for friendly intervention; whereupon Turkey declared 
war upon Bulgaria and Servia (October 17th). On the mor- 
row Greece declared war upon her. Montenegro had already 
opened hostilities. In view of these facts, the later asser- 
tions of the German Powers, that the Balkan League was 
a Russian plot for overthrowing Turkey and weakening 
Teutonic influence, is palpably false. Turkey had treated 
her Christian subjects (including the once faithful Albanians) 

' The claim that the Greek statesman, Venizelos, founded the league 
seems incorrect. So, too, is the rumour that Russia, through her Minis- 
ter, Hartvig, at Belgrade, framed it (but see N. Jorga, Hist, des Etats 
balcaniques, p. 436). Miliukoff, in a "Report to the Carnegie Found- 
ation, " denies this. The plan occurred to many men so soon as Turkish 
Reform proved a sham. Venizelos is said to have mooted it to Mr. 
James Bourchier in May, 191 1. (R. Rankin, Inner History of the 
Balkan War, p. 13.) 

^ Italy made peace on October 15th, gaining possession of Tripoli and 
agreeing to evacuate the ^gean Isles, but on various pretexts kept her 
troops there. A little later she renewed the Triple Alliance with Ger- 
many and Austria for five years. This may have resulted from the 
Balkan crisis then beginning, and from the visits of the Russian Foreign 
Minister, Sazonoff, to Paris and London, whereupon it was officially 
stated that Russia adhered both to her treaty with France and her 
Entente with England. He added that the grouping of the great 
States was necessary in the interests of the Balance of Power. 



372 The European Nations 

worse than ever. Their union against Turkey had long 
been foretold. It was helped on by Ottoman misrule, and 
finally cemented by massacre. Further, Russia and 
Austria acted together in seeking to avert an attack on 
Turkey; and the Powers collectively warned the Balkan 
States that no changes of boundary would be tolerated. 
Those States refused to accept the European fiat; for the 
present misrule was intolerable, and the inability of the 
Turks to cope with either the Italians or the Albanian rebels 
opened a vista of hope. The German accusations levelled 
at Russia were obviously part of the general scheme adopted 
at Berlin and Vienna for exasperating public opinion against 
the Slav cause. 

The Balkan States, though waging war with no combined 
aim, speedily overthrew the Turks in the most dramatic and 
decisive conflict of our age. The Greeks entered Salonica 
on November 8th (a Bulgarian force a few days later); on 
November i8th the Servians occupied Monastir, and the 
Albanian seaport, Durazzo, at the end of the month. The 
Bulgar army meanwhile drove the Turks southwards in 
headlong rout until in the third week of November the 
fortified Tchataldja Lines opposed an invincible obstacle. 
There, on December 3d, all the belligerents, except Greece, 
concluded an armistice, and negotiations for peace were 
begun at London on December 1 6th. Up to January 22, 191 3, 
Turkey seemed inclined towards peace ; but on the morrow a 
revolution took place at Constantinople, the Ministry of 
Kiamil Pacha being ousted by the warlike faction of Enver 
Bey. He, one of the contrivers of the revolution of July, 
1908, had since been attached to the Turkish Embassy at 
Berlin; and his successful coup was a triumph of German 
influence. The Peace Conference at London broke upon 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 373 

February ist. In March the Greeks and Bulgars captured 
Janina and Adrianople respectively, while Scutari fell to 
the Montenegrins (April 2 2d). The Powers (Russia in- 
cluded) demanded the evacuation of this town by Monte- 
negro; for they had decided to constitute Albania (the 
most turbulent part of the Peninsula) an independent State, 
incliiding Scutari. 

In Albania, as elsewhere, the feuds of rival races had 
drenched the Balkan lands with blood; Greek and Bulgar 
forces had fought near Salonica, and there seemed slight 
chance of a peaceful settlement in Central Macedonia. 
That chance disappeared when the Powers in the resumed 
Peace Conference at London persisted in ruling the Serbs and 
Montenegrins out of Albania, a decision obviously dictated 
by the longings of Austria and Italy to gain that land at a 
convenient opportunity. This blow to Servia's aspirations 
aroused passionate resentment both there and in Russia. 
Finally the Serbs gave way, and claimed a far larger part 
of Macedonia than had been mapped out in their agreement 
with Bulgaria prior to the war. Hence arose strifes between 
their forces, in which the Greeks also sided against the 
Bulgars. Meanwhile, the London Conference of the Powers 
and the Balkan States framed terms of peace, which were 
largely due to the influence of Sir Edward Grey. '^ 

They may be disregarded here; for they were soon dis- 
regarded by all the Balkan States. Seeking to steal a 
march upon their rivals, the Bulgar forces (it is said on the 
instigation of their King and his unofficial advisers) made 
a sudden and treacherous attack. Now, the dour, pushing 
Bulgars are the most unpopular race in the Peninsula. 
Therefore not only Serbs and Greeks, but also Roumanians 

' See Times of May 30, 1913; Rankin, op. cit., p. 517. 



374 The European Nations 

and Turks turned savagely upon them/ Overwhelmed 
on all sides, Bulgaria sued for peace; and again the Great 
Powers had to revise terms that they had declared to be 
final. Ultimately, on August lo, 1913, the Peace of Bukha- 
rest was signed. It imposed the present boundaries of the 
Balkan States and left them furious but helpless to resist a 
policy known to have been dictated largely from Vienna and 
Berlin. In Ad^ay, 1914, a warm friend of the Balkan peoples 
thus described its effects: 

"No permanent • solution of the Balkan Question has been arrived 
at. The ethnographical questions have been ignored. A portion of 
each race has been handed over to be ruled by another which it de- 
tests. Servia has acquired a population which is mostly Bulgar and 
Albanian, though of the latter she has massacred and expelled many 
thousands. Bulgars have been captured by Greeks, Greeks by Bul- 
gars, Albanians by Greeks, and not one of these races has as yet shown 
signs of being capable to rule another justly. The seeds have been sown 
of hatreds that will grow and bear fruit."* 

Especially lamentable were the recovery of the Adriano- 
ple district by the Turks, and the unprovoked seizure of 
the purely Bulgar district south of Silistria by Roumania. 
On the other hand. Kaiser William thus congratulated her 
king, Charles (a Hohenzollern) on the peace, a "splendid 
result, for which not only your own people but all the 
belligerent States and the whole of Europe have to thank 
your wise and truly statesmanlike policy. At the same 
time your mentioning that I have been able to contribute 
to what has been achieved is a great satisfaction to me. 
I rejoice at our mutual co-operation in the cause of peace. " 

This telegram, following the trend of Austro-German 

' Roumania's sudden intervention annoyed Austria, who had hoped 
for a longer and more exhausting war in the Balkans. 
* Edith Durham, The Struggle for Scutari, p. 315. 



Teuton versus Slav (1908-13) 375 

policy, sought to win back Roumania to the Central Powers, 
from which she had of late sheered off. In other respects 
the Peace of Bukharest was a notable triumph for Austria 
and Germany. Not only had they rendered impossible a 
speedy revival of the Balkan League which had barred their 
expansion towards the Levant, biit they bolstered up the 
Ottoman Power when its extrusion from Europe seemed 
imminent. They also exhausted Servia, reduced Bulgaria 
to ruin, and imposed on Albania a German prince, William 
of Wied, an officer in the Prussian army, who was destined 
to view his principality from the quarter-deck of his yacht. 
Such was the Treaty of Bukharest. Besides dealing a severe 
blow to the Slav cause, it perpetuated the recent infamous 
spoliations and challenged every one concerned to further 
conflicts. Within a year the whole of the Continent was in 
flames. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE CRISIS OF I914 

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider 
than that which we have in the Hteral operation of the guarantee. It is 
found in the answer to the question whether this country would quietly 
stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever 
stained the pages of history and thus become participators in the sin. " — • 
Gladstone: Speech of August, 1870. 

THE Prussian and German Army Bills of i860 and 
onwards have tended to make military preparedness 
a weighty factor in the recent development of nations; 
and the issue of events has too often been determined, not 
by the justice of a cause, but rather by the armed strength 
at the back of it. We must therefore glance at the military 
and naval preparations which enabled the Central Powers 
to win their perilous triumph over Russia and the Slavs of 
the Balkans. In April, 1912, the German Chancellor intro- 
duced to the Reichstag Army and Navy Bills (passed on 
May 2 1st) providing for great increases in the navy, also 
forces amounting to two new army corps, and that, too, 
though Germany's financial position was admitted to be 
"very serious," and the proposed measures merely piecau- 
tionary. Nevertheless, only Socialists, Poles, and Alsatians 
voted against them. But the events of the first Balkan 
War were cited as menacing Germany with a conflict in which 
she "might have to protect against several enemies, frontiers 

which are extended and by nature to a large extent open. " 

376 



The Crisis of 191 4 377 

A new Army Bill was therefore introduced in March, 1913 
(passed in June), which increased the total of the forces 
by 145,000 and raised their peace strength in 1914 to more 
than 870,000 men. The Chancellor referred gratefully to 
"the extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation" of 
Sir Edward Grey during the Conference at London, and 
admitted that a collision between Germans and Slavs was 
not inevitable; but Germany must take precautions, this, 
too, at a time when Russia and Austria agreed to place their 
forces again on a peace footing. Germany, far from relax- 
ing her efforts after the sharp rebuff to the Slavonic cause 
in the summer of 191 3, continued her military policy. It 
caused grave apprehension, especially as the new drastic 
taxes (estimated to produce £50,000,000) were loudly de- 
clared a burden that could not long be borne. As to the 
naval proposals, the Chancelloi commended Mi. Churchill's 
suggestion (on March 26th) of a "naval holiday, " but said 
there were many difficulties in the way. 

The British Naval Budget of 19 12 had provided for a six 
years' programme of 25 Dreadnoughts against Germany's 
14; and for every extra German ship two British would be 
added. In March, 191 3, this was continued, with the offer 
of a "holiday " for 1914 if Germany would soon accept. No 
acceptance came. The peace strength of the British Regu- 
lar Army was reckoned early in 1914 at 156,000 men, with 
about 250,000 effective Territorials. 

The increases in the German army induced the French 
Chambers in July, 191 3, to recur to three years' military 
service, that of two years being considered inadequate in 
face of the new menace from beyond the Rhine. ^ Jaures 

'The Temps of March 30, 19 13, estimated that Germany would soon 
have 500,000 men in her first line, as against 175,000 French, unless 



378 The European Nations 

and the Socialists, who advocated a national militia on the 
Swiss system, were beaten by 496 votes to 77, whereupon 
some of them resorted to obstructive tactics, and the 
measure was carried with some difficulty on July 8th. The 
General Confederation of Labour and the Anarchist Con- 
gress both announced their resolve to keep up the agitation 
in the army against the three years' service. Mutinous 
symptoms had already appeared. The military equipment 
of the French army was officially admitted to be in an 
unsatisfactory state during the debate of July 13, 1914, 
when it appeared that France was far from ready for a 
campaign. The peace strength of the army was then 
reckoned at 645,000 men. 

In Russia in 191 2 the chief efforts were concentrated on 
the navy. As regards the army, it was proposed in the 
Budget of July, 1913, to retain 300,000 men on active service 
for six months longer than before, thus strengthening the 
forces, especially during the winter months. Apart from 
this measure (a reply to that of Germany) no important 
development took place in 1912-14. The peace strength 
of the Russian army for Europe in 1914 exceeded 1,200,000.* 
That of Austria-Hungary exceeded 460,000 men, that of 
Italy 300,000 men. Consequently the Triple Entente had 
on foot just over 2,000,000 men as against i ,590,000 for the 
Triple Alliance; but the latter group formed a solid well- 
prepared block, while the Triple Entente were separate 
units; and the Russian and British forces could not be 
speedily marshalled at the necessary points on the Conti- 
nent. Moreover, all great wars, especially from the time of 

France recurred to three years' service. See M. Sembat, Faites unRoi, 
si non faites la Paix. 

' G. Alexinsky, La Russie et la guerre, pp. 83-8. 



The Crisis of 191 4 379 

Frederick the Great, have shown the advantage of the 
central position, if vigorously and Skilfully used. 

In these considerations lies the key to the European 
situation in the summer of 1914. The simmering of fiscal 
discontent and unsated military pride in Germany caused 
general alarm, especially when the memories of the Wars of 
Liberation of 18 13-14 were systematically used to excite 
bellicose ardour against France. Against England it needed 
no oflficial stimulus, for professors and teachers had long 
taught that "England was the foe." In particular prepa- 
rations had been made in South-West Africa for stirring 
up a revolt of the Boers as a preliminary to the expulsion of 
the British from South Africa. Relations had been estab- 
lished with De Wet and Maritz. In 191 3 the latter sent an 
agent to the German colony asking what aid the Kaiser 
would give and how far he would guarantee the independ- 
ence of South Africa. The reply came: "I will not only 
acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will 
even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immedi- 
ately. " ' The reason for the delay is not known. Probably 
on further inquiry it was found that the situation was not 
ready either in Europe or in South Africa. But as to 
German preparations for a war with England both in 
South-West Africa and Egypt there can be no doubt. India 
and probably Ireland also were not neglected. 

In fact a considerable part of the German people looked 
forward to a war with Great Britain as equally inevitable 
and desirable. She was rich and pleasure-loving; her 
Government was apt to wait till public opinion had been 
decisively pronounced; her sons, too selfish to defend her, 
paid "mercenaries" to do it. Her scattered possessions 

• General Botha's speech at Cape Town, July 25, 1915. 



380 The European Nations 

would therefore fall an easy prey to a well-organised, war- 
like, and thoroughly patriotic nation. Let the world belong 
to the ablest race, the Germanic. Such had been the 
teachings of Treitschke and his disciples long before the 
Boer War or the Anglo-French Entente. Those events 
and the Morocco Question in 1905 and 191 1 sharpened 
the rivalry; but it is a superficial reading of events to 
suppose that Morocco caused the rivalry, which clearly ori- 
ginated in the resolve of the Germans to possess a World- 
Empire. So soon as their influential classes distinctly framed 
that resolve a conflict was inevitable with Great Britain, 
which blocked their way to the ocean and possessed in every 
sea valuable colonies which she seemed little able to defend. 
The Morocco Affair annoyed them because, firstly, they 
wanted that strategic position, and secondly, they desired 
to sunder the Anglo-French Entente. But Morocco was 
settled in 191 1, and still the friction continued unabated. 
There remained the Eastern Question, a far more serious 
affair; for on it hung the hopes of Germany in the Orient 
and of Austria in the Balkans. 

The difficulty "for Germany was, how to equate her world- 
wide ambitions with the restricted and diverse aims of Aus- 
tria and Italy. The interests of the two Central Empires 
harmonised only respecting the Eastern Question. Welt- 
politik in general and Morocco in particular did not in the 
least concern Austria. Further, the designs of Vienna and 
Rome on Albania clashed hopelessly. An effort was made 
in the Triple Alliance, as renewed in 191 2, to safeguard 
Italian interests by insisting that, if Austria gained ground 
in the Balkans, Italy should have "compensation." The 
effort to lure the Government of Rome into Balkan adven- 
tures prompted the Austrian offer of August 9, 1913, for 



The Crisis of 191 4 381 

joint action against Servia. Italy refused, alleging that, as 
Servia was not guilty of aggression, the Austro-Italian 
Alliance did not hold good for such a venture. Germany 
also refused the Austrian offer — why is not clear. Austria 
was annoyed with the gains of Servia in the Peace of Bukha- 
rest, for which Kaiser William was largely responsible. Pro- 
bably, then, they differed as to some of the details of the 
Balkan settlement. But it is far more probable that 
Germany checked the Austrians because she was not yet 
fully ready for vigorous action. The doctrine of complete 
preparedness was edifyingly set forth by a well-informed 
writer, Rohrbach, who, in 191 2, urged his countrymen to be 
patient. In 191 1 they had been wrong to worry France and 
England about Morocco where German interests were not 
vital. Until the Bagdad and Hedjaz railways had neared 
their goals ; Turkish co-operation in an attack on Egypt would 
be weak. Besides, adds Rohrbach, the Kiel-North Sea 
Canal was not ready and Heligoland and other coast defences 
were not sufficiently advanced for Germany confidently to 
face a war with England. Thanks to the Kaiser, the fleet 
would soon be in a splendid condition, and then Germany 
could launch out boldly in the world. The same course 
was urged by Count Reventlow early in 19 14. Germany 
must continue to arm, though fully conscious that she was 
"constructing for her foreign politics and diplomacy, a 
Calvary which nolens volens she would have to climb. "^ 

Other evidence, especially from Bernhardi, Frobenius, 
and the works of the Pan-German Navy Leagues, might be 
quoted in proof of Germany's design to begin war when she 

' Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912), p. 216 (more than 
10,000 copies of this work were sold in a year) ; Reventlow, Deutschlands 
auswdrtige Politik, p. 251. 



3^2 The European Nations 

was fully prepared. Now, the immense sums voted in the 
War Budget of 191 3 had not as yet provided the stores of 
artillery and ammunition that were to astonish the world. 
Nor had Turkey recovered from the wounds of 191 2. Nor 
was the enlarged Kiel-North Sea Canal ready. Its opening 
at midsummer, 1914, created a naval situation far more 
favourable to Germany. A year earlier a French naval 
officer had prophesied that she would await the opening 
of the canal before declaring war.' 

At midsummer, 1914, the general position was as follows: 
Germany had reached the pitch of perfection in armaments, 
and the Kiel Canal was open. France was unready, though 
the three years' service promised to improve her army. 
The Russian forces were slowly improving in number and 
cohesion. Belgium also, alarmed by the German menace 
both in Europe and on the Congo, had in 1912-13 greatly 
extended the principle of compulsory service, so that in 
1914 she would have more than 200,000 men available, and 
by 1926 as many as 340,000. In naval strength it was un- 
likely that Germany would catch up Great Britain. But 
the submarine piomised to make even the most powerful 
ironclads of doubtful value. 

Consequently, Germany and her friends (except perhaps 
Turkey) could never hope to have a longer lead over the 
Entente Powers than in 1914, at least as regards efficiency 
and preparedness. Therefore in the eyes of the military 
party at Berlin the problem resembled that of 1756, which 
Fiederick the Great thus stated: "The war was equally 
certain and inevitable. It only remained to calculate 
whether there was more advantage in deferring it a few 
months or beginning at once. " We know what followed in 

^ Revue des questions diplomatiques (1913), pp. 417-18. 



The Crisis of 191 4 383 

1756 — the invasion of neutral Saxony, because she had not 
completed her armaments.^ For William II. in 1914 the 
case of Belgium was very similar. She afforded him the 
shortest way of striking at his enemy and the richest land 
for feeding the German forces. That Prussia had guar- 
anteed Belgian neutrality counted as naught; that in 191 2 
Lord Haldane had warned him of the hostility of England 
if he invaded Belgium was scarcely more important. Wil- 
liam, like his ancestor, acted solely on military considerations. 
He despised England: for was she not distracted by fierce 
party feuds, by Labour troubles, by wild women, and by 
what seemed to be the beginnings of civil war in Ireland? 
All the able rulers of the House of Hohenzollern have dis- 
cerned when to strike and to strike hard. In July, 1914, 
William II. 's action was typically Hohenzollern; and by 
this time his engaging personality and fiery speeches, aided 
by professorial and Press propaganda, had thoroughly 
Prussianised Germany. In regard to moral as well as 
materiel, "the day" had come by midsummer, 1914. 

Moreover, her generally passive partner, Austria, was 
then excited to frenzy by the murder of the heir to the 
throne. Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The criminals were 
Austrian Serbs; but no proof was then or has since been 
forthcoming as to the complicity of the Servian Govern- 
ment. Nevertheless, in the state of acute tension long 
existing between Serbs and Austria-Hungary, the affair 
seemed the climax of a series of efforts at wrecking the Dual 
Monarchy and setting up a Serbo-Croatian Kingdom. 
Therefore German and Magyar sentiment caught flame, and 
war with Servia was loudly demanded. Dr. Dillon, while 
minimising the question of the murder, prophesied that 

^FT6d6nc, Hist, de la guerre de sept anSy'u, p. 27. 



384 The European Nations 

the quarrel would develop into a gigantic struggle between 
Teuton and Slav.' In this connection we must remember 
that the Central Empires had twice dictated to the rest of 
Europe: first, in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9; secondly, in the 
negotiations which led to the Treaty of Bukharest (August, 
1913). On other occasions Kaiser William had bent the 
will of Tsar Nicholas II., notably in the Potsdam interview 
of November, 1910. It is therefore possible that Berlin 
reckoned once more on the complaisance of Russia ; and in 
that event Austria would have dragooned Servia and 
refashioned the Balkan lands at her will, Germany mean- 
while "keeping the ring. " This explanation of the crisis is, 
however, open to the objection that the questions at issue 
more vitally affected Russia than did those of 1908-10, and 
she had nearly recovered normal strength. Unless the 
politicians of Berlin and Vienna were blind, they must have 
foreseen that Russia would aid Servia in resisting the out- 
rageous demands sent from Vienna to Belgrade on July 
23d. Those demands were incompatible with Servia's 
independence; and though she, within the stipulated forty- 
eight hours, acquiesced in all save two of them, the Austrian 
Government declared war (July 28th). In so doing it relied 
on the assurances of the German ambassador, von Tchirsky, 
that Russia would not fight. But by way of retort to the 
Austrian order for complete mobilisation (July 31st, i A.m.), 
Russia quite early on that same day ordered a similar 
measure.^ 

^Daily Telegraph, July 25, 1914. 

^T accuse, pp. 134-5 (German edition). The partial mobilisations of 
Austria and Russia earlier were intended to threaten and protect Servia. 
The time of Austria's order for complete mobilisation is shown in French 
Yellow Book, No. 115. That of Russia in Austrian "Rotbuch, " 
No. 52, and Russian Orange Book, No. 77. 



The Crisis of 191 4 385 

The procedure of Austria and Germany now claims our 
attention. The poHcy of Count Berchtold, Austria's 
Foreign Minister, had generally been pacific. On July 
28th he yielded to popular clamour for war against Servia, 
but only, it appears, because of his belief that "Russia 
would have no right to intervene after receiving his assur- 
ance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement." 
On July 30th and 31st he consented to continue friendly 
discussions with Russia. Even on August ist the Austrian 
ambassador at Petrograd expressed to the Foreign Minis- 
ter, Sazonoff, the hope that things had not gone too far.^ 
There was then still a hope that Sir Edward Grey's offer of 
friendly mediation might be accepted by Germany, Austria, 
and Russia. But on August ist Germany declared war on 
Russia. 

It is well to remember that by her action in August, 191 3, 
she held back Austria from a warlike policy. Now some of 
Germany's officials knew of the tenor of the Austrian de- 
mands on the Court of Belgrade; and her ambassador at 
Vienna stated on July 26th that Germany knew what she was 
doing in backing up Austria. Kaiser William, who had been 
on a yachting cruise, hurriedly returned to Berlin on the 
night of July 26-27th. He must have approved of Austria's 
declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, for on that 
day his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, finally rejected Sir 
Edward Grey's proposal of a Peace Conference to settle 
that dispute. The Chancellor then also expressed to our 
ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, the belief that Russia 
had no right to intervene in the Austro-Serb affair. The 

'Austrian "Rotbuch, " Nos. 50-56; British White Papers, Miscel- 
laneous (1914), No. 6 (No. 137), and No. 10, p. 3; French Yellow Book, 
No. 120. 

2S 



386 The European Nations 

Austrian ambassador at Berlin also opined that "Russia 
neither wanted nor was in a position to make war." This 
belief was widely expressed in diplomatic circles at Berlin. 
Military men probably viewed matters from that stand- 
point; and in all probability there was a struggle between 
the civilians and the soldiers, which seems to have ended in 
a victory for the latter in an important Council meeting 
held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29th. Immediately 
afterwards the Chancellor summoned Sir Edward Goschen 
and made to him the "infamous proposals" for the neu- 
trality of Great Britain in case of a European war, provided 
that Germany (i) would engage to take no territory from the 
mainland of France (he would make no promise respecting 
the French colonies) ; (2) would respect the neutrality of Hol- 
land; (3) would restore the independence of Belgium in case 
the French menace compelled her to invade that country. 

These proposals prove that by the evening of July 29th 
Germany regarded war as imminent.^ But why? Even 
in the East matters did not as yet threaten such a conflict. 
Russia had declared that Servia was not to be made a vassal 
of the Hapsburgs; and, to give effect to that declaration, she 
had mobilised the southern and eastern portions of her forces 
as a retort to a similar partial mobilisation by Austria. 
But neither Russia nor, perhaps, Austria wished for, or 
expected, a European war.^ Austria seems to have ex- 



^ M. Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin to his Government on 
July 30th that late on July 29th Germany had ordered mobilisation, 
but countermanded it in view of the reserve of Sir Edward Goschen as 
to England's attitude, and owing to the Tsar's telegram of July 29th 
to the Kaiser. Berlin papers which had announced the mobilisation, 
were seized. All measures preliminary to mobilisation had been 
taken (French Yellow Book, No. 107; German White Book, No. 21). 

" Russian Orange Book, Nos. 25, 40, 43, 58. 



The Crisis of 191 4 387 

pected a limited war, i.e., only with the Serbs. She denied 
that the Russians had any right to intervene so long as she 
did not annex Serb land. Her aim was to reduce the Serbs 
to vassalage, and she expected Germany successfully to 
prevent Russia's intervention, as in 1909.^ The German 
proposals of July 29th are the first clear sign of a general 
conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with 
France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might 
be involved, while Holland would be left alone. In the 
course of his remarks the Chancellor said that "he had in 
mind a general neutrality agreement between England 
and Germany" — a reference to the German offers of 191 2 
described in Chapter XI. As at that time the Chancel- 
lor sought to tie our hands in view of any action by Ger- 
many, so, too, at present his object clearly was to preclude 
the possibility of our stirring on behalf of Belgium. Both 
Goschen and Grey must have seen the snare. The foimer 
referred the proposals to Grey, who of course decisively 
refused them. This was the first of Grey's actions which 
betokened tension with Germany. Up to the 28th his 
efforts for peace had seemed not unlikely to be crowned with 
success. On July 20th, that is three days before Austria 
precipitated the crisis, he begged the Berlin Government 
to seek to moderate her demands on Servia. The day 
after the Austrian Note he urged a conference between 
France and England on one side and Germany and Italy 

^Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 28, 31, 44; Brit. White Paper, Nos. 91-97, 
161. Taccuse (III. A), goes too far in accusing Austria of consciously 
provoking a European war; for, as I have shown, she wished on August 
1st to continue negotiations with Russia. The retort that she did so 
only when she knew that Germany was about to throw down the gaunt- 
let, seems to me far-fetched. Besides, Austria was not ready; Germany 
was. 



388 The European Nations 

on the other so as to counsel moderation to their respective 
Allies, Russia and Austria. It was Germany and Austria 
who negatived this by their acts of the 28th. Still Grey 
worked for peace, with the approval of Russia, and, on 
July 30th to August ist, of Austria. But on July 31st and 
August 1st occurred events which frustrated these efforts. 
On July 31st the Berlin Government, hearing of the com- 
plete mobilisation by Russia (a retort to the similar proceed- 
ing of Austria a few hours earlier), sent a stiff demand to 
Petrograd for demobilisation within twelve hours; also to 
Paris for a reply within eighteen hours whether it would 
remain neutral in case of a Russo-German War. 

Here we must pause to notice that to ask Russia to de- 
mobilise, without requiring the same measure from Austria, 
was manifestly unjust. Russia could not have assented 
without occupying an inferior position to Austria. If 
Germany had desired peace, she would have suggested the 
same action for each of the disputants. Further, while 
blaming the Russians for mobilising, she herself had taken 
all the preliminary steps, including what is called Kriegsge- 
fahr, which made her army far better prepared for war 
than mobilisation itself did for the Russian Empire in view 
of its comparatively undeveloped railway system. Again, 
if the Kaiser wished to avoid war, why did he not agree to 
await the arrival (on August ist) of the special envoy, 
Tatisheff, whom, on the night of July 30th, the Tsar had 
despatched to Berlin?^ There is not a single sign that 
the Berlin Government really feared "the Eastern Colos- 

' German White Book, No. 23a; /'accuse, Section III. B, pp. 153, 164 
(German edit.), shows that the German White Book suppressed the 
Tsar's second telegram of July 29th to the Kaiser, inviting him to refer 
the Austro-Serb dispute to the Hague Tribunal. (See, too, J. W. 
Headlam, History of Twelve Days, p. 183.) 



The Crisis of 191 4 389 

sus, " though statements as to "the Eastern peril" were 
very serviceable in frightening German Socialists into 
line. 

The German ultimatum failed to cow Russia ; and as she 
returned no answer, the Kaiser declared war on August ist. 
He added by telegram that he had sought, in accord with 
England, to mediate between Russia and Austria, but the 
Russian mobilisation led to his present action. In reply to 
the German demand at Paris the French Premier, M. 
Viviani, declared on August ist at i p.m. that France would 
do that "which her interests dictated"— an evasive reply 
designed to gain time and to see what course Russia would 
take. The Kaiser having declared war on Russia, France 
had no alternative but to come to the assistance of her Ally. 
But the Kaiser's declaration of war against France did not 
reach Paris until August 3d at 6.45 p.m.' His aim was to 
leave France and Belgium in doubt as to his intentions, 
and meanwhile to mass overwhelming forces on their 
borders, especially that of Belgium. 

Meanwhile, on August ist, German officials detained and 
confiscated the cargoes of a few British ships. On August 
2d German troops violated the neutrality of Luxemburg. 
On the same day Sir Edward Grey assured the French 
ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, that if the German fleet 
attacked that of France or her coasts, the British fleet would 
•afford protection. This assurance depended, however, on 
the sanction of Parliament. It is practically certain 
that Parliament would have sanctioned this proceeding; 
and, if so, war would have come about owing to the naval 
understanding with France,^ that is, if Germany chose to 

'German White Book, Nos. 26, 27; French Yellow Book, No. 147. 
2 British White Paper, No. 105 and Enclosures, also No. 116. 



390 The European Nations 

disregard it. But another incident brought matters to a 
clearer issue. On August 3d, German troops entered 
Belgium, though on the previous day the German am- 
bassador had assured the Government of King Albert 
that no such step would be taken. The pretext now 
was that the French were about to invade Belgium, as to 
which there was then, and has not been since, any proof 
whatever. 

Here we must go back in order to understand the action 
of the British, French, and German governments. They 
and all the Powers had signed the treaty of 1839 guarantee- 
ing the independence of Belgium ; and nothing had occurred 
since to end their engagement. The German proposals of 
July 29, 1914, having alarmed Sir Edward Grey, he required, 
both from Paris and Berlin assurances that neither Power 
would invade Belgium. That of France on August ist was 
clear and satisfactory. On July 31st the German Secretary 
of State, von Jagow, declined to give a reply, because 
"any reply they [the Emperor and Chancellor] might give 
could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of 
campaign in the event of war ensuing. " As, on August 2d 
the official assurances of the German ambassador at Brussels 
were satisfactory, the British Foreign Office seems to have 
felt no great alarm on this topic. But at 7 p.m. of that 
evening the same ambassador presented a note from his 
Government demanding the right to march its troops into 
Belgium in order to prevent a similar measure by the 
French. On the morrow Belgium protested against this act, 
and denied the rumour as to French action. King Albert 
also telegraphed to King George asking for the help of 
the United Kingdom. The tidings reached the British 
Cabinet after it had been carefully considering whether 



The Crisis of 191 4 391 

German aggression on Belgium would not constitute a 
casus belli. "^ 

The news of the German demand and the King's appeal 
reached Westminster just before the first debate on August 
3d. Sir Edward Grey stated that we were not parties to 
the Franco-Russian Alliance, of which we did not know 
the exact terms; and there was no binding compact with 
France; but the conversations on naval affairs pledged us 
to consult her, with a view to preventing an unprovoked 
attack by the German navy. He explained his condi- 
tional promise to M. Cambon. Thereupon Mr. Redmond 
promised the enthusiastic support of all Irishmen. Mr. 
Ramsay Macdonald, though demurring to the policy of Sir 
Edward Grey, said, "If the Right Honourable gentleman 
could come to us and tell us that a small European nation- 
ality like Belgium is in danger, and could assure us that 
he is going to confine the conflict to that question, then we 
would support him." Now, the Cabinet had by this time 
resolved that the independence of Belgium should be a test 
question, as it was in 1870. Therefore, there seemed the 
hope that not only the Irish but all the Labour party would 
give united support to the Government. By the evening 
debate official information had arrived; and, apart from 
some cavilling criticisms. Parliament was overwhelmingly 
in favour of decided action on behalf of Belgium. Sir 
Edward Grey despatched to Berlin an ultimatum demand- 
ing the due recognition of her neutrality by Germany. 
No answer being sent, Great Britain and Germany 

'British White Paper, Nos. 123, 151, 153; Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 
20-25. For a full and convincing refutation of^the German charges that 
our military attaches at Brussels in 1906 and 1912 had bound us by 
conventions (!) to land an army in Belgium, see Headlam, op. cil., ch. 
xvi., also p. 377, on the charge that France was about to invade Belgium. 



392 The European Nations 

entered on a state of war shortly before midnight of 
August 4th. 

The more fully the facts are known, the clearer appears 
the aggressive character of German policy. Some of her 
ministers doubted the advisability of war, and hoped to 
compass their ends by threats as in 1909 and 19 13; but they 
were overborne by the bellicose party on or shortly before 
July 29th. Whether the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, or the 
General Staff is most to blame, it is idle to speculate; but 
German diplomacy at the crisis shows every sign of having 
been forced on by military men. Bethmann-Hollweg was 
never remarkable for breadth of view and clearness of 
insight; yet he alone could scarcely have perpetrated the 
follies which alienated Italy and outraged the sentiments of 
the civilised world in order to gain a few days' start over 
France and stab her unguarded side. It is a clumsy imi- 
tation of the policy of Frederick in 1756. 

As to the forbearance of Great Britain at the crisis, few 
words are needed. In earlier times the seizure of British 
ships and their cargoes (August ist) would have led to a 
rupture. Clearly, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues clung 
to peace as long as possible. The wisdom of his proceduie 
at one or two points has been sharply impugned. Critics 
have said that early in the crisis he should have empowered 
Sir George Buchanan, our ambassador at Petrograd, to 
join Russia and France in a declaration of our resolve to 
join them in case of war.' But (i) no British Minister is 
justified in committing his country to such a course of 
action. (2) The terms of the Ententes did not warrant it. 
(3) A menace to Germany and Austria would, by the terms 
of the Triple Alliance, have compelled Italy to join them, 

» British White Paper, Nos. 6, 24, 99; Russian Orange Book, No. 17. 



The Crisis of 191 4 393 

and it was clearly the aim of the British Government to 
avert such a disaster. (4) On July 30th and 31st Grey 
declared plainly to Germany that she must not count 
on our neutrality in all cases, and that a Franco-German 
War (quite apart from the question of Belgium) would 
probably draw us in.^ 

Sir Edward is also charged with not making our intentions 
clear as to what would happen in case of the violation of the 
neutrality of Belgium. But he demanded, both from France 
and Germany, assurances that they would respect that 
neutrality; and on August ist he informed the German 
ambassador in London of our "very great regret" at the 
ambiguity of the German reply. Now on August 2d the 
German ambassador at Brussels protested that Belgium was 
quite safe so far as concerned Germany.^ When a Great 
Power gives those assurances, it does not improve matters to 
threaten her with war if she breaks them. She broke them 
on August 3d; whereupon Grey took the decided action 
which Haldane had declared in 19 12 that we would take. 
The clamour raised in Germany as to our intervention being 
unexpected is probably the result of blind adherence to a 
preconceived theory and of rage at a "decadent" nation 
daring to oppose an invincible nation. The German 
Government of course knew the truth, but its education of 
public opinion through the Press had become a fine art. 



'British White Paper, Nos. loi, 102, in, 114, 119. I dissent from 
Mr. F. S. OUver {Ordeal by Battle, pp. 30-34) on the question discussed 
above. For other arguments, see my Origins of the War, pp. 167-69. The 
ties binding Roumania to Germany and Austria were looser; but any- 
thing of the nature of a general threat to the Central Powers would 
probably have ranged her, too, on their side. 

^British White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, 125; Belgian Grey Book, 
No. 19. 



394 The ILuropean Nations 

Therefore, at the beginning of the war all Germans believed 
that France was about to invade Belgium, whereupon they 
stepped in to save her; that the Eastern Colossus had pre- 
cipitated the war by its causeless mobilisation (a falsehood 
which ranged nearly all German Socialists on the side of the 
Government) ; that Russia and Servia had planned the dis- 
memberment of Austria; that, consequently. Teutons (and 
Turks) must fight desperately for national existence in a 
conflict forced upon them by Russia, Servia, and France, 
England perfidiously appearing as a renegade to her race 
and creed. 

By these falsehoods, dinned into a singularly well-drilled 
and docile people, the Germans were worked up to a state 
of frenzy for an enterprise for which their rulers had been 
preparing during more than a decade. Thei colossal stores 
of war material, amassed especially in 191 3-14 (some 
of them certain soon to deteriorate), the exquisitely careful 
preparations at all points of the national life, including the 
colonies, refute the fiction that war was forced upon Ger- 
many. The course of the negotiations preceding the war, 
the assiduous efforts of Germany to foment Labour troubles 
in Russia before the crisis, the unpreparedness of the Allies 
for the fierce and sustained energy of the Teutonic assault, 
— all these symptoms prove the guilt of Germany.' The 
crowning proof is that up to the present (August, 1915) she 
has not issued a complete set of diplomatic documents, and 
not one despatch which bears out the Chancellor's statement 
that he used his influence at Vienna for peace. The twenty- 
nine despatches published in her White Book are a mere 

» See the damning indictment by a German in J' accuse. Section III., 
also the thorough and judicial examination by J. W. Headlam, The 
History of Twelve Days. 



The Crisis of 1914 395 

fragment of her immense diplomatic correspondence 
which she has found it desirable to keep secret, and, as we 
have seen, her officials suppressed the Tsar's second tele- 
gram of July 29th urging that the Austro-Serb dispute 
be referred to the Hague Tribunal. 

The sets of despatches published by the Allies show con- 
clusively that each of them worked for peace and was 
surprised by the war. Their unpreparedness and the 
absolute preparedness of Germany have appeared so clearly 
during the course of hostilities as to give the lie to the Ger- 
man pamphleteers who have striven to prove that in the last 
resort the war was "a preventive war, " that is, designed to 
avert a future conflict at a time unfavourable to Germany. 
There is not a sign that any one of the Powers of the Entente 
was making more than strictly defensive preparations; and, 
as has been shown, the Entente themselves were formed in 
order to give mutual protection in case of aggression from 
her. The desperate nature of that aggression appeared 
in her unscrupulous but successful efforts to force Turkey 
into war (Oct .-No v., 19 14). No crime against Christendom 
has equalled that whereby the champions of Kultur sought 
to stir up the fanatical passions of the Moslem world against 
Europe. Fortunately, that design has failed; and incident- 
ally it added to the motives which have led Italy to break 
loose from the Central Powers and assist the Allies in assur- 
ing the future of the oppressed nationalities of Europe. 



APPENDIX 

COVERING 

THE PERIOD FROM 1914 TO 1921 

BY 

WILLIAM L. Mcpherson 



CHAPTER I 

THE WAR AND THE TREATIES 

THE Great War of 19 14-18 changed the face of Europe. 
At Versailles the old political and economic balance of 
power was destroyed and a new balance was set up. The 
Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, and Romanoff dynasties disap- 
peared. Three empires — the Austro-Hungarian, the Turk- 
ish, and the Russian — were broken up. The maps of Asia 
and Africa were recast, at the expense chiefly of Turkey 
and Germany. 

The nationalist tendencies which had controlled Europe's 
political development in the Nineteenth Century were in 
no way checked by the derangements of the war. On the 
contrary, they were intensified, in spite of an idealistic 
effort at the peace conference to restrain nationalist energies 
and acquisitiveness by freezing national boundaries and 
creating an international police power. 

In the study of European history since 19 14, interest 
centres chiefly in the struggle, still unfinished, between the 
augmented forces of nationalism and the new polity of 
internationalism . 

German and Austro-Hungarian ambitions brought on 
the conflict. Germany willed the war in order to attain 
her place in the sun — in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa, pos- 
sibly also in America. Austria-Hungary seconded Ger- 
many, though with much more limited aspirations. Under 

399 



400 The European Nations 

William II. the Triple Alliance had become in essence offen- 
sive, through in form defensive. The Triple Entente was 
an association for defence. Great Britain, France, and 
Russia, with huge possessions in Asia and Africa, were 
natural partisans of a status quo. Germany was a late comer 
and a disturber, anxious to secure a readjustment. 

It is one of the weaknesses of an aggressive alliance that 
the partners can seldom harmonize their individual claims 
and interests. Italy joined the Teuton powers in 1882 in a 
fit of rancour against France, because France, encouraged 
by Great Britain and Germany, had taken Tunis. Italy 
was in strange company in a league with Austria-Hungary, 
her oppressor and enemy. But membership in the Triple 
Alliance was for her only a measure of self -protection, a 
form of political insurance. Her interests in the Adriatic 
and in the Balkans clashed with Austria-Hungary's even 
more than they did with Russia's. She had an Irredenta 
across the Austrian border. She therefore became an un- 
stable partner and when she declared war on Turkey in 191 1 
and occupied Tripoli, German militarists like Bernhardi 
realized that she was lost for the purposes of Germany's 
coming bid for "world power." 

Bismarck was not the only statesman who believed in 
"reinsurance treaties." The Italians insured themselves 
in one of the later renewals of the Triple Alliance by de- 
manding guaranties of compensation, in case Austria- 
Hungary should annex any more Balkan territory. Long 
before that they had quietly reinsured themselves by renew- 
ing friendly relations with France and compacting not to 
attack France on the Piedmont border should she become 
involved in war with Germany. The French Government 
published in 1920 a Yellow Book containing the secret ac- 



The War and the Treaties 401 

cords with Italy reached in 1900 and 1902. Interpreting the 
last accord, M. Prinetti, the Italian Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, wrote to the French Ambassador in Rome on Novem- 
ber 1 , 1902 : " In case France should be the subject of an ag- 
gression, direct or indirect, on the part of one or more powers 
(it was needless under the circumstances to name them) 
Italy will observe strict neutrality." She contracted to do 
the same in case France "in consequence of a direct provo- 
cation should be reduced to take, in defence of her honour 
or security, the initiative in declaring war." This letter 
was written in the year in which the Triple Alliance was 
extended for the next to last time. 

Italy had therefore already renounced the intention of 
aiding Germany agaihst France. She declared neutrality 
when the Great War broke out. She entered it on the 
Entente side in May, 191 5, when she had completed her 
military preparations and had had her peace settlement 
demands confirmed by the Entente powers in the Treaty 
of London. Italy did not technically violate the terms of 
the Triple Alliance, because the Teuton states had by tak- 
ing the aggressive relieved her of her obligations. But her 
prior assurances to France permitted a full French concen- 
tration on the Northern Front and helped materially to 
stave off a German victory in the First Marne campaign. 

Rumania, cherishing a grudge against Russia for the 
appropriation of Bessarabia after the Russo-Turkish war, 
and fearing Russia as a neighbour, had been drawn into the 
orbit of the Triple Alliance. Her king was a Hohenzol- 
lern. But the Balkan war had brought a clash with 
Austria-Hungary and Rumania had also an Irredenta in 
Transylvania. Nationalist interest prevailed over dynas- 
tic and was strong enough to extinguish a long-cherished 
26 



402 The European Nations 

distrust of the Russians. Rumania failed, too, in 1914 as 
a prospective Teuton ally. She declared neutrality and 
in her own time — in August, 1916 — joined the Entente, 
securing pledges of compensation similar to those given to 
Italy. 

There remained two other possible Teuton allies — 
Turkey and Bulgaria. By 19 14, Germany had gained 
almost complete ascendancy at Constantinople. Karl 
Kautsky, who searched the Wilhelmstrasse archives after 
the German Revolution of 191 8, discovered there the text of 
a treaty of alliance between Germany and Turkey, signed 
in the first week of August, 19 14. It provided that should 
Russia intervene in the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian war, 
thus bringing in Germany, Turkey should come to the aid 
of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany had, in 
fact, by that time already declared war against Russia and 
France. Turkey preserved for a few months the fiction of 
neutrality. The Goeben-Breslau corpedy was staged and at 
first greatly mystified the Entente powers. Turkey threw 
off the mask on October 29, 1914, when German and 
Turkish war vessels made a raid on Russian Black Sea 
ports. 

Bulgaria, smarting under the humiliation of the peace of 
Bucharest, was eager for revenge. The crafty Ferdinand 
held off, however, for more than a year, until the German 
General Staff should be free to help him overrun Serbian 
Macedonia, and William II. could guarantee the compla- 
cency of Constantine of Greece, his brother-in-law, who had 
by that time become a pliant agent of German policy. 
Ferdinand imposed on the credulity of the Entente diplo- 
mats until Mackensen was ready to strike. Late in Sep- 
tember, 1 91 5 — with an Irredenta of his own beckoning to 



The War and the Treaties 403 

him — he mobihzed for the invasion of Serbia. War was not 
declared until October 13th. 

Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia had brought little 
Montenegro into the war. Germany's brutal violation of 
the neutrality and territorial integrity of Belgium had drawn 
in Great Britain. Japan, Britain's ally in the East, stood 
by her treaty commitments. These concerned Asia only. 
The Japanese expelled the Germans from Shantung. But 
they immediately declared their own succession to Ger- 
many's rights and leaseholds in Chinese territory. Japan 
policed Eastern and East Mediterranean waters against 
German raiders, assisted in convoying Anzac and Indian 
troops to Egypt, helped to munition Russia, and furnished 
the Entente Allies with merchant tonnage. In 191 8, she sent 
a military expedition into Siberia. But her war activities 
were directed, in the main, to a furtherance of her own po- 
litical interests in the. Far East. She was not a belligerent 
in the sense in which the other major allies were. 

Portugal had an alliance of long standing with Great 
Britain. She entered the war nominally after Great Britain 
did and contributed some help in the fighting in Germany's 
African colonies. In February, 1916, she commandeered 
forty German and Austro-Hungarian ships interned in her 
harbours. The two Teuton powers then declared war 
against her. 

With Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey (and later 
Bulgaria) on one side, and France, Great Britain (with her 
dominions and colonies), Russia, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, 
Serbia, Montenegro (and later Rumania) on the other, 
Japan figuring also as a limited participant, the odds seemed 
at first glance strongly against the Central Powers. They 
were so far as crude man power was concerned. The En- 



404 The European Nations 

tente nations had a population in 19 14 (excluding Japan) of 
about 300,000,000. Including Italy and Rumania, they had 
later a population of about 342,000,000. The Quadruple 
Alliance powers had a population of only 145,000,000. 

But Germany alone among the belligerents was fully 
prepared for war. This gave her an enormous initial ad- 
vantage. Inferior numbers were more than offset by ampler 
munitions supplies, superiority in highly trained troops, 
heavy artillery and machine guns, a geographical position 
which afforded interior lines of operation, the possession of 
the strategical offensive, and, above all, by an early central- 
ization of military command. 

The Quadruple powers were unable to contest Entente 
control of the sea. Germany could not hope to defend her 
colonies. From the beginning, her merchant fleet was in 
terned at home or in the ports of neutral nations. Her com- 
merce-destroying cruisers were quickly captured or sunk. 
Her only formidable raiding squadron — ^Von Spec's — after 
a victory off Cape Coronel, was disposed of by Admiral 
Sturdee in the battle off the Falklands in December, 19 14. 
The High Sea fleet operated intermittently in the Baltic 
and remained a threat when concentrated in the North Sea. 
It fought in the open only once, off Jutland, on May 31, 1916, 
and although it was well handled and inflicted heavy losses 
on the British Grand Fleet, it was forced to withdraw and 
thereafter to cling to its bases. 

At sea, Germany's chief offensive weapon was the sub- 
marine. The U-boats harrassed Entente commerce and 
put a great strain on Allied sea communications. But in 
the end the submarine campaign, conducted in disregard of 
humane practice and international regulations, proved 
fatal to Germany. It brought the United States into the 



The War and the Treaties 405 

war at the moment when Russia, shaken by revolution, was 
about to drop out. And in the wake of the United States 
came Brazil and seven of the smaller American republics, 
and also China, Liberia, and Siam. Bolivia and Uruguay 
severed diplomatic relations with Germany. Greece, after 
the expulsion of Constantine, also declared war on Germany 
and Bulgaria, July 2, 191 7. The moral judgment of the 
world was given against an alliance which had begun a war 
of aggression and had waged war in defiance of civilized 
standards. 

Against France and Russia Germany could have made 
effective use of her sea power. It was, in fact, employed 
in the Baltic to support land operations. But Great Brit- 
ain's superiority in the North Sea limited the role of the 
German fleet and made an offensive hazardous. German 
naval policy was unsettled and wavering from i9i4to 1917. 
The naval chiefs were at odds with one another and with 
the Chancellor and the Foreign Office. The decision of 
191 7 in favour of unrestricted U-boat warfare was made 
over Bethmann-Hollweg's head. 

' It is clear now that Germany might have kept off the 
sea and still have fought the war to a draw — favourable to 
her — on land. There was no crying military need to use 
her fleet offensively. From this point of view her sea power 
turned out to be, on the whole, a detriment to her, rather 
than an advantage, for her final attempt to use it on the 
offensive, through the submarines, constituted the crown- 
ing blunder of German strategy. 

The German military leaders made many mistakes. The 
invasion of France by way of Belgium in 19 14 was planned 
years ahead by Count Schlieffen, when he was Chief of the 
Great General Staff. Moltke executed it too laxly. The 



4o6 The European Nations 

German headquarters, in Marshal Foch's judgment, kept 
too far in the rear and lost control of the advance. Kluck's 
disregard of orders — perhaps not clearly enough conveyed — 
imperilled the German right flank and rear to the east of 
Paris, and brought about a dislocation of the First and 
Second Armies which necessitated the retreat from the 
Marne to the Aisne. 

Ludendorif and Hindenburg have both critic 'z id the 
younger Aloltke for sending two corps from the West Front 
to East Prussia while the First Marne Campaign was still 
under way. The elder Moltke would probably have let 
the Russians overrun East Prussia, and West Prussia up to 
the line of the Vistula, in preference to weakening the main 
offensive in France. The easy victory of Tannenburg 
showed how greatly the Russian threat had been over- 
estimated. No German military critic now looks back 
with satisfaction to the conduct of the First Marne Camx- 
paign, any more than any sound Allied critic can condone 
the grave faults in the handling of the situation by Joffre. 

On September 14, 19 14, Falkenhayn superseded Moltke. 
His strategy emphasized the conflict of opinion which had 
long existed between the "Westerners" and the "Eastern- 
ers." Hindenburg and Ludendorff were "Easterners." 
They realized the weakness of Russia in modern warfare and 
saw that German victory in the East was the necessary pre- 
liminary to forcing a peace on the Western Allies. Hinden- 
burg says in Out of My Life: "The decisive battle in the 
West, a battle which would have meant final victory, was 
the ultima ratio, but an ultima ratio which could only be 
reached over the body of a Russia stricken to the ground." 

This was Germany's best policy — -the more so that the 
Entente powers lost at Gallipoli their one great chance to 



The War and the Treaties 407 

establish easy connections with Russia and to utilize to the 
full the value of her enormous crude man power. The 
German leaders could not foresee the political collapse of 
Russia in 191 7. But if they had followed a continental 
military policy, they would have received credit for fore- 
seeing it and would, without inviting war with America, 
have established a Middle European and Eastern Empire, 
not dependent on sea power and which could not be 
destroyed by sea power. 

Falkenhayn, however, was a "Westerner" or, perhaps, a 
neutralist. He disliked Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and 
disregarded their counsel. He shifted the offensive to the 
East in the winter of 1914-15, m.ore for political than for 
military reasons. He purposely limited the Polish offen- 
sive of 191 5 and thwarted Ludendorff 's promising schemes 
for a complete envelopment of the Russian armies. In 
The German General Staff and Its Decisions he describes his 
policy as one for husbanding German resources. Yet in 
1 916 he engaged in the excessively costly and barren 
offensive against Verdun. 

When Hindenburg and Ludendorff came into power in 
August, 1916, they wisely decided to stand on the defensive 
in the West and to solidify their position in the East. They 
overwhelmed Rumania, while easily holding off Russia. 
They could have dealt with Russia thereafter at their 
leisure. But they made a blunder more mortal than any 
of Falkenhayn's when they advised the Kaiser to resurne 
unrestricted submarine warfare on February i, 191 7. This 
decision brought America into the war, in spite of the Wilson 
Administration's very strong desire to keep out of it. And 
with America's vast financial, industrial, and military re- 
sources thrown into the balance, Germany's excellent chance 



4o8 The European Nations 

of imposing a peace of stalemate on the Western Allied 
powers through an extension of her Eastern conquests was 
recklessly sacrificed. 

German strategy was confused and defective. But it 
was hardly more so than the strategy of the Entente powers. 
In their case the primary weakness of an alliance for defen- 
sive purposes was painfully manifest until the very last 
stages of the war. Intelligent military co-operation was 
lacking. There was no unity of command. The German 
invasion of 19 14 pinned France down to a narrow defensive 
at home. The Entente's greatest military opportunity— 
that of taking Constantinople early in 1915, thus securing 
the Balkan front and communications with Russia — was 
allowed to slip away. Divided control on the Western 
Front prevented an economical use of the Entente forces 
there and neutralized a marked superiority in numbers 
from 1915 to 1918. Only the great disaster before St. 
Quentin in March, 191 8, compelled the selection of an Al- 
lied Commander-in-Chief. Up to then Allied military 
policy had floundered along without a clear purpose. 

The course of the war can be sketched here only briefly. 
The last five months of 19 14 saw the German invasion of 
France halted at the Marne, and a defensive trench line es- 
tablished from the North Sea, near the western border of 
Belgium, southeast to Switzerland. The Germans had 
failed to capture Paris or to cut their way through to Calais. 
They had failed to break up the French armies. But they 
had dug in on French soil and had thrown the burden on the 
Allies of expelling them. The Russians had been ejected 
from East Prussia, but had beaten the Austro-Hungarians 
in Galicia and had pushed west toward Cracow. 

In 1 91 5, Germany shifted the fight to the Eastern Front, 



The War and the Treaties 409 

overrunning Poland and Galicia, but failing to entrap the 
Russian armies. The Allies tried to rush the Dardanelles 
by a naval attack and then settled down to trench warfare 
in Gallipoli. Failure there allowed Bulgaria to join the 
enemy. Serbia was conquered, the main Serbian army re- 
treating through the Albanian Mountains to the Adriatic 
coast. A Teuton Mittel-Europa took shape. On the 
Western Front, the French and British made no sensible 
progress in applying the theory of attrition in a war of 
deadlock. 

Through 1916, the Quadruple Alliance powers stood on 
the defensive on the Eastern Front. Brusiloff 's offensive, 
Russia's last great effort in the war, gave them much trouble. 
After stopping this, they turned south and conquered 
Rumania, as far as a line stretching from Braila, on the 
lower Danube, up the Sereth and then across to the Tran- 
sylvanian Alps. In the west Falkenhayn launched his at- 
tack on Verdun, anticipating the Allied offensive on the 
Somme. In these two tremendous efforts the warfare of 
attrition reached its climax. The Allied and German 
losses on the Somme were between 1,300,000 and 1,400,000 
men. Of this war of usury Foch said afterwards that it 
was ' ' a war without results. If a war is to end in victory, 
it must always be given a character different from this."' 

Italy, entering the war in May, 191 5, was condemned 
by her geographical position to wage an independent cam- 
paign. She conducted an offensive against the Austro- 
Hungarians in the mountains on her northern border, facing 
almost prohibitive natural difficulties. Her armies took 
Gorizia and made some progress beyond it, at enormous 
cost. The Italian offensive was interrupted in the spring 

' Introduction to Field Marshal Haig's Despatches. 



410 The European Nations 

of 1916 by an Austro-Hungarian drive from the Trentino 
toward the northern plain. This was held up when it had 
reached the foothills north of Vicenza. 

On the Asian Front, the Russians overran the greater 
part of Armenia in the first half of 191 6 and the British, 
after Townshend's surrender at Kut, advanced again up 
the Tigris to retake that stronghold, preparatory to a drive 
for Bagdad the following year. Bagdad was captured in 
March, 191 7, giving the British a firm grip on Meso- 
potamia. 

The whole face of the war was changed in 191 7. Russia 
went out through revolution and the United States came 
in. The Duma Government, which forced the Czar's abdi- 
cation, gave way to Kerensky and Kerensky was ousted by 
Lenine. Soviet ideas undermined discipline and the 
armies melted away. The Germans let the poison work, 
financing Lenine's operations. German troops took Riga, 
and could have taken Petrograd. But the leaders pre- 
ferred to treat for peace with the new Bolshevist regime. 
In the winter of 191 7-1 8 a treaty was made which detached 
from Russia Finland, the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, 
Poland, the Ukraine, and parts of Trans-Caucasia and gave 
Germany control of the Black Sea. Russia's defection 
compelled Rumania to accept a humiliating peace. 

On the Western Front, the Germans withdrew early in 
the year from their advanced line in the Somme district to 
the newly prepared Hindenburg line. Field Marshal Haig 
continued the war of usury, making some progress east of 
Arras in the spring and then shifting his attack to the Bel- 
gian Front. The failure of Nivelle's ambitious offensive 
toward Laon led France to forswear such operations for a 
time and to conserve her strength for 19 18. Byng's battle 



The War and the Treaties 411 

of Cambrai, fought after Haig's Belgian drive ended, 
marked the beginnings of a reversion in the West from 
trench deadlock to the semi-open style of warfare. The 
Teuton powers turned on Italy near the close of the year, 
broke the Italian line on the Upper Isonzo, and pushed the 
Italian armies back to the Piave. A British advance from 
the Sinai Desert into Palestine ended on December loth 
with the capture of Jerusalem. 

In 191 8, Germany, her hands freed in the East, sought a 
decision in France before America's fighting power could be 
utilized. It was a desperate gamble. Ludendorff's five 
ponderous offensives left this decision unattained. The 
German armies in France found themselves over-extended 
in the vulnerable salients created by their successive ad- 
vances. Foch, made Generalissimo on March 26, 1918, at 
the height of Ludendorff's first drive, was unable to assume 
the offensive until July i8th. But within three months 
thereafter he had pushed the Germans nearly out of France 
and was close to the vital lines of communication between 
the northern enemy groups and those defending German 
Lorraine and Alsace. 

On August 14th, Ludendorff urged the German Govern- 
ment to open peace negotiations. Nothing was done. He 
renewed this demand on September 29th. Later on he 
drew back a little when it became apparent what political 
sacrifices would have to be made in order to get the Allies 
to consider peace. But it was his representative. Major 
Baron von dem Busche, who, in a speech to the Reichstag 
leaders on October 2d, started the panic which made almost 
any peace terms acceptable to Prince Max of Baden's 
parliamentarized government and led quickly to the over- 
throw of the Hohenzollern dynasty. 



412 The European Nations 

What Germany feared most was a continuation of the 
war on her own soil. But she saw, too, that the Quadruple 
Alliance was everywhere going to ruin. Bulgaria was the 
first to break away and acknowledge defeat. Her armies 
on the Salonika front were cut in two by Franchet d'Es- 
perey's offensive (September I5th-25th). On the latter 
date, the Bulgarian Government asked for an armistice. 
Turkey was next to succumb, Allenby's sensational cam- 
paign in Palestine had carried him north to Damascus, and 
then to Aleppo. In seven days — September I9th-26th — 
he had destroyed the three Turkish armies opposing him, 
capturing 50,000 prisoners and 300 guns and virtually end- 
ing the war on that front. On October 31st, Turkey's 
request for terms was granted. 

Almost at the same moment the Hapsburg empire col- 
lapsed. The Austro-Hungarian General Staff, supporting 
Ludendorff, had undertaken a final drive in Italy on June 
15, 191 8. It was badly directed and failed after ten days of 
fighting. Diaz delayed his counter-offensive until October 
24th. It swept the enemy out of Northern Italy. Vienna 
sued for peace and an armistice, effective on November 3rd, 
was granted. 

Germany, especially civilian Germany, had little stomach 
left for fighting. In the first days of November a mutiny 
broke out in the German fleet, which had been ordered to 
go out and meet the British fleet. Civilians joined the 
insurrection, which spread from the seaports to Berlin. 
This was the beginning of the German political revolution. 
The government directed by Max of Baden, which had been 
treating with Washington, sent armistice commissioners 
on November 8th to deal with Foch. On November 9th 
it announced the Kaiser's abdication, without even taking 



The War and the Treaties 413 

the trouble to consult him. He thereupon fled to Holland. 
The armistice was signed early in the morning of November 
nth and became effective at ii a.m. that day. It dis- 
armed the German land forces and sent the German fleet 
to Scapa Flow for internment. The German republic was 
proclaimed on November loth. 

The Allies were caught unprepared for war in 1 9 1 4. They 
were hardly less unprepared for peace. The Entente powers 
had stated their war aims on January 12, 191 7, when Ger- 
many was trying to draw them into peace negotiations. 
These aims might have been embodied in a treaty, drawn 
after the recognized European pattern, if the Entente, as it 
was constituted in January, 191 7, had won the war. But 
Russia presently dropped away. The United States re- 
placed Russia, functioning however, not as an "Allied" 
but as an "Associated" power. 

On January 8, 191 8, President Wilson promulgated his 
"Fourteen Points." He supplemented these on February 
nth with four "principles"; on July 4th with four more 
"principles," and on September 27th, with five additional 
"principles." In the Lansing-Solf armistice correspond- 
ence, Germany agreed to accept a peace based on the 
"Fourteen Points" and on the later "principles," particu- 
larly those enunciated on September 27th. The principles 
were vague and abstract and contemplated a peace of con- 
ciliation as a first step toward a new world concert which 
would end wars. 

The "Fourteen Points" were also full of ambiguities. 
By the end of 191 8, some of them had ceased to be appli- 
cable. Others had nothing to do with the German settle- 
ment. Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria had invited 
negotiations without any reference to Mr. Wilson's peace 



414 The European Nations 

aims. Moreover, the United States was not at war with 
either Bulgaria or Turkey. 

The major Entente powers made a reservation as to 
Point Two, relating to the freedom of the seas — a principle 
on which Mr. Wilson had laid special stress in all his prior 
discussions of peace readjustments. They also insisted that 
Germany must acknowledge an obligation to make com- 
pensation "for all damage done to the civilian population 
of the Allied states or their property by the aggression of 
Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." 

The peace conference faced the task, therefore, of fixing 
the amount of reparation due from Germany and of dis- 
tributing territory held to be forfeited by her within the 
limitations of the Wilson precepts. It faced a larger prob- 
lem, however — that of intertwining a territorial settlement 
affecting three continents, dissolving two empires and cut- 
ting deep into two others; creating new states, aggrandizing 
others and inflaming nationalistic ambitions everywhere — 
with a compact for subjecting national aggressiveness to 
international control. 

Point Fourteen of President Wilson's list, accepted as a 
basis for peace, read: 

A general association of nations must be formed under 
specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual 
guarantees of political independence and territorial in- 
tegrity to great and small states alike. 

This project of a supernational clearing house and 
council was the pivot on which all Mr. Wilson's activities at 
Paris turned. It had found expression in a Pan-American 
treaty which he and Mr. Lansing had drafted in 1916, but 
which none of the powers interested had ever signed. The 



The War and the Treaties 415 

original Wilson conception of such a world agency, as Mr. 
Lansing has disclosed, gave it authority to revise national 
boundaries, as v/ell as to guarantee these. A genuine super- 
state power was to be created. The Entente nations, 
which were seeking to recompense themselves for their war 
losses and to establish a new European balance of power, 
were asked to join with the new nations which had emerged 
from the war and with the neutrals in substituting inter- 
national guaranties against aggression for the limited group 
guaranties to which they had been accustomed. 

The conflict between this idealism and the more skeptical 
realistic policy of which Clemenceau was the most aggres- 
sive spokesman brought confusion into the conference. 
The chief negotiators worked at cross purposes and the rep- 
resentatives of the minor states, excluded from any real 
share in the decisions made, accepted the latter with reluc- 
tance and grumbling. Allied unity of purpose was shattered 
before the conference ended. 

When Colonel House and Ambassador Bernstorff were 
negotiating in the winter of 19 16-17, for American medi- 
ation on the basis of a "peace without victory," the German 
Government, as Bernstorff shows, was determined to have a 
political peace made by the belligerents at a first conference, 
allowing a world conference to be called later to consider 
international co-operation as a means of preventing future 
wars. Mr. Wilson may not have been fully aware at the 
time of Germany's intention to keep these two transactions 
separate. But in Paris he was resolved to take no chances. 
His paramount concern was to tie up the treaty with a world 
association covenant. The other chief negotiators, desir- 
ing a European settlement first, were won to the President's 
way of thinking when they sensed how much else he was 



4i6 The European Nations 

ready to yield in order to have his way on this point. They 
also quickly realized the possibilities of utilizing the league 
as an instrument for the execution of the treaty. 

But President Wilson's status as a negotiator was un- 
fortunately misunderstood by his European colleagues. 
His leadership had been rejected by the American people 
in the Congressional elections of 191 8, when, in spite of his 
personal appeal, the voters returned a Republican House 
and a Republican Senate. Undef a European parliamen- 
tary system, he could never have appeared at Paris at all, 
since he would have ceased to be the responsible spokes- 
man for his nation. American opinion resented his going 
to Paris, and as early as March 5, 1919, he was publicly 
warned that his purpose to attach a League of Nations 
covenant to the peace treaty was disapproved of by m.ore 
than a third of the membership of the Senate. He defied 
this opposition, thereby strengthening it. The result was 
that he took back home a treaty draft that could be ratified 
only at the cost of modifications which he considered to be 
destructive and personally humiliating. 

Mr. Wilson pursued no nationalist aims at Paris. He 
subordinated everything else to linking the covenant of the 
League of Nations with all the peace treaties. He was 
even willing for a time to offer up the Monroe Doctrine on 
this altar. The sincerity of his faith in an internationalistic 
regime as a cure for the excesses of nationalism is not open 
to question. But his imprudent methods kept the United 
States out of the League and prevented American accept- 
ance of the treaties. Thus he undid his own work and, in 
a measure, the work of the conference. For a peace settle- 
ment, and a world concert, with the United States left out, 
could not but have an air of unreality and incompleteness. 



The War and the Treaties 417 

In many other important respects the treaty with Ger- 
many lacked finahty. It could not deal with Russia — then 
and still a vagrant state. An effort was made to get the 
various Russian "White" governments and the "Red" 
government together at Prinkipo. This failed dismally. 
The negotiators at Paris accepted the fact of the secession 
from the Empire of Russian Poland. But they avoided 
recognition cf the other states which had been cut loose by 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, perhaps on the ground that 
the latter had been specifically denounced in the armistice. 

Mr. Wilson almost broke up the conference by denying 
Italy's claim to Fiume, thus alienating Italy for a time from 
the other major European powers and postponing for nearly 
two years an Adriatic settlement. He kept Japan in only 
by yielding on the cession to her of German rights in Shan- 
tung — a transfer by which the United States Senate after- 
wards refused to be bound. 

Poland was deprived of Danzig, converted into a free 
city under the League of Nations, and no boundary was 
fixed in Upper Silesia between Poland and Germany, or, on 
the east, between Poland and Russia. Out of these omis- 
sions came the Russo-Polish war and the bitter quarrels 
over the Upper Silesian plebiscite area. 

France's chief concern was to insure herself against fu- 
ture German aggression. Clemenceau asked for a defensive 
frontier on the Rhine. Lloyd George and Wilson would 
not concede this. As a compromise, they consented to a 
fifteen year occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and 
offered a special tripartite treaty, pledging Great Britain 
and the United States to come to France's aid in case of 
unprovoked attack by Germany. Great Britain promptly 
ratified this compact. But the United States Senate never 



41 8 The European Nations 

even considered it. Since it was to go into effect, so far as 
Great Britain was concerned, only after American ratifica- 
tion, France was left empty-handed. Clemenceau's trade 
of a bird in the hand for two in the bush greatly aggravated 
France's anxieties after the peace and led her to adopt a 
forcing policy toward Germany, which was not relished 
either at Rome or at London. 

Finally, the provisions for German reparation were left 
indefinite. Wrangles over these in the Allied Council and 
with Germany continued until May, 1921, to the injury 
both of the creditors and the debtor. The indictment is 
brought against the Versailles treaty by the Keynes school 
of economists that it has destroyed beyond repair the old 
economic balance on which European prosperity, in the 
period between the Napoleonic wars and the Great War, 
had so largely rested. This is, of course, conjecture. But 
at the peace table political considerations generally out- 
weighed economic ones. 

This priority of political motive was strikingly illustrated 
in the peace with Austria-Hungary. The Hapsburg Em- 
pire was a political mosaic, but a well-balanced economic 
unit. It was dismembered. Economic chaos followed 
and diminished Austria became a bankrupt, mendicant 
state. Hungary, also greatly reduced in size, remains 
vigorous and vindictive. A long and painful period 
of economic readjustment lies ahead in the Danubian 
countries. 

Bulgaria got off lightly in the treaty made with her and 
has since the war given the Allies no trouble. The treaty 
with Turkey was executed only in part. The Anatolian 
Nationalist government refused to sign it and Greece, in 
the opinion of the Allied powers, deserted them when she 



The War and the Treaties 419 

recalled Constantine. Constantine and Mustapha Kemal 
were left to fight it out in Asia Minor, with Allied good 
wishes for neither. 

The five Paris treaties were signed in this order: With 
Germany, at Versailles, June 28, 1919; with Austria, at 
St. Germain, September 10, 1919; with Bulgaria, at Neuilly, 
November 27, 1919; with Hungary at Trianon, June 4, 
1920; with Turkey at Sevres, August 10, 1920. 



CHAPTER II 



EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE 



THE peace makers at Paris constructed a new inter- 
national organism — the League of Nations. But 
the treaties left Europe more intensely nationalized than 
ever. Political boundaries were adjusted in a large measure 
to racial boundaries. 

Four new small states came into existence in the Baltic 
region — Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Poland 
was recreated. The Hapsburg Empire was dissolved. 
Austria and Hungary were separated. Austria's area, 
107,997 square miles in 1914, was reduced to 32,394 square 
miles, including Burgenland, a strip taken over from 
Hungary. Her population fell from 28,567,898 in 1910 to 
about 6,484,000 in 1920. Hungary's area shrank from 
125,430 square miles in 19 14 to 35,164, and her population 
from 20,886,487 in 1910 to 7,840,832 in 1921. 

The republic of Czecho-Slovakia was formed out of 
Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and the Slovak parts 
of Hungary. The kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes absorbed the southern vSlav provinces, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, a part of the Banat, and a few 
slices of Bulgaria. Italy recovered her Irredenta and a part 
of German-speaking Tyrol. Rumania, doubled in size, 
acquired Transylvania, the Bukowina and the major part 
of the Banat, besides regaining Bessarabia from Russia. 
Poland annexed Galicia. 

420 



Europe after the Peace 421 

Germany yielded back Alsace-Lorraine to France; two 
minute pieces of Belgian frontier territory to Belgium ; North 
Schleswig — after a plebiscite — to Denmark; Posen, a part 
of West Prussia, and a part of Upper Silesia to Poland. 
Danzig and Memel were ceded to the principal Allied 
Powers, the former becoming a free city and the latter being 
still undisposed of. Bulgaria gave up her part of Thrace 
to Greece and the Strumnitza district to Serbia. 

In Asia the new kingdom of Hedjaz arose; Georgia and 
Azerbaijan became independent; an Armenian state was 
established on paper, if not in reality; Palestine, Syria, and 
Mesopotamia' (including Kurdistan) were put under man- 
dates, and Greece went to war with the Anatolian National- 
ist government to make good her claim to Western Asia 
Minor. Eastern Siberia broke away from Soviet Russia 
and set up as a separate though not hostile republic. 

Great Britain assumed a protectorate over Egypt. She 
received mandates over Palestine, to be converted eventu- 
ally into a Jewish state; Mesopotamia (with Kurdistan), 
the greater part of German East Africa, renamed Kenya 
Colony ; fractions of the Cameroons and Togoland, and the 
island of Nauru, in the Pacific. The Union of South Africa 
obtained a mandate for German Southwest Africa. New 
Zealand became mandatory for German Samoa, — Australia 
for German New Guinea and the German islands in the 
South Pacific, except Samoa. 

Japan acquired the mandate for the German islands in 
the Pacific north of the equator, and took over the German 
bases and rights in Shantung, although these latter dis- 
positions were not acquiesced in by the United States. 

' Mesopotamia, renamed Irak, was subsequently made a kingdom, 
uader British suzerainty, with Emir Feisal as monarch. 



422 The European Nations 

France acquired a mandate for Syria, and for the larger 
portions of the German Cameroons and Togoland and 
claims in Cilicia, which she afterwards yielded in negotia- 
tion with the Turkish Nationalist government. Belgium 
received two districts of German East Africa adjacent to 
the Belgian Congo. The German East African territory 
south of the Rovuma River, known as the ' ' Kionga Triangle, ' ' 
was awarded to Portugal. 

Italy obtained by cession from Great Britain an addition 
to Italian Somaliland. She also received rights in Adalia 
and in Albania, but later practically abandoned these. Her 
title to the Dodecanese Islands, taken from Turkey in the 
war of 1911-12, was confirmed, but on the understanding 
that she was to transfer all of these but Rhodes to Greece. 
Greece received under the Sevres treaty Bulgarian and 
Turkish Thrace, up to the Chatalja lines; Tenedos, Im- 
bros, the ^gean Islands occupied by the Greek forces, and 
rights of administration in the Province of Smyrna and 
several adjoining districts, with provision for a plebiscite 
on annexation after five years. But the Sevres compact 
was never executed. Constantinople and a small district 
surrounding it were put under international control, though 
remaining the seat of the Sultan's government. British 
influence was left predominant, however, in this area. An 
Anglo-Persian agreement, signed on August 9, 1919, pro- 
vided for a partial British protectorate over Persia. In 
1 92 1, the Persian government, influenced by Russian and 
Turkish Nationalist pressure, cancelled the agreement, 
leaving Persia's status somewhat vague. 

The history of Europe since the signing of the three 
main treaties in 1919 is concerned chiefly with efforts to es- 
tablish the post-war political order, Germany gave her 



Europe after the Peace 423 

signature sullenly. The Allies soon discovered that she 
had little disposition to live up to her promises. The Ver- 
sailles convention called for a trial of William II. and of 
German subjects "accused of having committed acts in 
violation of the laws and customs of war." The ex-Kaiser 
was an exile in Holland and the Dutch government refused 
to surrender him. Germany also declined to deliver her 
war criminals. A compromise was patched up by which 
these offenders were to be tried in the German courts. The 
trials of the culprits at Leipsic subsequently proved a 
travesty. 

Germany also evaded the provisions requiring her to dis- 
arm. Her military forces were to be reduced to 100,000 by 
March 31, 1920. The date for their reduction was post- 
poned because of delays in the ratification of the treaty. 
But the German army continued to exceed the treaty 
strength until the summer of 1921, and compliance with the 
disarmament articles was secured then only through an 
Allied ultimatum, following military occupation of a part 
of the Ruhr district. The coal deliveries provided for in 
Annex V. of the Reparation Section were not made in full 
and the Allied governments, after much wrangling, reduced 
these payments at the Spa Conference of 1920. 

But the primary cause of irritation and unsettlement was 
the German reparation total, left undetermined in the treaty. 
Disagreements between France and Great Britain en- 
couraged Berlin to insist on German inability to pay. At 
the peace conference President Wilson had favored a lump 
sum indemnity, equivalent to about $15,000,000,000 in 
cash. Some of the British financial advisers recommended 
an even smaller total — in the neighbourhood of $10,000,000- 
000. Premier Lloyd George's commitments in the ' ' khaki ' ' 



4^4 The European Nations 

election of 191 8 and the extravagant hopes cherished by- 
many French politicians stood, however, in the way of a 
definite and moderate evaluation of Germany's debt. 
Lloyd George repented after he read the German observa- 
tions on the treaty draft. But it was then too late for him 
to turn back. He secured concessions to Germany in 
Upper Silesia, but none on reparation terms. 

The treaty delayed until May i, 1921, the fixation of the 
reparation total, shifting that burden to a Reparation Com- 
mission. Two years of political and economic turmoil were 
thus invited. For France and Great Britain, the two 
powers directly concerned in the reparation settlement, 
both realized as soon as the treaty was signed, that responsi- 
bility for the recovery of damages must rest with them and 
not with the Reparation Commission. 

A divergence of view appeared and became more pro- 
nounced. France was eager to make Germany pay in full 
for the restoration of the devastated departments. The 
British Government inclined more and more to the theory 
that Germany's economic recovery was essential to the 
economic recovery of Europe, and talked of revising Ger- 
man obligations downward. The reparation problem was 
discussed at the .San Remo conference, on April 18, 1920; 
at the Hythe conference, on May 15, 1920; and at the 
Boulogne conference on June 21, 1920. France kept urg- 
ing a decision; Great Britain held back from one. 

In November, 1920, the French and British governments 
formally agreed to anticipate the Reparation Commission's 
judgment and to fix the total. This agreement was carried 
into effect in the accord of Paris, of January 29, 1921. The 
indemnit}^ was set at 226,000,000,000 gold marks, about 
$56,500,000,000, the payments running through forty-two 



Europe after the Peace 425 

years. An additional annual tax of twelve per cent was 
to be levied on German exports. The cash value of the 
reparation lump sum was estimated at $21,000,000,000. 

But when the Paris agreement was presented to the Ger- 
mans at London on March ist, the latter refused to accept 
it and subrnitted counter-proposals so inadequate that the 
Allied Council indignantly returned them. The German 
delegates were curtly dismissed and the task of presenting 
an account to Berlin was turned over again to the Repara- 
tion Commission. 

In April, 1920, after the Kapp revolt, the German govern- 
ment moved troops into the Ruhr district to suppress a 
Communist uprising. Their strength was in excess of the 
garrison quota which Germany was allowed to maintain. 
French forces at once occupied Frankfort, Darmstadt, and 
a few smaller German cities beyond the treaty zone. These 
were evacuated after Germany reduced her Ruhr garrison. 
Following the London fiasco, British, Belgian, and French 
troops were sent across the Rhine into the Ruhr. This action 
was taken in retaliation for Germany's persistent refusal to 
disarm and to fulfil other treaty obligations. But it was also 
a warning that Germany m.ust come to terms on reparations. 

The Reparation Commission made its report on April 
27, 1 92 1. The amount due from Germany was put at 
132,000,000,000 gold marks, about $33,000,000,000. This 
sum excluded restitutions and the obligation to reimburse 
all sums borrowed from the Allies by Belgium. 

On May 5th an Allied ultimatum was forwarded to 
Berlin. It gave the German government until May 12th to 
accept the Reparation Commission's report, to disarm, and 
to proceed with the trial of the war criminals, on penalty 
of Allied seizure of the Ruhr Valley. 



426 The European Nations 

The Fehrenbach ministry resigned and a new ministry, 
headed by Chancellor Wirth, was formed. The Reichstag 
submitted and the new Chancellor set about discharging 
some of Germany's overdue debt. These efforts strained 
the Reich's resources and depressed the exchange value of 
the mark to a new low level — ^less than a cent. Early in 
November, 1921, a mark was worth only a third of a cent. 

The upper Silesian settlement kept Germany, Poland, 
Great Britain, and France on edge for more than two years. 
The plebiscite was deferred until March 20, 192 1. In 
the interval the pro-German and the pro-Polish Silesians 
organized for offence and defence. Clashes between them, 
armed and otherwise, continued for months. In February, 
1920, an Inter- Allied commission, supported by troops, 
mostly French, was put in charge of the plebiscite area. 
The election showed this result in the area as a whole : For 
Germany, 709,340 votes; for Poland, 479,747. Of the pro- 
German votes 65,000 were cast in the district of Leob- 
schtitz, where the choice was between Germany and Czecho- 
slovakia. About 200,000 German non-residents are said to 
have voted, under the provision allowing persons born in 
Upper Silesia to return there and take part in the election. 

The treaty required the Inter- Allied commission to recom- 
mend a boundary line between Poland and Germany on 
the basis of the vote by communes, regard being also given 
' ' to the geographical and economic conditions of the local- 
ity." • The commission was never able to agree, the British, 
the Italian, and the French delegate each favoring a dif- 
ferent line. Alarmed by a report originating in Ber- 
lin that the Commission would accept the British contention 
and give almost the whole of the area to Germany, the pro- 
Polish Silesians, under Korfanty, a former Deputy in the 



Europe after the Peace 427 

German Reichstag, occupied on May 2d the south-eastern 
district and most of the industrial triangle east of the Oder. 
Fighting between the pro-Poles and pro-Germans, and with 
the Allied garrison, continued until June loth, when both 
the Korfanty forces and the pro-German irregulars were 
disbanded. 

The Inter-Allied commission made a divided report to 
the Allied Supreme Council. The latter body could not 
break the deadlock. On August 12th, the Council of the 
League of Nations was asked to draw the boundary line. It 
made a decision on October nth, awarding Poland about a 
third and Germany about two thirds of the plebiscite area. 
The valuable industrial triangle was partitioned. 

Poland's eastern frontier was also a vSubject of heated 
controversy, which threatened another war, and did actu- 
ally lead to fighting. When the armistice was signed, 
Russia was left in an anomalous position. The Soviet 
government was at peace with Germany, but at least nomi- 
nally at war with the Allies. Allied forces held a front 
south of Archangel. On the Volga and east of it the 
Czecho-Slovaks and Siberians were preparing to advance 
toward the heart of Great Russia. The new Baltic states 
and Poland were suspicious of Moscow, which was already 
trying to recover and Bolshevize Ukrania. In the south, 
Rumania had taken over Bessarabia. French forces held 
Odessa and the Crimea and General Denikin's army had 
advanced out of the Kuban into the territory of the Don 
Cossacks. 

The first part of 191 9 was marked by many anti-Bol- 
shevist successes. Admiral Kolchak's Siberian govern- 
ment was recognized by the Allied Supreme Council, and 
Kolchak gave out a program for the restoration of a pro- 



428 The European Nations 

Ally democratic government for all Russia. But Lenine 
and Trotsky rapidly reorganized and strengthened the Red 
armies. Kolchak was thrown back to the line of the Urals. 
Then he lost Omsk, his capital, and the whole of Siberia 
east to Irkutsk. He was murdered by his own mutinous 
troops. 

Denikin made great progress in South Russia, taking 
Kiev and getting almost to within striking distance of Mos- 
cow. But his rear was left unorganized. His communica- 
tions were broken and his armies melted away. General 
Yudenitch also conducted a campaign for Petrograd from 
the Esthonian front. He was defeated after reaching the 
suburbs of the former Russian capital. Petlura, the 
Ukranian leader, fought both Denikin and Lenine, and 
maintained a precarious hold on Kiev. The Allies aban- 
doned the Archangel district. The Poles alone made steady 
headway against Trotsky's new military establishment. 

The treaties had failed to define Poland's eastern bound- 
aries. In December, 191 9, the Allied Supreme Council 
directed the Poles to occupy no territory east of the ' ' Cur- 
zon Line," running from Kovno south through Brest- 
Litovsk — approximately the eastern border of "Congress" 
Poland. The Poles, however, for defensive purposes, 
pushed much farther east, as far as Minsk and Vilna. They 
also expelled the Ukranians from Eastern Galicia. 

On December 31, 1919, the Soviet government concluded 
an armistice with Esthonia. The only important anti- 
Bolshevist group inside Russia in 1920 was that headed by 
General Wrangel in the Crimea sector. Wrangel's govern- 
ment was recognized by France as the de facto government 
of Russia. Yet it was only a skeleton. Wrangel had some 
successes in the south in the first eight months of the year. 



Europe after the Peace 429 

but was crushed in the fall. Lenine by that time had come 
to terms with Poland. 

In the spring of 1920 Moscow had concentrated the best 
of the Red divisions on the western border for an offensive 
against Pilsudski, Poland's President and the commander- 
in-chief of her armies. As a counter-stroke, Pilsudski 
entered into an alliance with Petlura and opened a cam- 
paign for Kiev. The Poles entered this city in June. But 
they were unable to hold it. The Red counter-offensive 
began and continued until, in July and August, Pilsudski 's 
armies were driven back into "Congress" Poland and 
Warsaw itself was threatened. 

General Weygand, Foch's former chief-of- staff, hurried 
to Poland and restored the military situation there. 
Denuding the southern front, he massed troops east and 
north-east of Warsaw and broke through the Russian lines, 
cutting off the retreat of the divisions which had worked 
their way along the East Prussian boundary toward Posen 
and Danzig. The Russians were routed and fled back to 
their former lines. Peace negotiations were begun on 
September 21st at Riga. An armistice and provisional 
peace was signed there on October 5th. Russia practically 
accepted Poland's terms, ceding the latter a wide strip of 
White Russian territory and a corridor shutting off contact 
between Russia and Lithuania. 

In October a body of Polish irregulars, under General 
Zellgouski, seized Vilna and set up a local government there, 
similar to d'Annunzio's in Fiume. The League of Nations 
later undertook to dispose of Vilna, but with no success up 
to late in 1 92 1. No people have a stronger sense of nation- 
ality than the Poles. By dint of fighting through 191 9 and 
1920 they were able to establish their national claims against 



430 The European Nations 

the Ukranians, against Red Russia, and even against the 
edicts of so powerful an international body as the Allied 
Supreme Council. 

Italy's dispute with the other major powers over Fiume 
was settled at last through direct negotiation with Jugo- 
slavia. D'Annunzio took possession of the city on Septem- 
ber 12, 1919, and wasn't ejected tmtil December 31, 1920. 
Many compromises were suggested while the Allied Council 
was trying unsuccessfully to harmonize the Italian view- 
point with President Wilson's. The Council eventually 
yielded its functions as a reviser of boundaries. Italy 
and Jugo-Slavia came to an understanding on November 
12, 1920, when the treaty of Rapallo was signed. This made 
Fiume an independent state, contiguous territorially to 
Italy, and at liberty to seek incorporation into the Italian 
kingdom. After the ratification of the treaty Italian 
troops drove out d'Annunzio and his legionaries. 

Greece was to play the role of Entente agent for the execu- 
tion of the Treaty of Sevres. When the Angora National- 
ists refused to ratify the partition of the old Ottoman 
Empire, the Greek government, whose forces had occupied 
Sm.yrna and a zone about it, landed an army on the coast 
of the Sea of Marmora. This army, marching east, joined 
another Greek army, marching north from Smyrna, and 
cleared the territory west of a line drawn from Ushak north 
to Brusa. The approaches to Constantinople were thus 
covered. The Greek operation, which was completely 
successful, ended in June, 1920. 

In November the Greek people elected a. Royalist parlia- 
ment and promptly recalled Constantine through a plebi- 
scite. This vagary upset the calculations which underlay 
the Sevres settlement. The Allied Powers had no intention 



Europe after the Peace 431 

of working hand in glove in the Near East with an intract- 
able enemy. At a conference held in London in February, 
1 92 1, the Sevres document was radically revised. Most of 
the' Asian territory intended to be allotted to Greece was 
reassigned to the Anatolians. Greece was left with only 
limited supervisory powers over a small district about 
Smyrna. 

Constantine, feeling himself snubbed, refused to submit 
to the revision. He set out to fight the Turks on his 
own account. In the latter part of March the Greek forces 
on the Ushak-Brusa front attacked the Nationalists and 
pushed them east as far as Eski-Shehr and Afium Karahissar, 
on the Constantinople-Bagdad railroad. A prompt Turk- 
ish counter-offensive drove the invaders back in turn to 
their starting, points. Constantine reinforced and refitted 
his arrhies and prepared for a second drive for Angora, the 
Nationalist capital. This drive began on July 9, 1921, and 
continued into September. Constantine's forces retook the 
line of the Constantinople-Bagdad railroad and advanced 
well beyond it — about halfway to Angora. They were 
halted on the Sakaria River early in September and by the 
middle of the month were retreating to positions covering 
Eski-Shehr. 

For two years after the dissolution of the peace conference 
Europe remained unsettled and at war. Many very diffi- 
cult phases of readjustment are still ahead. Complete 
economic ruin has overtaken Russia. Other states are 
insolvent, or nearly so. Never has the indulgence of na- 
. tionalist ambitions been so little checked by thoughts of 
a financial reckoning. In a vast area of Europe the money 
printing press is king. 

The general disarmament which the treaty makers had 



432 The European Nations 

in mind made little headway, because the League of Nations 
lacked power to coeice its over-armed members. Alliances 
were also framed or maintained inside the League. In 1921 
Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Rumania formed' the 
Little Entente, for the purpose of maintaining the new 
status quo in Central Europe, and more especially to restrain 
Hungary. Poland also concluded defensive alliances with 
Rumania and with Czecho-Slovakia. The Little Entente 
had twice to threaten Hungary with war to prevent the 
restoration of Charles, the former King-Emperor. After 
the armistice Karolyi set up a republic, but soon gave way 
to the Bolshevist regime of Bela Kun. The latter's dictator- 
ship was overthrown by the Rumanians, who in spite of the 
Allied Council's protests, entered Budapest. A "White" 
government was then set up by Admiral Horthy, acting as 
regent. Charles, an exile in Switzerland, appe'ared in 
Hungary with an armed following in the spring of 1 92 1 and 
claimed the crown. The Little Entente, backed by the 
Council of Ambassadors, forced him to return to his Swiss 
castle. He repeated the adventure in October, and this 
time the Little Entente and the Council demanded his sur- 
render to British custody and the forfeiture of his claims 
to the throne. On November 6th, the Hungarian Parlia- 
ment annulled his rights of succession and he was sent into 
exile at Funchal, on the island of Madeira. 

The British-Japanese Alliance expired by limitation in 
192 1. Since neither power had formally denounced the 
alliance treaty, it was held to continue automatically for 
a year from the date on which it might hereafter be 
denounced. It was terminated later by the four power 
Pacific treaty signed at Washington in December, 1921. 

The attitude of aloofness into which the United States 



Europe after the Peace 433 

had drifted by the fall of 1919 became more accentuated in 
1920 and the earlier half of 1921. Before Mr. Wilson's 
term, expired, his Secretary of State had raised a question 
as to the legality and propriety of the mandate over Yap 
which the Supreme Council had awarded to Japan. Ger- 
many's oversea possessions had been ceded to the five prin- 
cipal Allied and Associated powers, and Mr. Wilson main- 
tained that he had never consented to turning Yap over to 
the Japanese. 

Secretary Colby, and Secretary Hughes after him, carried 
the argument still further. Mr. Hughes announced that the 
United States would not recognize as valid any mandate 
over former German overseas territory assigned without 
the consent and approval of the United States. This brought 
in Shantung as well as the German Islands in the Pacific. 

The Far Eastern problem was thus raised in an acute 
form. To deal with all questions threatening discord in 
the Pacific and to secure an agreement for the limitation of 
armament — something beyond the existing potentialities 
of the League of Nations — President Harding invited Great 
Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China, Belgium, Holland, 
and Portugal to send delegates to a conference in Washing- 
ton, to meet on Armistice Day, 1921. There, it was hoped, 
the ill effects of American exclusion from the world concert 
and the world settlement of 1919, due to Mr. Wilson's mis- 
management, might be counteracted and the unity of the 
powers which won the war might be in part restored. The 
work of this conference proved, through the conclusion of 
the four-power Pacific treaty of non-aggression, the regu- 
larization of the Pacific mandates, the drastic limitation of 
naval armament for offence, and the partial emancipation 
of China, that the international impulse had not been 



434 The European Nations 

stifled, so far as America was concerned, by the blunders at 
Paris and the losing fight for the ratification of the Ver- 
sailles convention. Acting independently, hampered by 
no world association charter and no super-state machinery, 
the powers which met at Washington readily reconstructed 
a substantial world accord, making for stabilization and 
peace. 

The League of Nations, which has had a tendency to be- 
come a Europe-Africa-Western Asia League, completed its 
organization in the fall of 1920, when the first meeting of 
the Assembly was held in Geneva. A second session of 
the Assembly occurred in the summer of 1921. The lower 
house of the League modified by interpretation the impli- 
cations of Article X. of the Covenant. It held that no mem.- 
ber State was bound to furnish armed force in response to 
a recommendation by the League Council for the purpose 
of repelling aggression against the political independence or 
territorial integrity of another member. It also absolved 
members from the duty imposed by Article XVI., of enforc- 
ing an economic boycott against a member resorting to war 
in disregard of the covenant. A Permanent Court of Inter- 
national Justice, to determine international disputes, was 
set up in 1921. Argentina withdrew from the League at 
the 1920 meeting of the Assembly. Of the enemy stat;s 
Austria and Bulgaria have been admitted. The nation3 
which have not joined are Germany, Hungary, Russia, 
Turkey, Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States. 



. Note. — The index includes a few references to the epilogue in the 
original edition. The author's preface to the fifth edition explains why 
this epilogue is omitted in the present volmne. 



INDEX 



Abdul Aziz, I., 200 

Abdul Hamid II., I., 201-202, 
265—266, 283, 291-297, 309, 
206, 209-214, 219—221, 242, 
317-321, 326-327, 330, 340; 
11., IS, 144. 157-158, 164, 169, 

Abdul Kerim, I., 229-232, 237, 
242, 244 

Abdur Rahman, XL, 87, 99, 104- 
105, 107, 119, 121-122, 132- 
136, 138, 344 

Abcken, Herr, I., 48 

Abu Klea, Battle of, II., 195 

Abyssinia, II., 23, 203, 224 

Adam, Mme., II., 21 

iVdrianople, I., 262, 265, 272, 
209, 321 

Afghanistan, II., 21, 35-36, 60, 
74-76, 83-90, 1S5, 251, 344- 
348, 349; War in (1878-79), 
II., chap, iii., 92 passim 

Africa, Partition of, II., chap, 
vii., passim 

Albania, I., 188, 272 

Albanian League, I., 292 

Albrecht, Archduke, I., 37-41 

Alexander I, I., 37, 189-190, 
353; II., 57 

Alexander II, I., 171, 197, 205- 
208, 213-218, 228, 241-243, 
248-249, 254, 264-272, 278, 
302-307, 344, 349, 352-355, 
362, 364, 371; II., 2, 7, II, 
46, 96-99 

Alexander III, I., 303-316, 324- 
341, 353-354, 356-360, 367- 
369; II., 18, 26, 29, 32-36, 
129, 133-134 

Alexander, Prince of Bulgaria, 
I., 302, 309-337, 341 II.. 28, 

133- 
Alexandria, Bombardment of, 
II 159-162 



Alikhanoff, M., II., 128 
Alsace, I., 109, no, 122, 155, 

157-159 
Alvensleben, General von, I., 71, 

75, 78, 90 
Amur, river, II., 303, 304, 313 
Andrassy, Count, I., 194, 276 
Anglo - German Agreement 

(1890), II., 242-246, 248, 

257 
Angra Pequena, II., 246, 247 
Antonelli, Cardinal, I., 103 
Arabi Pasha, I., 317; 11., 152, 

156-159, 162, 163-168 
Archinard, M., II., 265 
Ardennes, Woods of, I., 90 
Argyll, Duke of, II., 65-67, 70, 

120 
Armenia, I., 261, 272, 287, 290, 

297, 364 
Army Bill, French (1875), I-. 

140, 142-144 
Arnim, Count von I., 145; II., 

2 
Artomoroff, Colonel, II., 224 
Atbara, Battle of the, II., 207- 

209 
Augustenburg, Duke of, I., 19 
Aumale, Due d', I., 138 
Austria (1815-66), I., 4-27, 36- 

43, 62-73, 161, 174, 194 210, 

213-215, 218—220, 231, 270- 

272, 274, 276, 283, 287, 292, 

306-308, 323, 336, 339; IL, 

2, 5, 8—14, 18-20, 40-42, 202. 

322 
Austro-German Alliance, II., 

9-14 
Austro-Prussian War (1866), I., 

20-25 
Austro-Russian Treaty (1877) 

I., 212-214 
Ayub Khan, II., 108, 117, 121- 

122 



435 



436 



Index 



Baden, I., 14-25 
Baden, Grand Duke of, I., 154 
Baert, Captain, II., 294 
Bahr-el Ghazal, the, II., 224, 226, 

280, 287-288 
Bakunin, I., 350-353 
Balaclava, I., 97 
Balan, Village of, II., 100 
Balfour, Mr. A., II., 136-138 
Balkan Peninsula, I., 28, 194, 

198, 202, 273, 331 
Balkh, II., 98. 138 
Baluchistan, II., 61, 77, 81-83, 

137 
Baring, Sir E., II., 174, 178-187 
Bashi-Bazouks, I., 202-204 
Batak, I., 202, 203 
Batoum, I., 242, 273, 279, 287, 

329 
Bauffremont, General de, I., 97 
Bavaria, I., 21, 24, 25, 154, 157- 

159 

Bayazid, I., 278 

Bazaine, Marshal, I., 72-75, 77- 
84, 86-90, 113-114 

Bazeilles, I., 91-95 

Beaconsfield, Earl of, I., 33, 
195-196, 203, 208, 215, 216, 
222-224, 261, 275, 276-278, 
279, 280-282, 286-287, 289- 
291, 343; II., 14, 76, 78-80, 
89-91, 99. 106, 148, 238, 323- 

325 
Beaumont, Battle of, I., 90 
Bechuanaland, II, 254-258 
Beernaert, M., II., 285 
Belfort, I., 115, 122, 123 
Belgium, I., 5, 10, 30, 175; II., 

277-280, 283-286, 298 
Bendereff, I., 323, 331-333 
Benedek, General, I., 21 
Benedetti, M., I., 47, 50, 55 
Bentley, Rev. W. H., II., 272 
Berber, II., 186, 189, 191, 205, 

207 
Beresford, Lord Charles, II., 195 
Berlin Conference (1885), II., 
274-277, 280, 288, 291, 298; 
Congress of (1878), I., 271, 
279-288, 294, 308; II., 9, 14, 
35' 85. 234, 323; Memoran- 
dum, I., 197-200, 214; 
Treaty of (1878). I., 282-288, 
302. 318-320, 328, 346; II., 
20, 44 



Besika Bay, I., 200, 202, £03, 
211, 266 

Bessarabia, I., 190, 242, 274, 
278, 310 

Beust, Count von, I., 37, 41, 42 

Biarritz, I., 19 

Biddulph, General, II., 96 

Bismarck, Count Herbert, II., 
246-247, 252 

Bismarck, Prince Otto von, I., 
9, 14-27, 30, 34, 35, 45, 47- 
57, 91, 99, 100, 104, III, 114, 
120—123, 128, 133, 140, 146, 
151-156, 163, 166, 167, 182, 
195, 199, 206, 218, 272, 306, 
311, 336: II., 1-13, 19, 22, 24- 
26, 31, 13c, 155, 168, 234-237. 
243-244, 251, 253, 259, 274, 
275; and "Protection," I., 166- 
178 

Bissandugu, II., 265 

Blagovestchensk, II., 318 

Blowitz, M. de, II., 6-8 

Blumenthal, Count von, I., 84, 
90, 99, III 

Bokhara, II., 59-66 

Bonnier, M., II., 265 

Bordeaux, I., 115, 116, 121, 124, 

i?5. 137. 140 
Boris, I., 341 
Bosnia, I., 194, 199, 284, 288, 

307; II., 20; Condition of, in 

1875. II-. 337-340 

Boulanger, General, I., 149; II., 
21, 25, 27, 30 

Bourbaki, General, I., 115 

Bourbon, House of, I., 3-7 

Bourgas, I., 331 

Bourgeois, M., II., 223 

Boxer Movement, the, II., 317 

Brazza, M. de, II., 273 

Bremen, I., 157, 168 

Bright, Mr. J., II., 120, 162 

British Central Africa Protect- 
orate, II., 258 

Broadwood, General, II., 204, 
214, 217 

Browne, General Sir Samuel, 
II. 92 

Brussels, Conference at, II., 259 

Bryce, I., 196 

Bukharest, Treaty of (1886). I,, 

324 
Bulgaria, I., 185-188, 194, 202- 
204, 209, 214, 267, 272-274, 



Index 



437 



Bulgari a , — Continued. 

278, 282-287, chap. X., 299 
passim, 302, 308, 324, 357; II., 
20, 21, 322, 326, 329; Cam- 
paigns in, I., 231-257 

Bundesrath, the, I., 157-158, 
164 

Burgundy, I., 114 

Burmah, II., 251, 254; Annexa- 
tion of, II., 137 

Burnaby, Colonel, II., 195 

Burrows, Brigadier-General, II., 
108 

Busa II., 266 

Busch, Dr., I., 26, 169 

Cabul, II., 64, 77, 78, 84, 85, 
88, ioo-ic6, 113-115, 137, 
343-346; Treaty of (1005), 
II., 141 

Cairo, capture of, II., 166-167 

Cairoii, Signor, II., 15 

"Caisse de la Dette" (Egyp- 
tian), II., 150, 170 

Cameroons, II., 252, 258-261 

Candahar, II., 61, 77, 84, 96, 
1C5, 108, 115— 121, 138 

Canning, Lord, II., 62 

Canrobert, Marshal, I., 83 

Caprivi, Count, II., 243 

Carnarvon, Lord, I., 267; II., 
248 

Carnot, President Sadi, I., 150 

Carpathians, the, I., 270 

Casement, Mr. Roger, II., 287, 
290—291, 295, 296 

Cassini, Count, II., 313 

Catharine II, II., 53 

Cattier, M., II., 279, 293, 294 

Cavagnari, Sir Louis, II., 100 

Cavour, Count, I. 10-13, 15, 
105, 169, 191 

Centralisation of Governments. 

I-. 373 
Chad, Lake, II., 263 
Chalons-sur-Marne, I., 79, 86, 87 
Chalouf, II., 164 
Chamberlain. Mr.. II., 120 
Chambord, Comte de, I., 139, 

144. 145 
Charasia, Battle of (1878), II., 

102-103 
Charles Albert, King, T., 8-10 
Charles, King of Roumania, I., 

228, 244, 249, 255, 274, 312 



China, II., 299, 302—303, 309- 

316 
Chino- Japanese War, II., 309 
Chitraf, II., 83, 86, 138 
Christian IX, I., 16 
Clement, Bishop, I., 333, 336 
Cobden, Richard, I., 168 
Colombey, Battle of, I., 72-75 
Combes, M., II., 39 
Congo, Free State, the, II., 222, 

267, passim chap. viii. ; River, 

II., 286 
Constantinople, Conference of 

(1876), I., 207, 208-212 
Constitution of Finland, I., 365, 

366 
Constitution, French (1875), !•> 

146-148; Turkish (1876), 209- 

212; German, I., 155-162 
Cossacks, the, II., 52-55, 163 
Coulommiers, Battle of, I., 114 
Courland, I., 364 
Cranbrook, Lord, II,, 84 
Crete, I., 286, 295 
Crimean War, I., 10, 15, 34, 36, 

190-194; II., 35, 58, 129, 

140 
Crispi, Signor, II., 24, 25, 47 
Cromer, Lord, II., 174. See 

Sir Edward Baring 
Cronstadt, II., 32, 36 
Currie, Sir Donald, II., 247, 251 
Curzon, Lord, II., 126, 136, 138, 

309 
Cyprus, II., 14; Convention, 1., 
279-280, 288-290, 297 



Dahomey, II., 265 
Daigny, I., 96 
Dalmatia, I., 194; II., 16 
Dalny, II., 317 
Damaraland, II., 247 
Danube, river, I., 233, 272 
Dardanelles, the, I., 200, 266, 

268, 287 
Darfur, District of, II., 172 
Decazes, Due, II., 6-8, 148 
Delagoa Bay, II., 248-250, 259 
Delhi, I., 251 
Denghil Tepe, Battle of, II., 

123—127, 220 
Denmark, I., 5, 6, 16, 40 
Depretis, Signor, II., 16, 23-24. 

47 



438 



Index 



Derby, Lord, I., 198, 209, 212, 
216, 266, 267, 269, 270, 275, 
289; II., 148, 246 254 

Deroulede, II., 46 

Dhanis, Commandant, II., 281 

Dilke, Sir Charles, II., 177, 248, 
292 

Disraeli. See Beaconsfield 

Dobrudscha, I., 233, 236, 272- 
273, 284 

Dodds. Colonel, II., 265 

Dolgorukoflf, General, I., 334- 

335 ^ 
Donchery, I., 100 
Dongola, II., 188, 190, 193, 205, 

206 
Dost Mohammed, II., 62, 75 
Douay, General, I., 97 
Dragomiroff, General, I., 234 
Drouyn de Lhuys, I., 24 
Drury Lowe, General Sir, II., 

165-167 
Dual Alliance, II., 31-41, 326 
Dual Control, the (in Egypt), 

II., 150, 151, 154, 168 
Ducrot, General, I., 93, 94, 97 
Dufaure, M., I., 149, 291, 293 
Dufferin, Lord, II., 12, 127, 130- 

133-134, 170, 173-174 
Dulcigno, I., 292-294 
Durand, Sir Mortimer, II., 138 
Durbar at Delhi (1878), II., 79 

East Africa (British), II., 242- 

244, 246; (German), II., 242- 

246 
East Africa Company (British), 

II., 241-245 
Eastern Questions, the, I., 184- 

224, 264-298; II., 79, 322— 

325 
Eastern Roumelia, I., 283, 301, 

309, 310. 314-315. 320, 328- 

329; II., 20 
Egypt, I., 198, 291, 317, 330; II., 

324, 328, passim, chaps, iv., v., 

vi. 
Einwold, Herr, II., 251 
Elgin, Lord, II., 62 
Elliott, Sir Henry, I., 209, 210, 

262 
El Obeid, Battle of, II., 173, 

174 
El Teb, Battle of, II., 183 
Ems, I., 48-53 



England. See Great Britain 
Epirus, I., 286, 294 
Erzeroum, I., 231, 287 
Esthonia, Province of, I., 364 
Eugenie, Empress, I., 22, 23, 44, 
54, 86, 102, 113, 164 

Faidherbe, M., II., 264 
Fashoda, II., 39, 220-227, 326, 

329 
Faure, President, I., 150; II., 36 
Favre, M. Jules, I., 103, 104, no, 

121, 133 
Ferdinand, Prince, I., 340-341 
Fergusson, Sir James, II., 24 
Ferry, M., I., 317; II., 16 
Figaro, II., 39 
Finland. I., 362, 365-374 
Flegel, Herr, II., 260 
Floquet, M., I., 150 
Flourens, M., II., 32 
Forbach, Battle of, I., 71, 72 
Formosa, Island of, II., 309 
Fox-Bourne, Mr., II., 292 
France, I., 3-8, 11, 22, 23, 28- 
34, 3^, 37, 40, 53-57. 60-65, 
100-103, ^3^' ^9°. 271; II., 
2, 5-10, 12, 20-26, 30-35, 37- 

39. 41, 144-145. 150, 155. 

157, 162—164, 168-170, 201, 

234-236, 253, 260, 262-268, 

272-277, 287, 288, 309-313, 

322, 327 
France and the Sudan, II., 220- 

227 
France and Tunis. II., 14-17 
Francis Joseph, I., 7, 36, 41, 

206, 276; TL, 2 
Franco-German War, Causes of, 

L, 41-57 
Frankfurt-on-Main, I., 13, 14, 

25, 26 
Frankfurt, Treaty of, I., 124., 

Frederick III, Crown Prince of 
Germany and Emperor, I., 22, 
86, 88, 94, 153, 160, 180, 283 

Frederick VII, I., 16 

Frederick Charles, Prince, I. 75, 
78 

Frederick William IV, I., 13-15, 
36; II 

Freeman, Professor, II., 331 

Free Trade in Germany, I., 166- 
169; in France, I., 168 



Index 



439 



French Congoland, II., 226, 273 
French Revolution of 1830, I., 

6 
Frere, Sir Bartle, IT., 76-77, 247 
Freycinet, M. de, II., 156, 162, 

167, 221, 223 
Frossard, General, I., 72-75 

Gaboon, II., 265 

Galatz, I., 233 

Galbraith, Colonel, II., 112 

Gallieni, M., II., 265 

Gallipoli, I., 264, 269 

Gambetta, M., I., 102, 112-118, 
130, 148; II., 2, 17, 155, 162, 
264 

(j^andamak, Treaty of, II., 99, 
120 

Garde Mobile, the, I., 62, no 

Garde Nationale, the, I., 62, no 

Garibaldi, I., 8, 9, 11-13, 31, 
105-107; II., 13 

Gastein, Convention of, I., 19 

Gatacre, General, II., 208, 209 

Gavril, Pasha, I., 314 

Geok Tepe. See Denghil Tape 

German, Army, I., 159; Confed- 
eration (1815-66), I., 4-27; 
Constitution (1871), I., 156- 
162; Empire, I., 153; ZoU- 
verein, the, I., 168 

Germany, I., 3-7, 13-22, 24- 

27. 30. 39. 45. 52-57. 59-64, 
151-183, 194-196, 265, 292, 
328, 331, 336; II., 2-16, 25- 

28, 41, 156-158, 163, 168. 
185, 202, 234-240, 242—245, 
247-255. 258-263, 267, 274, 
288, 310-312, 315 

Gervais, Admiral, II., 32 

Ghaznee, Battle of, II., 106 

Giers, M. de, I., 308, 314, 316, 
329.335.340,357; II., 19. 20- 
23, 25, 128, 131, 236 

Gladstone, William E., I., 204, 
265, 290, 328; II., 47, 65, 67, 
70, 76, 90, 106, 119, 131-134, 
155, 157-159. 162, 169, 172, 
177, 200—202, 221, 239, 247, 
252, 254, 255 

Glave, Edward James, II., 292 

Gold Coast, II., 264 

Goldie, Sir George T., II., 261, 
267 

Gontaut-Biron, M. de., II., 6 



Gordon, General, II., passim 

chaps, v., vi. 
Gortchakoff, Prince, I., 195, 199, 

215, 225, 264, 269, 281; II., 5, 

7-9. 59 
Goschen, Lord, I., 290, 292; II., 

150 
Gough, General, II., 104 
Gramont, Due de, I., 37, 46, 49, 

54 
Grant Duff, Sir Mountstuart, 

II.. 7 

Granville, Earl, I., 53; II., 87, 

130-131, 156, 175, 177, 183, 

186-188, 239, 246, 258, 274 

Gravelotte, Battle of, I., 79-84 

Great Britain, I., 17, 34, 35, 60, 

III, 172, 174-176, 189-190, 

198—210, 216, 222—223, 225, 

274. 308, 317, 336; II., 7-ro, 

14, 24, 25, 32, S4-6o, 66-69, 

78-81, 90-92, 99, 104-107, 

119-120, 141, 234-235, 243, 

246-255, 258-263, 267, 274, 

3^^-3^3' 314-316, 322-329, 

331-334, 342-347 

Great Britain and Egypt, II., 

passim chaps, iv., v.,vii. 
Great Britain and Russia (1878), 

I., 264-272 
Greece, I., 6, 189, 190, 230, 270, 

284-286, 291-295, 306, 318 
Grenfell, Rev. G., II., 272 
Grevy, M., I., 149; II., 25, 47 
Grey, Sir Edward, II., 223 
Griffin, Sir Lepel, II., 105-107 
Gurko, General, I., 239-241, 
246, 260 

Habibulla, Ameer of Afghanis- 

stan, II., 136, 142 
Hague Congress, the (1899), II., 

317 
Hake, II., 176 
Hamburg, I., 157, 168 
Hanotaux, M., II., 223 
Hanover, I., 13, 25, 27 
Hapsburg, I., 26, 36 
Hartington, Lord, II., 119, 177, 

190 
Heligoland, II., 243 
Herat, II., 61, 62, 77, 85, 86, 

105, 128 
Hericourt, Battle of, I., 115 



440 



Index 



Herzegovina, I., 193-195, 202, 

283; II., 20 
Hesse-Cassel, I., 14, 25, 27 
Hesse-Darmstadt, I., 24 
Hicks Pasha, II., 173-174 
Hinde, Captain S. L., II., 281 
Hinterland, Question of the, II., 

273, 277 
Hohenzollern, House of, I., 13, 

45-48, 152 
Holland, I., 6; II., 283-284 
Holstein, I., 6, 29, 156 
Holy Alliance, the, I., 6; II., 3 
Holy Roman Empire, the, I., 

160 
Hornby, Admiral, I., 266 
Hoskier, M., II., 29 
Hudson, Sir James, I., 326 
Huhn, Major von, I., 313 
Hungary, I., 37, 41, 189, 313, 

329 
Hunter, General, II., 204 

Iddesleigh, Lord, II., 241 
Ignatieff, General, I., 207, 210, 

215, 274, 276; II., 19 
Imperialism in Great Britain, 

^•. 329-332 
India, I., 197, 251; II., 58, 62, 

323, 328. 342-347, 349-351 
"International Association of 

the Congo," II., 271, 273-278 
"Internationale," the, I., 348 
Isabella, Queen, I., 46 
Ismail, Khedive, II., 145-148, 

150 

Istria, II., 15 

"Italia irredenta," II., 15 

Italy, I., 4-13, 18-27, 32, 34. 39. 
43, 44, 64, 65, 72, 103-108, 
176, 272, 317, 339; II., 3, 23, 
41, 44, 202, 203, 267, 268, 297, 
321, 322 

Italy and the Triple Alliance, 
II., 13-18 

Jacob, General, II., 82 
Jacobabad, Treaty of, II., 8i 
Janssen, M., II., 280 
Japan, II., 38, 304-311, 314- 

319 
Jermak, II., 53, 300, 301 
Jesuits, the, I., 164 
Jews, persecution of the, I., 

362, 363 



Johnston, Sir Harry, II., 241, 
267 

Kamchatka, II., 302, 303 
Karaveloff, M., I., 304, 309, ^^^ 
Kars, I., 230, 273, 278 
Kasongo, II., 282 
Kassala, II., 204, 205, 209 
Katkoff, M., I., 309, 337; II., 9, 

19, 20, 21, 25 
Kaufmann, General, II., 60, 80, 

97 
Kaulbars, General, I., 304, 306- 

307. 337, 338 
Khalifa, passim II., chap. vi. 
Khama, II., 257 
Khartum, II., 144, 147, 154, 

passim chaps, v., vi. 
Khelat, Khan of, II., 81-82 
Khiva, II., 58, 69, 72, 350 
Khokand, II., 80 
Khudaganj, II., 93 
Khyber Pass, II., 83, 88, 92, 100, 

.113 
Kiao-chau, II., 313-315 
Kirk, Sir John, II., 240, 267 
Kitchen^, Lord, II., 149, 193, 

passim chap. vi. 
Komaroff, General, II., 131, 132 
Koniggratz, Battle of, I., 21-24 
Kordofan, II., 172, 174, 183, 190 
Korea, II., 299 
Korsakoff, General, I., 303 
Kossuth, I., 7 
Kriidener, General, I., 237, 244- 

246 
Kultur-Kampf, the, I., 163-168 
Kuropatkin, General, I., 369- 

370, 372; II., 125-127 
Kurram valley, the, II., 92-96, 

99 

Labouchere, Mr., II., 24 
Lado, II., 222, 287-288 
Lagos, II., 265 
Lamsdorff, Count, II., 308 
Lansdowne, Lord, II., 139, 297 
Lawrence, Lord J., II., 58,62-63, 

65, 82, 84 
Layard, Sir Henry, I., 262, 269, 

291, 292 
Leboeuf. Marshal, I., 54, 62, 74, 

75 
Lebrun, General, I., 39-41, 75 
Leflo, General, II., 7 



Index 



441 



Le Mans, Battle of, I., 114 
Leo XIII, II., 13, 18, 23 
Leopold II (King of the Bel- 
gians), II., 31, 229, 235, 269, 

277-280, 283-286, 287, 295 
Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern, 

I., 46, 48 
Lessar, M., II., 128 
Lesseps, M. de, II., 145, 149 
Levant, the, I., 197 
Lewis, General, II., 204 
Liaotung Peninsula, II., 309, 

3". 314-316 
Li Hung Chang,II., 310, 312, 315 
Lissa, Battle of. I., 20 
Livingston, D., II., 228-230, 

269-271, 297 
Livonia, I., 364 
Lobanofif, Prince, II., 308 
Local Government (French), I., 

140, 141 
Lomakin, General, II., 123 
Lombardy, I., 5-13, 36 
London, Conference of (1867), 

I., 18, 31; Congress of (18 71), 

III 
Lorraine, I., no, 122, 124, 157, 

158 
Lothaire, Commandant, II., 281 
Loubet, M., I., 150 
Louis Philippe, King, I.. 7 
Lovtcha, I., 249, 251 
Liibeck, I., 157, 168 
Liideritz, Herr, II., 246 
Lugard, Sir Frederick, II., 245, 

262, 268 
Lumsden, Sir Peter, II., 130 
Luxemburg, I., 30, 31, 37, 45 
Lyttelton, Colonel, II., 209 
Lytton, Lord, II., 78-85, 88-91, 

105—107, 119, 122 

Macdonald, General, II., 102, 

204, 209, 215-216 
Macedonia, I., 188, 273, 295, 

297. 342-343; II-. 89 
Mackenzie, Rev. John, II., 254- 

256, 268 
Mackinnon, Sir William, II., 

238, 267 
Maclaine, Lieutenant, II., 109, 

117 
MacMahon, Marshal, I., 68-70, 

85-93. 146, 147-150; II., 7» 
240-2 "^o 



Mahdi, the, I., 317; II., chaps. 

v., vi., passim 
Maiwand, Battle of , II., 107-11- 
Malet, Sir Edward, II., 275 
Malmesbury, Lord, I., 54 
Manchuria, II., 34-37, 276, 299, 

311. 3^2,^ 318 
Mancini, Signer, II., 47 
Manin, I., 8 
Manstem, I., 82 
Marchand, Colonel, II., 221-227, 

266 
Marie-aux-Chenes, Battle of, I., 

83 
Marseilles, I., 121 
Mars-la-Tour, Battle of, I., 77-82 
Maxwell, General, II., 204, 209, 

216 
"May Laws," the, I., 164-167; 

11,3 
Mayo, Lord, II., 67-68 
Mazzini, I., 7, 8, 106, 107, 360; 

II.. 13 
Mecklenburg, I., 20, 168 
Mehemet Ali Pasha, I., 190, 

242, 247, 255-256 
Melikoff, General Loris, I., 230, 

352-355 
Meline, M., II., 223 
Mentana, Battle of, I., 31, 105 
Mercantile system, the, I., 178 
Merv, II., 35, 69, 84, 86, 128, 

129, 136, 239 
Metternich, Prince, I., 8, 42 
Metz, I., 64, 72-84, 114, 122 
Meuse, river, I., 77 
Mexico, I., 23, 29, 35 
Midhat Pasha, I., 212-213, 221 
Milan, King, I., 198, 313, 320- 

325 
Milner, Lord, II., 147, 157 
Milutin, General, I., 242, 255 
Mis, the, I., 350, 365 
Mohammedan Ali, II., 144-146 
Mohammed, religion, I., 188 
Moldavia, I., 193 
Moltke, Count von, I., 21, 50, 

75, 76, 90, 99, 122, 154, 229, 

243; II-. 5 
Mombasa, II., 242, 246 
Mongolians, I., 187 
Montenegro, I., 188, 194, 198, 

204-206, 214, 230, 242, 267, 

272, 276, 283, 288, 292-294, 

313 



442 



Index 



Morier, Sir Robert, I., 222, 326, 

341, 357 ; II., 132 
Morley, Mr. John, II., 132 
Moselle, river, I., 76 
Moslem Creed and Christians, 

I., 184-187, 220-222 
Mukhtar Pasha, I., 246 
Miinster, Count, II., 246 
Murad V, I., 201 
Muravieff, Count, II., 303-306, 

308 

Nabokoff, Captain, I., 231 
Nachtigall, Dr., II., 258-259 
Napoleon I, I., 2-5, 14, 15, 18- 
20, 27, 28, 103, 116, 190; II., 
10, 144, 263 
Napoleon III, I., 7, 8, 10-13, ^9' 
20, 22, 23, 28-38, 42-46, 53- 
57. 59. 72-75. 86-90, 97-100, 
102-103, 116, 119, 124, 145, 
163, 168, 191; II., 264, 
Napoleon, Prince Jerome, I., 23, 

44 
Natal, II., 251, 253, 254, 259 
National African Company, the, 

II., 260 
National Assembly, the French, 

I., 115-127, 135-149 
^Nationality, I., 2-15, 27, 28, 

29-32, 41. 103; II., 320, 323, 

333 
Nelidoff, Count, I., 316, 327, 

330 
Nelson, II., 144, 149 
Nesselrode, Count, II., 57 
Nice, I., 10, 34, 44 
Nicholas I, I., 190, 344, 348, 

359, 364; II., 57 
Nicholas II, I., 344, 368-372; 

.II-. 36, 39. 307. 314, 318 
Nicholas, Grand Duke, I., 227- 

228, 237-239, 244, 249, 255, 

265, 272, 347, 348 
Nicholas Prince of Montenegro, 

.1-. 313 
Nicopolis, I., 232, 236-238, 244, 

257 
Niger. R., II., 258-266, 275 
Nigeria, II., 259-263 
Nihilism, I., 131, 278, 316-31^, 

.347-355. 356-360; II., 13 
Nikolsburg, I., 22 
Northbrook, Lord, II., 68-69, 

70. 75. 77. 177 



Northcote, Sir Stafford, I., 200, 

267, 289 
North German Confederation, 

I., 26, 40, 59, 60, 160 
Norway, I., 4, 5-6 
Novi-Bazar, II., 19 
Nuttall, General, II., 112 

Obock, II., 224, 266 
Obretchoff, General, II., 9, 12 
O'Donovan, Mr., II., 128, 173 
Ollivier, M., I., 32, ^^, 39, 46, 47, 

53. 55. 64. 74 
Olmiitz, Convention of, I., 14. 21 
Omdurman, Battle of, II., 149, 

210—220 
Orleans, I., 114 
Osman Digna, II., 183, 203 
Osman Pasha, I., 232, 237, 243, 

253-260 

Palafox, I., 315 
Palermo, I., 11 
Palikao, Count, I., 74, 86, 89, 92, 

lOI 

Palmerston, Lord, I., 34; II., 

145. 149 
Panjdeh, II., 35, 1-31-134, 137, 

327 
Papal States, the, I., 10, 12 
Paris, I., loi, 102, no, 113, 114, 

123, 124-132, 142 
Paris Commune, the (1871), I., 

124-133. 138, 373 
Paris, Comte de, I., 139, 144 
Paris, Treaty of (1856), I., 192, 

210 
Peiwar Kotal, Battle at, II., 94 
Pemba, II., 242 

Persia, II., 61, 62, 69, 73, 76, 324 
Peshawur, II., 92 
Peters,' Dr. Karl, II., 239-242, 

243 
Phayre, General, II., 118 
Philippopolis, I., 260, 309, 314- 

315. 321, 323. 335 
Picard, M., I., 121 
Piedmont, I., 9 
Pishin, II., 100 
Pius IX, I., 7, 8, 43, 103-106, 

145. 163-164, 167; II., 13, 

321 
Plevna, Battles at, I., 244-260 
Pobyedonosteff, I., 354, 355 



Index 



443 



Poland, I., 5, 6, 29, 30, 35, 357; 

n., 35 
Pondoland, II., 253 
Port Arthur, II., 36, 313-319 
Porte, the. See Turkey 
Portugal, II., 242, 248, 249, 266, 

267, 273—276 
Posen, I., 167 

Primrose, General, II., 108, 113 
Prudhon, I., 347-351 
Prussia (1815-66), I., 4-27, 29, 

59-64, no, 153, 165, 166. See 

Germany 

Quadrilateral, the Turkish, I., 

229-233, 235-237 
Quetta, II., 77, 82, 96, 113, 118, 

137 

Rabinek, Herr, II., 295 
Radetzky, General, I., 248, 260, 

261 
Radowitz, Herr von, II., 6 
Radziwill, Princess, I., 281-282, 

347 
Rauf Pasha, II., 1 71-173 
Rawlinson, Sir Henry, II., 76 
Reddiffe, Lord Stratford de, I., 

224 
Reichshofen, I., 70 
Reichstag, the German, I., 157- 

158, 165, 166, 171-173 
Revolutions of 1848, I., 7-8, 12- 

14 
Rezonville, Battle of, I., 76-80 
Rhodes, Mr. Cecil, II., 254-257, 

268 
Rhodesia, II., 257 
Riaz Pasha, II., 153 
Ribot, M., II., 36 
Ripon, Lord, II., 107, 114, 119 
Roberts, Lord, II., 75, 87, 91, 

93-97. 101-105. 141 
Rome, I., 8, 12, 43, 103—107, 

III, 164 
Roon, Count von, I., 21, 50 
Rosebery, Earl of, I., 328, 329; 

II., 222, 241, 252 
Roumania, I., 29, 187, 188, 193, 

228-229, 262, 267, 272, 274, 

283-286, 306, 310—312, 321; 

^ II-' 325 ^ 
Roumania, King of, I., 48 
Roumelia, I., 264 



Royal Niger Company, the, II., 

262, 267 
Rubber Tax in Congo State, II., 

295-298 
Russell, Lord John, I., 17, 18 
Russell, Lord Odo, II., 7 
Russia, I., 6, 10, 14, 15, 29, 35, 
36, III, 132, 172, 176, 190, 
194-199, 205, 217, 225-228, 
275, 278, 284, 344, 345; II., 
2, 8, 14, 18-23, 25, 30-35, 37- 
40, 65, 155, 156-157, 168, 169, 
185, 202, 251; and Bulgaria, I., 
302-343; and Finland, 363-372; 
and the Jews, 360-361 ; and 
Turkey, 264-270, 272-288; in 
Central Asia, II., 51-59; 65- 
69, 70-76, 79, 84-89, 103, 122- 
136; in the Far East, chap. ix. 
passim. 
Russophil, Rising of, I., 339 
Rustchuk, I., 231, 246, 315, 334- 
336, 339; II., 22 

Saarbrucken, Battle of I,, 70, 

71 ■ 

Said, Khedive, II., 145 

St. Hilaire, Barthelemy de, II., 

IS 
St. Lucia Bay, II., 241, 248, 

251. 252, 259 
St. Privit, Battle of. See Grave- 

lotte 
St. Quentin, Battle of, I., 114 
Salisbury, Marquis of, I., 208- 

210, 223, 276-279, 286, 289, 

316-321, 326, 328, 337, 343; 

II., 14, 24, 76-78, 79, 84, 133, 

225, 241, 245, 266, 282, 315, 

326 
Salonica, I., 199, 214, 276 
Samarcand, II., 59-60, 65, 85, 

343 
Samory, II., 265 1 

San Stefano, Treaty of, I., 273- 

278, 283, 301 
Sandeman, Sir Robert, II., 81- 

82 
Sardinia, Kingdom of, I., 9-13 
Saverne, I., 70 

Saxony, I., 5, 6, 13, 21, 157-161 
Schleswig-Holstein, I., 6, 14-18, 

24 
Schnasbele, M., II., 22, 27 
Sedan, Battle of, I., 103 



444 



Index 



Segu-Sikoro, II., 265 
Seistan frontier, II., 81 
Septennate, V (in France), I., 

157 
Serpa Pinto, II., 266 
Servia, I., 186-188, 193, 198, 

204-206, 213, 230, 267, 272, 

276, 283, 288, 306, 307, 318 
Seymour, Admiral, II., 158-160 
Shan-tung, Province of, II., 314 
Shere Ali, II., 63-69, 70-72, 75- 

76, 81, 83-86, 88-91, 96-99, 

343 
Sherpur, engagements at (1878), 

II., 104 
Shevket Pasha, I., 257-258 
Shipka Pass, I., 233, 238-241, 

248, 260 
Shumla, I., 229, 247 
Shutargardan Pass, II., 10 1 
Shuvaloff, Count, I., 277, 279 
Siberia, II., 53, 59, 301-304, 306 
Sibi, II., 96, 100 
Sidars, II., 82 
Simnitza, I., 233, 236 
Simon, Jules, I., 121 
Sistova, I., 232, 233, 236, 246 
Skiernewice, I., 308, 317, 339, 

357; II., 19-22, 130, 236-240 
Skobelefif, General, 1., 235-237, 

241, 249, 250-255, 260, 308; 

II., 17, 85-87, 124-128, 136, 

341-347. 349-351 
Slave trade, the, II., 287, 291 
Slavophils, the, I., 367-370; II., 

98 
Slivnitza, Battle of, I., 322-323 
Soboleff, General, I., 304, 307- 

308 
Solferino, Battle of, I., 10 
Somaliland, II., 266 
Sophia, I., 249, 260, 323, 325, 

331-333 
South Africa Company, British, 

II., 257 
South German Confederation, 

I., 25, 26, 40 
South - West Africa (German) , 

II., 246-251, 255-257 
Spain, I., 47-50 
Spicheren, Battle of, I., 71, 72 
Stambulofif, I., 307, 309, 314, 

333> 337-341! II-, 22 
Stanley, Sir H. M., II., 177, 229, 
269-271, 280, 281 



State Socialism (in Germany), 

I., 1 7 7- 18 1 
Steinmetz, General, I., 82 
Stephenson, General, II., 188 
Stepniak, I., 349, 358 
Stewart, Colonel, II., 179 
Stewart, Sir Donald, II., 96, 106 
Stewart, Sir Herbert, II., 194 
Stoffel, Colonel, I., 61 
Stokes, Mr., Execution of, II., 

29s 
Stohetoff, General, II., 85-88, 97 
Stundists, the, I., 361-364 
Suakim, II., 174, 186, 191, 203, 

205, 240 
Sudan, the, II., chaps., v., vi., 

326 passim 
Suez Canal, the, I., 197, 225, 

268; II., 145, 147, 168, 234 
Suleiman Pasha, I., 242, 246- 

248, 255, 260, 262 
Swat Valley, the, II. 139 
Sweden, I., 5, 6 
Switzerland, I., 115, 176 
Syria, I., 192 

Tamai, Battle of, II., 183 
Tashkend, II., 58, 88, 138 
Tchernayeff, General, I., 206 
Tel-el-Kebir, Battle of, II., 165- 

166 
Tewfik, Khedive, II., 150-156, 

160-163, 169, 172, 178-180, 

204, 223, 227 
Thessaly, I., 284-287, 295-297 
Thiers, M., I., 29, 30, 54, 102, 

III, 116— 124, 127, 133-141, 

chaps, iv., v., passim 
Thomson, Joseph, II., 230, 261, 

267 
Thornton, Sir Edward, II., 131 
Three Emperors' League, the, 

I., 213, 219; II., 3-9, 12, 19- 

21, 157, 236 
Tilsit, Treaty of, I., 364 
Timbuctu, II., 265 
TipuTib, II., 281 
Tirard, M., II., 30 
Tirnova, I., 338 
Tisza, M., I., 214, 337 
Todleben, I., 256-258 
Transcaspian Railway, the, II., 

350 
Trans-Siberian Railway, the, 
II., 306-309, 313, 316-317 



Index 



445 



Transvaal, the, II., 248, 251 

Trieste, II., 23 

Triple Alliance, the, I., 25; II., 
13-21, 23-27, 163, 236 

Trochu, General, I., 118 

Tunis, II., 14-17, 24, 143, 158, 
234-236 

Turgenieff, I., 349, 351 

Turkestan, II., 53, 57, 59-61, 
122-136 

Turkey, I., 6, 184, 198-210, 
213-214, 222-223, 225-262, 
272-288; II., 19, 31, 38, 144- 
146, 155, 222, 297, 322, 325, 
337-340; condition of, in 
1875. 337-340 

Uganda, II., 221, 245-246 
Umballa, Conference at, II., 66- 

67 
Umberto I, King of Italy, II., 

13. 15-18, 20, 23, 24 
United African Company, II., 

265 
United Kingdom. See Great 

Britain 
United Netherlands, Kingdom 

of, I., 6 
United States, the, I., 34-36, 

II., 274, 297, 311, 315 

Vandervelde, M., II., 286 
Venetia, I., 6-13, 20, 22, 24 
Verdun, I., 74, 79 
Versailles, I., 121, 124, 127, 128, 

153 
Victor Emmanuel II, King of 

Italy, I., 2-13, 43, 73, 105; 

II., 14 
Victoria, Crown Princess of 

Germany, II., 8 
Victoria, Queen, I., 17, 172, 196, 

204, 266-267, 311; ll., 7; 

proclaimed Empress of India, 

78 
Vienna, Treaty of (18 15), I., 

4-6 
Vionville, Battle of, I., 76-83 
Vitzthun, Count, I., 42 
Vladivostok, II., 304, 307, 313 



Waddington, M., I., 286, 291, 

292; II., 14 
Wady Haifa, II., 147, 190, 191, 

199, 200, 203, 207, 221 
Waldemar, Prince, I., 338 
Walfisch Bay, II., 247 
Wallachia, I., 189-192 
Warren, Sir Charles, II., 256 
Warsaw, I., 235 
Wei-hai-wei, II., 316 
West Africa, II., 258-266 
White, Major G., II., 102 
White, Sir William, I., 210, 222, 

316, 319-321, 326-327, 343, 

358 
Widdin, I., 230, 232, 237, 244, 

322 
William I (King of Prussia, 

German Emperor), I., 13-26, 

35. 36, 48-54. 84, 121, 153- 

154, 163, 180, 281; II., 6-8, 

10, 22, 28, 230 
William II (King of Prussia, 

German Emperor), I., 178- 

181; II., 28-29, 31, 245, 314, 

316 
Wilson, Sir Charles, II., 195 
Wimpffen, General de, I., 92- 

100 
Winton, Sir Francis de, II., 280 
Wissmann, Lieutenant von, II., 

2 7 2 

Wolf, Dr., II., 272 

Wolff, Sir H. Drummond, II., 

201 
Wolseley, Lord, II., 164-167, 

178, 189, 190, 193, 196, 227 
Worth, Battle of, I., 68-71 
Wtirtemberg, I., 25, 155, 156- 

159. 163 

Yakub Khan, II., 75, 99-103 

Zankoff, M., I., 333 
Zanzibar, II., 237-244, 257, 281 
Zazulich, Vera, I., 347 
Zebehr Pasha, II., 182-187 
Zemstvo, the, I., 349. 353. 35^ 
Zollverein in Germany, I., 169 
Zulfika Pass, the, II., 133 



SUPPLEMENTARY INDEX COVERING NEW 
CHAPTERS, X., XL, AND XII., IN VOLUAIE 11. 



Abdul Hamid II. assisted by. 
Germany, II., 327 flF. 

Africa, partition of, II., 321 

Algeciras, Conference of, II., 345 
ff. 

Austria, in control of Balkans, II., 
328; supports Germany in Mo- 
rocco Aflair, II., 346; Balkan 
policies and actions of, II., 351 
fif . : mistake of, concerning Rus- 
sian attitude toward Serbia, 
II., 384 

Balkans, the, Austrian policies 
and actions in, II., 351 flf.; 
effect of Turko-Italian War on, 
II..37off. 

Bernhardi, von, policies of, II., 

367 

Boer War, causes of, II., 322; re- 
sults of, II., 322 S. 

Bosnia, annexation of, II., 351 ff. 

Boxer Uprising, II., 323 

Bulow, Prince von. Imperial Ger- 
many, quoted, II., 324 

China, Boxer Uprising, II., 323 
Chirol, Sir V., cited, II., 323 
Contemporary Review, quoted, II., 

326 
Czar, the, personality of, II., 326 

Delcass^, attitude of, toward 

Germany, II., 323 
Dual Alliance, tension between, 

and England, II., 325; II., 348 

Edward VII., effect of death of, 
II.,358ff. 



Far East, Russia concentrating in, 
11., 326 

France, internal difficulties, II., 
327; loss of influence of, in Tur- 
key, II., 328 ; the Dreyfuss affair, 
II-» 337 &•; conditions in 1895- 
1906, II., 337 ff.; relations of, 
with Great Britain, II., 339 ff.; 
convention of, with Spain, II., 
344; military preparedness in, 
II.,377flf. 

Franco-German War, II., 320 

German Naval League, II., 325 
German Sea Power, cited, II., 324 

note 
Germany, World-policy of, II., 
322 ; actions of , in Boer War, II., 
322 ff.; acquires control of Sa- 
moa, II., 323 ; hatred of England, 
II., 324 ff., 330; naval policy 
of, II., 325, 330, 331; anxiety 
in, over Kaiser's megalomania, 
II., 326; success of, in the Near 
East, II., 327 fif,; attitude of, 
towards other nations, II., 
330; proposes Anglo-German- 
Japanese Alliance, II., 333; 
attitude of, in Far East, 
II., 332 ff.; proposition of, to 
Great Britain, II., 333; re- 
sponsibility of, for Russo-Jap- 
anese War, II., 336 ff. ; attitude 
of, toward Anglo-French En- 
tente, II., 341 ff.; result of 
naval policy of, II., 342; in the 
Morocco Affair, II., 343; cause 
for complaint in Franco-Span- 
ish Convention, II., 344; rejects 
English proposal of limitation 
of armament, II., 347 ; beginning 



446 



Supplementary Index 



447 



Germany — Continued 

of acute friction with Great 
Britain, II., 348 ff.; attitude of , 
toward Balkan problem, II., 
351 ff.; political conditions in, 
191 1-, II., 362 ff.; effect of 
Italian-Turkish War 0.1, II., 
365 ff.; military and naval 
preparedness in, II., 376 ff. ; 
see also Kaiser 

Great Britain, in the Boer War, 
II., 322 ff.; secret arrangement 
of, with Germany, II., 323; at- 
tude of, toward Dual and Triple 
Alliances, II., 325 ff. ; tension 
between, and Dual Alliance, II., 
325; gravitating toward Triple 
Alliance, II., 325; unprepared- 
ness of, II., 327 ; loss of influence 
of, in Turkey, II., 328; foreign 
policies of, II., 331 ; attitude of, 
toward Germany, II., 331 ff. ; 
allianceof, with Japan, II., 334; 
declines Germany's proposals, 
II-. 334; relations of, with 
France, II., 339 ; naval power of, 
II., 342 ; beginning of acute fric- 
tion with Germany, II., 348 ff.; 
active efforts of, to improve rela- 
tions with Germany, II., 369 
ff. ; naval preparedness in, II., 
376 ff. 

Hohenlohe, Prince, II., 325 
Holt, G. E., Morocco the Piquant, 

quoted, II., 327 note 
Holy War, The, cited, II., 327 
Hurd and Castle, German Sea 

Power, cited, II., 324 note 
Hurgronje, The Holy War: Made 

in Germany, cited, II., 327 

Imperial Germany, cited, II., 324 

note 
Italy, attitude of, toward France, 
11-. 338; attitude toward Aus- 
trian-Balkan acts, II., 355; war 
with Turkey, II., 365 

Jameson, Dr., defeat of, II., 322 
Japan, browbeaten 'by Germany, 
il., 322 ; alliance proposed with, 
Il-t 333; alliance of, with Great 



Britain, II., 334; attitude of, in 
Far Eastern troubles, II., 334 
ff.; war with Russia, II., 335 ff. 

Kaiser, actions of ,in the Boer War, 
II., 322 ff. ; "Kruger telegram," 
II. , 322; Hamburg speech of, 
II., 325; attitude of, toward 
Great Britain, II. , 326; am- 
bitions of, II., 326, 327 ; person- 
ality and characteristics of, II., 

326 ff.; speech of, at Saladin's 
tomb, II., 327; "turn-coat" 
actions in the Near East, II., 
327; friendship of, with the 
Sultan, II., 327 ; result of actions 
of, in Near East, II. , 329; 
"Hun" speech of, cited, II., 
332 ; see Germany 

Kaiser und Reich, cited, II., 324 
note 

Kiel Canal, opening of, and effect 
of, II., 322 

Kruger, Oom Paul, encouraged by 
Germany, II., 322; visits Euro- 
pean capitals, II., 323 

Lewin, E., T^e Germans and Africa, 
cited, II., 322 note 

Morocco Affair, the, II., 343 ff. 
Morocco the Piquant, quoted, II., 

327 note 

Netherlands, armament in, II., 
321 

Pacifist movement, causes of 
collapse of, II., 320 ff. 

Rachfahl, Kaiser und Reich, cited, 
II., 324 note 

Reventlow, Count, Deutschlands 
auswdrtige Politik, II., 322 note ; 
quoted, II., 322 

Rose, J. H., The Origins of the 
War, IL, 322 note 

Russia, attitude of, during Boer 
War, II., 323 ff. ; attitude of, in 
Boer War, II., 324 ; Balkan poli- 
cies of, II., 326; concentrating 
in Far East, II., 326, 327, 328, 
332 ; military collapse of, II., 328 ; 
a warning to, II., 335 ; war with 



448 



Supplementary Index 



Russia — Continued 

Japan, II., 335 flf.; military 
preparedness in, II., 378 

Russo-Japanese War, II., 335 flf. 

Russo-Turkish War, II., 320 

Samoa acquired by Germany, II., 

323 

Spain, Convention of, with France 

II-, 344 

Sultan, The, see Abdul Hamid II. 

Tirpitz, Admiral von, introduces 
naval bill, II., 325 



Triple Alliance, Great Britain 
gravitating toward, II., 325; 
adopts new attitude, II., 337; 
reasons for, II., 348 ; strength of, 
compared to that of Triple 
Entente, II., 379 flf. 

Triple Entente, reasons for, II., 
331; II., 348; strength of, com- 
pared to that of Triple Alliance, 

II., 379ff. 
Turkey, German control of, II., 
328; in the Balkans, II., 351 flf.; 
events in, 1909-10, II., 358; 
war with Italy, II., 365 



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The Lowell Lectures, 1912 

THE PERSONALITY 

of 

NAPOLEON 

By J. HOLLAND ROSE 

Reader in Modern History to the University 
of Cambridge, Author o£ " The Develop- 
ment of the European Nations," "The 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic 

Era." etc. 

1^ 

This volume by a scholar of authority includes a series 
of studies of the most important sides of Napoleon's char- 
acter — (i) Man (including the salient features of his 
character); (2) Jacobin; (3) Warrior; (4) Lawgiver; (5) 
Emperor; (6) Thinker; (7) World Ruler; (8) Exile. 

This method of treatment, supported by numerous ex- 
tracts from Napoleon's letters, etc., will offer new points of 
view in an oft-treated theme. 

Though Dr. Rose's pages are seasoned with anecdote, 
they do not contain an irrelevant incident, and the result 
is a well-constructed, lifelike composite picture of Napo- 
leon as man, warrior, emperor, and ruler of the world. 

" At once an excellent summary of recent research, and 
the most convenient introduction to the study of the great- 
est of historic men." — Nation (London) 

" As an analysis of character and as an original portrait 
the study is worthy of the highest consideration." — Chicago 
Tribune 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

New York London 



PROBLEMS OF PEACE 
IN EUROPE 

From the Holy Alliance to The League of Nations j^ 

By 
GUQLIELMO FERRERO 

The author recalls that he has "had the good 
fortune to mature his mind in America for the 
understanding of these historical events" ; he re- 
cites the stirring history which has now reached 
its climax, from the French Revolution to the 
immeasurable maelstrom of the recent crisis. 
Chapter headings: "To the American People," 
"The French Revolution and the Austrian Em- 
pire," "The League and the Peace of the 
Dynasties, 1815-1848," "The Revolution of 
1848," "The Great Surprise," "The Germanic 
Triumph (1848-1870)," "The German Peace," 
"From the Holy Alliance to the League of 
Nations." 



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